The multilevel governance literature on European politics argues that supranational governing arrangements have increased their autonomy vis–à–vis national governments. As private interests increasingly bypass national levels and become active in transnational Euro–level policy networks, national governments are no longer the sole interface between supranational and national levels. In contrast, the European Union might also be conceptualised as a two–level interstate negotiation system, an approach assuming that interests are formed and aggregated at the national level. Societal interests enter the fray of European negotiations via national executives, and private interests bypassing the national level are considered as a rather marginal, even irrelevant, phenomenon. In addition, both accounts expect different outcomes regarding which sorts of private interests – diffuse or specific – seek and gain access to both domestic and European public actors. By analysing the varying network strategies of domestic private actors, in particular interest associations, this article explores some propositions held by these two approaches. After a more comprehensive outline of some hypotheses, evidence collected among public and private actors at both the domestic (Belgian) and European levels will be analysed. In general, the results suggest that Euro–level networks of domestic interests are substantially related to their structural location within the domestic realm, that network strategies tend to be quite bureaucratic and that the sort of interest represented – diffuse or specific – has a considerable effect on gaining and seeking access.

Since the publication of Gøsta Esping–Andersen's The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping–Andersen 1990), which built its typologies on a rich database of detailed programme characteristics, it has been generally accepted that measures of social expenditure are an inferior, and even a misleading, source of information concerning the character of welfare state development. The problem is, however, that the kinds of detailed programme data Esping–Andersen used are not routinely available, while the quality of social expenditure data has been improving rapidly, culminating in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) now regularly updated and highly disaggregated Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). This article explores the possibility of using SOCX to devise measures of the extent, structure and trajectory of welfare state change and reform in 21 OECD countries over the period 1984 to 1997. On the basis of these measures, it suggests that there has been almost no sign of systematic welfare retrenchment in recent years and only limited evidence of major structural transformation or programmatic reorientation.

This article examines the interaction between individual characteristics and institutional incentives in non–voting, with a special focus on the interaction between these two types of explanatory variables. The analysis of survey and contextual data for parliamentary elections in 15 Western European countries shows that the effect of individual resources and motivations on abstention is not constant across different countries. Conversely, the effect of institutional incentives (compulsory voting, voting facilities, electoral thresholds of representation and preference expression) on non–voting depends on the elector's level of resources and motivations. One of the four institutional incentives considered has even opposite effects for citizens with different individual characteristics. The analysis also shows that when analysing interactions it is fundamental to distinguish between magnitudes and consequences of the effects of explanatory variables. This has important implications for the interpretation of the results of logistic regression analysis.

An international trend towards establishing and conforming standards of ethical behaviour in the public sector has repeatedly been stated. Germany, however, remains surprisingly reluctant to adopt such recommendations. This article argues that the likelihood of German decision makers implementing new, and especially soft, ethics measures depends on the demand for such measures, on the one hand, and their supply, on the other. The analysis shows that contradictory forces have an impact on Germany. The demand for new ethics measures is relatively low as a high level of hard ethics measures incorporated in the longstanding formal legal system of rules and regulations make the implementation of new measures seem unnecessary. Also, the demand for soft ethics measures is less marked in Germany than in the United Kingdom. This comparatively weak pressure meets the natural inertia caused by cognitive and institutional path–dependency in institutional choices of political decision makers. On the other hand, external bodies (such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD) provide blueprints for soft ethics measures and encourage the implementation of uniform standards across countries. Which of these forces will prevail in the long run, however, cannot be deduced from the present situation.