Hostname: page-component-74d7c59bfc-g6v2v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-02-11T17:06:07.545Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Yü Shouzhi: from positional authority to personal influence in the Chinese diaspora, 1937–1971

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2026

Xuening Kong*
Affiliation:
History, Purdue University, USA
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Scholarship on overseas Chinese and modern Chinese diplomacy often centers on nationally recognized leaders and officials with prominent global roles. However, a fuller understanding of the diaspora requires examining lesser-known diplomats and local leaders who often had a greater impact on their communities than distant official policies. The transnational life and evolving identity of Yü Shouzhi (1907–1999) – a grassroots Chinese diplomat, community organizer, and small business owner in Mexico – exemplifies this dynamic. Initially trained and appointed by the Chinese Nationalist government, Yü’s diplomatic work extended beyond official channels to foster transethnic, transnational, and intergenerational networks within the Chinese-Mexican community. His transition from formal diplomacy to community leadership and commerce reflected how individual migrants successfully navigated transnational and national politics, community relationships, kinship, and transethnic relations and gained social power. In the process, Yü adjusted his sense of belonging and developed diasporic nationalism, transforming from a representative of the Nationalist government to a deeply rooted Chinese-Mexican community member. This article argues that Yü’s ability to adapt his role as a Chinese diplomat and cultivate a Chinese-Mexican identity was shaped by the interplay of formal state affiliations, grassroots networks, transnational and cross-ethnic relationships, and his personal initiative.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

In 1961, Yü Shouzhi (余受之 1910-?), a waijianglao (外江佬 non-Cantonese born outside of the Pearl River Basin) and small business owner, was selected as the president of La Asociación China in Mexicali, the most influential overseas Chinese community group in the city with the highest concentration of overseas Chinese in northern Mexico.Footnote 1 This was an unusual achievement in the first half of the twentieth century, when leadership positions in Chinese diaspora communities in the Americas were typically held by Cantonese men from established and well-resourced families. These leaders often maintained their influence by overseeing powerful surname associations and aligning themselves both with Chinese governments and Mexican political elites. Without elite lineage or established migration networks, Yü instead carved out his path through institutional affiliations and grassroots engagement. This article will explore how he harnessed his pre-Second-Sino-Japanese-War training with the Nationalist government’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) along with his early stationing in Mexico to become an influential leader and activist for overseas Chinese in Northern Mexico. Tracing his progression from OCAC trainee to Chinese school administrator, Nationalist diplomat, and eventually local community leader, this study explores how Yü’s adaptive trajectory enabled him to sustain influence even after formally distancing himself from the Nationalist Party and the Nationalist government. By cataloging his post-government career as a small business owner and Chinese association president, this paper investigates how he transitioned from an official diplomat to a “quasi-diplomat,” which refers to someone doing diplomacy without a formal diplomatic appointment by any nation’s authorities. His trajectory reveals a more fluid and contingent form of diaspora leadership, shaped not by inherited privilege but by negotiation, adaptation, and strategic positioning at the margins of state power.

Scholarship on Chinese migrants and international politics focuses on the more officially documented national leaders and officials who claimed the global stage. However, the diaspora and migration cannot be fully understood unless scholars examine the lesser-known diplomats and community leaders who influenced the public and their communities to greater degrees than far-away policy declarations. Only one book, Fredy González’s Paisanos Chinos, explores Yü’s legacy in detail, focusing on Yü as a wartime mobilizer and community leader dedicated to strengthening the relationship between overseas Chinese in Mexico and their native country through fundraising events, directing Cantonese operas, and translating and writing newspaper articles.Footnote 2 González’s account also sheds light on Yü’s political talent, including his role in easing the tensions between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the fraternal association Chee Kung Tong. However, a gap remains in the literature regarding Yü’s pre-Mexico life, especially his journey to becoming a Chinese diplomat and the transformation of his career. More importantly, beyond his efforts on wartime mobilization, it is worth expanding the discussion on how Yü navigated different powers within the Chinese-Mexican community as a non-Cantonese migrant and overcame racial barriers as a Chinese migrant in Mexico.

This article examines the distinctive case of Yü Shouzhi, spotlighting his journey to gain and maintain influence as a non-Cantonese member of the Chinese diaspora in Mexico. Unlike his Cantonese contemporaries, who often relied on established migration networks for support, Yü actively built up social networks and worked closely with Chinese Nationalists, various Chinese-Mexican communities, kinship groups, and local Mexicans.Footnote 3 These social networks helped Yü participate in the political circles of the Chinese-Mexican community during the Second World War and continue to use the social relations he established to support his small businesses – a restaurant followed by a grocery store – as a Chinese-Mexican civilian in the postwar era. Through these efforts, Yü demonstrated diverse strategies underrepresented migrants employed to assert agency and became a Chinese Mexican with multiple successful careers.

Yü’s career as a grassroots diplomat further contributes to the literature on Chinese diplomats representing the Republic of China, in which the history of Chinese diplomacy has long focused on professional diplomats and their contributions to nation building.Footnote 4 Unlike most of the Chinese diplomats during his time, Yü was not born into a prominent family, nor did he have a college-level education in international law or diplomacy. Even as he began his government career, he received a lower-level position that allowed few opportunities to meet with state governors or presidents at international conventions. As a result of this, he took a grassroots approach to his position as a diplomat and engaged with overseas Chinese in everyday practice. His journey continued to defy norms when, in a move unlike any other diplomats recorded, Yü left his reliable and prestigious career in Mexico following his disappointment with the Nationalist government and his reflections upon both his opinions and roles in the world, turning to forging new pathways for impact and influence.

In focusing on Yü’s experiences as an extraordinary overseas Chinese diplomat, this article examines how Yü deftly navigated multiple power structures and gained social and financial power. Tracing Yü’s life through his autobiographies, essays, and local gazettes, this article highlights Yü’s agency in developing diplomatic careers, working with overseas Chinese people, and engaging with Chinese migrants in Mexico in both national and transnational contexts. In this process, Yü adjusted his sense of belonging and developed diasporic nationalism. In contrast to the inherent Chinese identity, diasporic nationalism, which contains personal and communal self-perceptions, “transformed under the interaction between Chinese people and local society, as well as ideas and sentiments carried by intellectuals and officials from China who were sensitive to wider global power relations and conceptions of peoplehood.”Footnote 5 I argue that the combination of official diplomatic ties, local social networks, transnational and trans-ethnical connections, and individual effort made it possible for Yü to adjust his Chinese diplomatic role and develop his Chinese Mexican identity in different environments.

Yü Shouzhi, the diplomat (1937–1946)

Unlike higher-ranking envoys or ambassadors who came from a prestigious family with global experiences, Yü was born into an ordinary, average-income family in Yibin in Sichuan Province, an inland province in Southwest China. Despite his socioeconomic situation, he had the goal of pursuing a Western education and a prosperous future outside of his hometown. His father, a small business owner running a bakery, was the sole provider for six children. Though poverty during his childhood prevented him from going to school, Yü’s father worked hard to support his family and urged all his children to learn classical Chinese literature because he believed that a classical education would enable the social growth of his children necessary to enter the upper classes.Footnote 6 However, the traditional schooling for which his father worked so hard bored Yü. He thought that classical literature – highlighting patriarchy, feudal ethics, and arranged marriages – was obsolete and impractical in a modern global world. Drawn instead to New Youth magazine and writings from the New Culture Movement, Yü immersed himself in ideas of individual freedom, iconoclasm, and resistance to patriarchal authority. These progressive influences fueled his rejection of his father’s expectations and ignited his desire to forge a radically different path beyond the confines of his hometown and inherited worldview.

Anti-imperialist revolutions and protests in big cities on the East Coast also drew Yü’s attention and deepened his desire to pursue political influence. The year 1925 witnessed the death of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the Father of the Chinese Republic and the Nationalist Party, as well as the rise of Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership within the Nationalist Party (GMD). Within the next year, the army of the Nationalists began to march north from Canton with the goal of unifying China. The news of revolutions in Beijing and Shanghai spread to Sichuan quickly. Students’ anti-imperialist activism of the May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai and the Nationalist-led reunification campaign North Expedition stirred Yü’s longing to join the currents of revolution and pursue more educational opportunities in big cities.Footnote 7 Reflecting on these historical events, he wrote, “I am a teen. Why did not I catch up with the trend of other radical students who did not obey their parents’ words?”Footnote 8 With the goal in mind, Yü decided to leave his hometown behind. Yü registered in 1928 for a Western-styled middle school in Chengdu under a pseudonym without informing his family.Footnote 9

Nevertheless, Yü could not continue his schooling due to economic difficulties and his lack of familial sponsorship. After Yü finished his middle school studies, he had no financial support to pursue college studies, so he went to Chongqing to look for a job. Working for Minsheng Industrial in order to stay in Shanghai, Yü secretly moonlighted at a bank for a better salary because he wanted the benefit of two jobs to improve his standard of living. This ran afoul of Minsheng’s rules, as they expected Yü to work as a full-time, exclusive employee. After only a short period of double employment, Minsheng found out about his moonlighting and forced Yü to resign from the bank job to keep his employment with them. Believing that the decision of Minsheng was unjust, Yü indignantly resigned from Minsheng and relocated to Nanjing for other job opportunities in 1934. Once there, Yü heard about a one-year state-sponsored program training diplomatic personnel members recruiting students. Knowing that this training program covered students’ living expenses in Nanjing and offered them job opportunities to work overseas after graduation, Yü saw this program as an ideal fit, allowing him to pursue his social advancement without needing to seek external financial support.Footnote 10 This marked the official starting point of Yü’s diplomatic career.

Yü’s trajectory from an inland hometown to a provincial capital and then to the national capital, Nanjing, to find job opportunities was not unusual in early twentieth-century China. During this period, provincial radicals sought to escape the constraints of patriarchal family structures and conservative social norms by migrating to urban centers, where they aspired to participate in building a new social and political order.Footnote 11 Those provincial youth, such as Yü and his contemporaries Yun Daiying (惲代英 1895–1931) and Shi Cuntong (施存統 1899–1970), actively got acquainted with forward-thinking persons and developed networks with a range of social groups, including those from prestigious familial and educational backgrounds.Footnote 12 In those eastern Chinese metropolises, relocated rural youths cut across conventional lines of social division, sought job opportunities, built a dense network of relationships, and interacted with each other in multiple capacities that were unavailable in their rural hometowns. As Toby Lincoln points out, industrialization and the commitment of Chinese governments to urban development led to an increase in job occupations and urban modernity, where people from different social backgrounds “were able to afford their piece of the urban dream.”Footnote 13 While there was no guarantee of a comfortable life for anyone, the expanding networks and possibilities of life enabled newcomers like Yü to look for their economic needs.Footnote 14

Yü seized the opportunity of the state-sponsored training program to make a living in Nanjing while the support of overseas Chinese increasingly drew attention to the Nanjing regime, and the Nationalists were increasingly dedicated to developing diplomatic personnel to engage with the overseas compatriots. Unlike its predecessor, the Nationalist regime actively sought to offer support, protection, and a unifying Chinese identity to the diaspora, positioning overseas Chinese as both participants in and beneficiaries of China’s modernization project.Footnote 15 The Nationalists saw this engagement as mutually beneficial: the Nationalists received crucial financial support – from wealthy merchants to laborers abroad – while the diaspora was granted symbolic inclusion in the national narrative. Sun Yat-sen lauded the importance of overseas Chinese contributions to revolutions. A widespread slogan, “overseas Chinese as the mother of revolution,” praised overseas Chinese who raised money to support revolutions and hosted exiled revolutionaries.Footnote 16 Beyond the economic reasons, overseas Chinese loyalty to the Nanjing regime and their foreign connections were also important motivations for the Nationalists to feel compelled to develop solid connections with overseas Chinese.Footnote 17 This purpose was increasingly urgent in the late 1930s when the Nanjing regime’s need for external aid multiplied following the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

The training program that Yü enrolled in was founded by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC), a government agency overseeing and managing affairs related to overseas Chinese. Its responsibilities included “the administration of entry and exit, encouragement of investment, and promotion of education for Overseas Chinese and their descendants, as well as propaganda efforts among communities abroad.”Footnote 18 When the Nationalist government was established in April 1927, the OCAC was a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The OCAC later became an executive branch in 1932, reporting to the Executive Yuan, which empowered the OCAC to negotiate overseas affairs with the Ministry of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and four other ministries.Footnote 19 The OCAC contained a central office, local bureaus, and overseas branches. There were three main divisions within the central office: the secretariat, the administrative office, and the office of overseas education. Yü received his training under the office of overseas education, which took charge of training personnel to provide education for overseas Chinese returning to China or living abroad.Footnote 20 The establishment of the OCAC and the cooperation of these branches significantly reinforced the connection between overseas Chinese and Nationalist China. Steve Philips argues that the establishment of the OCAC “signaled an important shift in overseas Chinese policies. The Nationalists not only requested assistance in the name of patriotism, but also offered services in order to build legitimacy as a government – a reciprocal relationship that would become central to the War of Resistance and Cold War mobilization.”Footnote 21

In his autobiography, Yü did not discuss the specific content of the training he attended or the textbooks he used, but it likely included practical lessons in terms of how to quickly integrate into overseas Chinese communities rather than the international laws or diplomatic protocol typical of high-ranking envoys. One such skill was learning the Cantonese language. Before departing for Mexico, Yü learned to speak Cantonese at the OCAC training program because the majority of Chinese overseas were Cantonese speakers.Footnote 22 This linguistic ability proved crucial throughout his later life in Mexico. In his later life in Mexico, speaking Cantonese not only enabled Yü to converse with Chinese people in Mexico but also to compose songs and direct operas in Cantonese to foster patriotism within the overseas community.Footnote 23 The Cantonese language skill thus significantly contributed to Yü’s integration into the overseas Chinese community in Mexico. Moreover, the program hired previously overseas Chinese as instructors in order to familiarize its trainees with overseas affairs. Yü recalled one such instructor, Li Pusheng (李樸生 date unknown), a Southeast Asian-born overseas Chinese who served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Li offered a memorable lesson in interpersonal protocol: “feng ren jian sui, yu wu tian qian” (逢人減歲,遇物添錢 translated as “when encountering people, you should always shave a few years off people’s age; when someone shows you any purchases, you should always estimate the price higher).Footnote 24 This aphorism captured a key element of interpersonal diplomacy among overseas Chinese: people like to look younger than their real age and want to have purchases that look high-value. The saying reflected a nuanced understanding of social interactions, particularly the emotional needs and status sensitivities that shaped everyday encounters within diasporic communities. For Yü, the OCAC training equipped him with the linguistic and cultural skills necessary to earn trust and build enduring ties with overseas Chinese.

The training that Yü received distinguished him from high-ranking diplomats with prestigious backgrounds, who were usually from treaty port families, had extensive foreign experiences, and often earned advanced degrees in fields such as international law.Footnote 25 The Nationalists expected those high-ranking officials to familiarize themselves with the tools of international law and precedents and be persistent and tenacious in diplomatic negotiations, as exemplified by the widely-recognized diplomat Wellington Koo (顧維鈞 1888–1985).Footnote 26 However, the Nationalists also needed a different kind of diplomatic personnel – pragmatic operatives who could cultivate relationships with overseas Chinese communities at the grassroots level. The pragmatic-oriented training that Yü attended was short and not able to equip him with the skills necessary to participate in high-level diplomatic negotiations, but it significantly taught Yü to adapt in foreign environments and build rapport with overseas Chinese people quickly. He was capable and eager to work for overseas Chinese following the one-year program training him as a pragmatic generalist who could integrate into overseas Chinese communities and conduct overseas affairs.

Recent scholarship has shed light on the Chinese Nationalists’ diplomatic efforts to cultivate support among non-elite overseas Chinese communities at regional and communal levels. For instance, the Nationalists in the 1920s actively courted progressive Chinese residents in Chicago by issuing membership cards to donors – an initiative that rewarded their contributions and encouraged sustained engagement with China’s political and socioeconomic affairs.Footnote 27 Additionally, regional party chapters took an active role in combating opium trafficking and other illicit activities that harmed the reputation of overseas Chinese communities and provoked racialized violence.Footnote 28 In the northern Mexican state of Sonora, Chinese Nationalists strived to curtail the regional socioeconomic influence of several Chinese fraternal associations, especially regarding the opium trade of the mid-1920s, thereby positioning themselves as moral reformers and defenders of the community’s public image in contrast to local organizations.Footnote 29

To supplement his practical training, Yü pursued self-study and focused on how to improve policies that impacted individuals of the diaspora. Following his completion of the training program in 1935, Yü discovered that there was no well-matched position for him available. As he awaited suitable employment opportunities, Yü worked as an editor for the official journal Qiaowu Yuebao (僑務月報 Monthly Affairs of Overseas Chinese) to support himself. This position gave him access to a wide range of reports on diplomatic practices and allowed him to reflect on the strengths and shortcomings of Chinese officials’ engagement with diaspora communities. It was during this “unemployment period” that Yü wrote articles expressing his insightful thoughts on the important roles of overseas Chinese in helping China withstand the imperialist invasion. In his article “The Development of National Economy and Overseas Chinese” (Guomin Jingji Jianshe yu Huaqiao 國民經濟建設與華僑), Yü highlighted how overseas Chinese, an indispensable element of the Chinese population, played an important role in disaster relief, investment in infrastructure, and advocating for China-made products.Footnote 30 He argued that cooperation between the Nationalist government and overseas Chinese – especially civilians – was essential for advancing national economic development and countering the threat posed by Japan.Footnote 31 While overseas elites offered substantial financial support, overseas Chinese civilians also contributed to the national economy by promoting domestic products and participating in thrift campaigns to save money for remittances to China.Footnote 32 Yü also subtly pointed out the inefficiencies in the state’s overseas Chinese administration. In another article, Yü noted that although the government had established separate departments for diplomacy, education, and investment, coordination among them remained inadequate.Footnote 33 In the same article, Yü further critiqued that in some cases, consulates lacked clear directives and operational guidelines from central authorities, limiting their effectiveness in serving overseas Chinese communities.Footnote 34

The experience of writing about overseas Chinese affairs allowed Yü to reflect on the complexities of diaspora-state relations and to envision how a pragmatically trained diplomat could serve Chinese communities abroad. Whereas elite diplomats such as Wellington Koo operated at the level of formal international relations – appealing to the League of Nations and major powers such as the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union – Yü approached diplomacy from the ground up.Footnote 35 Rather than focusing on abstract geopolitical negotiations, Yü concentrated on how international politics and the domestic policies of host countries directly affected the everyday lives of overseas Chinese. This grassroots orientation would continue to shape his perspective throughout his official diplomatic career and his quasi-diplomatic period.

After Yü wrote on overseas Chinese affairs for a year, in 1937, the OCAC appointed him as the president of a new Chinese school in Mexico City, reflecting Nationalist China’s larger initiative to mobilize overseas Chinese communities amid rising nationalism on the eve of the Second Sino-Japanese War. By that time, a dense network of institutions linked overseas Chinese communities in Mexico to Nationalist China. From the early to mid-twentieth century, the Nationalist government – through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – extended formal diplomatic authority via embassies, consulates, and vice-consulates to negotiate with the Mexican government over policies affecting Chinese residents. These offices reported to the Executive Yuan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on matters such as petitions to visit China, investments, and civil disputes.Footnote 36 Meanwhile, the OCAC linked the homeland and diaspora through cultural programs, policy guidance, and coordination with local community leaders. Alongside these governmental institutions, the Nationalist Party developed its own network of local chapters that organized fraternal meetings (kenqin hui 懇親會), published newspapers, and raised funds for wartime relief, which fostered a sense of unity and political loyalty. The Party’s Central Committee in Nanjing also dispatched delegates to provide provisions on overseas Chinese affairs at local party chapters, while party members of local chapters also attended the GMD National Congress, showing their loyalty to the Party.Footnote 37 In Mexico, these layers of authority converged: the ambassador and consular officials served as the state’s representatives, while Nationalist chapters sustained community cohesion and Nationalist visibility. Together, this transnational network blurred the boundaries between diplomacy, commerce, and nationalism, embedding the Chinese diaspora in Mexico within the global reach of the Nationalist regime.

Education was a key part of these efforts to maintain overseas Chinese’s cultural and political ties to China as their motherland. During his presidential term, Yü confronted the reality that many children of the Chinese residents could not read or write Chinese. To address this gap, he compiled bilingual textbooks to enhance students’ Chinese literacy.Footnote 38 Scholarship on overseas Chinese during the Nationalist era (1927–1949) highlights that the Nationalists prioritized establishing and supporting Chinese-language education as a key part of its policy toward overseas Chinese communities.Footnote 39 As Isabelle Lausent-Herrera points out, the Nationalists intensified their propaganda and used Chinese education to strengthen the relations between the Party and the immigrants and their children in the 1930s.Footnote 40 The emphasis on Nationalist-led Chinese school education reflected their ambition to extend cultural and political influence over overseas Chinese communities beyond the huiguans (會館) and traditional fraternal associations.Footnote 41

Nevertheless, the paucity of Nationalists’ influence in Chinese Mexican communities made Yü’s work difficult. Supported financially by local Cantonese merchants for their children’s Chinese learning, the Chinese school was more like a prep school managed by local Chinese elites under limited administration of the Nationalist government.Footnote 42 Moreover, the sociopolitical landscape of the Chinese-Mexican community posed significant challenges for Yü’s grassroots diplomatic efforts. Within the first three months after his arrival in Mexico, Yü actively visited many overseas Chinese communities in Mexico City and quickly observed power struggles and divisions among the Chinese-Mexican community. Most notably, he observed an intense rivalry between the Nationalists and the long-established fraternal society Chee Kung Tong (CKT) 致公黨. The CKT originated in China and supported Sun Yat-sen’s revolution to overturn the imperial government in 1912, but later distanced itself from the Nationalist regime under Chiang Kai-shek. By the time of Yü’s arrival, the CKT had taken root in Chinese Mexican society much longer than the Nationalists and had more popular support and administrative power at the local level.Footnote 43 When Yü visited the Tong Hall of CKT, he noted that Nationalist China’s national flag was taken down, demonstrating that the CKT did not acknowledge the legitimacy nor respect the leadership of the Nationalist regime.Footnote 44

Despite the Nationalist government’s limited capacity to offer strong support, Yü actively worked to build alliances among Chinese Mexican groups and strengthen their ties with Nationalist China. For instance, with the coordination and communication facilitated by Yü, the Nationalists and the CKT, as well as nineteen other smaller Chinese associations, convened at the Chinese school and laid the groundwork for the Mexico City National Salvation Organization to Support the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance (Mojing kangri jiuguo houyuanhui 墨京華僑救國會), which was formally established the following month.Footnote 45 Yü served as the organization’s secretary, a role that allowed him to continue cultivating collaborative relationships across ideological divides in service of a shared patriotic cause.Footnote 46 During the years of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Yü was dedicated to engaging with celebrities and advocates from China to increase awareness of anti-Japanese mobilization among the overseas Chinese community in Mexico. In Fall 1937, Yü hosted Tao Xingzhi (陶行知 1891–1946), a Chinese educator renowned for advocating mass education as a means to alleviate poverty and strengthen national resilience. As Japan’s imperial expansion intensified, Tao toured overseas Chinese communities to promote national unity and grassroots support for China’s resistance. Seeing Tao’s visit as a valuable opportunity to galvanize patriotic sentiment among Chinese Mexicans, Yü organized a series of public events in Mexico City and served as Tao’s simultaneous interpreter from Mandarin to Cantonese.Footnote 47 In one of his speeches, Tao used graphs and character analysis to underscore the importance of solidarity between overseas Chinese and the Chinese nation.Footnote 48 Tao deconstructed the Chinese character “春 (Spring)” into “人 (people),” “三 (three),” and “日 (sun, also symbolizing Japan),” noting that the three figures form “眾” (the masses) with “日” positioned beneath the united masses. In Tao’s interpretation, the character “春” became a metaphor for national and diasporic cohesion: if people across all sectors of Chinese society – across class, region, and generation – could unite as one, then the collective strength of the people would be sufficient to crush Japanese imperialism.Footnote 49 Tao’s message, transmitted through Yü’s mediation, exemplified how linguistic creativity within Chinese literacy was mobilized to build transnational solidarity in the face of war.

In addition to Chinese and overseas Chinese elites, Yü actively engaged with civilian members of the overseas Chinese community in Mexico during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Like advocates in other overseas Chinese communities around the world, Yü raised money among Chinese residents in Mexico to garner support for their homeland.Footnote 50 However, Yü noted his belief that “…saving the nation requires not only donations but also the importance of transmitting information and spreading awareness.”Footnote 51 To achieve this goal, Yü drew on his working experience as a periodical editor and turned his attention to accessible, public-facing publications as a means of political mobilization. Recognizing that most overseas Chinese in Mexico could not read English-language newspapers covering events in China and anti-Japanese resistance, Yü founded a local newspaper in both Chinese and Spanish, Kangri Xinwen (抗日新聞 News of the War of Resistance), with the help of several young Chinese-Mexican volunteers.Footnote 52 As the editor-in-chief, Yü bought the latest newspapers published in San Francisco and New York City and then excerpted and translated news about China and overseas Chinese into Chinese and Spanish. In March 1938, Yü launched another overseas Chinese publication, Qiaosheng Yuekan (僑聲月刊 Monthly Journal of the Overseas Chinese Voice). González points out that unlike Kangri Xinwen, Qiaosheng Yuekan concentrated more directly on the Chinese-Mexican community and its initiatives to support the Republic of China.Footnote 53 As two of the very few periodicals available to Chinese migrants in Mexico, the newspaper and journal played a critical role in fostering a collective identity and sustaining transnational consciousness during the Second Sino-Japanese War.

As Yü became more deeply embedded in the Chinese-Mexican community, his professional focus underwent a transition – from a formal representative of the Nationalist government to a community-oriented figure deeply engaged with the everyday lives of overseas Chinese civilians in Mexico. Initially tasked with promoting the political agenda of the Nationalist government, Yü gradually redirected his focus toward the needs and aspirations of Chinese migrants in Mexico and their descendants. This shift was not abrupt but rather a steady realignment shaped by his growing immersion in community life. Over the course of Yü’s diplomatic service, he had only two brief visits to China. One was for his diplomatic duties, and the second was to get married and bring his new wife back to Mexico with him.Footnote 54 These rare visits highlight the waning connection he maintained with his homeland. In contrast, his commitments in Mexico grew steadily stronger. Through language instruction, organizing cultural events, and fostering community cohesion, Yü’s diplomatic mission came to center on grassroots engagement. His work evolved from advancing the political interests of a distant state to nurturing trust, belonging, and solidarity within the diaspora.

Furthermore, the transformation of Yü’s diplomatic role resulted in the development of diasporic nationalism and a reconfiguration of his Chinese identity. In the twentieth century, diasporic nationalism emerged in the context of colonialism and transnational displacement when dispersing populations reconceptualized their national belonging and redefined expressions of national identity.Footnote 55 Unlike ethno-nationalism, diasporic nationalism arose among individuals in diasporas who “appear[ed] to be bilingual cross-cultural negotiators moving regularly between different cultures and participating in exchanges across national borders.”Footnote 56 Yü exemplified this dynamic. Initially dispatched as a representative of the Chinese Nationalist government, his daily interactions with the Chinese-Mexican community gradually positioned him as a cultural mediator – interpreting cultural values and translating patriotic discourse. Yü’s active role in organizing these collective activities strengthened his diasporic nationalism and helped him integrate into the Chinese-Mexican community as his new home. In this case, instead of the village where he was born, the home referred to “a much larger entity, a motherland, which included strangers who spoke unintelligible dialects and yet…were inalienably linked to each other by virtue of race, culture, history, and affection.”Footnote 57 As Yü gradually embedded himself in the Chinese-Mexican community, he transformed from a Nationalist delegate to a locally rooted participant in community life.

As Yü’s diasporic nationalism deepened, his relationship with the Nationalist government became increasingly strained due to the lack of institutional support. Diplomats often received little guidance or timely responses from the central government on matters of foreign affairs, and their daily work regularly lacked coordination with broader foreign policy agendas. In his memoirs, Cheng Tiangu (程天固 1889–1974), China’s ambassador to Mexico at the time, observed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had few coherent diplomatic policies and lacked consistent principles for engaging with other nations.Footnote 58 He further lamented that the most common response to diplomatic inquiries from abroad was simply “handle according to the circumstances” (zhuoliang banli 酌量辦理).Footnote 59 This ambiguous directive reflected the government’s unwillingness or inability to offer concrete direction. Furthermore, financial difficulties due to warfare in China, as scholarship on the fall of the Nationalist regime has pointed out, severely limited the government’s ability to maintain effective oversight of its overseas branches.Footnote 60 This situation created a disconnect that undermined the cohesion between the central party and its local chapters abroad, leading to declining morale and weakened allegiance to the Nationalist cause. The lack of administration also meant that grassroots diplomats like Yü had little administrative backing and could not regularly receive stipends. Without a consistent stipend or material support, Yü described his party position as offering little more than a means to “merely able to survive (hukou 糊口) in the foreign land.”Footnote 61 What Yü sought instead was an occupation that allowed him to churen toudi 出人頭地, literally translated as “stand out” but mainly referring to someone who makes a good living with distinguishable fame and/or amount of property.Footnote 62

Factional conflicts within the local Nationalist chapter that Yü worked at aggravated his disappointment with the Nationalists. In his autobiographies, Yü recorded a conflict with the ambassador Cheng Tiangu. When Cheng first assumed office in 1941, he raised capital by floating shares among Chinese people in Mexico for mine exploration in Guangxi Province. When someone reached out to Yü for advice, Yü voiced concern that Cheng’s behavior was a corrupt abuse of his power and reported it as such. Yü’s suggestions ended up causing problems for him. Three months later, Yü received a letter from the central office of the OCAC dismissing him from his secretary position.Footnote 63 While Yü appealed the decision and received other party members’ assurance that he was not at fault, he did not receive any response. Having grown weary of dealing with office politics, Yü believed that there was seemingly no chance of promotion in the Nationalist system. In 1946, Yü decided to depart from the GMD and opened a Chinese restaurant in Mexico City called Asia.

Yü’s decision demonstrates that political environments and individual decisions cooperatively changed the life trajectories of Chinese migrants. As Adam McKeown pointed out, “migrants…interacted with local environments, creating images and activities that facilitated their transnational interests in accordance with the possibilities and constraints of local concerns.”Footnote 64 Yü’s diplomatic career began with official training offered by the Nationalist regime, but he continuously forged his own path, developed new identities, and adjusted his career in response to shifting sociopolitical circumstances in China and Mexico. Moreover, Yü’s trajectory was not simply the result of top-down political forces. As Steve Miles argues, migration trajectories “resulted more from decisions of individual migrants and their families than from state initiatives.”Footnote 65 From a rural youth in Yibin to a grassroots diplomat in Mexico, Yü’s own ambitions and values – ranging from pursuing promising careers and a comfortable life to his innovative approaches to overseas Chinese affairs and engagement – joined with the sociopolitical context to play a decisive role in shaping his transnational journey.

Yü Shouzhi, the small Chinese business owner and quasi-diplomat in Mexico (1946–1972)

The early days of Yü’s restaurant business in Mexico City were challenging, but the social networks he had cultivated through prior political and community involvement laid the foundation for his new venture. When Yü lacked both experience and start-up capital, his previous colleague at the Nationalist chapter, Yü Aihe (余愛和 date unknown), leased him the restaurant and believed that he would pay off the principal later.Footnote 66 This act of trust and generosity led Yü Shouzhi to affectionately refer to him as “Uncle Aihe.”Footnote 67 It was important to note that the two men were not blood relatives – Yü Aihe hailed from Taishan, Guangdong, while Yü Shouzhi was from Yibin, Sichuan.Footnote 68 However, sharing the same surname created a crucial loose kinship social connection that Yü depended on to start a new career. As Elliott Young underscores, while clan and lineage ties in China were grounded in blood relations, kinship ties linked even distant relatives or those with no blood relation through shared family names in the Americas.Footnote 69 In Yü’s case, this form of surname-based kinship, combined with connections formed through his prior political service, provided the social capital and credibility needed to launch his small business.

In addition to his social networks, Yü’s personal hard work and perseverance played a significant role in running a successful business. In his memoirs, Yü recalled that observing his father manage a bakery during his youth made it easier for him to operate the Asia at the outset.Footnote 70 However, maintaining the business proved demanding. While hiring twelve Mexican employees, Yü and his wife had to work in the restaurant seven days a week with only three hours of sleep in order to pay off the restaurant debt.Footnote 71 By the third year after he leased the restaurant, Yü earned a profit that exceeded his payments towards the loan principal. The small restaurant in Mexico City not only provided Yü with essential start-up capital but also valuable entrepreneurial experience, laying a solid foundation for his future business ventures.

Rather than remain satisfied with running a small restaurant through laborious efforts, Yü strived for more. After traveling to several Mexican states, he identified Mexicali as a promising site for his next business venture – a city where his earlier diplomatic service had made him a familiar and trusted figure among local Chinese residents.Footnote 72 His prior colleagueship also played a key role in facilitating new connections in the city. Upon hearing of his plans to relocate, the Mexicali chapter of the Nationalist Party extended an invitation encouraging him to establish a business there.Footnote 73 Yü Gunrong (余滾榮, date unknown), a standing committee member of the local Nationalist chapter, offered him the first floor of the party building to rent for his business and invited him to assist with party affairs in return.Footnote 74 With the support of these overlapping political and personal networks, Yü successfully relocated to Mexicali in May 1952.Footnote 75 Yü’s experience exemplifies how personal reputation and political engagement could work together to sustain diasporic livelihood.

When Yü moved to Mexicali, it was a burgeoning city on the U.S.-Mexico border attracting numerous immigrants. Located in Baja California, Mexicali was originally a sparsely populated desert town largely because of its extreme summer temperatures, which often exceeded 100 degrees Fahrenheit. However, in the early twentieth century, agricultural investments of U.S.-based companies operating on both sides of the border quickly developed Mexicali. Originally developed as a hub for livestock raising, Mexicali later implemented large-scale irrigation systems that transformed the region’s agricultural potential and drew European and Asian immigrant laborers, both with and without contracts.Footnote 76 They organized cooperatives, invested in land development, and cultivated cotton as both planters and harvesters.Footnote 77 The construction of railroads further stimulated economic growth by integrating Mexicali into regional transportation and trade networks.Footnote 78 Furthermore, Prohibition in the U.S. between 1918–1933 brought an economic boom to the city with the expansion of tourist and entertainment industries – such as liquor, gambling, cabarets, and casinos – as American visitors crossed the border to access these domestically forbidden pleasures.Footnote 79 Even after Prohibition ended, Mexicali remained enticing to Mexican citizens through the Bracero Program (1942–1964), which granted legal authorization for Mexican men to work in the U.S. under short-term contracts, allowing numerous Mexican laborers to go across the border and work in the U.S.Footnote 80 According to statistics cited by Arreola and Curtis, Mexicali’s population grew dramatically from just 462 in 1910 to 65,749 by 1950, reflecting Mexicali’s rapid transformation to a dynamic and thriving border economy.Footnote 81

In addition to its economic appeal, the sociopolitical environment of Mexicali was favorable for Chinese migrants in the mid-twentieth century. From the beginning of the twentieth century until the mid-1930s, Chinese migrants in northern Mexico were subjected to sustained anti-Chinese boycotts, legal mandates favoring the employment of Mexican laborers, and episodes of racial violence and expulsion.Footnote 82 Even though anti-Chinese activities did not prosper and had limited repercussions in the Mexican Valley, Chinese laborers lost jobs and many of them left the region.Footnote 83 Those who remained gravitated toward Mexicali, where they found relative safety in numbers and support from local Chinese associations.Footnote 84 This concentration of Chinese migrants contributed to the rise of Chinese-owned businesses and greater community stability. Chinese Mexicans’ living conditions further improved during the Second World War when Mexico joined China’s wartime allies and officially condemned Japanese aggression.Footnote 85 Moreover, Chinese Mexicans’ visible contributions to wartime efforts – such as organizing anti-Japanese boycotts – helped raise their profile in public life and fostered greater social acceptance.Footnote 86 The anti-Chinese sentiment and activities in Mexico then generally waned. Chinese residents who remained in Mexicali continued to live their lives and advance the interests of the Chinese community in the region in the latter half of the twentieth century.Footnote 87

When Yü opened his grocery store in Mexicali in February 1954, he and his wife painstakingly developed trans-ethnic and transnational connections. They first hired one Mexican female clerk and gradually expanded their workforce to include five additional Mexican employees as the business grew. Along with her role as an employer, Yü’s wife was very good at managing and communicating with their Mexican employees.Footnote 88 The employer-employee relationships, along with the couple’s openness to engaging with the broader Mexican community, helped them develop what Grace Delgado describes as kith and kin networks, referring to “connections born of blood, friendship, and business contacts.”Footnote 89 This kind of everyday interaction significantly contributed to Yü and his wife “establishing a sense of social belonging and residential permanency” in a foreign land.Footnote 90 Additionally, Yü and his wife took advantage of their residence in the borderlands to cross the U.S.-Mexico border frequently for business purposes. According to Yü, residents of Mexicali were eligible to obtain travel permits from the U.S. government that allowed unlimited border crossings for a six-month period.Footnote 91 Taking advantage of this opportunity, Yü and his wife walked across the U.S.-Mexico border to get supplies and place orders for a better price after the business hours of their store.Footnote 92 Through their efforts, sales increased from 500 pesos to more than a thousand per day.Footnote 93 One year after launching their grocery business, they had earned enough to purchase a car and expand the store, and finally owned the property itself in the seventh year of operation.Footnote 94 Through developing their professional and personal lives through transnational and transethnic connections, Yü and his wife established themselves as important members of the Mexicali Chinese community.

In addition to building a successful business, Yü remained actively engaged in political capital and social networks established during his prior diplomatic career and continued to get involved in local Chinese-Mexican community affairs. For example, his earlier initiatives – such as founding Kangzhan Xinwen and Qiaosheng Yuekan – had earned him recognition and trust within the local Chinese community by the time he settled in Mexicali.Footnote 95 By leveraging his prior political affiliations and community standing, Yü sustained his ongoing role in overseas Chinese affairs as a quasi-diplomatic figure, advocating for the interests of Chinese Mexicans. In 1952, Yü flew to Taiwan to participate in the National Congress of the Nationalist government as a public representative of overseas Chinese in Mexico. He proposed restoring the consulate of Mexicali because the dissolution of the original one – due to the lack of funds – caused significant difficulties for Chinese migrants in renewing passports and doing transnational businesses.Footnote 96 Three years later, when the foreign minister of the Republic of China Ye Gongchao (葉公超 1904–1981) attended the Commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the United Nations in San Francisco, Yü – together with Yü Gunrong and Chinese merchant Zhou Ruchao (周如超 date unknown) – met Ye and reiterated the importance of restoring the consulate.Footnote 97 Their efforts bore fruit. The Chinese consulate in Mexicali was reopened in 1958.Footnote 98 Yü’s efforts in this achievement continued his influence and leadership in the overseas Chinese community and his ability to advocate effectively for institutional resources without formal diplomatic status.

Yü’s quasi-diplomatic activities kept his connections with the Nationalists, who remained attentive to fostering amicable relations with overseas Chinese in the postwar era. Despite its defeat in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), the Nationalist government in Taiwan was still the official representative of China on the global stage until 1972 and actively sought to secure the loyalty of Chinese communities abroad. As Meredith Oyen argues, the effective administration over the overseas Chinese population was essential for the Nationalists to assert their anti-communist credentials, claim international legitimacy, maintain favor with the United States, and tap into remittances as a key source of domestic revenue.Footnote 99 Taomo Zhou also emphasizes that overseas Chinese “were at the center of a global battle for hearts and minds fought between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists.”Footnote 100 This geopolitical competition shaped local politics in Mexico as well. According to the memoirs of Feng-Shan Ho (何鳳山 1901–1997), the Republic of China’s ambassador to Mexico, upon his arrival in Mexico City in 1959, he strategically placed informants in government agencies, newspaper offices, and border checkpoints to monitor any potential communist activity.Footnote 101 He also convened meetings with members of the overseas Chinese community to warn against interactions with representatives of the Chinese Communist Party.Footnote 102 Positioned within this transnational campaign, Yü continued to cultivate his political connections and community reputation, sustaining his dual identity as both a community leader and a participant in the Nationalist government’s global anti-communist initiative.

In addition to keeping connections with some Nationalist colleagues, Yü’s shifting identity as a quasi-diplomat and community leader granted him greater autonomy to engage with the broader Chinese Mexican population, particularly younger and non-elite members who had historically been marginalized in overseas Chinese affairs. Drawing on his experiences of working with Chinese Mexican youth as the school president, Yü collaborated with the Chinese consulate in Mexicali to establish the Chinese Youth Association (Zhonghua Qingnian Xiehui 中華青年協會), organizing social and cultural events specifically geared toward Chinese Mexican young people rather than older overseas elites.Footnote 103 Moreover, Yü remained active in mass publication. He founded a new publication, Huaqiao Tongbao (華僑通報 Overseas Chinese Bulletin), for overseas Chinese in Baja California, which was more commercial than Kangri Xinwen or Qiaosheng Yuekan. The Huaqiao Tongbao was launched and maintained through shareholder investment, a funding strategy that enabled it to function independently while fostering a sense of ownership among overseas Chinese stakeholders. In addition to serving as editor, Yü also held the position of chairman of the board, which provided him with an additional source of income and influence beyond his grocery business.

Yü’s public-oriented engagement with the overseas Chinese community in Mexico served the broader interests of the diasporic community in the 1950s and 1960s. The contestation between the Chinese Nationalist and Communist regimes over the support of overseas Chinese in Mexico created a division among the majority of Chinese Mexican elites. While most Chinese Mexican elites continued to support the Nationalists, a small minority aligned with the newly established Communist government.Footnote 104 Yü believed that the political tension fractured the Chinese diaspora in Mexico, driving them apart to disperse and settle in other countries or to withdraw from participation in local Chinese communities.Footnote 105 Moreover, the closure of mainland China under the Communist regime curtailed new migration, further contributing to the shrinking population of Chinese Mexicans. In response to these challenges, Yü believed it was necessary to shift the administrative focus of Chinese Mexicans from attracting elites’ financial support to caring about civilians’ everyday needs and well-being.Footnote 106

Yü’s long-term accumulation of social capital and community networks culminated in 1961 when he was elected president of La Asociación China in Mexicali by local Chinese Mexicans. This honor reflected not only his ability to navigate complex social and political relationships but also his capacity to bring together Chinese residents and their descendants across class and generational divides. His presidency symbolized recognition of his sustained commitment to both the welfare of the diaspora and his informal diplomatic role in maintaining ties with the Nationalist government in Taiwan. The survival and eventual prosperity of Yü’s dual life – as a businessman and quasi-diplomat – demonstrates that individual agency was essential for Chinese migrants seeking to negotiate shifting local, national, and transnational power structures in the postwar era.

Conclusion

In 1971, Yü left for California to pursue better living conditions. However, he left an indelible mark on Chinese communities across Mexico. His legacy highlights the powerful role of individual agency within diasporic contexts, particularly as a non-Cantonese navigating spaces where regional identity often shaped opportunity. Rather than simply following the formal diplomatic pathways emerging from China’s efforts to engage its diaspora, Yü actively reshaped the possibilities available to him. His unique positioning as a grassroots diplomat (civilian-oriented diplomat) enabled him to move fluidly between official and civilian spheres – taking on roles as a diplomat, community organizer, business owner, and association president. These were not positions handed to him through privilege or lineage, but ones he carved out through strategic adaptation, social navigation, and the cultivation of influence across local, national, and transnational networks. Yü’s ability to leverage multiple identities and operate across boundaries of ethnicity, class, and nation demonstrates how diasporic actors assert agency not only to survive but to lead. His life challenges static ideas of power and belonging, showing instead that diasporic leadership is made through movement, negotiation, and purposeful engagement.

More broadly, Yü’s story illuminates a wider dimension of diaspora studies: how grassroots diplomatic actors navigated geopolitical rupture and institutional uncertainty. In the moment when nation states are weakened, fragmented, or in transition, displaced diplomatic personnel and community leaders often are forced to reinvent the very nature of their diplomacy. They must negotiate recognition, legitimacy, and protection not merely through their embassies and consulates, but through community networks and everyday practices of representation. These actors adapt formal diplomatic protocols for a new sociopolitical landscape, blending official aims with local needs and forging complex forms of governance and advocacy.

Yü’s trajectory thus exemplifies how diplomacy itself can be reconfigured from the ground up. It demonstrates that state outreach to diasporic communities is never a one-way process. It is continuously reshaped by the actions, reinterpretations, and innovations of individuals embedded in their new homes. His life invites further research to conceptualize diplomacy as a multi-sited and multi-scalar practice – one sustained not only by government institutions but also by the improvisation, resilience, and strategic agency of diasporic communities. By navigating shifting global conditions, such communities actively redefine what transnational belonging means and how political influence operates across borders.

Footnotes

1 “waijianglao” is how Yü described himself in his autobiographies. See Yü Reference Yü1999d, p. 41, and Yü Reference Yü1999f, p. 102.

2 González Reference González2017, Chapter 3.

3 Lai (Reference Lai2004) discusses the role of surname associations in helping Cantonese Chinese settle in the Americas. On migration networks in Mexico, see González Reference González2017, Delgado Reference Delgado2012, and Schiavone-Camacho Reference Schiavone-Camacho2012.

4 See Strauss Reference Strauss1998, Chapter 6, and Craft, Reference Craft2004. Recently, Shi Xia’s (Reference Shi2024) article on Madame Wellington Koo gives a different story and emphasizes that the study of modern Chinese diplomatic history should move beyond the lens of male professional elites and the institutionalization of diplomatic personnel.

5 McKeown Reference McKeown2001, p. 87.

6 Reference Yü1999a, p. 2.

7 The May Thirteenth Movement was an anti-imperialist movement in 1925, including a nationwide series of strikes and demonstrations led by the Nationalists and Communists. In early 1925, there was a serious conflict after a Chinese strike at a Japanese-owned factory in Shanghai, causing deaths and injuries. However, the warlord-led Beiyang government did not punish the factory owner but arrested several of the workers for disturbing the police, which caused a nationwide series of anti-imperialist and anti-warlord strikes and demonstrations led by the Nationalists and Communists. The Northern Expedition refers to a military campaign launched by the Nationalists against the Beiyang government and other regional warlords in 1926. The result was that the Nationalists toppled the Beiyang government and put the whole of China under the leadership of the Nationalist regime, with Nanjing as the capital city.

8 Reference Yü1999b, p. 8.

9 Reference Yü1999b, pp. 8–9; and Yü Reference Yü1999c, p. 21.

10 Reference Yü1999a, p. 2; and Yü Reference Yü1999c, p. 21.

11 Yeh Reference Yeh1996, p. 202.

13 Lincoln Reference Lincoln2021, p. 163.

14 Yeh Reference Yeh2007, pp. 30–31.

15 Barabantseva Reference Barabantseva2010, p. 24. Wang Gungwu’s early comments also discussed the important influences of overseas Chinese on China’s modernization; see Wang Reference Wang1991, pp. 8–10.

16 Yi Meng Cheng’s (Reference Cheng2023, pp. 147–165) recent article explains how the slogan “overseas Chinese were the mother of revolution” became a political myth used by the Nationalist Party and overseas Chinese to keep connections with each other for decades.

17 Ong Reference Ong2021, p. 121.

18 Szonyi 2005, p. 46.

19 About the history of OCAC, see Ji Reference Ji2013, pp. 94–101; and Chen Reference Chen2010, pp. 64–73.

20 Chen Reference Chen2010, p. 66.

21 Phillips Reference Phillips2013.

22 Reference Yü1999c, pp. 22–23 and Yü Reference Yü1999e, pp. 47.

23 Reference Yü1999c, p. 24.

24 Reference Yü1999g, pp. 224–226.

25 Strauss Reference Strauss1998, p. 168.

26 Footnote Ibid., p. 156. About Wellington Koo, see Craft Reference Craft2004.

27 Ling Reference Ling2012, pp. 153–154.

28 The stereotype of Chinese residents as opium users led to racial prejudice and violence overseas; see Shah Reference Shah2001, Chapter 3; and Arreola Reference Arreola2017, Chapter 4. As for the Nationalist anti-opium campaigns in the Americas, see Ma Reference Ma1990, p. 126.

29 Romero Reference Romero2011, Chapter 5.

30 Reference Yü1936, pp. 7–12.

31 Footnote Ibid., p. 13.

32 Footnote Ibid., pp. 10–11.

33 Reference Yü1935, pp. 1–5.

34 Footnote Ibid., pp. 2–3.

35 Craft Reference Craft2004, Chapters 4 and 5.

36 He Reference He1991, pp. 21–25.

37 Zhongguo guomindang zhongyangwei yuanhui di 3 zu, 1961, pp. 59–61.

38 Reference Yü1999c, pp. 23–24.

39 Peterson Reference Peterson2013, p. 123. Also see Lausent-Herrera Reference Lausent-Herrera2015a and Lausent-Herrera Reference Lausent-Herrera2015b.

40 Lausent-Herrera Reference Lausent-Herrera2015b.

41 Lausent-Herrera Reference Lausent-Herrera2015a.

42 Reference Yü1999d, p. 32. The main goal of the prep school Yü worked for was Chinese language learning, rather than entering senior high schools or universities.

43 As for CKT in Mexico and its development in the 20th century, see González Reference González2017.

44 Reference Yü1999c, p. 24.

45 Footnote Ibid., pp. 25, and also see González Reference González2017, p. 79.

46 Huaqiao xiehui zonghui 1999, pp. 563; González Reference González2017, p. 79.

47 As for Tao’s visit in Mexico during the Second Sino-Japanese War, see Kong Reference Kong and Ho2024, pp. 100–101.

48 Reference Yü1999h, pp. 226–227.

49 Footnote Ibid., p. 226.

50 Huaqiao xiehui zonghui 1999, pp. 562.

51 Reference Yü1999c, p. 25.

52 Footnote Ibid., pp. 26–27.

53 González Reference González2017, p. 80.

54 Reference Yü1999e, p. 50.

55 For example, Korean migrants living in Japan during Japanese colonial and postcolonial eras, see Lie Reference Lie2008.

56 Kim Reference Kim2011, p. 136.

57 McKeown Reference McKeown2001, pp. 86–87.

58 Cheng Reference Cheng1993, p. 459.

59 Footnote Ibid., p. 459.

60 For a recent discussion on the fiscal difficulty of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, see Coble, Reference Coble2023. As for a more comprehensive examination of the failure of the Nationalist regime during and after the Second World War, see Eastman, Reference Eastman1984; Lary, Reference Lary2010; and van de Ven, Reference van de Ven2018.

61 Yü, Reference Yü1999d, pp. 35–36.

62 Footnote Ibid., p. 36.

63 Footnote Ibid., pp. 33–34.

64 McKeown Reference McKeown2001, p. 178.

65 Miles Reference Miles2020, p. 3.

66 Reference Yü1999d, p. 36.

67 Footnote Ibid., pp. 36–37.

68 Chen Reference Chen1950, p. 565.

69 Young Reference Young2014, pp. 248.

70 Reference Yü1999e, p. 51.

71 Reference Yü1999d, p. 36.

72 Footnote Ibid., pp. 37–38.

73 Footnote Ibid., p. 37.

74 Footnote Ibid., p. 37.

75 Footnote Ibid., p. 37.

76 Castillo-Muñoz Reference Castillo-Muñoz2017, Chapters 1 and 2; and Hernández Reference Hernandez2010, pp. 79–80.

77 Arreola and Curtis Reference Arreola and Curtis1993, p. 21.

78 Arreola Reference Arreola2021, pp. 252–257.

79 Arreola Reference Arreola2021, p. 258.

80 Thurber Reference Thurbern.d.

81 Arreola and Curtis Reference Arreola and Curtis1993, p. 24.

82 In the early twentieth century, the influx of Chinese immigrants for jobs in northern Mexico fostered local residents’ anxiety about employment, which stimulated anti-Chinese activities. See Chang Reference Chang2017, González, Reference González2017, Delgado Reference Delgado2012, and Schiavone-Camacho Reference Schiavone-Camacho2012.

83 Sánchez Ogás Reference Sánchez-Ogás2021, pp. 114–123.

84 Footnote Ibid., p. 130.

85 Schiavone-Camacho Reference Schiavone-Camacho2012, p. 122.

86 González, Reference González2017, Chapter 3.

87 Castillo-Muñoz Reference Castillo-Muñoz2017, p. 109.

88 Reference Yü1999d, p. 40.

89 Delgado Reference Delgado2012, p. 42.

90 Footnote Ibid., p. 44.

91 Reference Yü1999d, pp. 40–41.

92 Footnote Ibid., p. 52.

93 Footnote Ibid., p. 40.

94 Footnote Ibid., p. 52.

95 Footnote Ibid., p. 52.

96 Footnote Ibid., p. 39; also see Yü Reference Yü1999e, p. 53.

97 Zhongguo guomindang zhongyangwei yuanhui di 3 zu, 1961, p. 95; and Yü Reference Yü1999d, p. 41.

98 Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui di 3 zu, 1961, pp. 96–97.

99 Oyen Reference Oyen2015, Chapters 4 and 5.

100 Zhou Reference Zhou2019, p. 12.

101 Ho Reference Ho1990, p. 349.

102 Footnote Ibid. p. 349.

103 Reference Yü1999d, pp. 41–42 and Yü Reference Yü1999e, pp. 53–54.

104 González Reference González2017, Chapters 4 and 5.

105 Reference Yü1954, pp. 28–29.

106 Footnote Ibid., pp. 28–29.

References

Arreola, D. (2021). Postcards from the Baja California Border: Portraying Townscape and Place, 1900s–1950s. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.10.2307/j.ctv1z2hmgpCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arreola, D. and Curtis, J. (1993). The Mexican Border Cities: Landscape Anatomy and Place Personality. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.10.2307/j.ctv1q8tg4fCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barabantseva, E. (2010). Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: De-Centering China. Taylor & Francis Group.10.4324/9780203845462CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Castillo-Muñoz, V. (2017). The Other California: Land, Identity, and Politics on the Mexican Borderlands. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Chang, J.O. (2017). Chino: Anti-Chinese Racism in Mexico, 1880–1940. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.10.5406/illinois/9780252040863.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, G. (2010). The overseas Chinese affairs commission of republican China, 1932–1945: a survey. Overseas Chinese History Studies 4, 6473.Google Scholar
Chen, K. (ed.) (1950). Meizhou huaqiao tongjian: Moxige 美洲華僑通鑑: 墨西哥 [The Chinese in the Americas: Mexico]. New York: Overseas Chinese Culture Pub.Google Scholar
Cheng, Tiangu 程天固 (1993). Cheng Tiangu Huiyilu 程天固回憶錄 [The Memoir of Cheng Tiangu]. Longwen chubanshe.Google Scholar
Cheng, Y.M. (2023). The mother of the revolution: from myth to political capital for the KMT. Journal of Chinese Overseas 19, 147165.10.1163/17932548-12341482CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coble, P. (2023). The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-Shek Lost China’s Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/9781009297639CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craft, S. (2004). V.K. Wellington Koo and the Emergence of Modern China. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.Google Scholar
Delgado, G. (2012). Making the Chinese Mexican: Global Migration, Localism, and Exclusion in the U.S.–Mexican Borderlands. Stanford: Stanford University Press.10.11126/stanford/9780804778145.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eastman, L. (1984). Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937-1949. Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
González, F. (2017). Paisanos Chinos: Transpacific Politics among Chinese Immigrants in Mexico. Oakland, California: University of California Press.10.1525/california/9780520290198.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
He, Feng Jiao 何鳳嬌 (ed.) (1991). Paihua shiliao huibian: Moxige 排華史料:墨西哥. Taipei: Guoshiguan.Google Scholar
Hernandez, K. (2010). Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border Patrol. University of California Press.Google Scholar
Ho, Feng-Shan 何鳳山 (1990). Waijiao shengya sishinian 外交生涯四十年 [eBook edition]. Hong Kong: Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe.Google Scholar
Huaqiao xiehui zong hui 華僑協會總會 (1999). Huaqiao Kangri Zhanzheng Lunwenji 華僑抗日戰爭論文集 [Essays of Anti-Japanese War]. Taipei: zhong zheng shu ju.Google Scholar
Ji, Man Hong 冀滿紅 (2013). Kangzhan qian Nanjing guomin zhengfu qiaowu weiyuanhui de yanbian ji zuoyong 抗戰前南京國民政府僑務委員會的演變及作用 [The committee of overseas business of the Nanjing National Government before the Anti-Japanese War]. Jinan Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 178, 94101.Google Scholar
Kim, Y. (2011). Diasporic nationalism and the media: Asian women on the move. International Journal of Cultural Studies (London, England) 14, 133151.10.1177/1367877910382184CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kong, X. (2024). Racialization from home: China’s response to the anti-Chinese movement in Mexico, 1928–1937. In Ho, J. (ed.), Global Anti-Asian Racism. Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian Studies, pp. 93105.Google Scholar
Lai, M.H. (2004). Becoming Chinese Americans: A History of Communities and Institutions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.10.5771/9780759115545CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lary, D. (2010). The Chinese People at War: Human Suffering and Social Transformation, 1937–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511761898CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lausent-Herrera, I. (2015a). ‘The language is race and patriotism’: new schools and New Sino-Peruvian press in Peru – the debate on education of Chinese and Mixed-Blood 1931–2015. Global Chinese 1, 311337.10.1515/glochi-2015-1014CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lausent-Herrera, I. (2015b). Speaking Chinese: a major challenge in the construction of identity and the preservation of the Peruvian Chinese community (1870–1930). Global Chinese 1, 203225.10.1515/glochi-2015-1008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lie, J. (2008). Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Lincoln, T. (2021) . An Urban History of China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/9781108164733CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ling, H. (2012). Chinese Chicago: Race, Transnational Migration, and Community Since 1870. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Ma, E.A. (1990). Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.Google Scholar
McKeown, A. (2001). Chinese Migration Networks and Cultural Changes, Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900–1936. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Miles, S. (2020). Chinese Diasporas: A Social History of Global Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/9781316841211CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ong, S.K. (2021). Coming Home to a Foreign Country. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Oyen, M. (2015). The Diplomacy of Migrations: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S. Chinese Relations in the Cold War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.10.7591/cornell/9781501700149.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peterson, G. (2013). Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China. New York: Routledge.10.4324/9780203804148CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phillips, S. (2013). National legitimacy and overseas Chinese mobilization. Journal of Modern Chinese History 7, 6486.10.1080/17535654.2013.780482CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rahav, S. (2015). The Rise of Political Intellectuals in Modern China: May Fourth Societies and the Roots of Mass-Party Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199382262.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Romero, R.C. (2011). The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.Google Scholar
Sánchez-Ogás, Y. (2021). Historia de Los Chinos En El Valle y Ciudad de Mexicali. Baja California: Gobierno del Estado de Baja California.Google Scholar
Schiavone-Camacho, J.M. (2012). Chinese Mexicans: Transpacific Migration and the Search for a Homeland, 1910–1960. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.10.5149/9780807882597_schiavone_camachoCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shah, N. (2001). Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Shi, X. (2024) “Madame Wellington Koo”: a diplomatic wife and a Peranakan representing and socializing for Republican China. International Journal of Asian Studies 21(1), 109127.10.1017/S147959142300027XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strauss, J. (1998). Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Building in Republican China, 1927–1940. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Thurber, D. (n.d.) Research guides: a Latinx resource guide: civil rights cases and events in the United States: 1942: Bracero program. Available at https://guides.loc.gov/latinx-civil-rights/bracero-program.Google Scholar
van de Ven, H. (2018). China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Wang, G. (1991). Patterns of Chinese migration in historical perspective. In China and Overseas Chinese. Singapore: Times Academic Press, pp. 321.Google Scholar
Yeh, W. (1996). Provincial Passages: Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism. Oakland: University of California Press.10.1525/9780520916326CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yeh, W. (2007). Shanghai Splendor: A Cultural History, 1843–1945. Berkley: University of California Press.10.1525/9780520933422CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, E. (2014). Alien Nation: Chinese Migration in the Americas from the Coolie Era through World War II. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.Google Scholar
, S. (1935). Ershisi Nian Qiaowu zhi Zhanwang 二十四年僑務之展望 [An Expectation of Overseas Chinese Affairs in 1925]. Qiaowu Yuebao 僑務月報 2, 1–5.Google Scholar
, S. (1936). Guomin Jingji Jianshe yu Huaqiao 國民經濟建設與華僑 [The development of National Economy and Overseas Chinese]. Qiaowu Yuebao 僑務月報 10, 7–12.Google Scholar
, S. (1954). Moxige Huaqiao Shihua 墨西哥華僑史話 [A History of Chinese Immigrants in Mexico]. Taipei: Hai wai wen ku chu ban she.Google Scholar
, S. (1999). Yü Shouzhi Shiwenji 余受之詩文集 [An Anthology of Yü Shouzhi]. Chengdu: Chengdu kanben.Google Scholar
, S. (1999a). Wode Yisheng 我的一生 [My Whole Life]. In Yü Shouzhi Shiwenji. Chengdu: Chengdu kanben, pp. 15.Google Scholar
, S. (1999b). Wo dusishu he xulianzhong de jingli 我讀私塾和續聯中的經歷 [My Experiences at An Old-style Private School and Xulian Middle School]. In Yü Shouzhi Shiwenji. Chengdu: Chengdu kanben, pp. 613.Google Scholar
, S. (1999c). Wo Canjiale Haiwai Jiuwang Gongzuo 我參加了海外救亡工作 [I Participated in National Salvation Activities Abroad]. In Yü Shouzhi Shiwenji. Chengdu: Chengdu kanben, pp. 2028. Google Scholar
, S. (1999d). Fendou Tianya Wushinian 奮鬥天涯五十年 [Working Hard Abroad for Fifty Years]. In Yü Shouzhi Shiwenji. Chengdu: Chengdu kanben, pp. 2846.Google Scholar
, S. (1999e). Fendou Haiwai Huikui Zuguo 奮鬥海外回饋祖國 [Working Hard Abroad and Contributing to the motherland]. In Yü Shouzhi Shiwenji. Chengdu: Chengdu kanben, pp. 4657.Google Scholar
, S. (1999f). Gudi Chongyou Hua Mojing 故地重游話墨京 [Revisiting an Old Place and Talking about Mexico City]. In Yü Shouzhi Shiwenji. Chengdu: Chengdu kanben, pp. 102112.Google Scholar
, S. (1999g). Wo Suo Jing’ai de Laoshi – Li Pusheng Xiansheng 我的老師 – 李樸生先生 [My Respected Teacher – Mr. Li Pusheng]. In Yü Shouzhi Shiwenji. Chengdu: Chengdu kanben, pp. 224226.Google Scholar
, S. (1999h). Wosuorenshide Tao Xingzhi Xiansheng 我所認識的陶行知先生 [Mr. Tao Xinzhi who I know]. In Yü Shouzhi Shiwenji. Chengdu: Chengdu kanben, pp. 226227.Google Scholar
Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui di 3 zu 中國國民黨中央委員會第三組 (1961). Zhongguo Guomindang zaihaiwai 中國國民黨在海外 [The Nationalist Party Abroad]. Taiwan: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui disan zu 中國國民黨中央委員會第三組.Google Scholar
Zhou, T. (2019). Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar