The Setting
In mid-August, 1449, news of horrible military defeat to the north reached Beijing. Soon, thousands of desperate men and some women began streaming through the capital’s towering gates. They told gruesome tales of the battlefields surrounding Tumu Fort and the wider Xuanfu region, where the dead and dying extended as far as the eye could see. Mongol cavalry troops had killed or wounded more than one half-million Ming troops and were now thundering towards Beijing, insisted the survivors. Early in September, wild rumors swirled through the city’s streets: the Son of Heaven was missing! He was dead! He had been taken captive by the Mongols! When Mongol riders approached Beijing’s massive walls, the Empress Dowager Sun (1399–1462) and senior ministers refused to negotiate for the return of the captured Zhengtong emperor (r. 1435–49, 1457–64) and instead enthroned his half-brother as the new Jingtai emperor (1449–57). In the following days, weeks, and months, men like the new Minister of War, Yu Qian 于謙 (1398–1457), and senior commander Shi Heng 石亨 (d. 1460) worked with the new emperor and the Empress Dowager to guide a shaken dynasty.Footnote 1
Among the most pressing of all issues was the dynasty’s military. Much energy went to shoring up Beijing’s defenses against marauders, reorganizing border defenses, rewarding and punishing officers and soldiers, and recruiting new sources of military labor.Footnote 2 Each of those steps involved the evaluation and cultivation of military ability. Those efforts were also inseparably tied to high court politics and retail patronage.
A snapshot of a crucial moment rather than a study of change over time, this article begins with a short discussion of some of the Ming dynasty’s institutional arrangements regarding performance evaluations. Then, drawing on the perspectives of two men, Yu Qian, and a junior official, Ye Sheng 葉盛 (1420–72), I briefly examine in turn civil officials’ language of excellence, the stakes of command appointments, the place of junior officers, and why officials felt that preserving the evaluation process was so important.Footnote 3 The article then turns to a quick look at one example of the interplay of regional diversity and command ability. Shifting perspective, the essay considers how military commanders like Shi Heng likely understood career success and the abilities it required. The article concludes with a perhaps superfluous reminder that positionality shapes perceptions of ability and authority. The sitting emperor, the captured emperor, senior court ministers, leading military commanders, field officers, soldiers—not to mention their family members and the rest of society—thought about military ability and authority differently, because their interests varied widely—in fact they often clashed sharply. Relatedly, assessments of ability and authority often crystalize in charged moments of crisis and conflict, when people find the status quo unacceptable and demand the restoration of past practices (real or imagined) or the creation of new ways (whether or not acknowledged as new).
Performance Evaluations
Before examining Yu Qian and Ye Sheng’s views of military ability and authority in the wake of the Tumu Crisis, a few words regarding the Ming dynasty’s performance evaluations are in order. Civil officials, who numbered between 10,000 and 24,000, were subject to regular performance evaluations conducted variously on monthly, annual, triennial, and sexennial bases, which were used to determine promotions, demotions, dismissals, and new appointments. Those regularly scheduled evaluations—in addition to unscheduled evaluations—incorporated assessments by local agency heads, local prefects, provincial authorities, the Ministry of Personnel, and the Censorate.Footnote 4 Military officers too underwent triennial and quinquennial performance evaluations that assessed their basic competence in archery and horsemanship, quality of service, and moral probity. Specifics varied over time and according to circumstances, but the performance evaluations were intended to identify men who were “knowledgeable and experienced” (識才老成), diligent in fulfilling their responsibilities, and intelligent, and who understood a modicum of military strategy. Just as important was the desire to remove the old and infirm, incompetent, corrupt, or cowardly. By the late fifteenth century, the Ministries of War and Personnel, censors serving in the Offices of Scrutiny, as well as senior commanders in the Capital Divisions all convened to decide about recommendations for new appointments.Footnote 5
Those deliberative recommendations assessed substantial numbers of military officers. In 1488, for instance, 484 officers from the Capital Garrisons were ranked into three categories (121 first grade, 295 second grade, and 68 third grade), and in 1493, it was suggested that 343 men (70% of the total) retain their current post, 68 (14%) be dismissed, and 77 (16%) be appointed to vacancies.Footnote 6 The assessment and recommendation system devoted to the performance and appointment of civil officials overshadowed its military counterpart.Footnote 7 Civilian posts were more prestigious, the political stakes higher, and the factional and personal tensions more acute. However, the regular evaluations and recommendations of military personnel likewise bound merit nobles (men whose forefathers had won investiture from the dynasty for exemplary service and who staffed the upper ranks of the military administration) and officers to networks of personal relations and ties of patronage in the capital. The system guaranteed that senior commanders had a strong say in subordinates’ careers and that merit nobles and military officers needed to cultivate ties with a wide variety of office-holders in Beijing. Merit nobles, military officers, and civil officials all considered regular evaluation an inescapable part of one’s career and were fully alive to the fact that their service was subject to official review and that dossiers containing written assessments and held in imperial archives and administrative offices inexorably increased every year for as long as they held a post in the dynastic government. The challenge was how best to leverage their position in the dynastic order to pursue personal and professional advantage.
Civil Officials’ Language of Excellence
Now, using a sampling from Ye Sheng’s memorials submitted between 1461 and 1467 during his tenure as governor of the northern border region of Xuanfu, let’s look at the terms he used to describe the attributes and abilities he and his colleagues sought in military commanders. What was his language of excellence?
1. I have ascertained through investigation that without regard to whether they are commanders, chiliarchs, centurions, or judges, there are those with both literary and military talent, whose stratagems and intelligence are outstanding, or those deeply knowledgeable about the use of troops and martial arts, highly conversant with military affairs, adept in martial arts, of superior knowledge and experience, of outstanding talent and appearance, who are worthy of appointment. They are to be recommended to the throne for office on a fair and accurate basis.
訪得:不拘指揮、千百戶、鎮撫等官中間, 果有才兼文武, 謀用出眾, 或諳曉兵法, 武藝熟閑, 練達戎務, 識見優長, 才貌出眾, 堪為舉用者, 即便從公具實奏保。Footnote 8
2. I have seen that Assistant Regional Commander of the Right of Fort Dushi, Huang Xuan, is strict and fair in disciplining his subordinates. He is just and industrious in carrying out his duties. Assistant Regional Commander of the Right of the Right Wanquan Garrison of the West Route, Li Gang, is strong in spirit and of limb as well as courageous. He is battle-tested, and further he is familiar with local conditions. Both possess the ability of a commander and are worthy of major appointments.
看得:口外獨石等城右參將黃瑄馭下嚴明, 公勤不忝, 西路萬全右衛等城右參將李剛精力驍勇, 累經戰陣, 且各熟知地利, 俱有將才, 堪以重用。Footnote 9
3. I have seen that Commanders-in-Chiefs of Xuanfu and other such places like Huang Xuan and Li Gang, like Xu Ning and like Commandant of Maying, Jiang Liang, or like Vice Regional Commander Zhang Shun are all familiar with local conditions, courageous and demonstrate initiative. They are worthy of appointment.
看得:宣府都指揮等官如黃瑄、李剛, 如許寧, 如馬營守備蔣良, 又如協同鎮守指揮張順俱熟知地利, 驍勇有為, 並堪任用。Footnote 10
4. I met with the Regional Commander and after deliberation ascertained that Regional Commander Li Gang was previously Assistant Regional Commander of the Right of the Right Garrison of Wanquan and now by imperial command is defending the Right Garrison of Dushi and environs. That is also a critically important region, and it is not acceptable to leave the post of Assistant Regional Commander vacant. Your minister has seen that Jiang Liang, Commandant of Maying, has always possessed stratagems and courage. He has served on the border for many years and is experienced and mature.
會同鎮守總兵官議得:都指揮使李剛, 原係萬全右衛等處鎮守右參將, 今既奉勅鎮獨石右衛一帶亦係緊要地方, 參將不可缺人, 今臣等會看得:馬營守備指揮僉事蔣良素有謀勇, 在邊年久, 練達老成。Footnote 11
5. I met with the Regional Commander and saw that Zhang Shun, who concurrently oversees the Left Wanquan Garrison and, by imperial order, acts as Regional Commander of the West Route, rose up through the military ranks and is of vigorous spirit and limb. He has repeatedly rendered meritorious service on the border and been promoted to the aforementioned posts. In terms of courage and resourcefulness, he is superlative. We first petitioned that he was to serve in the present post of head of Left Wanquan Garrison, and in one year, he has repaired all its decrepit fortified walls and towers. He has gained the confidence of his subordinates. I have further ascertained that the pickets of Wanquan Left Garrison are close to the core region. Chu Zhen, Assistant Regional Commander is a mature officer and is capable of being entrusted with responsibilities.
會同鎮守總兵官看得:兼管萬全左衛守備, 奉勅協同西路鎮守張順出自行伍, 年力精壯, 累建邊功, 歷陞前職, 膽略驍勇, 綽有可稱。先次奏令今守萬全左衛, 一年之間, 城池樓櫓, 百廢具興, 與下人信服, 再照萬全左衛哨近腹裡, 都指揮僉事楚禎原係老成官員, 並堪委寄。Footnote 12
6. Through meetings, I have now seen that Guo Xuan, Commandant of Baoan is physically strong and courageous. His mounted archery surpasses that of others, and his intelligence and wisdom are above average. He is battle-tested and has long been renowned for his meritorious service. Baoan is fairly close to the core region, and in a crisis, it will not be possible to make an appointment. Your minister believes that talent is most important in employing people, which will be advantageous to border defenses.
今會同看得:守備保安郭瑄膂力驍勇, 騎射過人, 頗有智謀, 常流罕及, 累經征戰, 久著勳功而保安稍近腹裏, 有警不得設施, 臣等切惟用人貴當其料, 庶于邊備有益。Footnote 13
7. I have ascertained through deliberation that at present the situation with the caitiffs is uncertain, and using the right men is urgent. I and others have recommended Commander Guo Xuan to the throne. He is physically strong and courageous. He is proficient in archery and riding. He is battle-tested and long renowned for his service and accomplishments. His abilities are worthy of promotion and appointment. My proposal has not received approval.
會議得:今虜情不測, 用人為急, 指揮郭瑄曾經臣等奏保本官, 膂力驍勇, 弓馬慣熟, 累經征戰, 久著勞績, 材堪陞用, 未蒙准理。Footnote 14
Ye Sheng draws on standardized terms to flag desirable traits and abilities, including experience (in war, on the border, and in administration), physical, emotional, and intellectual attributes (age, strength, courage, and intelligence), documented past success (in battle, in local defenses, in administrative capacities, in securing promotions, and in winning subordinates’ trust), and specialized knowledge (local conditions, strategy, martial arts, archery, and riding) in the context of identifying individuals for promotion to posts of greater responsibility. Each recommendation for a new appointment (or for rewards) expanded and deepened the wide-ranging patronage networks that transcended divides between civil and military personnel or those serving in the provinces versus those in the capital.
The Stakes of Command
This section first examines Minister of War Yu Qian’s observations about the significance of competent (and incompetent) commanders and then looks as Yu Qian and Ye Sheng’s evaluations of individual officers. In the first two examples, both drawn from 1450 in the immediate wake of the Tumu Crisis, Yu Qian described why appointing qualified commanders mattered. In the first instance, Yu Qian depicts the transformative role of a good commander and then limns the deleterious consequences of a poor commander. In the second example, Yu Qian depicts the commander as the hinge or linchpin upon which soldiers’ willingness to fight in war, their cohesion, and ultimately dynastic security depends. In both cases, he attends particularly to troop morale or what we might term unit cohesion.
1. If the martial disciplines are not highly proficient, morale will suffer. It is essential that [the commander] personally takes the lead in bolstering morale through field reviews. When he instructs his subordinates with cardinal principles of righteousness and orders them with military commands, they will be moved and naturally incline towards success. [Commanders] are not to be permitted to be lax and perfunctory, which inevitably undermines military discipline, which will lead to soldiers considering themselves weak. That naturally undermines their morale, which in turn will result in a dissolute attitude taking root among superiors and subordinates. When the moment comes, they will throw up their hands in despair. The consequence will be catastrophic failure in a moment of crisis.
若武藝未精, 士氣未振, 必須以身先率教閱振作, 諭之以大義, 申之以軍令, 使下有所感發, 自然所向成功, 不許姑息苟且, 自沮軍法, 及推稱軍弱, 自餒其志, 以致上下成風怠慢。臨期舉手無措, 因而失誤大事。Footnote 15
2. At present, the momentum of the caitiffs is formidable, and pressing border affairs are now numerous. The capital’s military forces drill with great order, but the lives of ten thousand men depend on a single commander. If the commander is absolutely determined to go to war, then the troops will commit themselves to fight to the death. If plans are not firm from the outset, then hearts will not be united and contradictory views will arise. If the commander is not absolutely determined to go to war, a distance will arise between superiors and subordinates, and the troops will not commit themselves to fight to the death. In an emergency, it will end in abject failure.
今虜勢猖獗, 邊務方殷, 京師軍馬雖操練頗有次第, 然萬人之命懸於一將, 將有必戰之心則士有效死之力, 苟計不先定, 心不齊一, 彼此異見, 而將無必戰之心, 上下隔絕, 而士無效死之力, 緩急之間, 恐誤大計。Footnote 16
In a 1451 memorial, Yu Qian returned to the adverse consequences of choosing the wrong people to serve as commanders. Yu Qian mentioned battle briefly, but he devoted more space to personnel problems such as the promotion of the unqualified, the hollowing out of military administration, and the adversarial relations that had developed between officers and rank-and-file soldiers.Footnote 17
In the following three examples drawn from 1449 and 1450, Yu Qian and Ye Sheng proposed specific recommendations to the throne based on their assessment of individual commanders’ past performance and future potential. In the first instance, Yu Qian makes the case why Shi Biao 石彪 (d. 1460), nephew of Shi Biao and an outstanding commander in his own right, deserves an extraordinary promotion within the Capital Training Garrisons on the basis of his proven ability and experience.
1. I have seen that Regional Commander Shi Biao is courageous and resourceful and battle-tested. He previously served as a Mobile Corps Commandant in Datong and repeatedly conducted reconnaissance in Daizhou and other such places. He rendered meritorious service in killing the enemy. I propose that Shi Biao be provisionally given an extraordinary promotion to the Five Training Divisions and be assigned two thousand imperial regulars from among the first-rate cavalry units and one thousand men from among the mounted firearms and infantry firearms units.
今看得都指揮石彪驍勇有謀, 曾經戰陣, 先充遊擊將軍在於大同並代州等處巡哨節次, 殺賊有功, 合無將石彪量與陞擢於五軍營, 選撥精壯馬隊官軍二千員名, 神機馬隊, 神銃官員一千員名。Footnote 18
In the next two snippets, Yu Qian and Ye Sheng argue that poor commanders, in contrast, lacked the ability to formulate strategy and were unconcerned with their men’s welfare, which in turn bred resentment in the ranks. Deficient commanders, insisted both men, lacked either the courage or inclination to engage the enemy in battle.
2. I have ascertained that the Earl of Yingcheng, Sun Jie, had previously been appointed to serve as Regional Commander overseeing Jizhou, Yongping, Shanhai and other similar places. He has always lacked stratagems. He fails to care for his subordinates, the troops are resentful, and military administration has fallen into decline. When he receives reports of border attacks, he retreats in fear. He fully indulges his avariciousness and cruelty.
照得:應城伯孫傑先奉命, 充總兵官鎮守薊州、永平、山海等處, 本官素無將略, 不能恤下, 士卒嗟怨, 軍政廢弛, 聞邊報而退怯, 縱貪酷以自如。Footnote 19
3. Through investigation, I have now ascertained that Zhang Tai, the Regional Commander of Ningxia and Vice Commissioner-in-Chief, may be highly knowledgeable in military matters, but he utterly lacks daring. He may be sufficient on defense, but he falls short on offensive operations.
今訪得:寧夏總官兵都督同知張泰雖稱頗知軍旅, 殊少勇敢, 守則有餘, 戰則不足。Footnote 20
Yu Qian and Ye Sheng’s stress on the need for commanders to engage the enemy was directly tied to one of the Ming court’s main tactics in the wake of the Tumu Crisis—small-scale, pre-emptive strikes into the steppe, which were intended to undermine the easy confidence of the Oirat leader Esen (1407–54) and his allies, improve Ming military morale, ease border population’s fears, and, most fundamentally, disrupt Mongolian forces before they entered Ming territory.Footnote 21 Daring was a critical quality for commanders of such lightning strikes, because by their nature those operations entailed far greater dangers than holding defensive positions from the relative safety of fortified positions.
Junior Officers and Protecting the Integrity of the Evaluation Process
Civil officials like Yu Qian and Ye Sheng understood that the health of dynastic military forces depended not just on senior commanders but also on junior officers who possessed a close familiarity of their immediate subordinates. For that reason, Yu Qian argued that the selection of company commanders and platoon leaders “must be completely fair.” He proposed that Regional Commander and Vice Regional Commanders found guilty of selecting officers on the basis on personal considerations were to be severely punished.Footnote 22 Elsewhere, Yu Qian explained that company commanders and platoon leaders were the officers who actually knew something about their men’s real attributes.Footnote 23 They saw beyond superficial qualities such as a soldier’s height and build or technical mastery of riding and archery to know whether they would fight or flee in battle. Without that kind of granular knowledge, attempts to create effective military units by identifying “the fit and strong” and culling “the weak” were bound to fail. As a consequence, it was essential, argued Yu Qian here and elsewhere, that company commanders and platoon leaders be selected on the basis of ability rather than personal connections.Footnote 24
In an extended discussion of military affairs in 1452, Yu Qian again drew attention to the deleterious consequences of subverting a rigorous and fair assessment process. “Among officers of the imperial military are those who cling to their posts and shirk responsibility,” averred Yu, and
in extreme cases, they use the pretext of official duties to pursue private gain. They use subordinates as servants and misappropriate funds.Footnote 25 They are concerned solely with personal advantage and don’t give a thought to what benefits the dynasty. As a consequence, soldiers have lacked a model upon which they might pattern their behavior, and they incessantly seek to avoid their duties and instead commit crimes.
官軍頭目中間亦有保位偷安, 甚者假公營私, 役使掊剋, 惟為身謀, 不思國計, 以致軍士無所表率, 往往逃避犯罪.Footnote 26
For Yu Qian and most other civil officials, a fair evaluation process that accurately assessed performance and ability was essential to the military’s health. Rewards and appointments shaped by personal rather than dynastic interest inevitably led to the promotion of incompetent and venal men, who not only failed to serve as a proper model for their men but also exploited their subordinates, undermined military preparedness, and destroyed troop morale. In sum, a smoothly functioning evaluation process promoted ability, courage, and experience while simultaneously eliminating incompetence, cowardice, and corruption. In general, Ming officials had a strong faith in an assessment-based meritocracy with standardized protocols of evaluation that were to be observed throughout the realm, but they also understood that the Ming throne ruled over a vast territory and that regional variation often shaped particular military needs across the empire. The next section briefly considers one such example.
Regional Variation
Since the late fourteenth century, the Ming ruling house had committed itself to an expensive and extended series of campaigns in its southern provinces, including Guangdong, Guangxi, Huguang, Yunnan, and Sichuan, where “native” or indigenous communities loosely labeled by Ming observers as Miao, Yao, Zhuang, Liao, and others exercised a powerful political and military influence. The following examples focus on how selecting the right—and wrong—commanders could influence the large-scale campaigns unfolding in the southern provinces, particularly relations with indigenous leaders and their military forces. The first is from a 1458 memorial by Ye Sheng, who noted that, in Guangxi, “plunder and murder grow ever more severe. Native officials and native troops are openly defiant and arrogant” (劫殺愈甚, 土官土兵公然悖慢). He argued, “If in Guangxi, the court appoints one honest and able Regional Military Commander and two mature and courageous men, who cooperate in fulfilling their duties, there will be no failure.” (廣西若得廉能總兵官一員, 老成驍勇二員, 同心盡職, 可無誤事).Footnote 27
In a series of reports from 1452, Minister of War, Yu Qian, had previously offered a similar assessment of the Regional Commander’s critical importance. An effective Regional Commander cooperated with other regional and local military and civil authorities in military operations, which contributed to the maintenance of consistent orders and clear lines of command, observed Yu. To be successful in many parts of southern China, Regional Commanders also needed to win the respect and cooperation of indigenous leaders, which Ming records often term “native officials” (tuguan 土官), who oversaw indigenous units that played an integral role in Ming regional military operations. As a successful example, Yu Qian pointed to Liu Pu 劉溥, the Marquis of Anyuan 安遠侯, who “has long had a renowned reputation, and the southern barbarians willingly obey [him]” (名望素著名, 蠻夷懷服).Footnote 28 Appointment of poorly known Regional Commanders, he argued, would encourage indigenous leaders “to shirk their responsibilities and render them unwilling to offer assistance, which makes success difficult.” Liu Pu had inherited the title of Marquis of Anyuan in 1435 and had served as Regional Commander of Guangxi since 1438 before being appointed to head the Firearms Division of the Capital Garrisons in 1449.Footnote 29 Here Yu Qian holds up Liu Pu as a commander well-known and respected by indigenous leaders, a fully justified assertion given that during his long tenure in Guangxi, Liu had emerged as a formidable patron to both Ming imperial officers and indigenous leaders. At the same time, Yu almost certainly knew that Liu Pu had been charged with avarice, corruption, abusing his influence to shield subordinates from imperial law, falsifying battlefield reports, allowing “rebels” to go free, and colluding with local “bandits.”Footnote 30 In other words, Yu Qian tacitly accepted that “renowned reputation” and the “willing obedience” of aboriginal leaders might come at the cost of strict adherence to dynastic regulations.
In discussions of potential commanders, Yu Qian highlighted demands specific to the post. In 1452, Yu wanted a capable Regional Commander with broad discretionary powers who would win the respect and obedience of indigenous leaders, facilitate the deployment of Wolf Troops (langbing 狼兵), and frighten Miao rebels, which would end the insurrection.Footnote 31 Wolf Troops was a generic term referring to warriors drawn from scores of different groups, primarily in Guangxi and Guangdong, each with its own chieftain, or “native officials” as Ming sources call them, who held their positions through a combination of inherited status within their community and investiture from the Ming court. When Yu Qian articulated the attributes he wanted in a senior commander, he was keenly aware of the consequences of selecting the wrong man. Yu wrote, “Vice Regional Commander Wu Yi is cowardly and lacks strategy; his actions violate accepted norms, with the result that native officials withhold respect and obedience. In extreme cases, some [native officials] cleave to both sides. They are violent and strong, domineering and overweening. This is a grave crisis for the region.” (副總兵都督武毅怯懦無謀, 處置乖方, 以致各該土官不肯信服, 甚者中間心持兩端, 強梁跋扈, 重為地方之患).Footnote 32 Because indigenous communities’ allegiance to the Ming throne could never be taken for granted, the right man needed to hold positions like Regional Commander.
Before turning to how things might have looked from the perspective of military commanders themselves, a quick review of the perceptions of civil officials discussed above is useful. Civil officials wanted many things from military commanders: competence in martial arts, knowledge of local conditions, an ability to formulate effective tactics and strategies, proven success as field generals and military administrators, and demonstrated reliability. Equally essential was a commander’s role as manager of men, which included the ability to inspire soldiers for battle, maintain high levels of morale, and offer fair assessment of their men’s performance and aptitude. Other sources show that civil officials sought military commanders who could work smoothly with fellow officers, civil officials (both local and regional), as well as palace eunuchs dispatched by the throne to oversee military operations. The specifics drawn from the southern provinces demonstrate the importance of simultaneously cultivating a reputation as a fearsome but just commander in the eyes of indigenous communities and developing bonds of trust and cooperation with local leaders. In the eyes of civil officials, military officers’ cowardice, exploitation of soldiers, and sacrifice of dynastic interests in the pursuit of personal advantage were recurring dangers that required tireless vigilance. Or, put in more positive terms, military ability was a precious resource that the dynasty husbanded for moments of crisis. Early in 1461, Ye wrote optimistically, “The glorious court of Heaven enjoys unimpaired territorial integrity [literally, is “whole like a golden basin”]. We have nourished soldiers and officers for nearly one hundred years. How can it be that they are no men of loyalty, ability, and courage? There is bound to come a day when [our] humiliation is avenged and the wicked are struck down” (堂堂天朝完如金甌, 養兵養士將及百年, 忠義材勇豈無其人?雪恥除惡, 必有其日).Footnote 33
How Did Military Commanders Define Success?
Reading our sources “against the grain,” we can also turn the question around to ask how military commanders themselves defined success and what they saw as its requisites. Merely holding the office of commander meant one could petition the throne for posts for male relatives, but further recognition and rewards from the throne for commanders themselves and their supporters were a prime element of professional success.Footnote 34 They variously took the form of promotions, rewards in cash, textiles, spices, livestock such as horses, cattle, and sometimes even pigs. Land (preferably tax-free) and residences were also welcome. Sometimes those rewards came from imperial warehouses, treasuries, and farms, and sometimes livestock, goods, lands, and even people were seized as war booty from defeated enemies. Commanders and their families prized titles of nobility for commanders, their wives, parents, and grandparents, which took material form in patents of investiture and were sometimes inheritable.Footnote 35 Such honors were widely recognized political and social capital, as reflected in how frequently they appear in funerary epitaphs and biographies. Titles of investiture opened the way to participation in prestigious ceremonial events sponsored by the court. Title holders might, for instance, host banquets for foreign envoys, notify imperial forefathers at the Imperial Temple, and even conduct sacrifices on the emperor’s behalf on such occasions as the Summer and Winter Solstices.
In addition, a commander measured success by his ability to secure the respect and obedience of the men under his command. Like Ye and Yu, every commander knew that holding that authority was imperative, because from time to time he ordered his troops to risk life and limb in combat. Success there was also essential to winning recognition and reward from the throne. His men’s visible support figured in a commander’s political and social jockeying in the capital and elsewhere. On city streets, a commander regularly traveled with military entourages that made clear his power.Footnote 36 Visible support from his men similarly elevated a commander’s standing with the throne, among fellow military officials, palace eunuchs, and civil officials. Anyone would need to think twice about open attacks on a popular commander, in case disgruntled subordinates decided to act out on behalf of what they perceived as their wronged commander (and patron). Their protests ranged from loud complaints and implied threats to a refusal to obey orders, and even open mutiny.Footnote 37 A bit of swagger, a fondness for drink, a sense of fashion, and a love of women on the part of a commander might prompt denunciations from civil officials but earn admiration from the troops.Footnote 38
To win and keep the support of his men, commanders knew that they had to balance a reputation for ferocity and munificence. Bold and courageous on battlefield, exacting and demanding on the training grounds, and generous and reliable as a patron, a successful commander understood that he needed to convince his men that he would win victories against the enemy, prepare them thoroughly for the perils of war, and accurately judge when it made sense to venture outside city walls—even dynastic borders—to engage the enemy and when it was wiser to adopt a defensive posture. Last but not least, he had to provide for their material welfare (and for their bereaved families) in a way that they felt was just.
Knowing that they were being appraised by those above and below them, commanders submitted battle reports that inflated the number of enemy troops captured and killed, exaggerated the size and frequency of enemy attacks, and overstated the number of men under his command who had rendered exemplary service. For instance in 1449, Shi Heng recommended 60,431 men for promotions for their part in killing a few hundred Oirat Mongols outside the capital’s Desheng Gate 德勝門. The high number of troops and low number of enemies rewards prompted Yu Qian to demand an investigation.Footnote 39 To bolster enemy numbers, civilian corpses (or depending on the circumstances, just their noses or ears) were passed off as enemy soldiers. A commander understood that all battle reports would be critically examined in the capital by junior civil officials serving in the Office of Scrutiny for the Ministry of War—and even occasionally the Minister of War—so better to begin with high numbers with the expectation that some cases would be discounted.
To minimize the questioning of one’s reports, commanders found it essential to cultivate good relations with other military officers, palace eunuchs sent by the throne, and civil officials on site who were to submit ostensibly independent reports on the same events. To adapt an expression from US police enforcement, it was important to maintain a “black wall”; a thicket of internally consistent reports in black ink from the field that made it difficult for capital officials to find fault or penalize false and inflated claims. Through careful cultivation of colleagues in the field and supporters in the capital, mastery of bureaucratic reports, and understanding of the evaluation processes, a commander increased the likelihood of securing promotions and rewards for himself and all his men. Those rewards and promotions in turn heightened his reputation as a worthy commander.
Active military operations, whether war with foreign enemies, campaigns against domestic foes, or patrols all provided opportunities to win rewards and recognition from the throne. But a successful commander simultaneously strove to continuously extract resources made available through his control over labor and materials. Judging by charges leveled by civil officials, commanders routinely exploited soldiers as a source of labor, a practice that mirrored the state’s perception of military personnel as an inexhaustible labor pool to be used for everything from the construction of imperial mausoleums and palaces to the repair of hunting parks and highways. Other sources of illicit wealth included quarrying, mining, logging, hunting, farming, harvesting ginseng, smuggling/trade (including maritime trade), selling and/or renting government lands (including pasture lands), charging fees for furloughing soldiers, and taking pay-offs from criminal organizations.Footnote 40
This brief review reveals obvious points of tension among military commanders and fellow officers, subordinates, civilian and eunuch colleagues, local actors including gentry, and finally the emperor and state. In addition to abilities such as battlefield judgement, maintaining troop cohesion and morale, and logistical management, a military commander’s success depended in large part on his skill in balancing those contradictory demands. One suspects that complaints about particular commanders—nearly all surviving examples were penned by civil officials but military men were not averse to denouncing rivals—to the throne reflected commanders’ failure to juggle those demands.
Civil officials’ comments on commanders can read like empty formulas and dry bureaucratic terms, but the stakes were high. Shi Heng played a pivotal role in orchestrating Yu Qian’s humiliation and execution in 1457, when the captured emperor was restored to throne. Three years later, Shi Heng too fell from power and was starved to death in an imperial prison, in large part because the restored emperor felt that Shi Heng had acquired dangerous levels of power through his military patronage.Footnote 41 The fall of Shi Heng and those close to him in 1460 owed much to his success in cultivating support among thousands of military men, including scores of officers, but also critically to his failure to convince the newly restored emperor and his advisors that he was a powerful ally, not a disruptive actor who might meddle in court politics. Running through discussions of military ability were acute, personal tensions over political influence and authority.
Conclusion
“I conclude that the dynasty relies on troops, and troops depend on their commander. When the right man is appointed commander, all troops will be highly skilled. When troops are highly skilled, dynastic awe will naturally be bolstered, and the danger of invading caitiffs will inevitably dissipate” (議得國之所恃者兵, 兵所賴者將, 將得其人, 則兵無不精, 兵無不精, 則國威自振而寇虜之患自平矣。)Footnote 42 Most fifteenth-century observers would have found axiomatic Yu Qian’s observation about the links among appointment of the right commander, troops’ combat-readiness, and dynastic power. Similarly, debate might roil about strategy and individual personnel appointments, but educated men broadly agreed about the importance of identifying and cultivating competent commanders, which they were certain required close supervision and assessment by civil officials and ultimately the emperor. Contemporaries harbored few doubts that tensions and conflicts among commanders, soldiers, the throne, civil authorities, palace eunuchs, and local populations were an inescapable political, military, social, and cultural reality that might be either highlighted or obscured depending on rhetoric imperatives but were never forgotten.
Some aspects of Ming military life are quite comparable to other empires. For one thing, as was true in many empires, questions of “ethnic” identity, interest, and allegiance in the Ming dynasty increased the potential for conflict and tension. Mongolian, Jurchen, Tibetan, and southern indigenous forces were variously integrated into dynastic institutions, subject to different demands and forms of discipline/oversight and periodically viewed through the prism of the barbarian Other.Footnote 43 For another, the military consumed the vast majority of the budgets of imperial states in China (some 70 per cent in peace time and even higher in war) from the Tang to the Qing periods, and the majority of those resources passed through the hands of military commanders.Footnote 44 Finally, the danger of the work sharpened questions of ability, evaluation, and reward, compared with other occupations. All soldiers and commanders expected to be renumerated, and officials knew that the consequences of failure to pay troops, especially those on campaign, could be dire: poor morale, desertion, plunder, atrocities against civilian populations, mutiny, rebellion, joining the enemy, and the consequent loss of dynastic credibility. Those dangers were far from unique to the Ming period or to China.Footnote 45
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