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The shadow of social desirability bias: evidence from reassessing the sources of political trust in China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 February 2026

Ding Li*
Affiliation:
School of Public Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, China
Xiaobo Lü
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Shuang Ma
Affiliation:
School of Economics and Statistics, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou, China
Wenhui Yang
Affiliation:
School of Government, Peking University, Beijing, China
*
Corresponding author: Xiaobo Lü; Email: xiaobo.lu@berkeley.edu
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Abstract

Recent scholarship has emphasized methodological innovations to mitigate preference falsification in public opinion data, yet systematic scrutiny of bias in regression analyses remains limited. Drawing on analyses of political trust in China, we offer three key insights. First, determining the direction of social desirability bias in regression estimates—whether over- or underestimation—is challenging ex ante. Second, analyses of two nationally representative Chinese surveys, one incorporating a list experiment, cast doubt on the purported positive effect of social welfare expansion on political trust. Extending beyond social welfare and the Chinese case, we find similar biases when regressions rely on direct questions. Third, we show that certain identification strategies can partially mitigate regression bias when direct questions are unavoidable.

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Type
Original Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of EPS Academic Ltd.
Figure 0

Table 1. Propensity toward Social Desirability Bias in Chinese Survey Data

Figure 1

Table 2. Potential bias in estimating the effects of social welfare on political trust

Figure 2

Figure 1. Citizen trust in county or district officials.

Note: The figure shows a comparison of the estimated proportion of the sensitive question—trust in local officials—using the data from 2015 CHFS list experiment and the 2014 and 2016 CFPS direct question with listwise deletion. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3

Figure 2. The effects of social welfare programs on citizen trust in county or district officials.

Note: The figure reports the point estimates regressing the effect of social welfare programs on citizen trust in local officials, using the data from 2015 CHFS list experiment and the 2014 and 2016 CFPS direct question with listwise deletion. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. See Table A-5 in Appendix F for the detailed regression results.
Figure 4

Figure 3. Mean comparison of estimates from direct question and list experiment.

Note:: We use the bootstrap-generated sample to calculate the mean difference between the estimated coefficients of direct questions (CFPS 2014) and indirect questions (CHFS 2015). The dot represents the mean difference between the estimate of direct questions and list experiment based on bootstrapped samples. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5

Figure 4. The effects of NPRS on citizen trust in county or district officials.

Note: The figure compares the point estimates of the effect of NPRS on citizen trust in county or district officials by using different model specifications. Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. All the model specifications control for personal characteristics, such as age, gender, years of schooling, CCP membership, and local hukou status. City characteristics include city-level GDP per capita (logged), population (logged), and proportion of rural population. Appendix M through Q report the detailed regression results.
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