In this article, I elucidate Martin Luther King Jr.’s views on the value and function of democratic disappointment. First, disappointment is intrinsically valuable as a morally appropriate emotional response to frustrated desires and expectations. Second, it is instrumentally valuable as a necessary precondition for political action. I close by exploring King’s account of how to constructively channel disappointment into determined political action through song.

This article develops an original account of the value of authenticity for meaning in life that explains how and when acting authentically enhances meaning in life. I argue that we appropriate meaningful actions by acting authentically, contra Joseph Raz’s (2001) position that appropriation occurs through attachments. Authentic actions are distinctly owned by the individual and the more a meaningful action is appropriated, the more it contributes to the meaning in their life. Considering authenticity as an enhancing factor for a meaningful life refines accounts of meaning in life and strengthens objectivist approaches against objections. The value authenticity holds for meaning in life is furthermore not susceptible to the critique of immoral or self-centered authenticity.

This article will argue that Sor Juana develops a revisionary virtue epistemology in her Reply to Sor Filotea in order to counter the oppressive dogmas of her time. Sor Juana’s epistemological reorganization of Catholic Scholasticism helps her epistemically ground and morally justify her lifelong passion for learning. Sor Juana’s virtue responsibilist epistemology posits that properly oriented humility actually motivates studying, even for women; subtly reworks the scope of the supposed vice of curiositas so as to endorse curiosity about the created world as a virtue; and underscores the equal importance of moral and intellectual virtues for persons of any gender. Furthermore, Sor Juana’s system emphasizes grounds for epistemic justification that are accessible third-personally to allow her to move beyond the discriminatory debate about women’s intellectual capacities and demonstrate her epistemic agency through externally observable markers.

It is widely held that theories of well-being must satisfy the criterion of descriptive adequacy. According to the criterion, an adequate theory of well-being must optimally fit our everyday experiences and judgments relating to well-being. This article argues that there is no such criterion that constrains theories of well-being. First, it examines in detail the reasons for which the criterion was originally introduced. Second, it argues against the criterion, on the grounds that well-being is essentially normative and normative theories more generally are not subject to any such constraint. Third, it considers two objections relating to reflective equilibrium and thick normative concepts. Finally, it explores the implications of rejecting the criterion for evaluating theories of well-being and for integrating the philosophy and science of well-being. A positive lesson of the article is that taking the normativity of well-being seriously from a meta-ethical perspective has implications for first-order theorizing about well-being.

Permissivisms in both epistemic and practical rationality enjoy support, but they are discussed in strikingly different ways. Epistemic permissivists focus on both intrapersonal and interpersonal cases, finding the latter more popular than the former. In contrast, practical permissivists focus only on intrapersonal cases. This is odd because practical and epistemic rationality are structurally similar. Furthermore, Paul Forrester (2024) argues that permissivism faces significant explanatory burdens regarding the range of one’s rational options: permissivists need to explain why some cases are permissive and others are not as well as explain why some options are permissible while others are not. I argue that we can meet Forrester’s challenge by appealing to reasons holism, which explains the range of rational options. This appeal also illuminates similarities between practical and epistemic permissivisms, motivating an underappreciated interpersonal practical permissivism.