Many multiethnic polities suffer from a deficit of citizens' support for their political communities. Hence, their governments may think of political decentralisation as a solution. This article analyses the effects of that policy on citizens’ identification with their political communities in Spain: on identification with the Basque Country, Catalonia or Galicia (its most conspicuous ‘nationalities’) once they have become ‘autonomous communities’, and on identification with the overall Spanish political community. To study the processes of transformation of such attitudes, nation‐building theories are interpreted from the political socialisation approach and applied to the autonomous institutions. It is also suggested that the state strictu senso, by contrast, may be developing an alternative method of forging identification with its own political community. Survey time‐series evidence shows that although those autonomous communities are engaged successfully in a local but standard nation‐building, the whole political system may be fostering its own diffuse support by recognising and institutionalising cultural diversity and self‐government.

What effects do regional, linguistic, and ethnic divisions have on support for the government and political system? What is the effect of each when the others are controlled for? Are apparent differences in support across regions simply compositional effects of ethno‐linguistic patterns in those regions? This article provides answers to these questions, through the analysis of late 1998 mass survey data from Ukraine. The results indicate that region of residence strongly shapes support for the government and regime. Ethnicity and language, on the other hand, have weaker effects than scholars would expect, once region is controlled for. Thus, regional differences are not simply reflecting ethno‐linguistic patterns in Ukraine, as scholars have often implied. These findings shed light on rival theoretical approaches to understanding regional, ethnic and linguistic sources of identity. They also highlight the necessity for scholars who have emphasized ethnic and linguistic cleavages in other countries to consider controlling for region of residence before jumping to conclusions about effects on political attitudes. Finally, the findings have narrower, but important, implications for the study of Ukraine and for its stability.

This article tests a number of hypotheses about foreign policy decision making within parliamentary democracies. First it explores the origins of debates among decision‐makers. Are deliberations provoked by alternative organizational perspectives or by conflicting ideological orientations? Second, it asks how debates are resolved. On the one hand, it has been suggested that, because each minister has an equal vote, a compromise between decision‐makers must be reached. On the other hand, it has been argued that the Prime Minister exerts considerable control and power in foreign policy matters in relation to other decision‐makers. These questions were studied with the aid of data collected from a sample of 97 decision episodes between 1949 and 1982, where the Israeli government discussed how to respond to low‐intensity aggression against Israeli citizens and soldiers. The results of this research demonstrate that internal debates are poorly associated with organizational or political diversity. Instead group size seems to be more important, although the relationship is not linear. In any case, the discussions usually concluded in a consensus around the Prime Minister's policy of choice, thus indicating that he or she is the paramount decision‐maker.

Countries vary substantially in the level of political patronage exercised in their respective political systems. This article examines how hypotheses generated by the literature on economic, institutional‐partisan and electoral factors account for variation in the level of political patronage in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Political patronage – operationalized as the proportion of spending on personnel to total spending, both at the central government and ministerial levels – is examined through a pooled cross‐sectional time‐series regression. Previous spending on personnel has the most consistent effect on political patronage, while the influence of political variables is more ambiguous. In contrast to conjectures that tie personalism and clientelism, it is shown that the presence of personalist parties in the legislature is negatively associated with patronage spending. Subsequently, the evolution of personnel expenditure in Argentina and Peru is traced, based on qualitative evidence and interview data.

The rise of parties that challenge the political establishment has recently sparked the interest of political scientists. Scholars have identified several factors that lie behind the success of such anti‐political‐establishment parties. Most empirical studies, however, have concentrated their attention either on the importance of electoral system features or on the effects of socioeconomic conditions. This article focuses instead on the role that party system factors play in the electoral success of these parties. Using three data sets from studies conducted in three different time periods it tests two seemingly contradictory hypotheses. On the one hand, the claim that where the established parties have converged toward centrist positions and thus fail to present voters with an identity that is noticeably different from their established competitors, the electorate will be more susceptible to the markedly different policies put forward by anti‐political‐establishment parties. On the other hand, there is the argument that these parties profit more from increasing polarization and the subsequent enlargement of the political space than from a convergence toward the median. The results of the analyses show that anti‐political‐establishment parties generally profit from a close positioning of the establishment parties on the left‐right scale. However, there is no consistent support for the notion that party system polarization by itself is associated with an increase in the support for parties that challenge the political establishment.