The PCC’s governance structure

It would not be feasible to provide a detailed account of the origins and expansion of the PCC, a topic that has already been extensively explored in the literature [Willis Reference Willis2015; Biondi Reference Biondi2016; Feltran Reference Feltran2018; Manso and Dias Reference Manso and Dias2018]. However, it is crucial to underscore the fundamental characteristics of the governance structure of this criminal organization. A key distinction that sets the PCC apart from other mafias, be they Latin American, European, or Asian, lies in its political philosophy: it explicitly rejects any centralized, personalized power structure.

The PCC does not rely on a single, charismatic leader, like the figures of Pablo Escobar, El Chapo, Dom Berna, or the Godfather. Instead, leadership roles rotate between several individuals, and the organization is not run by powerful billionaire bosses. Instead, it is characterized by a criminal network of powerful positions across multiple hierarchical levels, with thousands of wealthy, not-so-wealthy, or even very poor members, all of whom are supposed to have equal rights. Contrary to the portrayal of figures like “Marcola”Footnote ⁷ or other so-called leaders, often presented by the press as the masters of the PCC’s soldiers and subordinates, this secret society is composed of tens of thousands of initiated members who occupy diverse positions of responsibility, from strategic to local, all of whom concurrently manage their own autonomous criminal enterprises (Figure 1).

Figure 1

PCC governance structure (from 2002 onwards)

[Source: The author, based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork (2005–2024). Design by Victoria Scussel]

The diagram illustrates the coexistence of a decentralized economic framework and a centralized strategic political decision-making process within the PCC. Economically, the organization functions as a network of individual entrepreneurs, each managing their own criminal enterprises independently. These entrepreneurs, regardless of the scale of their operations, retain all profits from their independent activities and are not required to share them with the organization. However, when they use the organization’s infrastructure—a platform that provides them with many opportunities—they automatically share their contacts so that the PCC can also use them to generate income for the fraternity. Fully initiated members of the PCC do business with many uninitiated criminals, known as “partners” (companheiros), and hire outsourced employees, who are paid through informal contracts within their illegal companies. Members enjoy access to such resources as vehicles, weapons, legal assistance, protection, and valuable contacts. Additionally, those involved in drug trafficking benefit from access to the PCC’s networks, which enables them to purchase supplies at lower prices and benefit from the organization’s logistical, financial, and communication infrastructures. In the event of disputes or challenges, they can rely on the PCC’s resources and internal justice system for resolution. Conversely, although PCC members operate autonomously in economic terms, they are required to take on responsibilities within the collective organization. Based on their skills and internal standing, they may be elected or appointed to various roles; their responsibilities range from maintaining discipline in a prison cell to contributing to the organization’s international expansion strategy.

Strategic decisions are made within centralized councils called sintonias, which function as regulatory bodies overseeing areas such as weapons, legal support, vehicles, contacts, criminal discipline, justice in both streets and prisons, planned violent action, and the PCC’s strategic expansion beyond São Paulo and into other countries. Power is therefore not concentrated in individuals but vested in the positions themselves, thereby fostering a collective and flexible leadership structure in which authority is tied to a role rather than a person. A strong ideology of political equality makes it possible for each of the PCC’s initiated members, known as “brothers”, to effectively claim the same voice, the same right of argumentative speech, in any situation of interlocution within the brotherhood. Within the organization, a richer member is subject to exactly the same codes and rules as a poorer one, and a member in a leadership position is under an even greater obligation to behave in an exemplary manner. What appears to be unique about the PCC when it is compared to other mafias in the world [see Varese Reference Varese2011, Reference Varese2023] is that the multiple trade structures operated by its members are ultimately embedded within a unified governance framework. Hierarchical positions of power are occupied by individuals who have an equal power of speech internally, although as independent entrepreneurs they occupy different and unequal positions in the market. Small, medium, or large entrepreneurs can occupy the most diverse positions in the organization’s governance structure. There have been many cases in which high-ranking members have been killed or excluded because their “brothers” considered them to have acted wrongly [Feltran Reference Feltran2018].

The PCC does not advocate for material equality but upholds the belief that everyone has the potential to achieve wealth. While the established elites are viewed as representatives of an oppressive system, economically successful PCC members are admired, even by those in prison who lack such basic possessions as a toothbrush or a towel. Their shared origins in the hardships of favelas and prisons serve as a unifying bond that symbolizes a common humanity. The success of one member inspires others to strive for social mobility, reflecting the view that the “oppressed and criminalized” are equal in essence, if not in terms of material wealth. This shared identity, often tied to a common ethno-racial background, fosters a collective understanding that to recognize one’s position in the world is to oppose the system.

That is why one of the central slogans of the PCC is “one for all and all for one”, and why it preaches for “peace among us and war against the system”. While the PCC’s members can be extremely violent towards its enemies, and although internal discipline is exceptionally strict, which leads to many expulsions and even deaths, internally, the members are not personally subject to coercion or even commands. Isolated acts of revenge, or other individually decided acts, are not permitted. Those occupying positions of power, which are almost always collegial and continually rotating, are supposed to be at the service of the criminal population, not the other way around. The PCC’s ideology speaks of the need to do “what is right, what is fair, and what is just”, and all PCC peers are constantly evaluating whether their brothers’ actions fulfil these criteria. These assessments are made as part of their daily interactions, but when conflicts arise, the “justice agency” is called upon to resolve all internal disputes. Once a decision has been made by the organization, there is no appeal.

Each sintonia functions as a virtual office, typically managed by a collegiate group whose members occupy strategic roles; its influence extends hierarchically from the national to neighbourhood levels. These offices delegate responsibilities to regional and municipal leaders, who coordinate neighbourhood operatives in securing and distributing firearms for criminal uses, either through loans, rentals, or sale. Another highly secretive sintonia oversees organized violence, managing attacks and missions while minimizing visibility and avoiding the attention of law enforcement. This discreet approach reflects the PCC’s overarching strategy: to expand quietly and avoid direct confrontation with the established authorities.

This governance structure balances economic decentralization with centralized strategic decision-making. Information can flow from the highest levels to neighbourhood operatives in just two or three phone calls, while local actors maintain access to higher, more powerful bodies. The system operates effectively due to the strong cohesion of its principles and practices, which allows the PCC’s operational philosophy to infiltrate into its members’ daily activities and to attain a remarkable reach. The PCC’s governance model, underpinned by an egalitarian ideology shared by its initiated members, eliminates the need for the armed territorial control seen in extortion-based criminal organizations.

The Agência: a governance unit to regulate trade

The most significant governance body within the PCC today is the Agência, which oversees the organization’s drug-trafficking operations. Like all sintonias, the Agência operates through a centralized strategic board of administrators, supported by a network of subnational councils. This hierarchical structure ensures both operational reach and depersonalization, facilitating the execution of three primary functions. Firstly, it streamlines the connection between producers and retailers, thus enhancing the organization’s logistical efficiency. Secondly, it oversees quality control while striving to set lower prices. Thirdly, it establishes and enforces the economic regulations that govern interactions between PCC members, their associates, subcontractors, and allied actors within this value chain.

The Agência is a very complex body, which oversees operations involving various types of drugs at both wholesale and retail levels, with a primary focus on cocaine destined for export. The subject of the Agência is still insufficiently explored by law enforcement and until relatively recently, it had largely been overlooked in academic studies. As research into the area progresses, the Agência’s intricate and often misunderstood dynamics are becoming evident. For example, the lorry drivers or other operators who have been hired to transport PCC cocaine are frequently prosecuted as if they were members of the organization and as if all the seized cocaine belonged to them or the PCC. However, this is rarely the case. The Agência is a platform used to connect a myriad of outsourced actors, ranging from IT support workers and drug mules through those working in logistics infrastructures to lawyers and accountants. Drugs often pass through intermediaries who are unaware of their origin or ownership, a mechanism that shields the PCC while helping to perpetuate the narrative that their network is significantly disrupted by large drug seizures. This pattern, common in the global drug trade, protects the organization’s dominance while reinforcing claims on the part of law enforcement and the media that such raids are impactful.

The PCC operates as a “criminal freemasonry” that unites numerous independent entrepreneurs within its framework. These individuals retain full control over their profits, without having to pay any mandatory fees or extortion payments to the organization. Instead, they collaborate by circulating drugs explicitly identified as “from the Comando”. These are narcotics that are owned by the PCC rather than by the entrepreneurs themselves, although they are often transported alongside the entrepreneurs’ private shipments. This dual distribution model generates institutional revenue without infringing on individual enterprises. PCC members must clearly separate their personal ventures from the organization’s collective activities. Moreover, the organization appropriates the business contacts cultivated by its members, leveraging these to facilitate its operations and enhance institutional profitability. In return, individual entrepreneurs benefit from the PCC’s logistical support and protective infrastructure. Notably, institutional revenue is exclusively reinvested in order to sustain and expand the organization’s operational systems, rather than being distributed for private gain. This reinvestment strengthens the organization’s capacity to support its members and maintain its dominance within the criminal economy. The Agência’s melding of individual and institutional logistics is central to its functionality and demonstrates the PCC’s ability to avoid the centralization of power in the hands of one member while balancing entrepreneurial autonomy with collective coordination. This synergy ensures the sustainability both of individual enterprises and the organization’s broader criminal and political objectives. The operational nuances of this model will now be explored further, shedding light on the Agência’s pivotal role in maintaining the PCC’s strategic cohesion and adaptability.

The following examination of the PCC’s methods of international trafficking two decades ago and of the transformations observed between 2014 and 2016 will provide valuable insights into the organization’s evolving strategies.

Background (2004–2010)

Born in 1969, the man known in the criminal world as “Smooth Operator” amassed substantial wealth by exporting cocaine through PCC networks in Santos before transitioning into the legitimate business world in 2018. His illicit gains were laundered and reinvested and eventually converted into productive capital. Today, he manages a diversified portfolio that includes hotels, restaurants, and automotive trading, and also deals in art, which is prominently displayed across his properties. I have conducted numerous in-depth interviews and informal conversations with Smooth over the years, delving into his extensive experience in crime, business, and prison life. However, he remains resolutely silent on the current strategies employed by the PCC in the international cocaine market.

Fragments from our conversations reveal that Smooth’s involvement in cocaine exportation began in 2008 at the Port of Santos, although he had been trying to set up a criminal enterprise of this type since 2004. At that time, Brazil played a minor role in the global cocaine trade, and its exports to Africa and Europe were managed by a small elite of political and economic figures from the north of the country. Colombia, as the dominant global supplier, controlled the market in both the United States and Europe, leaving Brazil to handle primarily Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine. This trade was largely managed by ranchers and politicians in border states. The CV, an older Brazilian criminal organization and a former ally of the PCC, concentrated on importing base paste and cocaine hydrochloride for the domestic market and engaged only minimally in export activities.

Smooth’s first attempt at international trafficking was marked by a significant setback. After serving an eight-month prison sentence, he was invited by a Serbian drug dealer in the same prison to collaborate with him in a large-scale operation. In 2008, the pair organized the shipment of 400 kg of cocaine directly to the Balkans. However, the profits from the venture never materialized, and his Serbian associate vanished shortly after the shipment. For over a year, Smooth had no communication with his contact. This left him burdened by a significant debt to his suppliers, which he was forced to renegotiate on a monthly basis.

Despite the financial strain this caused, Smooth, known for his distinctive style and towering presence, remained confident in the trustworthiness of his associate. Born in a favela in São Paulo’s southern region [see Maria de Jesus Reference Maria de Jesus1962 for sociological context], Smooth emphasizes that favelados possess an innate ability to discern trustworthiness. His confidence in his associate stemmed from their shared prison experience in São Paulo during the early 2000s, where they had spent two years enduring what Smooth referred to as “many trials” together. Although the shipment’s failure made his position difficult, he remained convinced that his contact had not betrayed him, attributing the failure to unforeseen circumstances rather than malice or deceit.

Sixteen months after the initial failure, in 2010, Smooth’s Serbian contact returned to Brazil and sought him out in person. First, without saying a word, the contact opened his briefcase and showed him a series of foreign-language newspaper clippings detailing “settlements of accounts” among traffickers in the Balkans. He then explained that the 400-kg shipment had been stolen upon its arrival in Serbia, but all those involved in the theft had already been eliminated. While he could not reimburse Smooth for the loss, he invited him to work with him on another shipment, this time through a more secure arrangement. This proposal was their chance to recover financially. Smooth trusted his friend completely, comparing the trust he placed in him to his trust in his own wife.

Together, they prepared an even larger operation, leveraging more established networks and support from other associates tied to the emerging PCC. Almost 500 kg of cocaine, sourced from several São Paulo drug traffickers affiliated with the organization, was transferred from a small fishing boat to a transatlantic cargo ship in the early hours of the morning, shortly after it had departed the harbour. This time, the operation proceeded flawlessly. A month later, the payment was made available to Smooth Operator in Europe. However, Smooth could not personally collect the payment due to his past convictions, which prevented him from travelling abroad. His son, who had never been involved in crime and could easily obtain a passport, was tasked with undertaking the mission in his place. After facing numerous challenges as a first-time traveller, his son eventually arrived at a luxury hotel in Hamburg, where he received a briefcase containing nearly €8 million in cash from a tall, strong-looking, blonde, blue-eyed, well-dressed man. The identity of the man remained unknown, and when Smooth’s son attempted to thank him, the phone number was no longer in service. The euphoria among Smooth’s family members was immense—the future seemed promising.

This initial euphoria was soon overshadowed by a critical challenge: determining how to transfer the proceeds back to Brazil and facilitate payments to the other stakeholders involved in the shipment. During this inaugural operation, the strategy involved Smooth’s daughter spending three days acquiring as many luxury items as possible—clothing, footwear, jewellery, watches, and handbags—all purchased in cash and worn or carried back to Brazil. This operation represented a significant turning point, not only in Smooth Operator’s trajectory within the international cocaine trade but also in the PCC’s strategic entry into this highly lucrative market, leveraging its presence in the largest port in the South Atlantic. For subsequent missions, establishing reliable payment networks would be essential. Engaging with doleiros (currency exchange dealers) was a critical step, and Smooth could count on the PCC, which had already cultivated relationships with the most dependable operators. These arrangements ensured that funds could pass through customs without complications. Additionally, transporting cash necessitated the implementation of stringent security measures, which the PCC’s extensive network in São Paulo during the 2010s was well positioned to provide. Smooth’s subsequent operations were fully coordinated with the organization’s established networks. As his team gained more experience, it became clear that agreements on pricing were necessary to take into account the costs of corruption, while it was also important to maintain a consistent quality and pricing for the product, both of which had been positively received by the buyers of the initial consignment.

In a manner reminiscent of Durkheim’s assertion that necessity creates functions, the types of challenges faced by Smooth and his family, along with their colleagues who were establishing the PCC’s dominance in the Port of Santos, prepared the PCC for the development of the Agência. Originally tasked with overseeing institutional funds generated from the members’ monthly contributions as well as from the raffles and games of chance played in prisons, the Agência underwent a significant and quick transformation. It had to scale up and professionalize in response to the growing demands associated with the PCC’s expanding role in the international cocaine market.

Developing infrastructures (2010–2016)

Between 2008 and 2014, numerous entrepreneurs, including Smooth, sought to succeed by leveraging the organization’s support. By 2014, the PCC had, by means of a subtle but significant process, succeeded in consolidating its influence and establishing hegemony over the Port of Santos.Footnote ⁸ In 2016, the PCC underwent a rapid transformation, simultaneously challenging the dominance of the CV in the Amazon region and disrupting the entrenched elite family enterprises that had hitherto dominated the cocaine trade in Brazil. At this point, the PCC was prepared to introduce a business model that was quite distinct from those of the European and African mafias engaged in the trade. Central to this transformation was the Agência, which provided independent dealers like Smooth with access to essential resources, such as operators whose trustworthiness was guaranteed, security and insurance, logistics for coca production, distribution logistics, communication systems, international payment channels, and money-laundering schemes. Furthermore, the Agência facilitated a two-way exchange, making Smooth’s contacts and networks available to the broader PCC network and thereby strengthening the organization’s overall reach and control within the global cocaine trade.

Having gained insight into the profitability of international trafficking, the Agência continues to evolve. Like all of the PCC’s strategic agencies, it operates as an institutional regulatory body and its resources are not appropriated for private gain. Its primary function is to facilitate the interests of individual entrepreneurs, such as Smooth Operator, by ensuring that their profits are secured. The Agência is tasked with managing the complexities of international transactions, which encompass a range of activities, from establishing trust with suppliers and buyers to providing guarantees for intermediary operators. The activities also include navigating financial mechanisms, such as obtaining credit from loan sharks and financiers to ensure remittances, as well as managing the repatriation of funds. The suborning of key figures in the logistics chain—police officers, dock workers, sailors, and customs officials—ensures the smooth transit of goods, while the conversion of illicit profits into legitimate business income is also crucial.

Each entrepreneur could, like Smooth Operator, establish such an infrastructure on an individual basis—but this would require substantial time and investment and entail significant personal risk. This was the modus operandi of the established elite families in the international cocaine trade: operating relatively autonomously on a small scale and minimizing risk thanks to their political influence and networks. Smooth lacked access to this influence and these networks; thus, the Agência’s proposal was for it to take on the responsibility for regulating infrastructure along the entirety of the value chain, thereby offering operators progressively better conditions for undertaking their individual ventures. Instead of isolated entrepreneurial efforts, what increasingly emerged was a model in which individual endeavours were combined with institutional revenue, which was then reinvested into infrastructure for future operations.Footnote ⁹ The Agência would function as a platform linking different nodes of the value chain in a reliable way. It was to become the secret society’s most effective tool—ensuring the trust necessary for market development and the prosperity of its members.

On becoming a global platform (2016–2025)

Through a process of trial and error, a consolidated platform-type scheme was established by the Agência that leveraged its contacts across Brazil and positioned PCC members at critical points in the cocaine value chain. This network extended from production laboratories in Bolivia and Peru to the international flow of the drug to Europe. Faced with this logistics platform, the CV lost its capacity to control its contacts in Colombia, and the PCC expanded its network to include Colombian narcos, making it increasingly profitable for them to work with the Agência. Key logistical nodes, such as border regions, road junctions, ports, and airports, were strategically occupied by PCC members or others linked to the PCC. Evidence gathered from fieldwork I have conducted in various regions—including the Bolivian border (Cáceres), a major Brazilian logistics hub (Uberlândia), the Port of Santos, and recent research in French Guiana and the Port of Le Havre—indicates that a steady increase in cocaine trafficking through Brazil took place at this time; this included Colombian cocaine, which is now also handled by the PCC in Brazil’s northern macro-region.

An intense armed conflict between the PCC and the CV escalated during this period, with violent repercussions across Brazilian prisons and borders. This also marked the end of a 23-year partnership between the PCC and CV and led to open warfare between them. By 2016, following the murder of Jorge Rafaat in Paraguay, the PCC emerged as the Braziliandominant force in the international trafficking of cocaine, marijuana, and firearms; it consolidated its power in the Port of Santos and expanded its operations to encompass all the major ports and airports in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Strategically, the PCC decided that cocaine, particularly cocaine of the highest quality, should be sold at cost price to any member, regardless of the buyer’s location in Brazil.Footnote ¹⁰ This model meant that the PCC could profit from intermediation in the wholesale market without overcharging its members, which greatly enhanced the competitiveness of its operators within the broader market. Individual business ventures profited from this system by reselling cocaine at the retail or wholesale level, either domestically or for export. The sale of base paste was consolidated for the domestic market, while cocaine hydrochloride was sold for export due to quality requirements.

The PCC brought about a significant shift in both retail and wholesale operations: individual traffickers could still sell their own drugs, but they were often required to distribute the “PCC drugs”, thereby contributing to the organization’s financial pool. To better illustrate these mechanisms, consider the case of Alpha, a fictitious entrepreneur I created based on my field data. Having purchased 25 kg of cocaine per month for a number of months, his profits are increasing and he has gained the trust of the PCC. Alpha seeks to purchase 50 kg of cocaine hydrochloride from his fellow supplier Beta, located on the Brazil–Bolivia border, who offers a price of US$2,800 per kg. However, Beta, now connected to the Agência, utilizes broader networks and supplier pressure to secure a better price of US$2,500 per kg. Through the Agência’s intervention, Alpha also acquires an additional 50 kg of cocaine at cost price, thereby further reducing the price to US$1,500 per kg. As a result, Alpha now purchases 100 kg for US$200,000, rather than the usual 50 kg for US$125,000, making his business considerably more competitive. If Alpha sells this cocaine at US$20,000 per kg at the Port of Santos, he will earn US$2 million for his share of the 100 kg in an 800-kg shipment. However, half of this, i.e., US$1 million, must be returned to the Agência as payment for the “PCC drugs” sold at cost price. Without the Agência’s intermediation, Alpha’s turnover would have been limited to US$875,000. Thus, the collective efforts of Alpha and his network, facilitated by the offices of the PCC, ensure that all the parties involved see higher profits than they would have done by working independently, thus reinforcing the organization’s economic model and its dominance in the cocaine trade.

This allowed independent entrepreneurs, such as my interlocutors Smooth, Steve, and Linda, to maintain their operations while benefiting from the competitive advantage of purchasing “PCC drugs” at cost price. The increased number of PCC members involved in trafficking further diversified cocaine distribution routes, complicating enforcement and monitoring. Price flexibility had existed within the free market, but strict regulations now applied to those buying from the PCC. Competition among members was mitigated by these regulations, which ensured market stability. Payments made in advance secured better prices, as did larger-scale deals. The PCC’s platform-type business model rapidly took control of various points along the value chain, especially logistical intermediation, without clashing with producers or other mafias.

Over the past decade, the PCC has consolidated its position along the Bolivian and Peruvian borders, while internal tensions with the CV have intensified, especially in the wake of the latter’s diminished role in dealing Colombian cocaine.Footnote ¹¹ In 2024, two 10-tonne seizures made it clear that Brazilians, Colombians, and Venezuelans were working together.Footnote ¹² In both cases, the PCC logistics platform had connected them. Our research on ports and borders reveals significant contextual specificity, the understanding of which is crucial to transporting goods with minimal risk. This explains why the global cocaine value chain is highly fragmented, with professionals specializing in distinct stages. The costs associated with crossing borders in vehicles loaded with drugs, transporting cocaine by truck, storing drugs at the port, and loading them onto ships, are largely standardized. No single entity can oversee or regulate all these activities, as each one requires years of expertise to carry out safely. The complexity of these processes makes it nearly impossible for one team to master every link in the chain, especially when considering the linguistic and cultural capital that is required to conduct international transactions. However, it is possible to facilitate connections between all of these local operators, as well as providing essential services such as security, insurance, and international payments. The platform-type collaborative efforts of numerous entrepreneurs, who each specialize in a specific stage, and their coordination by means of a platform-type governance device (the Agência), appear to be driving notable improvements in the efficiency of the value chain.

The Agência’s platform structure enables the PCC to exert significant pressure on producers in the Andean and Amazonian regions and to demand lower prices and increased production or productivity. This framework facilitates the extreme exploitation of low-level independent operators, who are often from impoverished and marginalized communities. These producers frequently endure coercion and violence, but are driven by the prospect of the earnings associated with taking part in the drug-trafficking chain, which are higher than the minimal wages paid for traditional labour. For those who manage to ascend to the position of larger supplier to PCC-affiliated entrepreneurs, their experiences often align with Peter Reuter’s [Reference Reuter2003] observation: substantial wealth accumulation within cocaine markets tends to concentrate in the middle tiers of the supply chain. Evidence collected in recent years has revealed that this systemic labour exploitation, which is embedded in the market’s business model, is a critical factor behind trends such as declining prices, improved drug purity and quality, and the more reliable supply of cocaine to its final destinations.

Conclusions: expanding a multimodal trade, challenging established powers

As it expands, the more influence the PCC gains over the multimodal infrastructure facilitating the transportation of drugs from their source to their destination, the more it can offer its international crime partners in terms of diversified business, security, communication, and financial solutions. In Europe, Africa, Asia, and Oceania, local criminal players manage local distribution. However, the platform’s logistical efficiency has attracted partnerships with criminal organizations across these continents. Maritime options available through the platform include direct shipping via sailboats or fishing vessels, the use of shell export companies, concealing drugs within legal shipments, transferring them to fishermen, dissolving cocaine into products like sugar or tar, or using divers to attach packages to ships’ hulls. On land, drugs can be transported using dedicated vehicles, by contaminating legitimate truck cargo, or by covering short distances by motorcycle, bicycle, or even on foot. Aerial transportation may involve small planes operating on clandestine airstrips, large commercial airlines with compromised employees, or private jets and helicopters that are equipped to cross the Atlantic, flying from north-eastern Brazil to West Africa or straight to Europe. Government and private postal companies are always available to dispatch urgent or smaller shipments. Potential operators can be crowdsourced in every location. By leveraging this multifaceted network and employing sophisticated logistics software to identify optimal routes and methods, the PCC and its partners ensure delivery stability, which facilitates market consolidation. This operational flexibility allows for the strategic expansion of consumer markets. The greater the number of operators that use the platform, the more complete and efficient the offered service becomes.

The PCC employs violence as a last resort while striving to monopolize the intermediation of the global cocaine trade, leveraging a platform-based business model to overcome challenges coming from law enforcement or criminal competition. Colombian criminal organizations have long dominated the export market with defined territories, but the PCC positions itself as a cooperative partner rather than a competitor, emphasizing mutual benefit and shared profits. Rather than using coercion, the PCC claims to attract collaborators through offering them strategic advantages. My research interlocutors suggest that its diplomatic stance, which masks its self-interest, has fostered cooperation between diverse criminal actors. In the words of one of my interviewees—a veteran South American drug trafficker, now living in Europe—“The PCC approaches you and offers you a partnership; when you see them, they are already in control.”

This is not so different from what happened to the independent self-employed drivers who joined Uber, or the countless sole proprietors who saw AirBnb as a real opportunity to increase their income, expand, and diversify their independent businesses. After a while, they became dependent on a powerful platform and could not make money without it. With its robust logistical and financial capacities, the PCC has absorbed not only Bolivian and Peruvian traffickers but also Colombian and Venezuelan groups, as evidenced by major drug seizures in 2024 that revealed their reliance on its networks for international transportation.Footnote ¹³ The Agência’s financial capacity facilitates corruption agreements, provides traffickers with financial and communication infrastructures, and reduces their reliance on violence that might draw unwanted attention. It also allows PCC operations to expand beyond drug trafficking to encompass disparate illicit economies—the platform criminal economy facilitates connections among smugglers, scammers, miners, loggers, and squatters, all of whom engage in money laundering, financial investment, and legal businesses, thereby creating multiple marketplaces.

By fostering cooperative crime growth through its own criminal platform, the PCC has made territorial control through violence less important. Value lies not in a location but in its connections. In 2023, the Brazilian Federal Police reported the presence of PCC members in multiple countries across five continents. The organization’s operations span vast regions, leveraging billions annually in the global illicit economy. Cocaine profits are reinvested in both legal and illegal businesses, in branches including agriculture, cattle ranching, gold and timber extraction, real estate, and financial schemes involving cryptocurrencies and tax havens. It’s not merely money laundering; it’s capital protection, too.

The expanding contemporary criminal organizations and their criminal governance structures are, nonetheless, difficult to integrate into established political regimes. The more the PCC and other mafias grow in power, the more they challenge the authority of existing political powers and the more they are persecuted. In fact, the elementary forms of politics they present are fuelled by an incredible accumulation of capital that challenges the very nature of modern state power [Feltran Reference Feltran2020b].

The power struggle between diverse political frameworks and global value regulation becomes particularly pronounced when criminal power regimes interact with fragile, small, postcolonial, weak, or fragmented states. An individual arriving in a small island state—especially one functioning as a tax haven—with a billion dollars, an extensive network of commercial contacts, and a significant arsenal can quickly become established as a key political actor. This phenomenon is unfolding globally, at what is probably an unprecedented rate. On the other hand, large states, even those in central economies, today face significant challenges when it comes to controlling illegal markets and the actors behind them.

These conflicts reveal an unexpected confluence of global accumulation, localized violence management, and political order-making [Tilly Reference Tilly1990; Feltran Reference Feltran2020a]. Today, funds obtained from international cocaine trafficking are becoming increasingly embedded in global finance: there is ample evidence that cryptocurrency accounts, betting sites, and numerous banking products are being used for money laundering, including in tax havens [Cassano Reference Cassano2017]. Despite the political challenges posed by these dynamics, this illegal accumulation machine, regulated by criminal secret societies from various regions, appears to be in harmony with established global economies. The recent worldwide scandals around criminals laundering money through global banks, such as HSBC, the Canadian Lebanese Bank, and Credit Suisse among others, reflect the fact that this connection is not new to contemporary capitalism [Al Sabri Halawi Reference Al Sabri Halawi2019].

This sociological study of the PCC’s Agência provides us with a better understanding of the changes that are taking place in contemporary transnational cocaine markets. As the narco-state debate resurfaces in numerous countries around the world, my study leads me to the conclusion that the hybrid governance supporting the global cocaine trade, which is facilitated through potentially violent secret societies like the PCC, enables the coexistence of official and illicit forms of accumulation, and is producing emerging forms of criminal/political power regime that pose a challenge to our usual descriptive and analytical perspectives. To seek to understand the peculiarities of contemporary criminal forms of trade and governance [Breuer and Varese Reference Breuer and Varese2023], and of how they affect given power structures, seems to me to be an excellent way of approaching a more realistic analytical framework than that of the old model, which assumes a systematic opposition between states and criminal organizations. This inevitably requires the adoption of an integrated sociological framework in order to understand the management of violence, economic accumulation through different business models, and the (re)production of political orders. In this approach, criminal governance and illicit value chains are revealed as relevant to understanding contemporary power dynamics.