Conflict prevention, management and resolution as a framework for the PSC’s IHL mandate

As the preamble of the PSC Protocol underlines, “no single internal factor has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the Continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between our States”.Footnote ¹⁶ It was on the basis of this observation that the African heads of State and government entrusted the AU, in its Constitutive Act, with the mandate to “promote peace, security, and stability on the continent”.Footnote ¹⁷ This mandate has rightly been described by some commentators as “the raison d’être of the organization”.Footnote ¹⁸ To enable the AU to fulfil this mission, the PSC Protocol established the Council as the central mechanism responsible for conflict prevention, management and resolution. An analysis of the relevant provisions reveals that the PSC’s mandate explicitly incorporates the promotion and protection of IHL, a feature that marks a notable specificity compared to other regional and universal organizations. Indeed, Article 3(f) of the Protocol identifies among the PSC’s objectives the duty to “promote and encourage … respect for … international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts”. The fact that this reference to IHL is enshrined in a constitutive instrument, carrying binding legal force, rather than in a mere political declaration, and that it goes beyond a generic mention of international law, highlights the particular role that IHL is intended to play in shaping and implementing the PSC’s mandate. Placed within the provisions relating to objectives, the reference in Article 3(f) links respect for IHL primarily to conflict prevention efforts, reflecting the idea that promoting humanitarian rules helps prevent escalation and reduces the risk of a slide into armed hostilities.

This logic is consistent with the “Resolution on Respect for International Humanitarian Law and Support for Humanitarian Action in Armed Conflicts”,Footnote ¹⁹ adopted at the 60th Ordinary Session of the OAU, in which the organization

Here, respect for IHL is also conceived as a lever for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Taken together, these two formulations – the one in the PSC Protocol and the other in the OAU Resolution – reflect a complementary and systemic conception of the role of IHL as promoted by the AU: upstream, it operates as a tool of prevention, while downstream, it serves as a vector of settlement and reconciliation.

Commenting on Article 3(f) mentioned above, Gus Waschefort has argued that “[r]espect for IHL cannot realistically be seen as an element of efforts to prevent conflicts”.Footnote ²¹ Indeed, the primary purpose of IHL is not to prevent or resolve armed conflicts; rather, IHL is designed to regulate their conduct, on the one hand by limiting the use of armed violence to what is necessary to weaken the enemy’s military potential, and on the other by protecting persons who are not, or are no longer, taking part in hostilities.Footnote ²² It follows that IHL does not prohibit the resort to armed violence, let alone armed conflicts as such.Footnote ²³ The prevention and resolution of armed conflicts in fact belong to a different branch of international law, jus ad bellum, which prohibits the use of force in international relationsFootnote ²⁴ and defines the exceptions to that prohibition.Footnote ²⁵ This body of law must be distinguished from IHL, or jus in bello, which, far from prohibiting armed conflicts, sets out the humanitarian rules applicable to their conduct.Footnote ²⁶

The express reference to IHL in the context of conflict prevention efforts, as contained in Article 3(f) of the PSC Protocol, thus reflects an original approach on the part of the AU. It demonstrates a willingness to articulate the rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in a systemic manner, by considering that the promotion of respect for IHL can, indirectly, help create conditions for de-escalation and thereby contribute to the prevention or resolution of certain conflicts.

However, although IHL does not have as its primary objective the prevention or resolution of armed conflicts, it must be acknowledged that knowledge of, and compliance with, its principles and rules can, to some extent, contribute to such an outcome. Taught already in times of peace, the principles of IHL can help not only to prepare actors to conduct hostilities in accordance with humanitarian rules, but also to disseminate broader values such as solidarity, respect for others, tolerance, mutual respect and peace.Footnote ²⁷ When these values are embedded in social and institutional behaviour in pre-conflict situations, they can mitigate tensions, reduce the risk of escalation and thereby foster the establishment of a climate of peace.Footnote ²⁸

Moreover, violations of IHL are today regarded as threats to international peace and security, including when they occur in the context of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), due to the destabilizing effects of such violations on neighbouring countries and, at times, on entire regions.Footnote ²⁹ From this perspective, respect for IHL can help prevent the expansion or regionalization of an armed conflict.

In addition, the effective implementation of certain IHL provisions can foster rapprochement between parties engaged in an armed conflict and, in turn, help restore a climate of trust. For instance, Article 10(4) of Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, annexed to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, provides that

Effective cooperation in implementing this provision could contribute to restoring confidence between the belligerents and, consequently, help to prevent a potential resumption of hostilities between them.Footnote ³⁰

Thus, while IHL is not primarily intended to prevent conflicts, its respect can nonetheless have preventive effects and facilitate post-conflict reconciliation. These observations must, however, be situated within a broader doctrinal debate on the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Scholarly debate has long been divided over whether jus ad bellum and jus in bello should be kept strictly separate or whether they may interact in certain situations. Whereas some authors insist on a watertight separation between the two in order to guarantee impartial protection for victims,Footnote ³¹ others argue that the illegality of a war of aggression necessarily produces legal consequences, either through the continuing application of jus ad bellum throughout the conflictFootnote ³² or through the denial to the aggressor of certain belligerent rights while maintaining humanitarian guarantees.Footnote ³³ Although this debate does not directly address the idea that IHL may have preventive effects (such as reducing the escalation of violence or limiting the recurrence of hostilities), it nonetheless highlights that the separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is not impermeable. In this sense, it may be accepted that compliance with IHL, while remaining autonomous in its humanitarian purpose, produces effects that converge with some of the objectives of jus ad bellum, notably by helping to limit the escalation of violence and to foster the restoration of peace. The AU’s approach thus reflects a systemic articulation between the rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, insofar as it considers that the promotion of respect for IHL can, indirectly, contribute to creating conditions for de-escalation and to fostering a sustainable peace. It is precisely this potential impact that justifies the PSC’s competence, within its mandate to promote peace, security and stability, to undertake measures aimed at “promoting” and “encouraging” respect for IHL.

The terms “promote” and “encourage” generally refer, in institutional practice, to activities such as awareness-raising, training or advocacy, thereby situating this objective primarily within a register of proactive but non-coercive measures.Footnote ³⁴ Their use thus appears, at first sight, to orient the PSC’s action toward initiatives aimed at disseminating and strengthening adherence to IHL, without necessarily implying the exercise of coercive powers. In the specific context of the PSC Protocol and the PSC’s mandate, however, the ordinary meaning of “promote” and “encourage” may be expanded. Embedded in a legally binding instrument and entrusted to a permanent decision-making body whose competences are not confined to specific subject areas but extend across its objectives (including the imposition of sanctions, the suspension of member States, and the authorization of peace support operations), these terms can reasonably be interpreted as encompassing coercive measures designed to foster compliance with IHL. Such measures may include diplomatic pressure, sanctions or the suspension of participation rights, insofar as they aim to ensure that States align their conduct with humanitarian obligations, prevent violations, and repress violations that occur.Footnote ³⁵ That said, any interpretation suggesting that respect for IHL alone could serve as an autonomous legal basis for the use of force must be approached with considerable caution, as the use of military means to compel respect for humanitarian law raises complex legal, political and ethical questionsFootnote ³⁶ and would remain subject to the strict conditions governing the use of force under both the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act, particularly Article 4(h). While serious violations of IHL may constitute war crimes and thereby fall within the situations envisaged under Article 4(h), the PSC’s mandate to “promote” and “encourage” respect for IHL would not in itself create an independent legal ground for military intervention. Although the reference to the promotion and encouragement of respect for IHL is primarily addressed to AU member States as the immediate addressees of obligations arising from the PSC Protocol and the Council’s decisions, its scope may not be so narrowly confined. IHL itself imposes direct obligations on non-State armed groups (NSAGs), notably under Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II (AP II) and customary international law, all of which bind parties to NIAC. Substantively, limiting the PSC’s action with regard to the promotion of respect for IHL to States alone would deprive Article 3(f) of much of its practical relevance, given that NSAGs are also, and indeed frequently, associated with the gravest violations of IHL.Footnote ³⁷ Moreover, PSC practice confirms this broader reading: in its decisions and in the mandates of its peace operations, it regularly calls upon NSAGs to respect IHL and to ensure humanitarian access.Footnote ³⁸ Accordingly, the objective set out in Article 3(f) must be understood as encompassing PSC action aimed at influencing the behaviour of NSAGs, whether directly or through States and mandated missions.

Beyond Article 3(f), Article 4(c) of the PSC Protocol lists, among the principles guiding its action, “respect for … international humanitarian law”. Articles 3(f) and 4(c) are mutually reinforcing. The former establishes a specific mission – “to promote and encourage” respect for IHL – which may give rise to targeted initiatives such as training programmes, humanitarian clauses in mandates or political interventions. The latter, by contrast, elevates IHL to the rank of a general principle guiding all decisions and initiatives of the organ. As a result, every action of the PSC – whether in conflict prevention, management or resolution – must be designed and implemented in conformity with this legal framework.

The principle set out in Article 4(c) reinforces the normative weight of Article 3(f) insofar as, in the law of international organizations, guiding principles enshrined in constitutive acts or organic protocols operate as interpretative norms.Footnote ³⁹ Applied in this context, the reference to respect for IHL in Article 4(c) confirms that the obligation in Article 3(f) must be understood not merely as a political aspiration, but as a norm that guides and legitimizes the acts adopted by the PSC. This combination creates a dual normative anchoring: IHL is both an explicit mission and a benchmark for evaluating the conformity of PSC acts. It follows that, whatever the nature of the decision (whether it involves authorizing a peace mission, imposing sanctions, suspending a State’s participation or formulating recommendations), respect for IHL, where relevant, must be considered ex ante as a criterion of evaluation and safeguarded ex post throughout the implementation phase. In this way, IHL becomes a guiding thread: it requires the PSC to avoid any action likely to directly or indirectly facilitate serious violations, and to prioritize operational options most consistent with humanitarian obligations.

This combination appears relatively original in a regional context. Unlike the European Union (EU) or the Organization of American States, whose security mechanisms are more intergovernmental in nature and do not explicitly incorporate IHL into their constitutive texts, the AU has endowed itself with a permanent collective security organ – the PSC – whose mandate expressly integrates respect for IHL as both an objective and a guiding principle. Similarly, the United Nations (UN) Security Council is not governed by a constitutive text that mentions respect for IHL or human rights as objectives or guiding principles; its references to these bodies of law in resolutions arise in the exercise of its mandate to maintain international peace and security, without stemming from an explicit normative authorization in the UN Charter.

Beyond its overarching responsibility for conflict prevention, management and resolution, the PSC’s IHL mandate is further grounded in the explicit role entrusted to it in the field of humanitarian action, as set out in the PSC Protocol.

Humanitarian action as an operational dimension of the PSC’s IHL mandate

Article 6(f) of the PSC Protocol provides that the Council “shall perform functions in … [the area of] humanitarian action”. This formulation is both significant and problematic. It is significant not only because it recognizes a competence of the PSC in this area, but also because it explicitly incorporates humanitarian action into the mandate of a collective security organ – an orientation that is relatively original in the regional context, where comparable organizations generally do not accord such a prominent role to humanitarian matters. It reflects a determination to respond to long-standing criticisms of the AU’s dependence on international actors by asserting the continental organization’s capacity to develop its own instruments and to take ownership of the humanitarian management of African crises.Footnote ⁴⁰

In doing so, Article 6(f) establishes a direct link between the PSC and a core domain of IHL, namely the protection and assistance of victims of armed conflict. IHL explicitly recognizes the right of civilian populations to receive impartial aid and imposes on parties to the conflict the obligation to facilitate such assistance.Footnote ⁴¹ Yet, this integration is not without criticism: many humanitarian actors argue that the involvement of political organs, such as the PSC, in the management or supervision of humanitarian assistance carries the risk of blurring the line between humanitarian imperatives and political or security objectivesFootnote ⁴² – an issue to which this analysis will return below.

The wording of Article 6(f) also raises important questions. The provision merely states that the PSC “shall perform functions” in this field, without specifying what those responsibilities entail, nor outlining their modalities or limits. This results in uncertainty as to the exact scope of the competence: does it cover only a role of facilitation and coordination? Does it also encompass a mandate to supervise humanitarian operations in order to ensure their conformity with IHL? Does it even include the authority to impose measures on member States to guarantee humanitarian access, or to sanction those who obstruct it? The absence of clarification thus leaves room for variable interpretations and, potentially, for uneven or selective implementation depending on the context.

A systemic reading of the PSC Protocol, however, helps to nuance this impression of indeterminacy. Other provisions, when read in conjunction with Article 6(f), contribute to clarifying the range of measures that the PSC may undertake in the field of humanitarian action. This is the case with Article 7(p), which appears among the PSC’s powers and provides that the Council, together with the chairperson of the AU Commission, shall “support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict”. This provision gives more concrete substance to the general competence set out in Article 6(f). The verbs “support” and “facilitate” should be read in light of the Council’s institutional nature: as a political and security organ, it does not merely assist the delivery of aid but helps to remove obstacles to, and establish the enabling environment for, humanitarian action. In this sense, its role may be interpreted as extending to contributing to the creation of the political, security and legal conditions necessary for humanitarian aid to effectively reach the civilian populations concerned. It is arguably on this normative basis – although not explicitly highlighted in the relevant decisions – that the establishment of an African Humanitarian Agency (AfHA) has been envisaged, the institutionalization of which is currently under way.Footnote ⁴³ This agency is expected to serve as the AU’s operational tool for coordinating, strengthening and, where necessary, directly undertaking humanitarian action on the continent, in complementarity with international actors but with a clear ambition of African ownership.Footnote ⁴⁴

Moreover, Article 15 of the PSC Protocol, which is specifically entitled “Humanitarian Action”, clarifies and deepens the humanitarian function already mentioned in Article 6(f) by giving it a concrete operational dimension. The first paragraph of Article 15 provides that the PSC shall “take active part in coordinating and conducting humanitarian action in order to restore life to normalcy in the event of conflicts”. This formulation presents a dual significance: on the one hand, it confirms that humanitarian action falls fully within the mandate of the PSC, which is therefore not confined to a role of political guidance or advocacy, while on the other, it anchors this role in a post-crisis perspective aimed at re-establishing living conditions for affected populations. In the context of armed conflict, this dimension directly reflects the purposes of IHL, which are not limited to regulating hostilities but also seek to protect victims and, as noted above, can contribute to the reconstruction of living conditions after the end of fighting.

The second paragraph of Article 15 reinforces this operational dimension by providing that the PSC shall “develop its own capacity to efficiently undertake humanitarian action”. Here, the text goes beyond mere coordination with external actors and affirms a competence for direct action. This provision reflects the intention to anchor humanitarian action within the AU’s own means, which may involve the establishment of specialized human resources, tailored procedures, and solid institutional partnerships. It may therefore be regarded as a normative foundation justifying the creation of an AfHA within the AU framework.Footnote ⁴⁵

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 15 also link this competence to the role of the African Standby Force, which must be adequately equipped to undertake humanitarian activities in its mission areas under the control of the chairperson of the AU Commission, and to facilitate the work of humanitarian agencies in those same areas. This articulation is significant for operationalizing the PSC’s IHL mandate under Article 3(f): by equipping the ASF to conduct and facilitate humanitarian activities, the PSC Protocol creates institutional capacity both to support the parties’ fulfilment of their IHL obligations and to contribute to monitoring compliance by actual parties as a basis for potential PSC enforcement action. From an IHL perspective, this linkage is important because it positions AU peace operations as both facilitators and observers of IHL compliance: their mandates are designed to give effect to the humanitarian obligations of States under IHL, particularly the facilitation of impartial humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians and relief personnel, and the preservation of a humanitarian space consistent with IHL principles.Footnote ⁴⁶ While the ASF, as a non-party to the conflict, is not itself legally bound by IHL in most circumstances, these provisions remain relevant in that they ensure institutional readiness. They anticipate and reaffirm the obligations that would apply should AU peace operations become parties to an armed conflict – that is, once the factual criteria for that status are met, such operations must then comply with the applicable rules of IHL, including those incumbent upon parties to facilitate impartial humanitarian relief and to protect civilians and humanitarian personnel.

A major uncertainty remains, however: Article 13(3)(c) of the PSC Protocol merely provides that the ASF may be deployed for humanitarian assistance “to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas and natural disasters”, without specifying the nature of the humanitarian functions entrusted to the ASF or the modalities of their implementation. Planning documents relating to the ASF do mention the existence of a civilian component capable of assuming humanitarian tasks, but only in broad terms, without clarifying the origin of the resources.Footnote ⁴⁷ Are these capacities meant to be developed within the AU’s own deployed forces, provided by specialized agencies (such as the AfHA currently being established), or mobilized from international partners? The publicly available draft Statute of the AfHA offers some important clarifications by creating a specialized institution with a clear mandate to coordinate humanitarian action, by providing for financing mechanisms primarily rooted in AU resources, and by envisaging that member States will contribute national capacities to a continental pool.Footnote ⁴⁸ In this way, it begins to address the long-standing criticism of over-reliance on external donors and underscores a determination to institutionalize African-owned humanitarian responses.Footnote ⁴⁹ Yet, the Statute stops short of resolving all uncertainties. It does not clearly define how AfHA will interface with ASF deployments, whether it will directly supply the civilian experts needed for humanitarian tasks in the field, or how operational coordination and rapid deployment will be structured in practice. The risk of fragmentation therefore remains: while the AfHA marks a step forward in terms of institutional ownership, its relationship with existing ASF frameworks and its ability to guarantee predictable, autonomous humanitarian capacities still require further clarification and political consolidation.

Article 15(4) of the PSC Protocol enshrines a positive obligation of facilitation that reflects the IHL provisions requiring parties to a conflict to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance for populations in need. While AU forces deployed as non-parties to the conflict are not themselves bound by these provisions, their mandate to facilitate such access establishes institutional capacity both to support the parties’ fulfilment of their IHL obligations and to enable the PSC to monitor compliance as a basis for potential enforcement action. Moreover, this mandate ensures that should AU peace operations acquire party status, the institutional practices and operational capabilities necessary for IHL compliance would already be in place.

Thus, Article 15 of the PSC Protocol usefully adds specificity to the general formulation of Article 6(f), by defining more concrete functions in the humanitarian field and linking them to the AU’s operational capacities. However, this clarification remains partial: while the text identifies coordination, direct implementation and facilitation of humanitarian action as functions of the PSC and the ASF, it does not establish the criteria or procedures necessary to ensure that such activities comply with IHL. Nor does it provide guidance on how to resolve potential conflicts of priorities between the security objectives of missions and humanitarian imperatives. To address these shortcomings, it would be necessary to develop specific guidelines governing the humanitarian action of the PSC, the ASF and the AfHA, explicitly integrating IHL obligationsFootnote ⁵⁰ and establishing mechanisms for close coordination with impartial humanitarian actors. Such an initiative could be undertaken, in particular, by the AU Commission in collaboration with the AU Commission on International Law, with the contribution of external actors specialized in the field.

That said, the fact that political organs such as the PSC – and, in the future, potentially the AfHA currently under review – are entrusted with humanitarian responsibilities has unsurprisingly raised reservations among humanitarian actors.Footnote ⁵¹ These actors emphasize the risk that embedding humanitarian action within a politico-security mandate may blur the line between impartial assistance and political action, thereby undermining the perceived neutrality and independence of humanitarian actors.Footnote ⁵² It is in this context that the project of creating the AfHA acquires its full significance. In principle, a specialized agency operating in line with international humanitarian standards should help alleviate these concerns by providing a more autonomous and technical framework, but the fact that the AfHA would remain institutionally attached to the AU and under the authority of its political organs may constrain this autonomy and perpetuate certain ambiguities regarding its impartiality and neutrality.

While humanitarian action constitutes a central component of the PSC’s IHL mandate, this mandate equally encompasses another major responsibility: the prevention of, protection against and response to serious crimes and other violations of that legal regime.

Responsibility for the prevention of, protection against and response to serious crimes and violations of IHL

One of the clearest links between the PSC’s operational mandate and IHL is found in Article 7(e) of the PSC Protocol, which empowers the PSC to recommend to the AU Assembly intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a member State in respect of grave circumstances, including war crimes, which constitute serious violations of IHL. This power does not originate solely from the Protocol; it builds on Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, which enshrines the Union’s right to intervene in a member State in such circumstances. The Protocol goes further, however, by explicitly assigning to the PSC the responsibility to recommend such measures and by elevating, within its statement of guiding principles, this right of intervention into a normative foundation of its action.

Although this competence has never been exercised in practice (an issue that will be revisited below), it constitutes a major innovationFootnote ⁵³ in that the commission of war crimes – that is, serious violations of IHL – serves as a legal threshold for triggering collective intervention by the AU. IHL thus functions not only as a normative framework for protection, but also as a structuring element of Africa’s crisis response mechanism, providing the very legal basis for the organization’s strongest coercive measure. This articulation, set out in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act and reiterated in the PSC Protocol, distinguishes the African approach from that of other regional systems and even from the UN Security Council, none of which have explicitly elevated IHL into a criterion for intervention.

Inserted in response to long-standing criticisms of the OAU’s inaction in the face of mass atrocities in the 1990s, this provision represents a normative innovation without equivalent in the founding instruments of other international organizations. It grants the AU an autonomous right of intervention to prevent or halt the commission of the most serious international crimes, including war crimes that fall squarely within the ambit of IHL. While this provision emerged in a context of growing recognition of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P), the legal status of which remains contested,Footnote ⁵⁴ Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act carries binding force in African regional law, thereby accentuating its distinctiveness.

The provision does not, however, specify the modalities of intervention. While it is widely accepted that such intervention may take the form of military action consistent with Chapter VII of the UN Charter,Footnote ⁵⁵ it can also be understood to encompass the establishment of a regional jurisdiction specifically mandated to prosecute international crimes, including war crimes.Footnote ⁵⁶ This interpretation is supported by the preamble of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which explicitly links the Court’s competence over international crimes – including war crimes – to the AU’s recognized right to intervene in such grave circumstances.Footnote ⁵⁷

It is also possible to establish a link between these provisions and Article 7(1)(m) of the PSC Protocol, which empowers the PSC, together with the chairperson of the AU Commission, to “follow-up, within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities, the progress towards … respect for … international humanitarian law by Member States”. This monitoring mandate places the PSC in a normative oversight role, enabling it to identify violations, alert the AU Assembly and potentially recommend corrective or even coercive measures. This role is to be exercised in particular through the Continental Early Warning System, which collects and analyzes relevant information before transmitting it to the chairperson of the AU Commission,Footnote ⁵⁸ who in turn communicates it to the PSC in order to support the formulation of recommendations,Footnote ⁵⁹ including on IHL compliance. In theory, this prerogative could be exercised proactively, for instance by establishing a regular reporting mechanism or by integrating IHL-related indicators into crisis assessments. In practice, however, such monitoring appears to be sporadic and is often triggered by major crises rather than by continuous observation. No precise information is publicly available regarding the effective implementation of this responsibility – an original feature in itself, since few constitutive instruments, whether of regional organizations of comparable scale or even of international organizations, formulate so explicitly a mandate to monitor compliance with IHL.

Furthermore, the PSC Protocol provides that “[t]raining on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, with particular emphasis on the rights of women and children, shall be an integral part of the training”Footnote ⁶⁰ of ASF personnel. This requirement reflects the AU’s commitment to integrating IHL from the earliest stages of troop preparation, so as to ensure that their actions comply with humanitarian norms and to prevent them from becoming a source of violations themselves. In addition, to support member States affected by armed conflicts, the PSC is tasked with undertaking various peace consolidation activities, including “consolidation of the peace agreements that have been negotiated”.Footnote ⁶¹ Such agreements frequently contain provisions related to IHL (such as compliance with ceasefires, the repatriation of prisoners of war or the protection of civilians), thus requiring the PSC to ensure their respect and effective implementation.Footnote ⁶² The PSC Protocol also mandates the PSC to oversee the “implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration [DDR] programmes, including those for child soldiers”.Footnote ⁶³ Although IHL does not directly regulate DDR or impose specific obligations to conduct such programmes, this mandate nevertheless resonates with several IHL obligations relating to the protection of children in armed conflict, most notably the prohibitions on recruiting or using children under 15 years of age in hostilities, the duty to ensure their care and protection, and the obligation to facilitate family reunification.Footnote ⁶⁴ This IHL-based child protection framework is further translated into operational guidance for DDR through a range of influential soft-law instruments which, while not deriving their authority from IHL, build upon and operationalize its underlying norms in peace operations and stabilization contexts.Footnote ⁶⁵ In the same spirit, the PSC must work toward the “resettlement and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons”Footnote ⁶⁶ and provide “assistance to vulnerable persons, including children, the elderly, women and other traumatized groups in the society”.Footnote ⁶⁷ This latter provision, moreover, connects with the humanitarian assistance functions analyzed earlier, confirming that IHL permeates multiple dimensions of the PSC’s mandate, whether in prevention, management or post-conflict recovery.

Finally, other provisions of the PSC Protocol, although they do not explicitly mention IHL, can nonetheless be mobilized to support the PSC’s role in promoting and ensuring respect for IHL. This is the case, for example, with paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 7, which concern respectively the deployment and the mandate of peace support operations, or paragraph (k), which relates to cooperation with the UN and other international and regional organizations. In the context of peace operations, the integration of IHL is unavoidable, both to ensure compliance by deployed forces and to guarantee the protection of civilian populations. Likewise, cooperation with the UN Security Council or with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can strengthen the coherence and effectiveness of interventions, particularly in securing respect for IHL and facilitating humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict. Moreover, the residual flexibility of the PSC’s mandate further reinforces this interpretative space. Article 6(g) authorizes the PSC to “decide on any other issue having implications for the maintenance of peace, security and stability on the Continent”, while Article 7(1)(g) empowers it to perform “any other function as may be decided by the Assembly”. Read together, these provisions provide a broad and adaptable legal basis enabling the PSC to address emerging humanitarian challenges and to integrate evolving forms of IHL promotion or humanitarian engagement, including in response to contemporary realities such as cyber operations or the activities of transnational armed non-State actors.

Thus, the PSC’s mandate in the field of IHL is not only explicit but also broad, grounded in the Council’s overarching responsibility for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and further articulated through its specific roles in supporting humanitarian action and in preventing and responding to serious crimes and violations of IHL. Yet this very breadth raises a crucial question: does the PSC possess the political, institutional and operational means to effectively discharge such an ambitious mandate? The answer can only be found by turning to its practice, which reveals both significant efforts and enduring shortcomings.

The limited contribution of PSC communiqués to strengthening respect for IHL

One of the main instruments through which the PSC exercises its mandate to monitor and promote respect for IHL is the adoption of communiqués relating to situations of armed conflict on the continent. These communiqués constitute the Council’s primary institutional vehicle of action but their content is far from uniform, ranging from purely declaratory statements to more prescriptive injunctions and, in particularly grave situations, support for accountability or monitoring mechanisms. At times, communiqués are confined to general political or normative statements – for example, condemning violations,Footnote ⁶⁸ reaffirming specific obligations under IHLFootnote ⁶⁹ or urging compliance.Footnote ⁷⁰ In other instances, they take a more prescriptive tone by demanding accountability for breaches,Footnote ⁷¹ insisting on unimpeded humanitarian access and the protection of humanitarian personnelFootnote ⁷² or facilitating humanitarian action in conflict settings.Footnote ⁷³ In particularly serious situations, the Council has gone further by supporting the establishment of accountability mechanisms – most notably the AU Commission of Inquiry on South SudanFootnote ⁷⁴ and, subsequently, the envisaged creation of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan to prosecute war crimes and other serious violations, although the latter’s establishment remains pendingFootnote ⁷⁵ – and by mandating monitoring instruments, including observer deployments.Footnote ⁷⁶

The PSC’s constitutive instruments do not explicitly clarify the legal nature or binding force of these efforts. Yet, drawing on the characterization of the PSC as a “standing decision-making organ” of the AU,Footnote ⁷⁷ on the explicit language of its decision-making mandateFootnote ⁷⁸ and on the general obligation of member States to comply with the policies of the Union under pain of sanctions,Footnote ⁷⁹ it can be inferred that such decisions carry binding force for member States and AU organs alike. Thus, whether couched as political communiqués or as binding decisions, these acts articulate the institutional will of the Union and shape the diplomatic, humanitarian or coercive measures that may subsequently follow.

This continuum of responses reflects both the flexibility and the limitations of the PSC’s engagement with IHL. On the one hand, the range of instruments allows the Council to tailor its reactions to the specific dynamics of each conflict. On the other hand, the reliance on declaratory or intermediate measures, with limited follow-up, often dilutes the impact of its action and raises doubts about its capacity to ensure effective compliance with IHL on the ground.

The diversity of these instruments reflects the multiple functions simultaneously fulfilled by the PSC’s communiqués. The normative function of the communiqués consists in recalling the obligations arising from IHL and, in some cases, clarifying the scope of those obligations. Through repeated reminders of the principles of distinction and proportionality and the obligation to protect humanitarian personnel, the PSC acts as an institutional relay for universal norms; in doing so, it contributes not only to maintaining those norms’ visibility within the African context and consolidating their normative authority, but also to strengthening their customary value and binding force. The political function of the communiqués is inseparable from this role: by publicly condemning violations and at times naming those responsible, they exert diplomatic pressure that stigmatizes conduct contrary to IHL and fuels accountability dynamics within the AU and beyond.

A preventive function may also be discerned, though in a more limited sense. By consistently condemning violations and recalling applicable obligations, the PSC may contribute to deterring further breaches and to creating a normative environment in which compliance with IHL is framed as a condition of political legitimacy. Finally, the communiqués assume an operational function when they trigger or support the activation of concrete mechanisms such as commissions of inquiry, human rights observer missions or fact-finding processes, as examined in greater detail below. These mechanisms are intended to document violations, verify compliance with obligations and, where appropriate, lay the groundwork for the adoption of sanctions or other coercive measures.

In practice, these various functions are not compartmentalized but intertwine within the same document, as a communiqué may simultaneously recall norms, condemn violations, warn of sanctions and order the establishment of monitoring mechanisms. The result is a continuum of graduated actions, enabling the PSC to adapt its response to the severity of violations observed and to adjust its interventions in line with the evolving dynamics of humanitarian crises, as the South Sudan example below demonstrates.

This functional spectrum directly reflects the obligation, set out in Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions (common Article 1), to “respect and ensure respect” for IHL in all circumstances. By recalling the rules, condemning violations, exerting diplomatic pressure, deterring unlawful conduct and activating monitoring or sanctioning mechanisms, the AU, through its PSC, gives concrete meaning to the requirement to ensure respect for IHL. It is not merely a recipient of these obligations but becomes one of their collective guarantors, assuming part of the international responsibility incumbent upon States Parties to ensure the effectiveness of this normative corpus.

The communiqué of the PSC’s 411th meeting, held in Banjul (Gambia) on 30 December 2013,Footnote ⁸⁰ provides a particularly illustrative example of the integration of IHL into an official act of the Council. This document was adopted in the context of the outbreak, in mid-December 2013, of a NIAC in South Sudan between government forces and opposition groups, marked by intense fighting, massacres of civilians, and widespread attacks on civilian infrastructure. Based on a report on the situation by the former chairperson of the AU Commission, the PSC explicitly condemned the violations of IHL committed by the parties and enjoined them to “ensure the protection of the civilian population and humanitarian workers”,Footnote ⁸¹ to “refrain from any further acts of violence and other violations of human rights and International Humanitarian Law”,Footnote ⁸² and to “ensure unhindered and secured humanitarian access to the populations in need”.Footnote ⁸³

This example clearly illustrates how the PSC integrates IHL into its decision-making language: not only does it reiterate the fundamental norms applicable to armed conflicts, but it reformulates them as explicit political injunctions, directly addressed to the parties to the conflict. In doing so, the Council does not create new obligations but rather acts as an institutional vector of existing norms, projecting them into the register of African political decision-making. It thereby contributes to giving regional effect to the obligation, enshrined in common Article 1, to “respect and ensure respect” for IHL in all circumstances, by transforming universal legal prescriptions into concrete political imperatives. Through this normative relay role, the PSC reaffirms the centrality of humanitarian law in Africa’s response to crises and consolidates its status as an indispensable reference point for security governance on the continent.

However, despite their clear recall of certain fundamental obligations, the clarity of their injunctions, and the strength of their condemnations, the concrete impact of PSC communiqués remains limited. Admittedly, the Council’s decisions must, under the PSC Protocol and the AU Constitutive Act, be understood as binding on member States; in practice, however, most of the instruments adopted take the form of declaratory communiqués, whose legal force remains ambiguous and whose implementation often depends on political will. Although the PSC occasionally resorts to measures with a more coercive dimension (most notably sanctions or suspensions in cases of unconstitutional changes of government, and sometimes the authorization of peace operations), such measures have not been employed in response specifically to violations of IHL. By contrast, the numerous injunctions addressed directly to belligerents generally retain a primarily political and moral dimension. The PSC’s interventions thus rely largely on the political and normative authority of the AU, an authority that is certainly significant within the continental space but is regularly undermined by the sovereignty of States and the persistent defiance of NSAGs. This absence of intrinsic legal constraint results in weak predictability regarding the implementation and follow-up of the measures recommended.

The case of South Sudan provides a striking illustration: the persistence, and even the worsening, of IHL violations in the years following the December 2013 communiqué highlights the gap between the reiteration of fundamental legal obligations and the absence of coercive measures or robust monitoring mechanisms. In practice, the PSC lacks an institutionalized system for monitoring compliance with IHL and rarely resorts to explicit pressure instruments grounded in this legal framework. Its capacities, both human and financial, remain limited,Footnote ⁸⁴ and even when investigative or monitoring mechanisms are established, their resourcing, methodology and visibility often prove uneven, thereby reducing their deterrent potential.

To this structural limitation must be added a drafting weakness: PSC communiqués frequently suffer from vague or overly general language, which leaves the targeted parties with considerable room for interpretation. Although some texts clearly reiterate obligations derived from the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (such as the protection of civilians, humanitarian access, or the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks), they often confine themselves to general exhortations, lacking details on the concrete measures to be adopted, the timelines to be respected, or the indicators to be used in assessing compliance. In many cases the PSC “strongly condemns” violations and “urgently calls” for their cessation, without specifying what concrete actions should be undertaken or providing for consequences in the event of non-compliance. This absence of operational prescriptions weakens the normative force of the texts and reduces their potential to transform the behaviour of belligerents. The example of the 2013 communiqué on South Sudan is telling: although it recalls key IHL principles, it does not define the mechanisms through which compliance with those principles would be verified, nor the measures to be considered in the event of continued violations.

Moreover, the PSC’s responses sometimes appear selective and marked by hesitation, undermining the coherence and credibility of its action. In certain situations, the organ has adopted more firm positions accompanied by concrete measures, such as the establishment of a commission of inquiry or the deployment of observers. In others, it has limited itself to cautious statements or relative silence, even in the face of manifest IHL violations. This inconsistency often seems dictated by political considerations internal to the AU, the need to preserve consensus among member States, or a reluctance to challenge actors with particular diplomatic or strategic weight. Such inconsistency weakens the PSC’s moral and political authority and can be perceived as an implicit signal that certain violations are tolerated or carry no significant consequences. Thus, while the Council reacted firmly by authorizing the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic in December 2013, with an explicit mandate to protect civilians and create conditions conducive for the provision of humanitarian assistance to populations in need,Footnote ⁸⁵ and by creating a Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan in 2014 to document humanitarian law violations,Footnote ⁸⁶ it seemed more cautious in addressing the conflict in Tigray (Ethiopia)Footnote ⁸⁷ or the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon,Footnote ⁸⁸ where its statements were limited to general appeals without coercive measures.

The same restraint is evident in the PSC’s reaction to Boko Haram’s violence in Nigeria: although massive IHL violations have been attributed to both armed groups and State security forces,Footnote ⁸⁹ the Council refrained from any direct condemnation of the authorities, limiting itself to expressing support for counterterrorism efforts and regional cooperation.Footnote ⁹⁰ This selectivity further illustrates the political weight of major member States, whose explicit condemnation is consistently avoided in order to preserve the Union’s internal balance.Footnote ⁹¹ It suggests that the gravity of violations is not always the decisive criterion, with internal AU political and diplomatic considerations playing a determining role in shaping the PSC’s responses, as noted above. Furthermore, again as noted above, such selectivity in turn undermines the Council’s moral and political authority and reduces the deterrent effect of its interventions. It may be explained by the influence of internal AU political considerations, linked in particular to the Council’s rotating composition and the need to preserve consensus, which often leads to privileging diplomatic rather than prescriptive language and to avoiding coercive measures against influential States or strategic allies.

The shortcomings identified in the formulation, responsiveness and follow-up of the PSC’s decisions are not merely internal technical weaknesses; they have direct and far-reaching consequences for the effectiveness of IHL in Africa and, more broadly, for the protection of individuals affected by armed conflicts. First and foremost, they undermine the normative authority and institutional credibility of the PSC. When a body issues vague statements or confines itself to general condemnations without specifying the measures to be taken or ensuring proper follow-up, it diminishes its ability to concretely influence the behaviour of conflict parties. The absence of clear prescriptions and monitoring mechanisms leaves belligerents with a margin of interpretation that can be exploited to delay or evade the implementation of their obligations. This situation is particularly concerning in contexts where the good faith of the parties is uncertain and where political or military pressure is needed to encourage compliance with humanitarian law norms.

Secondly, the selectivity or hesitation in the PSC’s responses may create a perception of unequal treatment across different conflict situations, which fuels a sense of injustice and undermines the principle of impartiality, a cornerstone of IHL implementation. When certain violations elicit swift and vigorous reactions while others trigger only timid or delayed responses, conflict parties may conclude that the firmness of the AU’s action depends less on the objective gravity of the violations than on political or diplomatic considerations. This real or perceived double standard weakens the deterrent effect of PSC interventions and may even, through a negative incentive effect, encourage the commission of further violations.

Fragmented implementation of compliance monitoring measures for IHL

The PSC’s action in promoting IHL is not confined to issuing public statements condemning violations or calling for greater compliance. In certain contexts it has resorted to more substantive monitoring mechanisms, most notably the single Commission of Inquiry it established on South Sudan in December 2013,Footnote ⁹² as well as the deployment of human rights observers, as examined below. These instruments, although established on an ad hoc basis, represent a concrete extension of its monitoring mandate, as they seek to establish facts, assess the compliance of parties’ conduct with applicable obligations, and inform political and judicial decision-making. Their use, however, remains exceptional and is constrained by political, financial and logistical considerations that limit their structural impact. Yet from the perspective of IHL, such mechanisms are particularly significant, as they mirror specific tools expressly provided for to ensure its effective implementation – notably the inquiry procedure established by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I (AP I) of 1977,Footnote ⁹³ which, despite being enshrined in treaty law, has never been formally activated. By resorting to analogous mechanisms, the PSC does not merely replicate tools already envisaged in IHL treaty law; it anchors them in the regional institutional framework, where they gain concrete visibility and operational significance. This regionalization is crucial as it gives practical effect to compliance procedures otherwise dormant at the universal level while strengthening the implementation of IHL and aligning Africa’s peace and security mandate with international obligations to protect victims of armed conflict.

The establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan reflected a dual objective: to respond to grave and widespread violations of IHL and international human rights law (IHRL) requiring detailed examination, and to provide member States as well as regional and international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies with objective findings capable of supporting accountability efforts. The Commission’s mandate, as defined by the PSC, was to investigate violations of human rights and other abuses committed during the conflict, to formulate recommendations on ways and means of ensuring accountability, and to contribute to reconciliation and the restoration of peace among communities.Footnote ⁹⁴ While encompassing both IHRL and IHL, this mandate explicitly recognized the need to qualify and document breaches of humanitarian rules. Yet this precedent also highlights the fragmented nature of the PSC’s practice. Despite the gravity of other conflicts marked by widespread violations of IHL, such as in Darfur, the Central African Republic or northern Nigeria, the Council has not established comparable commissions of inquiry for those conflicts. The South Sudan Commission therefore remains an isolated initiative, launched in response to a high-profile crisis but never institutionalized as a standing tool. This selectivity reflects the PSC’s ad hoc approach: investigative mechanisms are created only exceptionally, in circumstances where political consensus and resources align, rather than as part of a systematic strategy to monitor and repress violations of IHL.

The deployment of human rights observers follows a similar logic, but with a more continuous monitoring function on the ground. To our knowledge and on the basis of available information, such observers have been effectively deployed on only two occasions: in Mali, within the framework of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in 2013, and in Burundi in 2015.Footnote ⁹⁵ In other contexts where the humanitarian situation was equally alarming, comparable deployments did not take place. In both Mali and Burundi, the observers were mandated to monitor the situation, collect information on potential violations, and transmit reports to the AU Commission. Although formally designated as “human rights observers”, their mandate was not confined to IHRL: as expressly stated, “[t]he human rights observers will monitor the human rights situation on the ground and report on possible violations of human rights and international humanitarian law”.Footnote ⁹⁶ This reflects the AU’s broader practice of using the term “human rights” in a generic sense, encompassing not only IHRL but also IHL.Footnote ⁹⁷ The observers’ presence on the ground therefore carries significant potential: providing conflict parties with an objective assessment of their compliance with IHL, enabling the PSC to rely on updated and credible information, and constituting an evidentiary basis that could be used by national or international courts.

However, experience shows that the effectiveness of these mechanisms is hampered by multiple constraints, underscoring their fragmented character. To begin with, financial and resource limitations significantly reduce the scale, duration and consistency of observer deployments. In Burundi, for example, although the PSC decision envisaged deploying 100 human rights observers and 100 military experts, the maximum deployment fell well short of these numbers, and was gradually reduced from 2017 onwards.Footnote ⁹⁸ In Mali, there was a delay of several months between the PSC’s decision to deploy observers (Meeting 353, January 2013) and the operational deployment of those observers to conflict-affected northern regions.Footnote ⁹⁹

Added to these are challenges related to mandate clarity, legal arrangements, and access. In Burundi, for instance, the absence of a signed memorandum of understanding between the AU and the government constrained the operations of the military experts component.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ In many cases, reports do not provide sufficient information about the composition of observer teams (such as whether they include specialists for sexual violence, child protection or cultural property), and this limits assessment of how well these missions are structured to address all relevant dimensions of IHL.Footnote ¹⁰¹

Moreover, transparency and accessibility of reports are uneven. Some observer findings are delayed, partially unpublished or difficult to access, which impairs their use by the PSC, civil society, and potential judicial mechanisms. All of these factors – funding shortfalls, mandate ambiguity, uneven access, team composition, and transparency – contribute to the PSC’s fragmented use of human rights observer teams, which have been deployed in only a small number of instances to date and which lack the permanence or structural depth that one might expect given the scale of IHL violations across the continent.

A further limitation concerns the follow-up on the implementation of adopted decisions, which remains particularly weak. When the PSC establishes an investigative mechanism or deploys observers, it does not always provide a clear procedure for reviewing the reports produced, drawing conclusions from them, and taking appropriate action. In the case of Mali, for example, observers were deployed only after considerable delays, and the visibility of their reports remained limited. This lack of timeliness and transparency made it difficult to ensure that their findings effectively informed subsequent decision-making, highlighting the weakness of the follow-up chain. Such weaknesses often turn these mechanisms into isolated operations, with no lasting connection to a broader strategy of protection and accountability.

Despite these shortcomings, commissions of inquiry and human rights observers remain among the most tangible tools available to the PSC for influencing respect for IHL. If properly designed and endowed with adequate resources, these mechanisms can fulfil several essential functions: establishing uncontested facts, supporting efforts to prevent and halt violations, documenting responsibilities, and serving as leverage to encourage parties to improve compliance. To fully realize this potential, however, it is necessary to move beyond an ad hoc and reactive logic. This would require institutionalizing a permanent or semi-permanent IHL monitoring mechanism, diversifying the profiles and expertise of deployed teams, standardizing methodologies for data collection and analysis, and ensuring the systematic dissemination and use of reports at the political and judicial levels. Such an evolution would strengthen the credibility of the PSC as a central actor in promoting and monitoring respect for IHL on the continent and enhance the tangible impact of its interventions on the protection of conflict-affected populations.

The multifaceted cooperation of the PSC with other actors in promoting and implementing IHL

Cooperation with other regional and international actors constitutes an indispensable extension of the PSC’s action in promoting and implementing IHL. Aware of its limited resources and of the complexity of the contexts in which it operates, the PSC frequently relies on institutional partnerships to broaden its capacity for action, benefit from specialized expertise and strengthen the authority of its decisions. Such cooperation goes beyond occasional support; it largely structures the way in which the AU integrates IHL into its responses to armed conflicts.

The UN is a central partner. Relations between the PSC and the UN Security Council are framed by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which recognizes the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. In the field of IHL, this relationship is reflected in the articulation between PSC communiqués or decisions and Security Council resolutions or statements. In some cases, such as South Sudan, Mali or Somalia, the PSC and the Security Council have adopted convergent positions condemning IHL violations, calling for the protection of civilians and supporting the establishment of investigative mechanisms.Footnote ¹⁰² Such convergence can increase political pressure on conflict parties, but it depends on effective coordination between the two bodies and on the compatibility of their respective mandates. Furthermore, AU peace support operations conducted in cooperation with the UN – whether hybrid missions such as the former African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) or missions authorized by the Security Council – generally include in their mandates explicit tasks related to respect for IHL,Footnote ¹⁰³ thereby serving as a concrete mechanism through which the AU and UN translate the normative commitments of the PSC into operational measures of civilian protection and compliance with humanitarian law.

The ICRC is another strategic partner of the AU. Its cooperation with the PSC and the AU Commission is institutionalized through the establishment of a permanent delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa, which serves as a hub for humanitarian dialogue and coordination.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ This cooperation takes different forms: the dissemination and promotion of IHL among AU Peace Support Operations Division personnel, policy-makers, and, where possible, NSAGs; the provision of technical advice and capacity-building support for the elaboration of AU guidelines, training manuals and operational policies; and the organization of joint seminars and roundtables aimed at sensitizing African policy-makers to the importance of national implementation of humanitarian obligations.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ For instance, each year the ICRC, in collaboration with the AU, organizes a Roundtable on the Operationalization of the Obligation to Ensure Respect for IHL. This event brings together the AU and troop/police-contributing countries, peace support operations, the UN and Regional Economic Communities to share practices, discuss the current state of affairs and address the challenges encountered in implementing the obligation to ensure respect for IHL.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Thanks to its expertise and privileged access to conflict zones, the ICRC complements these normative and political efforts, of which the PSC is a central component, by providing field-based action and technical support, thereby fostering greater coherence between continental policy discussions and humanitarian realities on the ground. Notably, the ICRC delegation to the AU is the only organization granted a statutory annual session to brief the PSC on the humanitarian situation across the continent, an engagement delivered by the president of the ICRC.Footnote ¹⁰⁷

Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) also play an important role in the decentralized implementation of the PSC’s training and dissemination efforts. For example, in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, the AU, in collaboration with the SADC and the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, conducted a “Training of Trainers” course to integrate modules on compliance with IHL (and IHRL) into training regimes of national military and police institutions.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Likewise, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has partnered with the ICRC through Annual Review Meetings on the Implementation of IHL in West Africa, which include training, dissemination, national action plans, and capacity-building for security forces.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ These subregional bodies, by relaying PSC decisions and adapting them to regional contexts, can facilitate appropriation of PSC norms by member States and sometimes mobilize political or military leverage at the subregional level. Nevertheless, harmonization between the continental (PSC/AU) and subregional levels remains a challenge: differences in institutional capacity, resource constraints, variable will among member States and irregular coordination all affect how effectively REC/RMs integrate PSC priorities – including IHL obligations – into their security agendas.Footnote ¹¹⁰

The PSC also collaborates with external regional and international organizations that share humanitarian and peace and security concerns, particularly the EU. Such partnerships, often framed through specific programmes, can provide funding, technical assistance and capacity-building – for example, the EU’s APSA IV programme supports the AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department and RECs/RMs with targeted technical assistance, including training and compliance measures that explicitly incorporate IHL standards.Footnote ¹¹¹ These alliances help reinforce PSC decisions by enabling the implementation of priority projects such as the development of national legal frameworks for IHL, the training of peace support personnel on the protection of civilians and humanitarian obligations, and the establishment of monitoring or accountability mechanisms to ensure respect for IHL in operations.Footnote ¹¹² However, the multiplicity of partners, varied modalities and uneven country implementation of such projects introduce risks of duplication and fragmentation – especially in the absence of a fully institutionalized, transparent coordination platform within the AU to align external initiatives with PSC priorities and with Africa’s humanitarian law obligations.Footnote ¹¹³

While cooperation with external partners undoubtedly broadens the PSC’s scope (including in terms of integrating IHL and protection-of-civilians norms into its orientation), it is not without limits. The AU’s financial dependence on external donors – especially the UN and EU – can shape which issues receive priority, potentially downplaying or delaying IHL-related tasks when they do not align with donors’ strategic interests.Footnote ¹¹⁴ Moreover, coordination among institutions sometimes suffers from bureaucratic delays and methodological divergences; for example, in conflict-affected regions, data on alleged IHL violations may be collected unevenly or according to differing standards, impeding timely reporting or joint fact-finding.Footnote ¹¹⁵ Finally, the public visibility of joint PSC–partner initiatives in humanitarian affairs remains uneven, which reduces their deterrent effect on armed actors and limits their pedagogical value for affected communities.

The examination of the PSC’s concrete actions in the field of IHL reveals a genuine commitment to integrating this normative corpus into its deliberations and to mobilizing its institutional tools to promote respect for IHL. Through communiqués condemning violations and recalling fundamental obligations, the exceptional creation of a commission of inquiry, the ad hoc deployment of human rights observers, and multifaceted cooperation with regional and international partners, the PSC has developed a repertoire of tools that enable it to address violations of IHL in armed conflicts in Africa. These initiatives reflect an implicit recognition of the central role that IHL plays in protecting civilians, regulating the conduct of hostilities and preventing international crimes. They also illustrate the PSC’s ambition to be not only a crisis management body but also a normative actor capable of disseminating and operationalizing humanitarian rules at the continental level. Yet, this dynamic remains characterized by ad hoc practices, limited resources and weak follow-up, which significantly constrain its structural impact. It is therefore necessary to explore avenues through which the PSC’s action could be consolidated, institutionalized and rendered more effective in advancing compliance with IHL.

Consolidating the PSC’s core mandate to monitor compliance with IHL

A crucial condition for enhancing the effectiveness of the PSC in ensuring respect for IHL lies in the full operationalization of a function already entrusted to it under its founding Protocol. Article 7(1)(m) of the PSC Protocol expressly mandates the Council, in conjunction with the chairperson of the AU Commission, to follow up on member States’ progress towards respect for IHL, within the broader framework of conflict prevention. In principle, this provision constitutes a solid normative foundation for continuous monitoring of IHL compliance in Africa, even more so since, as demonstrated above, respect for IHL can have positive effects on preventing conflict escalation and facilitating the restoration of peace. Yet, in practice, this function has not been institutionalized in an effective, systematic or transparent manner. To date, monitoring has often relied on ad hoc, crisis-driven initiatives, activated in response to particular situations. Reports resulting from these exercises tend to be fragmented, diluted or not publicly shared, which reduces their impact and undermines the visibility and coherence of the PSC’s action. This reactive approach limits the Council’s ability to exercise genuine oversight over IHL compliance and contributes to the unpredictability of its responses.

This situation may partly be explained by the fact that the mandate in question is embedded within a broader catalogue of responsibilities. Article 7(1)(m) entrusts the PSC, within the framework of its conflict prevention functions, with following up on member States’ progress in promoting democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the sanctity of human life, and IHL. While this cumulative formulation reflects the holistic approach of the AU to peace and security, it may also have the effect of obscuring the specific scope and importance of IHL within the Council’s practice, thereby limiting the chances that this dimension of its mandate is given systematic and sustained attention. One way to give effect to this mandate, without neglecting any of its components, would be to envisage a comprehensive follow-up report covering the full range of responsibilities listed in Article 7(1)(m). Such a report could highlight the commonalities between these dimensions while ensuring that each of them receives balanced treatment. Within this framework, compliance with IHL would be granted the visibility and importance that it deserves, on an equal footing with the other elements of the mandate, possibly through a dedicated section specifically addressing humanitarian law.

Ensuring that these different dimensions are addressed in a coherent report also presupposes the establishment of a permanent mechanism capable of systematically collecting, analyzing and disseminating information, in particular on IHL compliance. Building on the legal authority already provided by Article 7(1)(m), such a mechanism would transform a formal mandate into a concrete institutional tool. Its functions would include preparing periodic reports, producing comparative assessments across conflict situations and evaluating the degree of compliance by conflict parties.

For the mechanism to be effective, it would need stable financial and human resources in order to guarantee both its sustainability and its independence. Its team should include IHL specialists while also being able to assess intersections with IHRL and with the other dimensions of the mandate formulated in Article 7(1)(m) of the PSC Protocol. Institutionally, it could take the form of a permanent thematic working group of the PSC, or alternatively, an expanded mandate of the Panel of the Wise, with a specific responsibility for monitoring IHL compliance. In either scenario, it would operate under the authority of the PSC and coordinate closely with the AU Commission: with the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security for governance, human rights, conflict analysis, and issues directly related to the protection of civilians and other IHL obligations; with the Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development for matters relating to humanitarian access, humanitarian action and displacement; and with the Office of the Legal Counsel to ensure consistency with applicable law.Footnote ¹¹⁶

Admittedly, this proposal may face a significant obstacle: the persistent financial constraints of the AU.Footnote ¹¹⁷ These constraints have long delayed the institutionalization of new mechanisms and risk undermining the sustainability of such an initiative, considerably reducing the prospects for full implementation. Nevertheless, if the ongoing reforms to enhance the Union’s financial autonomy begin to yield more tangible results,Footnote ¹¹⁸ they could make possible at least a partial realization of this proposal.

In practice, the mechanism could function through a multi-step approach. First, it would gather information from AU field missions, RECs, the UN, the ICRC and African NGOs. Second, a multidisciplinary team would conduct a structured analysis using a compliance grid aligned with humanitarian obligations. Third, the findings would be consolidated into periodic reports submitted to the PSC, thereby providing a factual foundation for its communiqués and for the adoption of decisions. Finally, the parties concerned would be required to provide mandatory follow-up, responding to the findings and reporting on corrective measures undertaken.

The expected benefits would be multiple. The mechanism would enhance the credibility of the PSC by grounding its decisions in systematic and verified data rather than fluctuating diplomatic considerations. It would improve responsiveness by enabling early detection of risk situations and alerting the Council before violations escalate. It would foster stronger institutional coordination by creating a functional interface between the PSC, RECs and international partners, thus avoiding duplication and pooling available data. Finally, it would help instil a culture of accountability by compelling parties to respond regularly to the findings, thereby reducing the temptation to ignore the Council’s injunctions.

In sum, strengthening the PSC’s monitoring mechanism would allow the Council to move from a reactive, ad hoc logic to a continuous and structured approach to IHL compliance. It would consolidate the Council’s normative authority, reinforce the legitimacy of its interventions and bring its practice closer to the ambition assigned to it by the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol: to act as a central regional actor in the effective protection of victims of armed conflict on the African continent.

Structuring the normativity and gradation of PSC decisions

Based on reliable monitoring reports, the PSC should ensure that its decisions move beyond broad political declarations to become precise, predictable and enforceable instruments of regulation. Achieving this transformation requires simultaneous progress along two complementary dimensions: enhancing the normative precision of the Council’s pronouncements and institutionalizing a transparent, graduated scale of responses to violations of IHL.

While PSC communiqués regularly recall applicable IHL (often referencing civilian protection, humanitarian access, child protection and the prohibition of conflict-related sexual violence), their language sometimes follows formulaic patterns from one communiqué to another, giving the impression that the specific stakes of each conflict are not sufficiently addressed. Obligations are typically “recalled” or “reaffirmed” through repetitive formulations that, while diplomatically convenient, may fail to reflect the particular humanitarian dynamics of each crisis and may leave parties with considerable interpretive latitude. This formulaic approach preserves political room for manoeuvre but limits both practical traction and the deterrent effect of PSC interventions. For instance, in the case of Mali, the Communiqué of the 1057th Meeting of January 2022, while primarily addressing the unconstitutional change of government in Mali, also makes reference to the broader security situation there.Footnote ¹¹⁹ Yet, despite the existence of an ongoing armed conflict, the communiqué contains no explicit reference to IHL or the obligations arising under it, nor even a brief recall to respect IHL, illustrating that humanitarian law references are not always systematic, even in situations where they appear most relevant.

By contrast, in the case of the Central African Republic, the Communiqué of the 1221st Meeting of July 2024 does express deep concern about the security situation, condemns all attacks against the population and warns perpetrators that they will be brought to justice.Footnote ¹²⁰ However, it does so in broad and generic terms, without specifying, for example, which groups of civilians are most affected, which infrastructures are particularly targeted or which regions are most affected, and without addressing issues like urban warfare dynamics, thereby diluting its contextual precision. Nor does it explicitly link these violations to the applicable obligations under IHL. As a result, while the communiqué acknowledges the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, its lack of contextual precision and normative anchoring in IHL weakens its regulatory and deterrent value. These examples highlight two sides of the same problem: references to IHL are sometimes absent altogether, and when present, they are often expressed in overly general terms that risk obscuring the specific humanitarian challenges at stake – challenges that need to be better highlighted, even if not in their entirety or in full detail.

Addressing these weaknesses would require a certain reorientation of the drafting of PSC decisions, systematically moving toward prescriptions that are consistently contextualized and operational. Rather than merely reproducing abstract obligations, communiqués could be framed through a harmonized template designed to ensure that IHL norms are systematically translated into actionable directives whenever the circumstances call for it. Each decision, in this sense, would not only recall the applicable principles but would also specify the concrete actions expected from the parties – such as halting aerial bombardments in populated areas, safeguarding cultural heritage sites or establishing humanitarian corridors – while at the same time, insofar as possible, providing timelines for their implementation and measurable benchmarks against which compliance can be assessed. To consolidate such a shift, decisions should also contain follow-up clauses obliging the parties to report periodically on the measures adopted, with the possibility of verification through ad hoc observation missions or other dedicated monitoring mechanisms mandated for this purpose.

The systematic integration of IHL references, whenever the context of armed conflict makes them relevant, would also be crucial in avoiding inconsistency or selective application. Too often, as seen in past practice, communiqués have addressed situations of armed conflict without explicitly invoking the humanitarian obligations at stake, thereby reinforcing perceptions of double standards. Embedding IHL consistently and without exception would both enhance the credibility of the Council and demonstrate its commitment to impartiality. In this way, PSC pronouncements would progressively move away from the repetition of hortatory language and instead contribute to the emergence of a genuine culture of accountability, where obligations are not only recalled but are also operationalized in a manner that reflects the specific humanitarian dynamics of each conflict.

A second and closely related dimension concerns the clarification and institutionalization of the PSC’s responses to IHL violations. At present, these responses remain inconsistent, oscillating between broad statements and more prescriptive measures, even though they are in principle binding, and without a predictable framework indicating the criteria for escalation. Such unpredictability diminishes the deterrent effect of PSC interventions and nourishes perceptions of political selectivity.

To overcome this weakness, the PSC’s practice would need to be restructured around a progressive scale of measures aligned with the gravity and persistence of violations. At the lowest level, this scale could involve diplomatic démarches, such as summoning conflict parties to provide explanations or adopting resolutions that reiterate their specific obligations. At an intermediate level, it could evolve toward more constraining measures, including the requirement to adopt mandatory action plans accompanied by verifiable benchmarks and timelines for implementation. In the gravest situations, where violations are systematic, widespread or repeated, the PSC could, drawing on the authority of Article 23(2) of the AU Constitutive Act, recommend or impose targeted sanctions against identified perpetrators, such as travel restrictions, asset freezes or suspension from AU bodies, or even activate the intervention mechanism provided under Article 4(h), which authorizes the Union to act in cases of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity; we will return to this in more detail in the following section.

Embedding such a framework would provide conflict parties with a predictable and transparent basis for anticipating the consequences of their actions, while reducing political manoeuvring and ensuring greater equality of treatment across different contexts. More importantly, the prospect of progressively coercive measures in cases of non-compliance would reinforce deterrence, encouraging armed actors to take humanitarian obligations more seriously.

Taken together, the enhancement of contextual and operational precision in PSC communiqués and the institutionalization of a transparent scale of graduated responses would mark a decisive step in transforming the Council’s practice. Instead of remaining confined to the declaratory register, the PSC would be equipped with a structured and credible compliance enforcement logic, one that not only reaffirms IHL obligations but also secures their concrete implementation for the protection of populations affected by armed conflict.

Leveraging institutional and legal mechanisms within the African system

Another crucial avenue for reinforcing the authority and effectiveness of the PSC’s action in strengthening IHL lies in the use of the tools at its disposal, particularly its power to trigger Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act and its faculty to request advisory opinions from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR). These two instruments, although distinct, both provide the Council with legal foundations capable of transforming its responses from political exhortations into more normatively grounded and institutionally robust interventions.

Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, reiterated in Article 7(e) of the PSC Protocol, confers upon the AU, and by extension the PSC acting under the authority of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the competence to intervene in member States in cases of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. This provision, globally unique in its institutional architecture, constitutes an explicit legal basis for responding to grave breaches of IHL, which lie at the core of these international crimes. Yet despite its clarity, this competence has never been activated, even though situations such as the mass atrocities in Darfur, phases of the conflict in the Central African Republic or the documented crimes committed during the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia might, in theory, have justified its use.Footnote ¹²¹ Political considerations partly explain this inertia: invoking Article 4(h) requires a decision by the Assembly, which presupposes consensus or a qualified majority that member States are often reluctant to reach, given their fear of establishing a precedent that could one day be turned against them.Footnote ¹²² This reluctance is reinforced by a strong attachment to sovereignty and by concerns that Article 4(h) could become a politicized and selectively applied tool, depending on diplomatic alignments.

Operational obstacles also weigh heavily. Effective implementation presupposes the ability to rapidly deploy a capable and well-equipped force mandated to protect civilians and halt atrocities in highly unstable environments.Footnote ¹²³ Yet the ASF, conceived partly for such scenarios, has never reached full operationalization, remains dependent on external financing and is hampered by cumbersome decision-making.Footnote ¹²⁴ Other challenges include access to theatres of operation, coordination with partners such as the UN, and the need to plan post-intervention stabilization in order to avoid power vacuums.Footnote ¹²⁵ Even the legal dimension presents complications: determining that genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity are occurring requires a robust factual and legal assessment that may be contested by the State concerned or its allies. In the absence of a clear AU procedure for such determinations, the threshold remains largely political, undermining credibility and discouraging decisive action.

The stakes of activating Article 4(h) are considerable. Normatively, it would give concrete effect to the AU’s commitment to upholding fundamental IHL obligations and to protecting populations against mass atrocities, in line with common Article 1. Politically, it would strengthen the AU’s legitimacy as an institution capable not only of adopting norms but also of enforcing them when they are most gravely threatened. Preventively, even the prospect of a credible intervention could deter perpetrators from committing atrocities. For this competence to become operational, however, several conditions would need to be met: the development of objective and transparent criteria to identify the crimes covered, the creation of procedures within the Continental Early Warning System to detect early warning signs and prepare intervention options, the strengthening of the ASF and its regional brigades through sustainable and autonomous financing, and targeted partnerships with actors such as the UN or the EU to share operational and financial burdens. If carefully prepared and strategically deployed, Article 4(h) could shift from a dormant provision to a concrete instrument of collective protection in Africa.

Closely related to this underused competence is another institutional prerogative that the PSC has so far left entirely unexploited: its ability to request advisory opinions from the ACtHPR. Article 4 of the Protocol establishing the Court explicitly authorizes the PSC, along with other AU organs, to seek opinions on any legal question concerning the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights or any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by AU member States. The relevance of this mechanism is heightened by the fact that the ACtHPR’s mandate – as reflected in both the Court’s founding Protocol and its jurisprudential practice – has been interpreted as encompassing the interpretation and application of IHL rules when these are relevant to the questions before it.Footnote ¹²⁶ This finding opens up a considerable field of action for the PSC, whose mandate explicitly encompasses the promotion of IHL and the protection of civilians. Yet, since the Court’s creation, the PSC has never availed itself of this possibility, thereby foregoing a tool that could significantly strengthen the precision, legitimacy and impact of the Council’s decisions.

Strategically used, this prerogative would offer multiple advantages. It could clarify humanitarian concepts or obligations that remain ambiguous in practice, such as the legal qualification of certain types of violence, the applicability of IHL to complex or cross-border NIACs, or the scope of protection owed to specific categories of victims, including children or displaced persons. It would also provide a stronger legal basis for PSC communiqués: although advisory opinions are non-binding, they carry interpretative authority that would lend normative and political weight to the Council’s positions, reducing the ability of conflict parties to contest their legal foundation. Over time, regular recourse to the advisory opinion procedure could help generate a body of consultative jurisprudence on IHL in the African region, where judicial pronouncements on IHL remain scarce. Such jurisprudence, rooted in African realities, could address emerging issues such as the protection of civilian infrastructure in cyber warfare or the accountability of private actors for serious violations.

The impact would extend beyond the legal dimension. Politically, turning to the ACtHPR would strengthen the PSC’s credibility as an authoritative body on IHL by demonstrating its reliance on the full spectrum of mechanisms within the African human rights system. Institutionally, it would foster greater synergy between the PSC and other organs, including the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which could play a role upstream in framing the questions submitted to the Court. Ultimately, activating the advisory opinion procedure would give the PSC a new legal lever to overcome some of its structural limitations, notably the lack of precision in its communiqués and the weak legal basis of certain recommendations. It would enhance both the coherence and the visibility of Africa’s contribution to the interpretation and development of IHL.

Taken together, the activation of Article 4(h) and the systematic recourse to the advisory jurisdiction of the ACtHPR would demonstrate that the PSC can go beyond political statements to mobilize the full range of institutional and legal mechanisms embedded in Africa’s normative architecture. By doing so, the Council would transform its interventions from a largely declaratory register into one that is legally grounded, strategically equipped and institutionally integrated, thereby reinforcing its capacity to protect populations and uphold humanitarian norms on the continent.

Consolidating the PSC’s cooperation for effective implementation of IHL

Cooperation with other actors constitutes one of the most decisive levers for enhancing the PSC’s effectiveness in the field of IHL. Given its limited resources and the complexity of the contexts in which it operates, the Council cannot act in isolation. Partnerships are therefore not complementary add-ons but structural conditions for the PSC’s capacity to function. This cooperation fulfils several purposes: it expands operational capacity, provides technical expertise and strengthens the legitimacy of the PSC’s action. At the same time, if better institutionalized, cooperation could also serve as a bridge to accountability mechanisms, transforming political pronouncements into processes with legal and practical consequences.

On the operational and normative front, cooperation with the UN, the ICRC and regional or international partners remains indispensable. Joint engagement with the UN – including through parallel calls for respect for IHL and for the protection of civilians in contexts such as Mali and Somalia – has contributed to greater convergence in normative messaging, even though cooperation may take different forms depending on political sensitivities on the ground. In South Sudan in particular, the acceptance of the UN integrated mission has at times been contested,Footnote ¹²⁷ creating a sensitive environment in which coordinated public action is limited and the establishment of IHL or human rights monitoring mechanisms becomes especially challenging. The South Sudan government has also adopted a cautious or resistant attitude toward external oversight and human rights- and IHL-related monitoring initiatives, which further constrains the scope for more robust monitoring and accountability efforts.Footnote ¹²⁸ Closer synergy – through joint briefings, harmonized mandates or structured information exchanges where appropriate – could nevertheless improve coherence in peace operations. The ICRC, through its technical expertise in IHL, provides advice and capacity-building support that can inform PSC decisions and policies. RECs and RMs, for their part, have begun to incorporate IHL into their security frameworks and training modules. By aligning more systematically with these initiatives, the PSC can ensure that its priorities are operationalized at the subregional level. Finally, external partners such as the EU and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie contribute crucial resources and technical support, though more institutionalized coordination is required to avoid duplication and fragmentation.

On the accountability front, however, cooperation remains far more fragile. One of the main weaknesses of PSC interventions lies in the absence of systematic follow-up to ensure that violations are investigated and sanctioned. To address this gap, closer institutional links with African judicial and quasi-judicial bodies are essential. The ACtHPR and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights already have mandates covering aspects of IHL, whether through adjudication or monitoring. The PSC could enhance its impact by systematically engaging with their findings, supporting the implementation of their recommendations and ensuring that its own pronouncements reinforce, rather than duplicate, their work. Looking ahead, the future African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, once its criminal section becomes operational, offers an opportunity to anchor PSC action more firmly within a continental accountability framework. By mandating fact-finding missions that meet evidentiary standards, transmitting information relevant to investigations and endorsing referrals when national jurisdictions are unwilling or unable to act, the PSC could play a catalytic role in linking its political authority with judicial enforcement.

In short, while cooperation already constitutes a vital pillar of the PSC’s work on IHL, its potential is unevenly realized. To be truly effective, it must not only provide operational reinforcement but also embed accountability more firmly into the Council’s mandate, thereby transforming cooperation from a pragmatic necessity into a driver of compliance and protection.