Conceptual Framework: Multiculturalism, Racism, and Group Dynamics

In this article, I explore how attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Turkey are shaped through the lens of multiculturalism and social identity theory, while also analyzing how these processes reinforce social hierarchies. Multiculturalism, in theory, aims to recognize and protect ethnic and cultural diversity within a society. Thinkers like Kymlicka (Reference Kymlicka1995) and Taylor (Reference Taylor and Gutmann1994) have argued that multiculturalism enhances social harmony by protecting minority rights and allowing individuals to retain their cultural identities while participating in broader society. Kymlicka sees the protection of minority cultures as integral to social justice, while Taylor emphasizes that identity and recognition are essential for individuals to fully realize themselves in modern societies.

However, as my data show, multiculturalism’s focus on cultural recognition often falls short of addressing deeper issues of structural racism and power imbalances. Critics like Purdie-Vaughns and Walton (Reference Purdie-Vaughns, Walton, Tropp and Mallett2011) argue that multicultural frameworks can obscure systemic inequalities by concentrating too heavily on cultural celebration without confronting the economic and social inequities faced by marginalized groups. In the Turkish context, the rhetoric of multiculturalism has similarly masked the underlying ethnic hierarchies present in society, particularly in relation to Syrian refugees (Berry Reference Berry2017; Vertovec Reference Vertovec2010).

Through my interviews, it became evident that the Arab identity, often generalized under the label of “Syrian,” is coded negatively, and this ethnic stereotyping aligns with social identity theory, which explains how individuals tend to favor their own “in-group” while negatively differentiating “out-groups” (Tajfel and Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Worchel and Austin1986). The Turkish identity has long been constructed as an in-group characterized by cultural superiority, while Syrian refugees have increasingly been positioned as the out-group, perceived as culturally inferior and undesirable. This dynamic is particularly visible in the way local community members view Syrian refugees through the lens of Turkish nationalism, where ethnic homogeneity is seen as a key marker of the nation-state, a perspective deeply rooted in the Republic’s historical commitment to Turkishness (Ünlü Reference Ünlü2016).

Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined communities” has been influential in understanding how nations are socially constructed, particularly through shared symbols, histories, and cultural narratives (Anderson Reference Anderson2016). In the Turkish context, the idea of a homogeneous Turkish identity has been central to the nation-building project. However, as Partha Chatterjee argues in his postcolonial critique, this form of nationalism often replicates the colonial power structures it seeks to resist. Chatterjee’s revision suggests that while nationalism in postcolonial states like Turkey is framed as a resistance against external powers, it simultaneously imposes internal hierarchies by marginalizing ethnic and cultural groups, such as Kurds and Syrian refugees. This postcolonial perspective offers a critical lens through which to view the persistence of racialized national identities in Turkey, where the emphasis on Turkishness has historically excluded and marginalized groups perceived as “others.” This helps explain how Syrian refugees, despite shared religious ties, continue to be seen as an out-group, reinforcing the in-group/out-group dynamics central to both social identity theory and postcolonial critiques of nationalism.

In my interviews, this in-group/out-group dynamic manifested clearly in the participants’ language. For example, one participant noted that Syrians were “dirty” and lacked the same sense of honor and national pride as Turks, reinforcing a sense of Turkish superiority and distancing Syrians as “other.” Similarly, local Turkish participants frequently generalized Syrian refugees under the “Arab” label, reflecting historical and cultural prejudices that position Arabs as inferior. This prejudice was not only evident in personal interactions but also reinforced by structural practices, such as exclusion from certain neighborhoods and discrimination in the labor market.

While multiculturalism might acknowledge these cultural differences, it does little to address the power dynamics that are at play in such interactions (Goldberg Reference Goldberg1994). As Nancy Fraser (Reference Fraser1997) suggests, focusing solely on recognition without considering the distribution of resources and power within a society can lead to further marginalization. The temporary protection status granted to Syrian refugees, while offering a degree of safety, does not challenge the entrenched ethnic hierarchies that limit their social mobility and integration.

To overcome the limitations of multiculturalism, I argue for an intercultural approach that actively engages with these power imbalances and promotes dialog between cultural groups. Interculturalism, as described by Bouchard (Reference Bouchard2011) and Cantle (Reference Cantle2012), emphasizes the importance of interaction and mutual influence between cultural groups, rather than passive coexistence. This approach is particularly relevant in the Turkish context, where interactions between Syrian refugees and the local community are often mediated by deep-seated prejudices and everyday racism.

My interviews revealed how local Turkish participants often expressed subtle forms of racism, such as discomfort with Syrians speaking Arabic in public spaces or assumptions that Syrians were “backwards.” These everyday encounters, while seemingly minor, reflect a broader system of symbolic violence (Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu and Nice1977), where the dominant group—Turks—maintains their position of power by subtly devaluing the cultural practices and identities of Syrians. Interculturalism, in this context, would not just celebrate cultural diversity but actively work to dismantle these power structures by fostering genuine dialog and mutual understanding.

In conclusion, the limitations of multiculturalism are evident in the racist attitudes and institutional discrimination that persist in Turkish society, particularly toward Syrian refugees. As my data suggest, the in-group/out-group dynamics between Turks and Syrians are reinforced by both personal interactions and structural inequalities, making interculturalism a more effective approach for promoting social integration and anti-racism. By focusing on dialog, interaction, and power dynamics, interculturalism offers a path forward that can help dismantle the deep-seated prejudices and structural barriers that continue to hinder the inclusion of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Continuity of Racism in Migration Policies

Understanding the impact of racist approaches within the context of migration policies in Turkey is of critical importance for the analysis of the data in this study. Exposed to numerous migration movements throughout its 100-year Republican history, Turkey has naturally shaped its legal-political regulations in line with ideological perspectives. Analyzing all political approaches could form the subject of a much broader article. Therefore, in this section, I will examine some significant political regulations that have had key effects in demonstrating how the founding ideological approach of the Republic has continuity in the context of migration policies toward Syrian refugees.

The establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 transformed Turkey’s political and legal landscape, especially regarding Turkish identity and ethnic hierarchy. Nationalist-driven laws aimed to create a homogenous national identity centered on Turkish ethnicity, marginalizing non-Turkish ethnic groups. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne granted limited privileges to Armenians, Greeks, and Jews without ensuring citizenship or equality, establishing a Turkish Muslim-majority framework that prioritized Turks over non-Muslim minorities (İçduygu, Erder and Gençkaya Reference İçduygu, Erder, Gençkaya, İçduygu and Sert2014). After the Republic’s founding, ethnic and religious purity gained prominence, with national identity molded around Turkishness.

With the establishment of the Republic, the pursuit of nation-state construction and ethnic homogenization was further strengthened, and these efforts gained a concrete legal framework with the 1934 Settlement Law. The 1934 Settlement Law redefined the ethnic structure of Turkey as “of Turkish descent” and “affiliated with Turkish culture,” allowing for the legal shaping of pressures and assimilation efforts directed at groups outside the Turkish ethnic identity. The regulations introduced by this law legitimized discrimination and exclusion against groups outside the Turkish race and culture, especially ethnic groups such as Kurds. Within the framework of the Turkism ideology, which also contained racist practices rising in the 1930s, the approach to the Muslim migration during the establishment years was altered, leading to the emergence of policies emphasizing Turkishness, Turkish ethnicity, and the Turkish language (İçduygu, Erder, and Gençkaya Reference İçduygu, Erder, Gençkaya, İçduygu and Sert2014). The ideological groundwork of the period led to the enactment of the 1934 Settlement Law No. 2510. This law divided the residents of Turkey into three groups: “those of Turkish descent and connected to Turkish culture,” “those who do not speak Turkish but are considered part of Turkish culture,” and “those who neither speak Turkish nor are part of Turkish culture,” aiming to “assimilate” these groups (İçduygu, Erder, and Gençkaya Reference İçduygu, Erder, Gençkaya, İçduygu and Sert2014).

The racist approach of the Settlement Law is evident from its initial provisions. The first article of the Settlement Law states: “In Turkey, adjustments to the population’s residence and dispersion will be made according to a program implemented by the Ministers of Execution, due to the allegiance to Turkish culture. This responsibility is assigned to the Ministry of Interior” (İçduygu, Erder, and Gençkaya Reference İçduygu, Erder, Gençkaya, İçduygu and Sert2014). This clause highlights a preference for identities inherently tied to Turkishness and sets the primary goal of redistributing the population within the framework of allegiance to Turkish culture. This approach, favoring homogeneous identities, is also apparent in the third article and suggests a significant continuity in modern migration policies. According to this article, only “those of Turkish descent and connected to Turkish culture” have the right to immigrate and settle in Turkey. This racially and ethnically biased approach persists in Turkey’s contemporary refugee, and more broadly, its immigration and foreign policies (İçduygu, Erder, and Gençkaya Reference İçduygu, Erder, Gençkaya, İçduygu and Sert2014).

The 1934 Settlement Law laid the groundwork for migration policy approaches during a significant period of the Republic’s history. One of the most striking examples demonstrating the continuity of racist and homogenizing foundational ideology is the approach to the migration movements termed “cognate migration,” which occurred at different times in Bulgaria for various reasons. These migration waves were encouraged within the “cognate” policy framework, linking them to the pressure and assimilation policies against Turks living in Bulgaria. Integrating these migrating groups into the Turkish identity within the context of national identity construction has also reinforced structural discrimination against other ethnic and religious groups in Turkey (Şimşir Reference Şimşir1986). On the other hand, the migration movements of Kurds, being outside the Turkish identity, were treated differently compared to the tolerance shown to “kin” coming from Bulgaria. Particularly in the early 1990s, the mass migration of Kurds from the northern regions of Iraq to Turkey was a flight from Saddam Hussein’s oppressive policies against minorities. The pressures on ethnic and religious groups in Iraq led to the mass asylum of Kurds in Turkey. However, this migration movement was not met with the same “cognate” policy by Turkey (Kirişçi and Karaca Reference Kirişçi, Karaca, Erdoğan and Kaya2015). The different approaches toward Turks from Bulgaria and Kurds from Iraq clearly display Turkey’s ethnic-centered migration policies.

In the 1980s, the concept of “cognate” re-emerged as a central theme in Turkey’s migration policies. The year 1979 marked a significant turning point in Turkey’s migration history. The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan triggered two major migration movements, directly impacting Turkey. Approximately 1 million Iranians sought refuge in Turkey, and one-third of Afghanistan’s population was displaced, causing significant shifts in regional migration dynamics (Buz Reference Buz2008). During this period, Turkey decided to accept Afghan migrants of Turkish descent, thereby reviving the “cognate” policy. The “Law on the Acceptance and Settlement of Turkish Descent Migrants from Afghanistan to Pakistan in Turkey” facilitated the transfer and settlement of approximately 5,000 Turkish descent Afghans in Turkey. This decision illustrates the continuity of Turkey’s ethnic identity-based migration policies, which have been in place since the early years of the Republic.

In the post-Cold War period, Turkey’s migration policies continued to be influenced by an ethnicity-centered perspective. Throughout the 1990s, particularly as a transit country to Europe, many migrants tried to pass through Turkey to reach Europe (İçduygu and Yükseker Reference İçduygu and Yükseker2010). During this time, the European Union (EU) accession process and international migration rights necessitated significant changes in Turkey’s migration policies. However, profound changes in migration policies were not made during this period. For example, the Asylum Regulation issued in 1994, which slightly expanded the existing migration policies, continued the ideological approaches of the 1934 Settlement Law.

With the influence of the Justice and Development Party’s (in Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) liberal policies in the early years of its governance, a new Settlement Law was enacted in 2006 as part of the EU harmonization process. Although the new 2006 Settlement Law was expected to transform immigration acceptance policies, it faced criticism for perpetuating old ideological approaches (Ekmekçi Reference Ekmekçi2016). This law stated that foreigners who are not of Turkish descent and not affiliated with Turkish culture would not be accepted as immigrants in Turkey, indicating the continuation of emphasis on Turkishness. Consequently, Turkey’s migration policies have historically been intertwined with ethnic identity. From the final years of the Ottoman Empire through the founding years of the Republic and thereafter, legal regulations have developed Turkey’s migration policies within an ethnically centered and discriminatory framework. This historical process continues to be a decisive factor in shaping migration and refugee policies today.

Following the mass migration triggered by the Syrian civil war, the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (in Turkish: Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, YUKK) marked a new era in Turkey’s migration and refugee policies, providing a more systematic and comprehensive structure for migration management. However, these innovations cannot be considered entirely independent of Turkey’s legacy of ethnic identity-based migration policies. In particular, the “temporary protection” status and social integration policies applied to refugees from Syria indicate the continuation of trends toward preserving ethnic identity and national identity (Altıok and Tosun Reference Altıok and Tosun2019; Atasü-Topcuoglu Reference Atasü-Topcuoğlu2018). Although the rhetoric of Turkey’s revised migration policies post-YUKK does not explicitly emphasize the Turkish race, the implementation continues to exhibit racist approaches, as evidenced by the 2018 “Migration Adaptation Strategy Document and National Action Plan.” This document claims, “Our country, which has been a merciful society for over a thousand years, has approached people from different cultures and civilizations with tolerance for centuries” (GİGM 2018), producing a narrative inconsistent with the exclusionary and homogeneous ethnic identity-focused migration prioritized throughout Republican history. The overall Action Plan is constructed to continue this narrative, frequently mentioning terms like cultural sensitivity, effective intercultural communication, cultural diversity, and multiculturalism (GİGM 2018).

Assessing the impact of these migration policies is difficult, primarily due to the vague boundaries of the concepts and the significant methodological difficulties involved in measuring social and cultural integration. In Turkey, despite the rhetoric of “multiculturalism” produced at the discursive level and the emphasis on “cultural diversity” in official documents and policies, the implementation remains insufficient. For instance, the “Migration Adaptation Strategy Document and National Action Plan” (GİGM 2018), frequently refer to terms like “cultural diversity” and “intercultural communication.” However, these discourses do not translate into tangible policies that protect the cultural and ethnic identity characteristics of refugee and immigrant groups. While international institutions mandate the inclusion of multiculturalism in projects, on the ground, refugees are often the target of hate speech by both government and opposition members, as well as local community members, driven by political motives (Çevik Reference Çevik2021).

One visible example of the discrepancy between rhetoric and reality is Turkey’s performance in the international Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). With a score of only 43 out of 100, Turkey ranks low across various areas of integration, such as labor market participation, political participation, permanent residency, and anti-discrimination efforts (MIPEX 2020). This data underscores the gap between the country’s official stance on multiculturalism and the challenges refugees face in practice. There are no direct legal regulations allowing refugee and immigrant groups to preserve their cultural and ethnic identities, which further leads to structural exclusion, especially targeting Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Over the last two decades, the ruling AKP has maintained an ideological continuity regarding its migration policies. Initially, the “open door” policy allowed over 3.5 million Syrian refugees into Turkey under the notion of religious solidarity. However, as the economic crisis deepened and societal tensions increased, criticisms from opposition political parties gained momentum. One notable example is the rise of the Victory Party (in Turkish: Zafer Partisi, ZP), a party that does not hesitate to employ openly racist rhetoric, contributing to the spread of discriminatory discourse toward refugee groups. While its electoral impact remains limited, its strong presence on social media and vocal criticism of the government’s migration policies have amplified broader societal discontent regarding refugee integration (Türk Reference Türk2023; Erdoğan Reference Erdoğan2014).

This political shift reflects a broader public sentiment that Turkey’s open-door policy has failed, especially as critics argue that the AKP’s policies have been inadequate in addressing the economic and social consequences of such large-scale migration. The continuity of ethnic discrimination and nationalism within Turkey’s migration policies remains evident, highlighting the long-term socio-political consequences of this ideological framework. As a result, the local community’s perspectives toward Syrian refugees are shaped not only by historical and ideological continuities but also by the failures of these policies, further exacerbated by the deepening economic crisis.

Does Religious Brotherhood Prevent Racism?

Among the most significant cultural similarities between Syrian refugees and the local Turkish community are their shared religious beliefs. The Muslim identity of the refugees, who were forced to migrate due to the civil war that began in Syria in 2011, has been used as an important reference. The rhetoric of “our religious brothers” was long used as a crucial political tool to persuade the local community to accept the influx of people from Syria (Çevik Reference Çevik2021).

Refugees from Syria, perceived as “remnants of the Ottoman Empire,” were allowed to enter Turkey under the “open door” policy. In this political approach, the ideological groundwork of the ruling party, AKP, which includes references to the Ottoman Empire, was directly decisive (Tokdoğan Reference Tokdoğan2018). In the early stages of the Syrian crisis, the AKP embraced an “open door” policy, motivated by the concept of religious brotherhood. This policy was framed within the historical and ideological continuity with the Ottoman Empire, where Muslim unity was central (Tokdoğan Reference Tokdoğan2018). Refugees from Syria were perceived as “guests” and “brothers,” drawing on shared Islamic identity, with the expectation that their stay in Turkey would be temporary and that they would return once the war in Syria concluded. This approach positioned the AKP as the guardian of Muslim refugees, using Ottoman symbolism to craft a narrative of solidarity based on religion.

However, this narrative of religious brotherhood, which initially facilitated the acceptance of refugees, began to wane as the permanence of the refugee crisis became apparent. As the economic strain and social tensions escalated, the rhetoric of the AKP shifted from one of hospitality to one marked by exclusion. The religious identity that once united Turks and Syrians began to lose its significance as nationalist sentiments, deeply rooted in the ideology of Turkishness, started to dominate the discourse. This shift reveals how the AKP’s policies were grounded more in political opportunism than in a genuine commitment to long-term integration or solidarity (Çevik 2018).

The instrumentalization of Ottoman imagery and religious brotherhood by the AKP reflects what Simon (Reference Simon2023) refers to as a form of neocolonialism. Syrian refugees were incorporated into the Turkish socio-political landscape as symbolic extensions of the Ottoman past, yet their integration was always conditional. The underlying expectation that they would eventually return home highlights how the AKP’s policy was less about permanent inclusion and more about temporary management. As time passed, the refugee community became a convenient scapegoat for economic challenges and social unrest, further alienating them from the Turkish national identity.

This shift from religious solidarity to exclusionary nationalism is reflective of Turkey’s broader historical migration policies, where ethnic identity consistently outweighs religious commonality. The AKP’s early reliance on shared Muslim identity eventually gave way to a focus on the superiority of Turkishness, a concept that defines itself in contrast to the “other,” as described by Barış Ünlü (Reference Ünlü2020). Thus, the transformation of AKP’s policies underscores the continuity of Turkish migration policies, which have historically favored ethnic homogeneity, even when religious solidarity is used as a short-term political tool.

“Aren’t we always religious brothers, but they still practice racism. How are we religious brothers!” (R1, Altındağ, 29, Male) a Syrian refugee remarks, indicating that similarities in religious beliefs do not prevent racism. The initially tolerant approach due to the Muslim identity gradually lost its key role in fostering social cohesion as the ideology of Turkishness became more dominant. “They may be Muslims, but personally, I am uncomfortable. I do not see a good future with them, it will get worse with each one we accept. Our social structure, our children, our youth might be corrupted,” (LC13, Ümitköy, 63, Female) a participant expresses her concerns about the ethnic disruption of the Turkish social structure, indicating that the shared Muslim identity is insignificant.

On the other hand, participants who are critical of the current ruling party, AKP’s religious policies—predominantly upper-middle-class and social democrats living in the Ümitköy area—view the Muslim identity of Syrian refugees as a tool used by the government to fulfill its political-Islamic ambitions, and their critique of the government borders on racism toward Syrian refugees: “They are increasing. They have their beliefs; everyone’s belief is their own. It’s shameful to say, but their way of worship is different. Our religion might be similar, but their culture and everything else are nothing like ours. We are all Muslims, but these are different, all supporters of the government, and the government brought them here knowingly. Now they will stay here, they won’t leave. They do it for the elections. They give citizenship during elections to collect votes,” (LC20, Ümitköy, 71, Male).

Turkish Ideology and Its Reflections on Daily Life and Community Relations

The ideology of Turkishness has been central to the nation-building process in the Republic of Turkey, legitimizing forms of discrimination and racism toward groups perceived as “other.” This ideological framework promotes a vision of ethnic homogeneity and nationalism, fostering a sense of superiority and belonging within the Turkish identity (Ünlü Reference Ünlü2016). As one participant states, “There is a very ideological thing among our people. We have racism. Now, in relation to them, they are different” (LC8, Mamak, 72, Male). This statement underscores how deep-rooted Turkish identity creates a distinction between “us” (Turks) and “them” (Syrian refugees), reinforcing ongoing racial and ethnic discrimination.

“I’m not racist, but despite our best efforts as Turks, it bothers me that they do nothing here, just sitting around in parks” (LC15, Ümitköy, 47, Female) reflects a similar pattern, where participants who claim not to be racist nonetheless express discomfort and homogenize all Syrians without direct interaction. This statement reveals how the initial disavowal of racism is quickly contradicted by negative generalizations and stereotypes.

In the early years of the Republic, the ideology of Turkishness was institutionalized through policies aimed at achieving ethnic homogeneity, such as the 1934 Settlement Law. This law laid the foundation for discriminating against groups not considered “Turkish” by race or culture. The same mindset persists today in the discourse surrounding Syrian refugees, highlighting a continuity of exclusion and marginalization. Although the “open-door” policy initially framed Syrians as “guests” under religious solidarity, the ongoing economic crisis and rising nationalism have turned this temporary rhetoric into lasting exclusion and hostility.

Such attitudes reflect the broader ideological continuity from the founding of the Republic, where ethnic homogeneity was prioritized over cultural pluralism. This tendency continues to manifest in Turkey’s migration policies and everyday interactions, reinforcing social hierarchies and exacerbating the “us” vs. “them” dynamic that shapes Turkish public opinion toward Syrian refugees (Saraçoğlu and Özhan Reference Saraçoğlu and Özhan2014).

It is evident that the local Turkish community’s view of Syrian refugees is significantly influenced by the ideology of Turkishness. “God forbid our homeland suffers. We can’t be like them. No matter where we go, we can’t live like them. For us, the nation, the people, and the flag are important” (LC5, Mamak, 35, Male), suggests that there are generalized differences between the Turkish community and Syrian refugees, particularly in terms of nationalism linked to the homeland and nation. Another participant criticizes refugees fleeing the war in Syria from a nationalist perspective: “A Turk has no friend but a Turk. No one looks out for us. If it were me, I wouldn’t have come (referring to the refugees coming from Syria)” (LC8, Mamak, 72, Male). It’s possible to say that the saying “A Turk has no friend but a Turk” has at least a hundred-year history. This perception, first introduced at the foundation of the Republic and often nurtured by subsequent governments, that the Turkish race is alone in the world, that everyone is an enemy, and that friendship is not possible, is very prevalent in Turkish society (Ünlü Reference Ünlü, Alemdaroğlu and Göçek2023).

The prevalence of this perception alone brings ethnic and racial distancing from the moment Syrian refugees arrive. Without any prior contact or relationship, the existing negative attitudes toward “the other” in the minds of the Turkish community can directly shape their approach to Syrian refugees. This ideological positioning is a significant feature of an ordinary Turkish individual built within the continuity framework of the Republic’s nation-state founding ideology based on a homogeneous Turkish identity. For example, the impact of this ideology can be observed in the process of acquiring Turkish citizenship, especially through the necessity of learning certain information and rituals about Turkish identity. “Before becoming a citizen, you have to be tested on the history of Turkey. They must take a test before citizenship, recite our pledge, and learn the national anthem. If they are living in this country, they need to know what this country is about. Maybe then things will improve” (LC19, Ümitköy, 62, Male) highlights an understanding of integration based on assimilation rather than accepting ethnic and cultural diversity.

“The Turks are more warlike, while Arabs are used to scheming and living off others. This is their culture,” (LC9, Mamak, 33, Male). This statement encapsulates the deeply ingrained discriminatory and stereotypical perceptions toward Arabs, particularly Syrian refugees, in Turkey. When analyzed through the framework of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Worchel and Austin1986), it provides a clear example of how social groups form the foundation of individual and collective identity. According to this theory, individuals derive a part of their self-esteem from the social groups to which they belong (in-group) and often do so by contrasting their group with others (out-group). This distinction results in a process called “othering,” where those outside of the in-group are viewed through a lens of negative stereotypes, further widening the perceived gap between groups. In this context, the Turkish community positions itself as the “in-group” and constructs a collective identity based on positive traits such as strength, resilience, and honor (“warlike”), while the Arab identity is reduced to a series of pejorative and simplistic characteristics such as deception and dependency (“scheming” and “living off others”). This stark binary creates a psychological and social boundary between Turks and Arabs, which reinforces national pride and strengthens feelings of superiority among the in-group members.

The example provided is not an isolated one but is deeply embedded in the larger social and historical narratives that have long shaped Turkish-Arab relations. Arabs, particularly in the context of Syrian refugees, are often depicted in Turkish society as culturally inferior or backward, an image that is perpetuated through media portrayals, political discourse, and everyday social interactions. This process of othering not only dehumanizes the Arab population but also serves to validate and strengthen the Turkish identity by juxtaposing it against a negatively constructed “other.” In this way, Arabs become a convenient scapegoat for broader societal issues, such as economic instability or social change, allowing the in-group to maintain a positive self-image while distancing itself from perceived problems.

The division between Arabs and Turks is not limited to individual prejudices but is institutionalized through political rhetoric and state policies that reinforce these social divisions. In fact, the preference for refugees who share ethnic ties with the Turkish population, such as Turkmen, highlights the ways in which in-group favoritism shapes national immigration policies and social integration efforts. As one participant noted, “Turkmen are good, Arabs are different. They don’t look after their children; they let them roam outside. I don’t know if it’s because they are Arabs, but they seem different to me” (LC11, 41, Mamak, Female). Despite having had no prior interaction with Turkmen refugees, the participant instinctively perceives them as better or more acceptable than Arabs simply because they share ethnic ties with the Turkish identity. This reveals the significant role that ethnicity plays in determining the boundaries of the in-group and out-group, where Turkmen refugees are more easily accepted due to their perceived ethnic and cultural similarities with Turks, while Arabs are relegated to the out-group based on their ethnic and cultural differences.

The distinction between Turkmen and Arab refugees is not only a reflection of personal biases but also mirrors broader social hierarchies and power dynamics. In Turkey, ethnic identity has long been a central organizing principle in determining social status and inclusion. The historical legacy of Turkish nationalism, with its emphasis on ethnic homogeneity and Turkishness, continues to shape contemporary attitudes toward migrant and refugee populations. Turkmen refugees, who share a linguistic and cultural connection to Turkey, are seen as part of the in-group. Conversely, Arabs, whose identity is constructed as foreign and culturally incompatible, face more significant challenges to social acceptance and are more likely to be excluded from the in-group. This dynamic underscores the racialization of refugee identities, where certain groups are more readily accepted based on their proximity to the dominant ethnic identity, while others are marginalized and discriminated against.

Additionally, the emphasis on child-rearing practices in the participants’ comments highlights the intersection of cultural and racial stereotypes. Arabs are not only racialized as the “other” but are also depicted as lacking the moral and cultural values necessary to be part of the Turkish in-group. This reinforces a broader narrative of cultural superiority, where Turkish norms and practices are seen as the standard against which other groups are judged. By highlighting perceived deficiencies in Arab parenting, the participant further distances Arabs from the Turkish in-group, framing them as culturally backward and unfit to be part of the national community.

As briefly mentioned in the previous sections, the continuity of the ideological approach promoting “cognate” migration as a significant indicator of the racist approach in Turkish migration policies and its ongoing influence in shaping the approach toward Syrian refugees is evident from the following statement: “In the past, those coming from Bulgaria and such were different because they were Turks. Right upon entry, our state gave citizenship to all who were Turks from Syria. The others were Arabs,” (LC9, Mamak, 33, Male). Although there is no truth to the belief that Turkmen could directly transition to Turkish citizenship due to being Turks, it’s clear that racial affiliations define this perspective.

A participant, who is a professional in a social field that allows direct interaction with both the local Turkish community and refugee groups, shares their observations as follows: “They generally exclude Arabs, and do it even more to Syrians. They embrace Turkmen more. Our community sees Turkmen and Syrians differently,” (LC12, Mamak, 48, Female). These statements suggest that racial similarity is a significant factor shaping the local Turkish community’s perspective toward refugee groups.

In the quotes above, the local Turkish community’s expressions of cultural superiority reveal a deep-seated belief that their values and norms are more advanced compared to those of Syrian refugees, whom they perceive as culturally “backward” and “crude.” This perspective aligns with Benedict Anderson’s (2016) concept of “imagined communities,” where nations are constructed around shared values, symbols, and historical narratives that unify people even when they don’t directly know each other. In Turkey, concepts such as “homeland, flag, honor, and army” are presented as central elements of Turkish national identity, with Syrian refugees often described as lacking these attributes, reinforcing the “us” versus “them” distinction within the national narrative.

However, Partha Chatterjee’s postcolonial critique expands this analysis by pointing out that the nationalism emerging in postcolonial states like Turkey often replicates the very power structures it aims to resist (Chatterjee Reference Chatterjee1986). Chatterjee argues that postcolonial nationalism tends to create internal hierarchies, marginalizing certain ethnic and cultural groups in much the same way that colonial powers did (Chatterjee Reference Chatterjee1986). In the Turkish context, this means that the project of nation-building—centered around Turkishness—has led to the exclusion of groups such as Syrian refugees, who are perceived as cultural outsiders despite shared religious ties. Syrian refugees, much like other marginalized groups, are placed in a subordinate position in the national hierarchy, revealing how Turkish nationalism has internalized and perpetuated colonial modes of exclusion.

The homogenization process negatively impacts the evaluation of cultural diversity and differences, viewing these differences as sources of social discord and conflict. Conversely, the coexistence of different cultural groups requires mutual tolerance and understanding (Walzer Reference Walzer1997). The homogenizing tendencies of Turkishness diminish the capacity to tolerate social diversity and differences, thereby paving the way for divisions and conflicts within society.

One of the most visible places where racist attitudes are observable is in neighborhood relations. In Turkey, the concept of neighborliness is romanticized and serves an important social function (Hatipoğlu and Alsavada Reference Hatipoğlu and Alsavada2022). In this context, neighborhood relations among different social groups are also crucial. However, this socially important structure is ineffective in intergroup relations. According to research findings, the local Turkish community’s willingness to live next to Syrian refugees is quite low (Saraçoğlu and Belanger Reference Saraçoğlu and Bélanger2021). Most of the individuals I interviewed also did not have a favorable view of such neighborliness. “I wouldn’t want to live with them. Nobody would. They are uncultured,” (LC21, Ümitköy, 60, Male) reflects the common attitude among the local community members I spoke with. This situation underscores the deeply ingrained prejudices against Syrians and how these prejudices lead to social exclusion. Bourdieu (Reference Bourdieu and Nice1977) mentions that symbolic violence is a form of communication that legitimizes, naturalizes, and sustains social hierarchies and power imbalances. Labeling Syrians as “uncultured” is an example of symbolic violence, reinforcing their place in the social hierarchy. “We don’t let them into our apartment. We decided collectively not to rent or sell to them. At the last meeting, we said neither to sell nor to rent,” (LC11, Mamak, 41, Female) illustrates that social exclusion and discrimination are endorsed not just at the individual level but also by communities and institutions.

Another prominent aspect of the local Turkish community’s view toward Syrian refugees is the notion of “superiority.” “I don’t see them as second or third class citizens but maybe it’s subconscious, I don’t know, we feel superior, there is something like that,” (LC1, Altındağ, 38, Male). This statement represents a significant observation about the subconscious sense of superiority and ethnic hierarchies. The words of this participant highlight the complex nature of power dynamics, social hierarchies, and identities between ethnic groups. The explanation shows how relations among ethnic groups in society are shaped not only by overt acts of racism but also by more subtle, subconscious feelings of superiority. This situation also points back to the concept of “symbolic violence,” where dominant groups maintain power and status in social structures through societal values and norms, indicative of how less powerful groups are oppressed (Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu and Nice1977).

The tendency to see oneself as superior naturally enhances the emphasis on assimilation as a method of integration. “I think they will integrate as they become like us, become Turkified. But according to us, it’s also not acceptable for them to continue their own culture among themselves. Maybe over generations, integration could actually happen. Their culture will change, they will start to resemble us,” (LC12, Mamak, 48, Female). This quote expresses a common view on the acceptance of ethnic and cultural diversity and the process of integration in a society, while also highlighting the tense relationship between assimilation and multiculturalism. The participant believes that Syrian refugees need to develop cultural similarities to integrate into Turkish society, but acknowledges that this might conflict with the refugees maintaining their own cultural practices. This quote also points to tendencies toward homogenization in social integration processes; newcomers are expected to adopt the norms and values of the mainstream society and over time resemble “us.” However, this can imply a complete melting away of a culture and assimilation, which often opposes the ideals of interculturalism.

The above statement also sparks a discussion on how integration policies should be designed. It highlights the importance of intercultural approaches that allow for the preservation of minority cultures while promoting social harmony and mutual understanding. It also recalls criticisms of the effectiveness of multicultural policies in making concrete interventions and combating racism and discrimination. In this context, the statement reflects ongoing debates about the integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey and how cultural diversity should be managed, showing that these debates are deeply connected not only to social policies but also to the fundamental ideological and cultural values of society.

Exclusion Created by Racism

“Do you know how they look at us? As if we’re at a lower level than their own,” (R2, Altındağ, 28, Male); “They look at me badly. They treat me very badly,” (R9, Mamak, 28, Female); “Sometimes you can just tell by the way people look at you,” (R8, Mamak, 30, Male) state participants who are more distressed by people’s stares than verbal and physical exclusion. Another participant, who doesn’t want to go outside their residential area, emphasizes the looks as the reason: “We don’t go out because they stare. They stare when we speak Arabic,” (R19, Altındağ, 33, Male). The exclusion and racism felt by migrants are not limited to explicit verbal or physical attacks but are also manifested through the stares and behaviors of community members. Goffman (Reference Goffman1986) argues that stigmatization originates not only from overt discriminatory actions but also from more subtle, everyday social interactions. How individuals look at each other in a society can provide significant insights into the quality of social relations and the general attitude toward stigmatized groups.

“People get mad when we speak Arabic,” (R3, Altındağ, 42, Male) remarked one participant, reflecting how language becomes a marker of exclusion in Turkish society. Another participant, recalling experiences at work, noted, “the boss at work doesn’t want us to speak Arabic,” (R6, Altındağ, 30, Male), illustrating how even in professional settings, Arabic is stigmatized. The same individual recounted a violent incident: “They beat up my friend for speaking Arabic on the bus,” referencing the Altındağ AttacksFootnote ² and how these events have led to fear, “after those incidents, I no longer speak Arabic on the bus or in crowded places” (R6, Altındağ, 30, Male). Another participant added: “When we speak Arabic on the bus, people shout at us, it happens every day. When we speak Arabic, they look at us as if we are swearing. We speak quietly, everyone speaks, but they tell us to be quiet, to stop talking,” (R1, Altındağ, 29, Male). These testimonies demonstrate how speaking Arabic has become a marker of racialized identity, interwoven with exclusionary and discriminatory practices in Turkish society.

The stigmatization of the Arabic language in everyday interactions reflects the broader racialization of Arab identity within Turkish social and cultural contexts. The use of Arabic is not only perceived as a linguistic difference but is deeply tied to ethnic hierarchies, where speaking Arabic signifies an “otherness” that is met with hostility and discrimination. These instances of exclusion, from public transportation to workplaces, reveal how Arabic speakers—predominantly Syrian refugees—are marginalized not solely based on nationality but through the racialized framing of their language and culture.

This racialization of the Arab identity extends beyond verbal or physical confrontations; it underscores a systemic issue wherein language becomes a visible marker of cultural inferiority, reinforcing the racial hierarchy that places Arab identity as subordinate to Turkishness. These daily interactions reveal how language functions as a site of power, where the ability to speak Arabic openly is curtailed by social norms that deem it unacceptable in public spaces. The exclusionary practices against Arabic speakers reflect not just personal prejudice but a broader societal framework that racializes Arab identity, posing substantial challenges to social cohesion and integration.

“In places like these, for instance, there are no Syrians; they just come here to beg. That’s why these are peaceful, clean places,” says the participant (LC21, Ümitköy, 60, Male). This participant’s stark comments about the areas inhabited by Syrian refugees can be seen as a typical representation of the local Turkish community. The description of these places as “clean” and “peaceful” suggests that the presence of Syrian refugees is coded as “dirty” and “disturbed,” thus perpetuating spatial segregation and exclusion.

These negative perceptions and attitudes are linked to the effects of the ideology of Turkishness. Particularly during Turkey’s modernization process and in the construction of national identity, Turkishness ideology has been used to reinforce the perception of the ethnic “other.” A historical perspective on the formation of the “us” and “them” dichotomy has developed during the construction of national identity, serving the practice of social discrimination and exclusion (Kurtiş Yalçınkaya, and Adams Reference Kurtiş, Yalçınkaya and Adams2018). This dichotomy also plays a decisive role in the Turkish community’s perception of Syrian refugees and underlies the negative attitudes toward this group. Particularly in the perception of Syrian refugees, this concept of “the other” is often further reinforced through cultural characteristics associated with the Arab ethnic identity and the Islamic religion. The close association of Turkishness ideology with ethnic homogeneity and nationalism creates a continuity in negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees. This continuity manifests itself in political and social structures that aim to balance the preservation of Turkish identity and the exclusion of “the other.” This situation emphasizes that multiculturalism and integration policies need to develop more effective strategies not just to celebrate cultural diversity and differences, but also to combat the forms of racism and discrimination produced by ethnic and nationalist ideologies.