Gilan: Religious and Political Background

When the Safavid Shah Ismaʿil I came to power in 1501, Gilan was a semi-autonomous region in the southern Caspian littoral with two longstanding ruling families competing over resources and territorial control. Gilan was not a homogenous territory. It was home to two main groups: the Gil inhabited the plain and the Deylam lived in the mountainous areas. Religious diversity, including both Sunni and Shiʿite Muslims, further complicated Gilan’s demographics. The main geographical division was between Western and Eastern Gilan, a division demarcated by the Sefidrud River, but which came to encompass a political, religious, and administrative divide by the thirteenth century.Footnote ¹² Eventually, the inhabitants of Western and Eastern Gilan came to be ruled by two main local dynasties, the Eshaqiyyeh and the Kiyayis.

The distinction between the two Gilans was not just a matter of political boundaries, it was also underscored by religious differences. Although not neatly divided, the inhabitants of Western Gilan adhered to Sunni Islam, generally speaking, while the inhabitants of Eastern Gilan were Zaydi Shiʿites.Footnote ¹³ Gilan's mountainous region, known as Deylam, also had its own unique differences.Footnote ¹⁴ The Deylam region is well-known for its eleventh-century hosting of the Nizari Ismaʿili daʿwa and their politico-religious activities under the leadership of Hasan-e Sabbah. Indeed, the Ismaʿilis were among the forces the Kiyayis had to contend with in the process of cementing their control over the region.

The Eshaqiyyeh family mainly ruled over the Biyeh Pas territory, or Western Gilan, while the Kiyayis ruled over Biyeh Pish, Eastern Gilan. The Eshaqiyyeh, also referred to as the Eshaqvand, were one of the oldest ruling families in Gilan. It is commonly noted that this family came to rule over parts of Western Gilan, especially the town of Fuman, sometime in the twelfth century. The Eshaqiyyeh lineage is traced back to either the ancient Iranian Ashkanid dynasty or the Prophet Isaac (Eshaq/Ishaq).Footnote ¹⁵ In terms of their religious affiliation, the Eshaqiyyeh adhered to the Shafiʿi madhhab.Footnote ¹⁶

Originally followers of Zaydi Shiʿism, the Kiyayis came to power in the second half of the fourteenth century, around 1364. Sayyed ʿAli Kiya, the first of the Kiyayis to establish their rule in Gilan, drew legitimacy primarily from his status as a sayyid and Zaydi imam, or at the very least a Zaydi daʿi, an imam with restricted status.Footnote ¹⁷ Gilan's political scene was even more fragmented before the Kiyayis’ consolidation of power. With the help and support of their Twelver Shiʿite allies, the Marʿashis of Mazandaran, the Kiyayis managed to either eradicate or incorporate most of their competition in the area, including the Ismaʿilis of Deylam. The Eshaqiyyeh and Kiyayi rulers remained the two leading political powers in Gilan for almost two centuries. Their relationship was at times marked by conflict and upheaval, and at times by cooperation and stability.Footnote ¹⁸

Gilan’s geographical location set it apart from the rest of the Iranian plateau, as this region came to embrace Islam at a later date than most of the Iranian mainland. It also became an attractive refuge for the ʿalids (early Shiʿi precursors) and their religio-political movements. The Zaydi madhhab flourished in the region until the Safavids converted the population to Twelver Shiʿism.Footnote ¹⁹

Locals considered Gilan's autonomy to be inviolable for some time, even after the Safavids rose to power. Indeed, both Eshaqiyyeh and Kiyayi rulers had managed to maintain their positions and thwart all previous regional power efforts to fully incorporate Gilan, only paying intermittent tribute to the Safavid precursors, the Timurids, the Aq Qoyunlu, and the Qara Qoyunlu. This trend continued into the Safavid era. Although Gilanis certainly acknowledged Safavid supremacy, the Safavids could not always rely on Gilanis’ full compliance. The Safavids did not control Gilan until 1592, almost a century into their dynastic rule, when Shah ʿAbbas I conquered and gradually incorporated the region as a Safavid administrative unit.Footnote ²⁰ Before Shah ʿAbbas I’s military campaign, Safavid rulers instituted various policies to keep Gilan in check, extract taxes, and postpone military confrontation. The reign of Shah ʿAbbas I is often viewed as the most important phase of both Safavid centralization policies and the process of decisively transforming the Safavid polity from “a tribal confederation into a bureaucratic empire.”Footnote ²¹ Scholars have also pointed to the continuation of centralization efforts after the reign of Shah ʿAbbas I.Footnote ²² While such efforts may have reached their apex under Shah ʿAbbas I, they had been set in motion prior to his reign, even as early as the reign of Shah Ismaʿil I.

In Gilan and neighboring Mazandaran, Shah Ismaʿil I depended mostly on “soft” power policies and less on direct military intervention.Footnote ²³ Perhaps the fact that the Kiyayis had given Shah Ismaʿil and his followers refuge in Gilan played a role in putting off an outright invasion. Moreover, at the time, the threat of more considerable external forces loomed over the Safavid realm, and stretching the military thin was not advisable. The Safavid monarchs, faced with superior adversaries—i.e., the Ottomans—had to maintain a balance of power among their main rivals, including the Mughals and Uzbeks, while trying to avoid a two-front war at any given time.Footnote ²⁴ This dynamic influenced how they approached less powerful adversaries like the Gilani dynastic rulers.

When it came to centralization efforts, the Safavids employed various processes to win over groups and factions with volatile loyalties. Co-opting local notables, integrating them into the Safavid administration, and seeking to build alliances were good alternatives to direct military engagement. Gilan's already fragmented political scene was also conducive to a divide-and-rule policy, which the Safavid monarchs utilized well, keeping the two Gilans separate.Footnote ²⁵

Moreover, political marriages between the Safavid royal household and other competing power holders, including local dynastic households, were important to the Safavids and their political mission. The offspring of such marriages were often raised at the Safavid court, allowing the monarch to condition them into devoted subjects. However, this was not always done voluntarily, as the Safavids would also hold the sons of local rulers hostage to ensure such rulers’ full cooperation.Footnote ²⁶

It was not until the final decade of Shah Tahmasp I's reign (r. 1524-76) that the Safavids began direct intervention in Gilan. In 1568, Shah Tahmasp I removed Khan Ahmad II (r. 1538-68 and 1578-92), the Kiyayi ruler, and imprisoned him in Qahqaha fortress for over a decade.Footnote ²⁷ Shah Tahmasp I had earlier attempted to allocate Gilan to his brother, Bahram Mirza, but relentless Gilani resistance had forced Bahram Mirza to abandon his post there.Footnote ²⁸ Upon Khan Ahmad II's removal, Shah Tahmasp I divided Eastern Gilan among a few of his Qizilbash amirs.Footnote ²⁹ This arrangement was short-lived, however, as once Shah Tahmasp I passed away, his appointed Qizilbash left Gilan.Footnote ³⁰ As such, the Qizilbash's short stay in Gilan can be attributed to Shah Tahmasp I's failure to properly establish the center’s grip on the region. Khan Ahmad II was eventually reinstated to Gilan during the reign of Shah Mohammad Khodabandeh, as a result of the mediation of his Mazandarani wife, Khayr al-Nesa Beygom, also known as Mahd-e ʿOlya.Footnote ³¹

Gilan and the Safavid Conquest

The process of absorbing Gilan into the Safavid polity included a series of policy adoptions related to the religion, administration, economics, and politics of the region, which were set in motion before the outright conquest. From the early days of their rule, the Safavids began converting the population of Iran to Twelver Shiʿism. The Zaydi population of Gilan, in particular, was a target of such Safavid conversion efforts. Gilan's religious landscape, however, also included a sizeable Sunni population and small pockets of Armenian Christians and Jewish tribal communities.Footnote ³²

The process of converting the Zaydis of Gilan to Twelver Shiʿism began during the reign of Shah Ismaʿil I. Sources discuss the possible conversion of Khan Ahmad I (r. 1506-34) to Twelver Shiʿism; however, evidence of the genuineness of this conversion—and his motives for converting—remains contradictory.Footnote ³³ Khan Ahmad II, on the other hand, unequivocally embraced Twelver Shiʿism, even vehemently berating Gilan's remaining Zaydi residents.Footnote ³⁴

The Safavid insistence on converting Zaydis to Twelver Shiʿism stemmed from anxieties around any potential challenge to their legitimacy. In the context of the relationship between Sufi orders and the Safavids, Sajjad Rizvi raises the point that, among other factors, certain Sufi orders’ claim to sayyid genealogy “made Shah Ismaʿil uneasy,” which led to their suppression by the Safavids.Footnote ³⁵ Similar to the situation Sufis faced, Kiyayi affirmation of their sayyid lineage, coupled with their adherence to Zaydi doctrines of religio-political authority, also made them the target of Safavid religious policies. While there is less primary information on the conversion of Western Gilanis to Twelver Shiʿism, it is likely they followed a similar path and eventually converted, albeit at a slower rate. By converting the Zaydi rulers of Gilan to Twelver Shiʿism, the Safavids effectively removed their religious authority and reduced local Kiyayi rulers to a status lacking the religious legitimacy of a Zaydi imam or daʿi.

Once Shah ʿAbbas I conquered Gilan in 1592, he began the process of altering its mode of governance, basically transferring power from the local nobility to Safavid-appointed officials. This was similar to what Shah Tahmasp I had done previously, i.e., removing Khan Ahmad II and installing a number of amirs, most of whom were Qizilbash, in his place. Once the local Eshaqiyyeh and Kiyayi rulers fled and took refuge in the Ottoman empire, Shah ʿAbbas I began placing his own deputies in positions of authority in Gilan.Footnote ³⁶ Following the conquest, Shah ʿAbbas I either co-opted or purged the Gilani notables who had remained in the region. He conferred the title “khan” on ʿAli Beyg Soltan, the vakil of Ebrahim Khan, the deposed ruler of Biyeh Pas, leaving him in charge of Biyeh Pas for six months before detaining him. Later, the Shah gave Kar Kiya Shah Malek, ʿAli Beyg Soltan's cousin, the post of commander (sepahsalar) of Biyeh Pas.Footnote ³⁷ Fereydun Beyg, one of Khan Ahmad II's trusted advisors, who betrayed him during the confrontation with the Safavids, was promoted by Shah ʿAbbas I to the position of elder or rish sefid of all of Gilan in recognition of his service.Footnote ³⁸ The most important posts, however, were assigned to the trusted Qizilbash dignitaries. Mehdi Qoli Khan Shamlu was appointed amir al-omara (commander in chief), while Khwajeh Masih was designated as the vizier of Gilan.Footnote ³⁹ The Gilani elite who lent their loyalty to the Safavids were instrumental in facilitating the dissolution of local ruling dynasties and the transfer of power to the Safavids.

As the Safavids incorporated various territories, they dealt with local rulers on a case-by-case basis, but the general tendency towards centralization can be seen in all. In Lorestan, Shah ʿAbbas I made similar efforts to end hereditary local rule. One of the longest-lasting local dynasties, the Atabakan of Lor-e Kuchak, also came to an end during the time of Shah ʿAbbas I. Although at first Shah ʿAbbas I engaged with the Atabakan of Lor-e Kuchak diplomatically and tried to strengthen their relationship through inter-dynastic marriage, he soon changed course. With its strategic location on the porous frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, Lorestan had the potential to be a significant threat to the Safavids and their territorial integrity. While the particularities of Lorestan should be accounted for, this case also falls within the Safavid monarchs’ general tendency to gradually eradicate hereditary rule in the peripheral regions.Footnote ⁴⁰

In contrast, the Ardalan family of the Kurdish region of Iran held on to their position until the end of Safavid rule. Shah ʿAbbas I, however, still demanded that the Ardalan ruler, Halu Khan, swear his allegiance. To prove his loyalty, the Kurdish ruler sent his son, Khan Ahmad Khan I, to the Safavid court. The Ardalan rulers continued to send their young family members to be raised at the Safavid court. This practice was mutually beneficial: while the Safavids were ensured of the Ardalan ruler's loyalty, they enjoyed the benefits of proximity to the court in return. The Ardalan dynasty thus came to feel the effects of Safavid centralization policies more gradually.Footnote ⁴¹

How the Safavids dealt with Gilan and Mazandaran was likely due to these territories’ economic significance. As major hubs for the production of silk, Gilan and Mazandaran were crucial to the region's economy and the Safavid treasury. Generally speaking, Gilanis needed very little from the outside world. Olearius, the German traveler, contended that Gilanis

Climatic conditions in Gilan were ripe for growing crops and produce. While raw silk was the most important commodity that Gilan had to offer, its other agricultural production enabled it to remain self-sufficient. Olearius described Gilan's production abilities as follows: “There is no Province of all Persia so fertile and so abundant with Silk, Oyl [sic], Wine, Rice, Tobacco, Lemons, Orenges [sic], Pomegranates, and other Fruits. The Vines there are excellent, and as big as a man at the Waste.”Footnote ⁴³ Gilan's favorable climate coupled with its secluded geographic location meant that Gilanis were self-sufficient; they had nothing to gain from Safavid presence in their region or from Safavid rule.

Gilan had long maintained a certain level of autonomy over silk production and retained much of its revenue. However, when Shah ʿAbbas I turned Gilan and Mazandaran into crown lands in 1599, the locals lost control of the silk revenue.Footnote ⁴⁴ The income from crown lands went directly to the Shah's treasury. Turning Gilan into crown land had significant consequences for the local toyul holders as well, as they also lost their toyul privileges.Footnote ⁴⁵ In addition, Shah ʿAbbas I granted a silk export monopoly to the Armenian merchants of Julfa, who had been moved from Julfa to New Julfa in Isfahan, as well as to Gilan and Mazandaran.Footnote ⁴⁶ Scholars have debated the reasons behind the Julfans’ displacement from Old Julfa to New Julfa. While Baghdiantz McCabe argues that the Julfans were moved as a result of Shah ʿAbbas I's policies around the silk trade, Aslanian contends the move was part of the Safavid scorched-earth policy in response to Ottoman advances.Footnote ⁴⁷ Regardless of the reasons for the move, the introduction of Armenian merchants to Gilan limited the role and influence of local Gilani producers and merchants.

There were also clear and substantial changes to the system of taxation in Gilan. After Shah ʿAbbas I conquered the territory, he issued a decree on the administration of taxes. Röhrborn asserts that the Shah aimed to standardize tax administration throughout his realm.Footnote ⁴⁸ This particular decree, however, was also meant to convince the Gilanis, soon after the conquest, that they would pay less taxes under Safavid administration. In the decree, Shah ʿAbbas I condemned the arbitrary and non-sharʿi taxes local rulers exacted—some of which had already been abolished—such as shahiyeh zar (most likely a tax paid for the maintenance of the local court) and teymureh zar (it is not clear what this is), among others. It is important to point out that not all the taxes Shah ʿAbbas I abolished were paid by Gilanis themselves. Some such taxes were, in fact, levied on Gilan's external visitors as a way for locals to collect revenue. The tamgha tax exacted on outsiders who entered Gilan was similar to a road toll, and the gharibeh zar was another visitor tax paid by outsiders.Footnote ⁴⁹ These taxes served the interests of locals but not the Safavid monarch, who wished to make Gilan more accessible to trade and commerce, as well as make the region his vacation destination. In the end, the tax burden on the Gilani population increased rather than diminished, counter to what the Shah's decree had suggested.

Historical accounts often point to Safavid efforts to build roads and bridges, improving overall access to Gilan. While, taken at face value, these seem like important developments with the potential to improve the locals’ condition, in reality, Gilanis at the time felt they were nothing more than ways to facilitate further extraction of Gilan's wealth and natural resources.

Safavid rule in Gilan brought the presence of Safavid officials, as members of the ruling elite and their entourage made Gilan their permanent home and the Shah made Gilan and Mazandaran his vacation and hunting destinations. Thus, the Gilanis now had to contend with increasing Safavid influence on local affairs. After the conquest, a network of power relations linking the co-opted local elite to Safavid officials, and ultimately the Shah, ensured greater control over the region.

Safavid expectations of Gilan and Gilanis took a financial, human, and environmental toll. Shah ʿAbbas I appropriated the local customary hunting trip, known as shekar-e zangul, as an official court custom.Footnote ⁵⁰ These hunting trips, especially prearranged ones, employed local Gilani labor; most likely forced, unpaid labor, known as bigari. In the medieval and early modern periods, peasant conscription for unpaid labor was a common practice. Petrushevsky specifically discusses such conscription by “shahs and large feudal lords” for the purpose of hunting. These hunts often involved more than 10,000 people surrounding a large, designated area, creating an encircling barrier around animals and thus preventing their escape.Footnote ⁵¹ These hunting expeditions would, at times, result in the death of laborers. On one such occasion, Fumani asserts that some 30,000 local Gilanis were involved in facilitating a hunting trip for Shah ʿAbbas I, 2,700 of whom died in Rankuh's cold winter weather; deaths Shah ʿAbbas I “did not pay much attention to.”Footnote ⁵² Fumani also informs us of the excessive number of animals hunted by the Shah, a fact likely resented by locals.Footnote ⁵³

Aside from the toll these hunting trips took on Gilan's population, the taxes levied on them were also burdensome. The tarh and tasʿir taxes were two particularly onerous ones. Tarh involved selling produce to the center at a reduced price, while tasʿir was a tax levied on cereals and grains and was to be paid in cash. The price of cereals and grains was set by the central government and could fluctuate, and such fluctuations in tasʿir could result in “excess payments extorted when the assessment in kind was converted into cash.”Footnote ⁵⁴

In order to improve the economy and productivity of Iran's central regions, Shah ʿAbbas I followed economic policies that enriched the center at the expense of outlying regions. For instance, Isfahan's population were exempt from paying taxes to the court for a year, and their agricultural tax was reduced. Gilan was afforded no such exemption.Footnote ⁵⁵ On the contrary, Fumani points out how Behzad Beyk, the vizier of Gilan, in fact levied indemnities (tarjoman) on the region's population; a population whose repeated petitions of protest to the Shah went unheeded.Footnote ⁵⁶ Petrushevsky contends that “similar methods of robbery” were practiced in other regions, such as Shamakhi, Georgia, and Lorestan.Footnote ⁵⁷

Shanei et al. also indicate other common taxes as a source of Gilani frustration with the Safavids, taxes such as qatlagheh (locals’ responsibility to host state officials and foreign visitors staying in the region), cherik (a military tax), and multiple agricultural taxes exacted on farmers and peasants.Footnote ⁵⁸ Moreover, Gilan's population were to also pay the following taxes: bazdid, paid to crop inspectors; mobasheraneh, paid for the maintenance of Safavid officials (known as mobashers) tasked with managing the crown lands; and mohasselaneh, the tax paid to tax collectors for the task of collecting taxes.Footnote ⁵⁹

Hence, for Shanei et al., economic grievances were the main cause of the rebellion. However, acknowledging that the Gharib Shah Rebellion was triggered by economic concerns should not diminish the fact that it was also clearly aimed at altering modes of governance in Gilan. Indeed, the tax burden was the result of political changes in Gilan; a fact not lost on Gilanis. Thus, Shanei et al.'s argument that this rebellion was distinctive in its motivation and should be set apart from earlier uprisings with more political undertones leaves out a very important point: that Gilanis retained a collective memory of Gilan's past political reality, a memory present during this uprising. How Gilanis grasped this past contributed to how they saw themselves in relation to the Safavids. The desire to restore long-lost rulers to their past glory clearly manifested in their choice of leader: Gharib Shah was presented as the son of a former ruler, however much that lineage may have been fabricated.

The drastic alterations in Gilan's modes of governance did not go unnoticed by the local population. Indeed, a series of intermittent uprisings erupted shortly after the Safavid conquest. The Gharib Shah Rebellion, which followed the death of Shah ʿAbbas I, was the most significant of these uprisings, signaling locals’ deep dissatisfaction with Safavid policies and with the shifting of political and economic control in the region. An overview of some of the uprisings preceding the Gharib Shah Rebellion elucidates the dynamic of Safavid-Gilani relations following the conquest.

Gilani Resistance and Safavid Responses

After the conquest, there were four uprisings in Gilan between 1593 and 1596. Mohammad Shurmij’s overview argues that “the tension between the local notables and previous ruling aristocrats, and the agents of the central government,” was one of the main reasons for these uprisings.Footnote ⁶⁰ Shurmij identifies two key categories of rebellion following the conquest: those in response to the Safavid conquest that aimed to re-establish local rule, and those addressing the Safavids’ taxation and fiscal policies in Gilan.Footnote ⁶¹ Complementing Shurmij’s assessment, I contend that the uprisings did not necessarily belong to one category or the other; rather, political and fiscal motivations often overlapped.

An analysis of Safavid responses also sheds light on the significance of these uprisings. Another way to categorize the anti-Safavid rebellions in Gilan is by looking at the different ways the Safavids responded to different rebellions. Shurmij's assessment views the elite as a monolithic group with common interests. In reality, however, some rebellions were clearly the work of specific members of the elite out for personal gain and self-preservation. In these cases, Safavid responses targeted the disgruntled individuals and their immediate followers. Other rebellions, regardless of their motivating factors, threatened the Safavids with more widespread popular resistance and were, hence, punished more severely.

In their effort to address Safavid intrusion in Gilan, some such rebellions led to strategic alliance adjustments among the Gilani elite. Initial rebellions were led by former members of the Kiyayi and Eshaqiyyeh rulers’ entourage. The uprisings of Malek Shah and Talesh Kuli in 1593, for example, culminated in an alliance between old Western and Eastern Gilani rivals against the Qizilbash. Indeed, such strategic collaboration was not common before the conquest. The leaders of early rebellions anticipated the return of Khan Ahmad II and Mohammad Amin Khan (the son of the late Jamshid Khan, the Eshaqiyyeh ruler, who fled along with Khan Ahmad II) from their Ottoman refuge.Footnote ⁶²

Moving forward, we witness uprisings by high-ranking Gilani officials and commanders who, after initially working with the Safavids, fell out of favor and became hostile. At this point, the loyalty of local commanders and high-ranking officials to the Safavids remained dubious. The rebellion of Shah Malek Soltan, who was appointed commander in chief of Biyeh Pas by the Safavids, is an example of a rebellion resulting from shifting and precarious loyalties. ʿAli Beyg Soltan, Shah Malek Soltan's cousin, who was released from prison to aid the Safavids in hunting down his belligerent cousin, is another example of a Safavid ally becoming hostile.Footnote ⁶³ The Safavids specifically targeted rebels such as Shah Malek Soltan, ʿAli Beyg Soltan, and their immediate followers while avoiding direct action against the population at large.

On the surface, the uprising of Talesh Kuli, another Gilani commander who initially cooperated with the Safavids, seems similar to the rebellions of Shah Malek Soltan and ʿAli Beyg Soltan. However, the Safavid response to Talesh Kuli's rebellion was very different from their response to the others. Talesh Kuli's opposition to the Safavids attracted diverse followers and led to alliances among different factions of Gilani society. Most importantly, we see notables from the Chapak joining Talesh Kuli and his efforts against the Safavids.Footnote ⁶⁴ The Chapak and Azhdar, who often appear in the sources together, were indigenous to Gilan. Members of these families frequently served in various military and high-ranking official posts, such as the sepahsalar and vakil of the local rulers.Footnote ⁶⁵ As the Qizilbash pursuit of Talesh Kuli and his followers in the forests of Gilan did not go as smoothly as expected, Shah ʿAbbas I ordered the population in the surrounding areas be massacred, hoping to terrify locals into finding Talesh Kuli and his followers. Talesh Kuli's uprising marked the first instance of collective punishment handed down by the Safavids in post-conquest Gilan.Footnote ⁶⁶

Of the earlier uprisings, Kar Kiya Amir Hamzeh’s rebellion in 1595 had a more grassroots base, again with the engagement of Chapak and Azhdar notables, who led this uprising. Some 10,000 participants, equipped with quotidian objects such as sticks, hatchets, and scythes, attacked the Hesar fortress of Lahijan expecting to expel the Qizilbash inhabitants.Footnote ⁶⁷ This rebellion, which specifically targeted the Qizilbash, also provoked a more severe Safavid response, culminating in Shah ʿAbbas I ordering the massacre of the population of Lashteh Nesha.Footnote ⁶⁸ The Safavid-appointed governor of Lahijan, hoping to avoid bloodshed, gave the Lashteh Nesha population a few days to leave town.Footnote ⁶⁹ Still, the Safavids massacred many, and the hostility between Shah ʿAbbas I and the Chapak and Azhdar continued. Eventually, following another instance of resistance from members of the above-mentioned groups, Shah ʿAbbas I exiled them from Lashteh Nesha and all surrounding villages. The Chapak and Azhdar inhabitants of Lashteh Nesha, including women and children, were forcefully resettled in Seyl Akhur and, according to Fumani, many perished in this displacement.Footnote ⁷⁰ However, we still see people of Chapak lineage participating in the Gharib Shah Rebellion.

The next uprising took place in 1603 during the tenure of Aslan Beyg, the Safavid-appointed vizier of Western Gilan.Footnote ⁷¹ The rebels were led by a former Gilani military commander, Kar Kiya Fathi, who had joined and served Shah ʿAbbas I for a few years before returning to Gilan to engage in farming.Footnote ⁷² Fumani contends that this uprising was directed at the Safavid-appointed official in charge of Western Gilan, Aslan Beyg, and his unjust treatment of the people. Kar Kiya Fathi led the rebels on a raid on Aslan Beyg’s home, confiscating his belongings. The Safavid forces responded promptly and in a public spectacle shamed and punished the captured culprits, executing most of their leaders. Aslan Beyg returned to his “unjust” ways with Gilanis and was eventually dismissed.Footnote ⁷³

This rebellion, specifically, brings us to an evaluation of the kind of recourse for grievances available to Gilanis. Aslan Beyg's removal came a few months after the rebellion and upon Mirza-ye ʿAlamiyan's investigation into its causes. Delivering justice was an indispensable part of the Shah's authority. Generally speaking, “the Shah’s justice (ʿadālat) was to be manifest through social stability, the security of his subjects, and their goods and money. He was expected to curb excess and the arbitrary actions of state officials.”Footnote ⁷⁴ In Gilan, Shah ʿAbbas I was keen on holding sessions for the population to air its grievances against local officials, but Gilanis had mixed responses to these sessions. In some instances, Fumani reports, not a single person came forward; in other instances, Gilanis approached the Shah with their petitions.Footnote ⁷⁵ Behzad Beyg, the appointed vizier of Fuman, was removed from his post after the Shah held one such hearing of grievances against him. While, in general, Shah ʿAbbas I had a reputation of treating his subjects justly, it is important to note that political and fiscal considerations sometimes carried more weight. When the Shah removed Mirza-ye ʿAlamiyan from his post as the vizier of Gilan for his alleged mishandling 18,000 tuman in tasʿir revenue from rice production, his official replacement collected that amount from the farmers a second time, re-burdening the population by making them pay for Mirza-ye ʿAlamiyan's likely embezzlement.

Another uprising in Gilan over a decade later constitutes a distinct variety of rebellion. The short-lived uprising of Sayyed Mohammad Sheykhavand, of the tribe of Sheykhavand, erupted in 1619 and had two characteristics setting it apart from other similar uprisings.Footnote ⁷⁶ First, Sayyed Mohammad Sheykhavand declared himself to be the representative (naʾib) of the Twelver messiah (the Twelfth Imam).Footnote ⁷⁷ Second, the rebellion was initiated by a Qizilbash residing in Gilan. While Fumani does not discuss this uprising, it is briefly mentioned in Eskandar Beyg Monshi’s Tarikh-e ʿalam ara-ye ʿAbbasi and Pietro della Valle's travel account.Footnote ⁷⁸ Monshi's account attributes the uprising to the “Sheykhan-e Gilan,” while della Valle specifies that the self-proclaimed messiah belonged to the Sheykhavand tribe.Footnote ⁷⁹ The fact that Fumani never mentions the uprising can also be indicative of its lack of importance to Gilani interests. To understand this peculiar episode, it is critical to locate it within the broader context of the political circumstances of the time. By this point, the Qizilbash were slowly losing their previously-held position of privilege within the Safavid system.Footnote ⁸⁰ Shah ʿAbbas I had turned his attention to strengthening the loyal slave army, gradually distancing himself from the previously-favored Qizilbash.Footnote ⁸¹ On a personal level, Falsafi, who also attributes this uprising to the Sheykhavand tribe, argues that Shah ʿAbbas I did not like the Sheykhavand due to their leader's role in the murder of his mother, Mahd-e ʿOlya.Footnote ⁸² Furthermore, the Sheykhavand uprising had another important element: its messianic undertone. However, Sayyed Mohammad Sheykhavand’s rebellion was quietly and expeditiously quashed by Shah ʿAbbas I, and the messiah impersonator promptly summoned to the court and executed.Footnote ⁸³

It is within the context of the uprisings and developments following the Safavid conquest of Gilan that I engage with the Gharib Shah Rebellion and its treatment in both primary and secondary sources.

The Gharib Shah Rebellion

Throughout his Tarikh-e Gilan, Fumani uses the titles Gharib Shah and ʿAdel Shah interchangeably. Gharib Shah literally means “Strange King,” while ʿAdel Shah means “Just King.” Fumani clarifies this discrepancy by mentioning that “Gharib Shah” was how his adversaries, namely the Qizilbash, referred to him.Footnote ⁸⁴ I also use the title “Gharib Shah,” as it is the title most often used in both Iranian and Western academic sources. However, I acknowledge that the title reflects the Safavids’ adversarial point of view and not that of the Gilani participants themselves. The title “ʿAdel Shah,” used by his followers, indicates the expectation and perception of the rebellion as an effort to achieve “justice.” In later chronicles, this discrepancy is resolved differently. Such sources mention two uprisings, that of Gharib Shah and another by his brother, ʿAdel Shah.Footnote ⁸⁵ However, it is Fumani’s account that is generally accepted by historians, as he was an eyewitness to the events in question.

The Gharib Shah Rebellion erupted shortly after Shah Safi I ascended the throne following the death of his grandfather, Shah ʿAbbas I. Fumani states that the uprising was a direct response to the oppression and injustice Gilan's inhabitants had faced under the Safavid-appointed viziers, especially in the last seventeen years of Shah ʿAbbas I's reign.Footnote ⁸⁶ The uprising took place during the period of succession and transition, as the ruler's position was weakened during such times, making these periods more prone to instability and uprisings and providing a potential window of success for a rebellion.Footnote ⁸⁷ Fumani states that a group of Gilanis, including leaseholders, heads of villages, financiers, and peasants, had been awaiting the right time to strike, confirming that the timing was indeed related to Shah ʿAbbas I's death and the revolt the result of a strategic alliance among a diverse group of Gilanis.Footnote ⁸⁸ The leaders of the uprising not only came from different professions, they also represented diverse lineages. Abu Saʿid Chapak, Muhammad Gukeh, Kuleh Mohammad Kuchesfehani, Shahmorad Gilwaʾi and his son Mohammad, Shirzad Beyk Keysami, and Atash Baz Khoshkbejari are some of the leaders Fumani mentions by name.Footnote ⁸⁹

Gharib Shah's given name was Kalanjar Soltan; he was allegedly one of the remaining sons of the late Jamshid Khan, the former ruler of Biyeh Pas.Footnote ⁹⁰ While there is very little information about Gharib Shah or his life before the revolt, it seems he had previously led a modest life with his mother in anonymity. Gharib Shah began his mission at the home of Pir Shams Gol Gilwaʾi, the Sufi sheykh to whose order Gharib Shah, his mother, and his handlers belonged.Footnote ⁹¹ The sources give no information about this Sufi order or its sheykh beyond this brief mention and a mention of the sheykh's eventual execution, which seems to indicate they did not figure largely in the rebellion. Nevertheless, the planning of this uprising was carried out not by Gharib Shah himself, but by a group of local notables and their allies who chose him for his alleged rightful claim to the throne of Western Gilan.Footnote ⁹² As previously mentioned, some scholars argue that the Gharib Shah Rebellion was a messianic movement. Despite the involvement of a Sufi order, however, this rebellion was not a messianic one. Indeed, the choice of leader—the son of a former ruler—supports a very different conclusion.

The characterization of the Gharib Shah Rebellion as messianic can be attributed to the association of Iranian Shiʿism, and the Iranian religious milieu in general, with heterodoxy and messianism. Heterodox and Sufi movements, including the Safavid movement, that came to prevail in the religious landscapes of Iran and Anatolia engaged with aspects of pre-Islamic religious elements, such as the notion of cyclical time, in conjunction with certain Shiʿi elements, like loyalty to the imams and messianism.Footnote ⁹³ As they came to establish their rule, the Safavids distanced themselves from heterodox elements, opting instead for a more legalistic Twelver Shiʿi tradition more conducive to state building.Footnote ⁹⁴ While the prevailing understanding of Iran’s religious milieu may explain certain socio-religious movements, it is not a satisfactory explanation for all.

More recently, scholars have started questioning earlier characterizations of certain Safavid-rea uprisings as messianic in nature. For example, Rula Jurdi Abisaab points out that the generally-accepted messianism of the Siyah Pushan uprising in Astarabad is unfounded.Footnote ⁹⁵ Similarly, while the Gharib Shah Rebellion was supported by a local Sufi order, the primary sources show no indication that his contemporaries viewed him as a messiah. While the Sheykhavand uprising, as previously mentioned, is clearly characterized as messianic in Monshi’s Tarikh-e ʿalam ara-ye ʿAbbasi, no such designation is accorded to the Gharib Shah Rebellion.Footnote ⁹⁶

Gharib Shah's association with a local Sufi order should not be taken as evidence of messianism, as Sufi orders were part and parcel of the social fabric of Islamicate societies. In the absence of city halls and other similar venues, these brotherhoods provided space for popular gatherings and the expression of shared grievances.

Moreover, much of the history of Safavid Iran, including that of its peripheral regions, is written from the point of view of the center, i.e., the Safavids and their Qizilbash followers. This limits our understanding of local concerns. Even so, the southern Caspian littoral region of Gilan and Mazandaran had an enduring heritage of local historiography.Footnote ⁹⁷ This tradition was partly derived from the region’s long-lived custom of local rule, and such local chronicles usually “cover the characteristics, special merits (fazâʾel) and foundation legends of the districts concerned, together with dynastic history and contemporary affairs.”Footnote ⁹⁸ For the most part, local dynastic rulers commissioned the composition of these works, as they did not see themselves merely as “local rulers.” Rather, like any other ruler, the possibility of expansion was a hallmark of their political positions. Still, Gilan's local historical accounts are valuable sources, regardless of their patronage. Not only do they complement universal or dynastic histories, they also offer different perspectives and even counter-narratives of affairs conveyed in imperial accounts.

Local historical accounts are often used sparingly, if at all. In recent years, however, more scholars have begun exploring such chronicles and incorporating local perspectives into their work.Footnote ⁹⁹ Indeed, it is through engaging with Fumani's chronicle more closely that it becomes clear that the Gharib Shah Rebellion was neither an isolated event nor a messianic movement signifying the “renewal of spiritual unrest.” Rather, this account makes apparent that this rebellion was the final effort in Gilan’s forty-year struggle to expel the Safavids and re-establish local dynastic rule, alongside the considerable economic grievances intermeshed within it.

The Gharib Shah Rebellion broke out with an attack on the residence of the kalantar of Lahijan, Mir Morad Lashteh-Neshaei. Mir Morad, whose title suggests that he was a local Gilani, had been appointed to his position by Shah ʿAbbas I and enjoyed the Shah's full support and respect. As a local official representing the center, Mir Morad was one of the rebellion's first targets, with the rebels looting an estimated 30,000 tuman from his residence. Following the attack on the kalantar's house, the rebels took to the homes of the official financiers/merchants, two brothers who had just returned from a trip to Muscovy and were hence in possession of “some unmatched goods.”Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Looting was at the center of both this attack and the next, on the home of yet another kalantar, Mohammad Taleb.Footnote ¹⁰¹ These initial attacks prepared the rebels for a more substantial assault on the merchants and their belongings in the bazar of Kuchesfehan. As the rebels moved from one town to another, their movement gathered momentum and attracted diverse participants, who numbered between 14,000 to 30,000 according to different chronicles and travelogues.Footnote ¹⁰² In such skirmishes and raids, the number killed is estimated at about 7,870 people, most of whom were residents of Pashija, Kuchesfehan, Lashteh Nesha, and Lahijan.Footnote ¹⁰³

The rebels also targeted the official palace of Rasht, as many of the elite had abandoned their residences as the insurgents moved into town, creating favorable conditions for plunder. Gharib Shah’s followers managed to redistribute 200 of the 300 kharvar (one kharvar is equivalent to 300 kilograms) of silk purchased and stored in Gilan, and destined for the Shah's treasury, before some notables convinced Gharib Shah that this was unwise as he might need the silk for future purposes.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ Moving from Rasht to Fuman, the movement gathered more momentum. Those officials who remained loyal to the Safavids (including ʿAbdolfattah Fumani) fled the town, while others, including sadat, judges, and scholars, joined the cause.Footnote ¹⁰⁵

During the rebellion, certain actors took advantage of the chaos to further their own interests. These rogue elements did not necessarily advance any particular collective cause, be it that of the center or the rebels. For example, Bahram Qoli Soltan Sufi, a trusted Safavid official, became a rogue agent during the uprising. As the Safavid-appointed hakem of Deylaman, he was at first involved in helping the Safavids quash the rebellion. However, he soon took advantage of the disarray and, while fleeing Gilan, began looting. His first target was the Lahijan fortress, which also held goods belonging to the recently-returned merchants of Muscovy and Farang (Europe).Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Bahram Qoli Soltan Sufi and his followers then moved on to Deylaman and continued looting and pillaging villages around Rankuh until Safavid officials arrested him and confiscated his loot.Footnote ¹⁰⁷

Molla ʿAli Kami's tale is another example of shifting loyalties. Molla ʿAli Kami was a Lahijan notable from a well-known family of scholars and physicians, and a close advisor to a high-ranking Gilan official, Mir Morad Kalantar. As the uprising ensued, Molla ʿAli Kami counted on a close acquaintance and supporter in the town of Layl to protect him, his family, and his belongings against the rebels. In the anarchy following the uprising, however, his ally in Layl turned on him, executed him, and sent his head to Gharib Shah.Footnote ¹⁰⁸

Olearius informs us of another interesting tale, that of Saru Khan (also known as Saru Taqi), the commander in charge of defeating Gharib Shah's army.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ During the rebellion, Saru Khan interceded on behalf of a wealthy merchant to protect him from the wrath of the Safavids. The merchant had either gotten involved in the rebellion out of despair or had failed to advise Safavid officials of Gharib Shah's activities. While there is a possibility that the merchant was indeed involved and lent his support to the rebels, it seems Saru Khan interceded due to his influential standing.Footnote ¹¹⁰

Shah Safi I put Saru Khan, who was serving as governor of Astara at the time, in charge of several provincial governors and their efforts to quash the rebellion.Footnote ¹¹¹ Saru Khan's men slowly captured and executed most of the rebel leaders, including Pir Shams Gol Gilwaʾi, the head of Gharib Shah's Sufi order.Footnote ¹¹² Later, Gharib Shah and some high-ranking followers were taken to Isfahan and executed publicly in the great square.Footnote ¹¹³

The rebellion was ultimately a failure, but had devastating effects on the silk trade and the Safavid treasury.Footnote ¹¹⁴ For locals, the human cost of the rebellion was high, and they came to face more restrictions in its aftermath. The Safavids completely disarmed Gilan's local population, forbidding them from owning or purchasing arms, with the exception of agricultural tools such as the hedge-bill. This ban on weaponry in Gilan stood in stark contrast to the Safavids’ lax attitude towards Taleshis, who retained “the privilege of using all sorts of weapons,” as they had remained loyal to the Safavids during the uprising.Footnote ¹¹⁵

The Rebellion in Safavid Sources: The Ajamereh va Owbash

Safavid sources refer to participants in the Gharib Shah Rebellion as ajamereh va owbash (hoodlums and riffraff) or ronud va owbash (knaves and riffraff).Footnote ¹¹⁶ The term ajamereh va owbash had at least two different connotations. It was often used to refer to those understood as career hoodlums and riffraff—usually marginalized and underprivileged inhabitants of urban centers. In times of crisis, such individuals were involved in instigating riots and looting, taking advantage of the disarray and anarchy that ensued in periods of social unrest.Footnote ¹¹⁷ The term was also used derogatively, as a negative construction in narratives delegitimizing opposition groups, regardless of their socio-economic class.

Another term used by chroniclers to refer to underprivileged and marginal groups is leʾam, the plural form of the Arabic word laʾim, which literally means a dishonorable, ignoble, or shabby person. The word leʾam appears frequently in Safavid historical accounts. In Fumani's Tarikh-e Gilan, the term leʾam is closely associated with the term sepahi, and they are often mentioned together. Fumani also refers to the leʾam as a specific social class, or “tabaqeh-ye leʾam.”Footnote ¹¹⁸ In Monshi's Tarikh-e ʿalam ara-ye ʿAbbasi, leʾam also accompanies the terms owbash and sepahian, mostly in reference to Safavid adversaries such as the rebels in Gilan.Footnote ¹¹⁹

Different Gilani towns had their own groups of leʾam and sepahis. Leʾam were the underclass of able-bodied men who could serve as mercenaries in times of need. Such mercenaries sometimes belonged to well-organized and hierarchical groups the ruler could call upon to engage in battle. The roʾasa-ye leʾam or akaber-e leʾam were the leaders and chiefs in charge of coordinating and mobilizing subordinates. Goto refers to this group as a reserve army.Footnote ¹²⁰ Whether the leʾam's use of force, as distinct from the official military corps, was legitimate or not depended on the context of engagement. Shah ʿAbbas I, for example, kept a close eye on the leʾam of Gilan. During his tenure as the vizier of Gilan, Behzad Beyg armed and organized a group of Gilani leʾam in order to prepare them for an offensive on Astara to confront Khwajeh Mohammad Reza Saru Khwajeh, the vizier of Azerbaijan. Khwajeh Mohammad had initiated a takeover of Astara and Gaskar, territories considered by Gilanis to be part of Gilan. Thus, Behzad Beyg felt it necessary to react to this blatant disregard for Gilan's territorial integrity. Behzad Beyg's maneuver, however, came under fire from Morteza Qoli Khan, the hakem (governor) of Gaskar, and the above-mentioned vizier of Azerbaijan, who arrested Behzad Beyg's men as they reached Astara.Footnote ¹²¹ Yet, the main issue raised was not the offensive against the vizier of Azerbaijan, but the fact that Behzad Beyg had armed and mobilized Gilan's leʾam without the Shah's permission.

When the story reached Shah ʿAbbas I, he ordered Morteza Qoli Khan to confidentially gather and send the names of some 300 (now) armed Gilani leʾam. Morteza Qoli Khan then tasked his advisor, who was apparently familiar with these men, to compile this information for the Shah. Once the Shah was in possession of the names, he sent a decree to Behzad Beyg requesting his presence at Soltaniyeh along with all 300 men. Behzad Beyg promptly responded, presenting himself and the 300 leʾam in question to the Shah. Shah ʿAbbas I then bestowed robes of honor on the leʾam chiefs, after vetting them, and sent them back to Gilan, thereby legitimizing their possession of arms.Footnote ¹²² At the same time, the bestowal of this honor also represented the Shah's claim to these men's loyalty.

A more positive view of urban ajamereh va owbash emerges in the fictional figure of the incredible pahlavan (champion) or javanmard (chivalrous man) represented in Hosseyn Kurd Shabestari's epic tale, which circulated during the reign of Shah ʿAbbas I.Footnote ¹²³ The difference between ajamereh va owbash and pahlavans lies in whether such were legitimized by being brought into the Shah's fold or remained unsanctioned actors. Thus, several connected and contradictory representations of ajamereh va owbash can be discerned from the sources. Another conventional use of the term was as an adjective for the Safavids’ domestic adversaries. For instance, when Fumani refers to Gharib Shah's followers as ajamereh va owbash, he is pointing not only to the urban underclasses, but to all the players, including high-ranking noblemen. In this way, the term denotes the author's intent to discredit the rebels as no more than hoodlums and riffraff, rather than dissidents with legitimate concerns.

There is no primary account of this uprising from the rebels’ point of view. Even the local chronicler Fumani, who at times may have held slight sympathies for his Gilani compatriots, remained a pro-Safavid official, condemning the rebels and labelling them as nothing more than ajamereh va owbash.