2. Meaning in life

A common position in the new but already established debate on meaning in life maintains that meaning in life is found in the pursuit of something that has value outside oneself. (This view can also be found in Raz’s account of well-being (Raz Reference Raz2004).) The notion of value outside oneself refers to values that transcend the limits of the individual and that are more valuable than the subjective concerns of a single person (Levy Reference Levy2005). Paradigmatic candidates are the triad of the good, the true and the beautiful (Audi Reference Audi2005, Metz Reference Metz2013). As Nozick argued: “The particular things or causes people find make their life feel meaningful all take them beyond their own narrow limits and connect them up with something else. Children, relationships with other persons, helping others, advancing justice, continuing and transmitting a tradition, pursuing truth, beauty, world betterment – these and the rest link you to something wider than yourself” (Nozick Reference Nozick1983: 595). Those values go beyond the individual’s animal nature and physical pleasures and connect them to wider concerns. Most naturalist philosophers in the current debate on life’s meaning tend to gravitate to an account similar to this one (Kekes Reference Kekes2000, Levy Reference Levy2005, Metz Reference Metz2013, Nozick Reference Nozick1983, Wolf Reference Wolf2012).

Research in psychology suggests that comprehension/coherence (when one understands the world and one’s experiences), purpose (the feeling that one’s behavior is guided by personally valued goals, particularly in abstract, long-term goals and aspirations), and existential mattering/significance (the extent to which a person believes their life counts and has a lasting impact on the world) are central elements to a subjective feeling of meaning in life (for a review see King & Hicks Reference King and Hicks2021). The dimension of coherence and comprehension seems to be distinct from the phenomenon that philosophers in the recent analytic debate (including this article) aim to address (exceptions include Goldman Reference Goldman and Landau2022, Leuenberger Reference Leuenberger2021). Besides this distinct dimension, contributing to substantial values can plausibly lead to a feeling of having a purpose and being of significance or having an impact on the world, suggesting that this view agrees with research in psychology.

Actions that destroy or undermine those values, such as hurting others or blowing up the sphinx (to use an example from Metz Reference Metz2013), are not only meaningless but may diminish the overall meaningfulness of a life. Such actions seem to be worse with regard to a meaningful life than, for instance, merely inconsequential actions that clearly do not contribute to meaning in life (Campbell & Nyholm Reference Campbell and Nyholm2015, Landau Reference Landau2017, Metz Reference Metz2013). When considering the meaningfulness of the life of a person who contributes substantially to values outside of themselves, but also commits highly immoral acts, one could not simply overlook their immoral actions (Metz Reference Metz2013: 64). Some have argued that immoral actions can also be meaningful (Edwards Reference Edwards, Klemke and Cahn2008, Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt, Buss and Overton2002, Kekes Reference Kekes2000), but this view has not been widely endorsed. Those who considered their lives meaningful even though they were clearly morally wrong (Nazis, for instance) likely did not consider their actions morally wrong themselves. If they were to subjectively understand the immorality of their actions, they would likely revise their judgment about the meaningfulness of their lives.

For the purpose of this article, I assume that meaning in life consists in contributing to substantial values outside of oneself and that actions that undermine such substantial values reduce meaning in life. I assume an objectivist rather than subjectivist or hybrid view. After developing the argument from this objectivist starting point, section 5 addresses how the account of authenticity as contributing to meaning in life through modes of appropriation relates to hybrid and subjectivist views.

Beyond identifying the sources or drains of meaning in life, the manner in which we engage with sources of meaning also matters, in particular the degree to which they are appropriated, as argued in the following. To appropriate means to make something one’s own: rather than merely encountering or engaging with it, it is made part of one’s identity. Appropriation is a gradual notion, meaning we may appropriate an action, value, belief, or project to a greater or lesser degree. As developed in section 3, appropriation occurs through an interplay of taking psychological ownership (for instance, by adopting a belief, committing to a value, or identifying with an action) and a mode of action in which one’s identity is present (for instance, acting in line with one’s preferences, beliefs, and values). The related concept of attribution is understood as ascribing an action or value, for instance, to a person from a second- or third-personal perspective.

The aim of having a meaningful life is not just to create meaning but to create meaning that belongs to my life distinctly. This becomes plausible when we consider what someone who is in a crisis of meaning is concerned about. They do not worry that there is not enough good art or scientific progress in the world or that people should care more for each other (Raz Reference Raz2001: 19). They worry that this kind of value is missing from their life specifically, that they do not sufficiently engage with this value. Understanding and acknowledging the nature of the concern for a meaningful life reveals that the concept of meaning in life needs to be construed in connection with a notion of appropriation. Those values need to be made part of me and my life if I am to have a meaningful life. The role of appropriation has so far not received sufficient attention in the debate on meaning in life.

In contemporary debates on meaning in life, it is widely accepted that meaning in life is primarily or exclusively realized through some sort of active engagement with sources of meaning.Footnote ² Wolf talks of a positive active engagement, such as creating, protecting, promoting, honoring, or generally actively affirming an object of value (Wolf Reference Wolf2012: 9-10). Audi maintains that “a life is meaningful on the basis of the good that is realized in it or the good created by it” (Audi Reference Audi2005: 343). According to Metz, meaning in life “requires effortful or hands on activity” (Metz Reference Metz2013: 195), and Smuts argues that any causal contribution to the good, even if it is not intentional and one is not aware of it, adds meaning to life (Smuts Reference Smuts2013). It seems plausible (and in line with common positions) that the greater the causal role in contributing to sources of meaning (such as values outside of oneself), the more an action contributes to meaning in life. Single-handedly saving someone’s life plausibly makes a life more meaningful than donating a bit of money that, together with other donations, a charitable organization and the active help of volunteers and employees, saves the life.

But even actions that seemingly exert the same degree of causal influence on a source of meaning could contribute differently to meaning in life. If I help a stranger because I follow peer pressure, the action is less part of me and my life than if my peers instead convince me to help, even if otherwise my causal role in providing help remains the same. What distinguishes those cases is that in the latter, the reason to help has been internalized, which implies a greater degree of ownership of the decision. The intention to help and the resulting action are more mine and part of me, i.e. they are appropriated to a greater degree.

This example illustrates that there are different degrees to which we can own an action, attitude, thought, emotion, or characteristic (such as personality traits or dispositions).Footnote ³ On one end of the spectrum are actions strongly ascribed to external influences, such as illness, social pressures, or work stress. An individual might consider an action as ‘not really me’ but rather arising from social norms and pressures. Those external influences might be physically internal, as in the case of an illness, but external to the person’s identity. You can never fully disappropriate an action, feeling, or thought – it was still you who did, felt or thought it – but it can at least partially be ascribed to external influences. This can lead to uncertainty about how to demarcate oneself from external influences, a phenomenon which has received increasing attention in recent years in the philosophical literature, particularly in the context of self-illness ambiguity (Bluhm & Y. Cabrera Reference Bluhm and Laura2022, Dings & de Bruin Reference Dings and de Bruin2022, Drożdżowicz Reference Drożdżowicz2023, Jeppsson Reference Jeppsson2022, McConnell & Golova Reference McConnell and Golova2023).

A common example of a feeling ascribed to an external influence is the colloquial phenomenon of being ‘hangry’. The anger and its resulting actions are attributed to hunger rather than to oneself. This contrasts with feelings and actions arising from deeper commitments, as when someone gets angry because a close friend or a project they care about has been insulted. In the hangry case, the anger is less appropriated because it arises from a psychological state that has little to do with one’s identity, with who one is.

On the other end of the spectrum are actions (or thoughts, emotions, characteristics) with which one fully identifies: actions into which one has laid one’s own values and purposes, and through which one can express one’s identity. Consider, for example, someone who is deeply committed to animal rights founding an NGO dedicated to that cause. Such actions are fully appropriated and understood as self-defining. Because they are appropriated and express who one is, they are also transformative. One becomes the person who has done X or stands for Y. Those actions and their underlying values and intentions have been internalized. The causes for those actions are part of oneself, and their enactment represents oneself.

This indicates that appropriation can affect causal roles. In actions that lack appropriation, such as peer-pressure cases, external influences act through a person rather than the person acting from within themselves. When a person is convinced rather than pressured by their peers, they act based on values and intentions that have been appropriated and made their own. The causal source of the action thus lies within the agent rather than in external sources such as the peers, which is why appropriation increases their causal involvement in an act. Similar distinctions are also made in debates on autonomy and moral responsibility (Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt and Schoeman1987, Mele Reference Mele2019, Sripada Reference Sripada2016).

Meaningful actions that are fully appropriated in this sense contribute more to the meaning in that person’s life than if the same action had been conducted in a mode of ‘that was not really me’. Through appropriation, the person’s causal contribution is increased and the actions in question are more integrated into the person’s life and identity. Since meaning in life is concerned with meaning that belongs to me and my life distinctly, appropriation matters. This raises questions about identity and which actions, thoughts, intentions, values, and other characteristics can be fully attributed to a person. One promising way to further specify appropriation, as argued in the next section, is in terms of authenticity.

Kipke also draws a connection between authenticity, individuality and meaning in life (Kipke Reference Kipke2025). He argues convincingly that we strive for individual meaning that is shaped by our particular conditions and opportunities rather than aim to maximize whatever is objectively meaningful. Meaningful actions always occur within a context of personal constraints, opportunities, talents, and limitations which give the meaning of an individual’s life its distinctive character. In the search for meaning in life, we do not simply try to emulate Nelson Mandela, Frieda Kahlo, or others with particularly meaningful lives but attempt to find our own way to live meaningfully. However, as argued below, beyond just giving meaning a distinct character, authenticity can enhance meaning by deepening the degree to which actions are appropriated as one’s own.

3. Appropriation and authenticity

Rahel Jaeggi develops an account of alienation in terms of a lack of appropriation (Jaeggi Reference Jaeggi2016). Based on this account, we can understand authentic actions, attitudes, thoughts, emotions, or characteristics as wholly owned or appropriated by the individual. Authenticity is achieved through appropriation. According to Jaeggi, we appropriate by being present in our actions and choices, identifying with wishes, beliefs, values, actions, projects, etc., exercising our capacity to choose and lead life, articulating our own identity in social roles and being involved with the world (Jaeggi Reference Jaeggi2016: 217). To identify with something here does not imply endorsement but rather making it part of one’s identity by incorporating it into a coherent and adequate self-conception.Footnote ⁴ One might, for instance, acknowledge negative traits or embarrassing projects as part of oneself and integrate them into one’s self-conception without endorsing them. Whether someone is authentic or alienated according to this view can be assessed from a third-person standpoint. The criteria for appropriation listed above are objective, even though they concern the person’s own actions and attitudes.

Appropriation transforms us because what is being appropriated becomes part of who we are, rather than merely something we happened to do or think. But the object of appropriation, such as an action, social role, belief, value, or project, is transformed in this process as well (Jaeggi Reference Jaeggi2016: 225-6). The appropriated action, for instance, receives a new context and meaning through its integration into a person’s identity. If one fails to live authentically, according to those criteria, one is not ‘really someone else’, but a discrepancy or contradiction does arise in their actions. Thus, alienation should not be understood as being alienated from something, as missing the mark of your essence, but as being alienated in action. It is a mode of action (Jaeggi Reference Jaeggi2016: 220).

Overall, Jaeggi’s notion of appropriation can be characterized as making ourselves the cause of our actions and lives. Presence, identification, choosing and leading life, and self-articulation are ways to ensure that choices and actions are integrated into one’s identity, arise from wishes, beliefs, and values that are part of one’s identity, and express that identity. Appropriation can be understood as a mutually enforcing combination of psychological ownership and a mode of action in which the individual is present.Footnote ⁵ Appropriation affects identity (specifically how and to which degree an action is integrated into one’s identity) and enhances causal involvement by internalizing causes for action. Thereby, appropriation can have metaphysical consequences: you are the person who is either defined by action X or, alternatively, just happened to perform X to conform to external pressures.

Paradigmatic cases of inauthenticity or alienation confirm this notion of authenticity-as-appropriation (for a more extensive discussion of those cases see (Jaeggi Reference Jaeggi2016: 71-212)). A conformist who merely follows social norms passively without endorsing them or even against her own convictions does not appropriate her actions. External influences rather than appropriated intentions, beliefs, and values guide the conformist’s actions. Someone who does not take charge of his life and ends up unsure of who he is and how he got to where he stands in life has failed to identify with his actions and to infuse them with his own purposes and values. The person who fully disappears into a social role (for instance, the role of a waitress) and loses her individuality within this role, is another paradigmatic case of inauthenticity.Footnote ⁶ Again, she has not appropriated this role and made it her own by putting her own stamp on it. A self-delusional person or a phony also fails to appropriate their actions because there is a discrepancy between their (alleged) values and beliefs and their actions. Those examples illustrate that inauthenticity or alienation can be conceptualized as arising from a lack of appropriation of one’s actions, thoughts, dispositions, or other characteristics due to either following external influences to a problematic degree or not leading one’s life but rather drifting through it. An inauthentic actor continues to occupy a link in the causal chain of their actions, but their causal role is diminished because the action is primarily shaped by external influences or circumstances rather than themselves.

I am focusing on Jaeggi’s account of authenticity not only because she develops a compelling view in line with common intuitions but also because she makes explicit the connection between authenticity and appropriation. She integrates elements of coherence, identification, independence, and self-expression that are also found in other accounts of authenticity (DeGrazia Reference DeGrazia2000, Erler & Hope Reference Erler and Hope2014, Leuenberger Reference Leuenberger2020, Pugh et al. Reference Pugh, Maslen and Savulescu2017) but understands them as a way to appropriate.

The argument of this article hinges on the claim that authentic actions are more attributable to the individual than inauthentic ones. Jaeggi’s view makes this connection explicit and provides an extensive argument for why we should understand authenticity in terms of appropriation. But other accounts of authenticity aiming to identify ‘the true self’ or what it means to be true to yourself can also plausibly be understood as analyzing (usually implicitly) which actions, beliefs, values, feelings, or characteristics can be fully attributed to a person. For example, accounts that identify coherent beliefs, values, and actions as the true self or that define elements of the self the individual identifies with as authentic understand those aspects as particularly defining of and attributable to that person. They allow for the distinction between actions that are not part of the true self, those which are ‘not really me’, and actions which are defining who someone really is and thus attributable to them in the strongest sense. The argument of this article is also compatible with other accounts of authenticity that understand authentic actions, beliefs, values, etc. as particularly attributable to the individual and distinctly part of the individual and their life.

Raz also stresses the importance of appropriation for meaning in life, but he attributes the role of appropriation to attachments instead of authenticity: “Simply: our attachments appropriate (impersonal) value, and make it meaningful for us. […] They endow it with a role in our lives, make it relevant to the success or failure of our life” (Raz Reference Raz2001: 19). Attachments are defined as ties of which we are conscious and that are deemed valuable by us. However, it seems that we can appropriate value without attachment and have attachments we do not appropriate in cases where attachment and authenticity come apart. For the former, consider instances where someone is not attached to an action yet remains fully present in it, integrates it into their self-conception, deliberately chooses it, and expresses their identity through it. An example of this would be a scientist who contributes greatly to human knowledge in such an authentic mode but for whom this is just a way to earn a living without being attached to it (we can assume she does not deem conducting research valuable beyond its financial benefits and would cease to do so if she could afford to). It seems that the value of the scientific contributions would still be wholly owned by the scientist and fully contribute to the meaning in her life despite the lack of attachment. The causal role of the scientist in the scientific discoveries is not diminished by the lack of attachment whereas it would be, had she acted inauthentically and not taken charge and ownership of her actions.

Cases of attachments lacking appropriation can occur, for instance, when someone fails to articulate their identity in a relationship they are attached to. Think of a phony who senses that the woman he is drawn to would not be impressed with his real self, someone who finds art tedious. So he pretends to be deeply interested in art, lies about his habit of visiting museums, and memorizes commentaries on art pieces. He performs the role of an art enthusiast convincingly enough that she falls for him and they end up together. Let’s assume their relationship is meaningful due to their emotional bond, mutual trust, intimacy, and shared history.Footnote ⁷ The phony fails to substantively appropriate these valuable and meaningful aspects of the relationship since he is not genuinely known, loved, or valued in the relationship, the trust in him is misplaced, and throughout their shared history it was regularly not really him who was present. The love, intimacy, and trust directed at him miss their mark because they are aimed at a façade, a fiction he has constructed (Landau Reference Landau and Landau2022). Despite his attachment to everything the relationship affords him, none of it is genuinely his because his engagement in the relationship lacks authenticity. Thus, appropriation arises from authentic engagement rather than attachment (although the two often overlap).

One might object that the disagreement with Raz is not about different views on appropriation but whether sources of meaning are subjective, objective, or a hybrid of both. Raz could argue that the scientist might authentically discover something of objective value but still find her life lacking in meaning because she does not see value in conducting science and that this subjective attitude means that her life actually lacks meaning. Attachments matter for meaning because they designate what we find subjectively meaningful, and for a meaningful life, both subjective and objective value are necessary (Raz Reference Raz2001). However, even on such a hybrid view, what is identified as meaningful needs to be appropriated to confer meaning to that person’s life. In the phony case, his attachment to the relationship might succeed in making it matter for his subjective experience of meaning, but he still fails to appropriate what is meaningful about it. Designating and appropriating a source of meaning are distinct tasks, and attachments are, at best, only suited to the former. How appropriation through authenticity can be integrated into hybrid and subjective accounts of meaning in life is explored further in section 5.

Joe Mintoff also discusses attachments and the appropriate connection to transcendent values for meaning in life (Mintoff Reference Mintoff2008). He upholds a distinction between the two tasks of making something meaningful for a person through attachments and making something part of them through identity-relevant connections. Identity-relevant connections are defined very broadly based on a Parfitian account of personal identity. A person is connected to transcendent values via memories of actions, connections between intentions and acts that realize them, connections between psychological states in reasoning and in cognitive, conative, or affective dispositions. The more identity-relevant connections that constitute attachment are established, the more a person is attached to those values. Such connections can extend to other people, for instance, when “I remember what you did earlier; you decide something and I act to realise it; you and I deliberate about what we are to do; I believe or want something because you do, I feel your pain and share your joy” (2008: 70). However, the phony establishes all those connections as well. The phony’s relationship is plausibly a part of his identity, but since he is not genuinely present in the relationship it is not truly his. Moreover, Mintoff’s account implies that more extensive memories of an act also lead to greater appropriation. However, it seems possible for a person to form and retain stronger or more enduring memories of an act performed under peer pressure than of the same act undertaken as an expression of their own values and intentions, thereby raising the counterintuitive possibility that the former could contribute more to the meaning in their lives. Thus, this approach cannot account for the diminished meaningfulness of phony cases, those caused by peer-pressure, and other ‘not really me’ cases.

4. The value of authenticity for meaning in life

Following the arguments that the contribution of a meaningful action to the meaning in a person’s life depends on the degree of appropriation of that action (section 2) and that authentic actions are particularly appropriated (section 3), we can now infer that authenticity can contribute to meaning in life by increasing the appropriation of meaningful actions (as well as meaningful attitudes, thoughts, emotions, or characteristics in case a more passive engagement with values also confers meaning). This clarification of the role of authenticity for meaning in life also informs our understanding of the value of authenticity.

Authenticity is instrumentally valuable by deepening the impact of sources of meaning in life. If you help someone just because your friend told you to, it can make your life more meaningful, but if you help because it is your choice, conforms with your values and beliefs, and you identify with this act of help, it contributes more to the meaning in your life. This does not exclude that authenticity could be valuable in other ways as well, for instance, by contributing to autonomy or being intrinsically valuable. The value authenticity holds by strengthening the appropriation of meaningful actions explains why it is valuable to live life in one’s own mode, as Mill called it (1989: 106), or to be human my way, to use Taylor’s words (2003: 28). Funding an animal rights NGO in response to one’s own, deeply held commitments, as part of one’s own way of life, allows one to take full ownership of what is valuable and meaningful in that action.

Yet, authenticity is not a source of meaning on its own and neither is it necessary to live a meaningful life. You could still contribute to substantial values outside of yourself and thereby make your life more meaningful, even if you did so inauthentically. But because those actions are less attributable to you, they contribute less to the meaning in your life. Since actions can never be entirely disassociated from the agent, even markedly inauthentic actions can contribute to the meaning in their life.

While authenticity can enhance meaning in life, it only does so in the case of authentically meaningful actions. Acting authentically in immoral ways only increases the appropriation of an action that is not meaning-conferring, per the definition of meaning established above. Moreover, assuming certain actions can diminish meaning in life, performing them authentically also increases their appropriation and thereby amplifies their negative impact on meaning in life. A person who authentically – i.e., in a way that is fully present, resulting from their own free choice, and identifying with their actions – blows up the Sphinx, reduces the meaning in their life more than someone who did the same action under pressure or without identifying with it.

This implies that a vicious person benefits from not being authentic. Some might hold the contrary intuition that a person who is evil but inauthentic is worse off than someone who is evil but at least authentic. This could be explained by authenticity’s value in contributing to autonomy or intuitions regarding the intrinsic value of authenticity. Such conflicting views on the (dis)value of authenticity for a vicious person may reflect authenticity simultaneously promoting one value (e.g., autonomy) while undermining another (e.g., meaning).

Those skeptical of the value of authenticity because it calls upon the authentically sadist to harm others might find the value of authenticity in the context of meaning in life more convincing than its role for autonomy or its potential intrinsic or moral value. In terms of authenticity’s contribution to meaning in life, only some ways of being authentic are valuable: those that are also meaningful. An action might be somewhat immoral, but so meaningful that it still positively contributes to the meaning in the person’s life. But just acting immorally for authenticity’s sake, as in the case of authentically immoral actions, and not as an unfortunate side-effect of a meaningful action, does not contribute to meaning in life. Recent work on the moral value of authenticity also offers solutions to the issue of immoral authenticity, mainly by making the concept of authenticity more demanding and denying that one could be authentically immoral.Footnote ⁸ The argument presented here upholds the possibility of such problematic instances of authenticity while denying them value. The merely instrumental value of authenticity for meaning in life thus offers a solution to the issue of immoral authenticity without necessitating a revision of the concept.

A similar response can be offered to those concerned about self-centeredness in the pursuit of authenticity. Authenticity adds meaning in life when we authentically contribute to values outside of ourselves. An entirely self-centered self-exploration would not meet this criterion and could even be detrimental to the pursuit of meaningful projects or relationships. Self-knowledge may indirectly enhance life’s meaning, for instance, by fostering healthier relationships, but this instrumental value of self-exploration imposes limits and conditions. Self-exploration for the sake of authenticity is only valuable (in terms of its value for meaning) as long as it furthers sources of meaning.

The presented account further implies that authenticity can provide guidance for how to choose between different meaningful projects, commitments or actions. Different accounts of meaning in life tend to view a broad range of activities (in some cases, also experiences (Scripter Reference Scripter2022)) as contributing to meaning in life. This raises the question of how we should choose between different meaningful projects, and whether there is a specific way I personally should pursue a meaningful life. The practical uselessness of most theories of meaning in life has also been criticized by Kipke (Reference Kipke2025: 1140-1141). The argument for the value of authenticity implies that we have reason to pursue meaningful projects we can identify with, in which we can articulate our own identity, and generally be authentic. Given who you are (as discussed above, this involves both self-discovery and self-creation), certain meaningful projects and actions are more fitting for you than others. Because they can be distinctly appropriated and thereby contribute more to the meaning in your life, you have reason to pursue those over others. This does not preclude the possibility of changing yourself to authentically fit a chosen project.

Understanding authenticity as a valuable heuristic in selecting meaningful projects to engage in addresses concerns raised by Cheshire Calhoun (Reference Calhoun2018: 26-29). She argues that it is counterintuitive to assume that life can be made more meaningful by disregarding actions connected to personal commitments, concerns, and values in favor of those that are more valuable on agent-independent grounds. This is a challenge for objective accounts of meaning in life, whereas subjectivists can readily explain that our subjective attachments are what make those personal projects and commitments meaningful. The argument of this article presents a way for the objectivist to address this concern: we can engage in personal commitments and actions that express our values and concerns more authentically. When we do, they contribute more to the meaning in our lives.

Kipke (Reference Kipke2025) raises similar concerns about objectivists’ neglect of the individuality of meaning in life. According to his individuality account, meaning in life should be measured by meaningful actions as well as the individual’s personal conditions which include internal and external limitations and possibilities. Moreover, the uniqueness of the meaning in someone’s life and its suitability for the person enrich life’s meaningfulness, “giving it a higher value without changing its level” (Kipke Reference Kipke2025: 1143). According to his view, individuality does not enhance meaning but, together with meaning, forms the new entity of individual meaning which we value more than pure meaning. When two persons both do the same meaningful work, but this work only individually suits one of them, their lives are equally meaningful, but the suitability enriches the meaningfulness of one person’s life qualitatively.

However, according to the argument developed in this article, authenticity not only gives meaning a distinct quality but can implicate how meaningful a person’s life is since it affects how strongly meaningful actions are appropriated. The degree of appropriation matters for individual as well as for pure meaning (i.e., for a concept of meaning that allows for interpersonal comparison independent of individual circumstances). Even when assuming “that individual lives are containers of meaning, all with the same shape but filled to different degrees”, as Kipke characterizes pure meaning views (2025: 1140), it is relevant to know whether the meaning of an action is fully or only partially ‘filling’ that person’s ‘meaning container’. Thus, even when striving for pure, interpersonally comparable meaning one has reasons to take individual preferences, talents, and personality into account insofar as they relate to authenticity. While Kipke argued for a distinct value of individual meaning, authenticity does not lead to a distinct value of authentic meaning in life but enhances the degree to which meaningful actions contribute to the meaning in a person’s life.Footnote ⁹

The argument presented in this article appears to entail the troubling implication that a vicious person has less reason to do good on the basis of its contribution to meaning in life than a virtuous one. For the vicious person, morally good actions would be inauthentic and thus contribute less to the meaning in their life. On those grounds, following the concern, they would have less reason to do good. Two factors help mitigate this concern. First, the conception of authenticity through appropriation entails a dynamic and non-essentialist view of identity. Having been a vicious person your whole life does not prevent you from an authentic virtuous action. Self-change, lasting or even only temporary, is possible. The vicious person has the same reason to perform an authentically good act as the virtuous one, and they generally have the ability to do so, even though they might be less inclined. Second, doing good inauthentically still contributes to a meaningful life, so the vicious person still has reasons to do good, and they have even more reason to become authentically virtuous. This account provides a reason to do good beyond just going through the motions, by identifying with the good action and being present in the action. This resembles virtue ethical accounts wherein the path to virtue might begin by imitating a virtuous person to develop the habit of acting virtuously prior to full identification with such actions.

One might wonder why the value of authenticity should lie specifically in increasing meaning in life rather than in increasing other values, for instance the morality of a person. A detailed exploration of whether authentic moral action similarly increases the morality of a person or their life through modes of appropriation goes beyond the scope of this article, as the answer would likely differ depending on the moral theory. To give an idea of a direction the response could take, it seems that the aims behind the value of meaning in life and various moral values have different addressees, which can impact the role of appropriation. Very broadly speaking, meaning in life is about a life going well, utilitarianism aims to improve the state of the world, deontological ethics emphasizes adhering to moral principles or duties, and virtue ethics aims to improve the individual. For a life to go well, good things need to be attributed to it (and authenticity can strengthen attribution). This kind of attribution is less relevant when we aim to improve the state of the world, follow deontological principles or generally treat others well. Due to its focus on personal character cultivation, virtue ethics appears, at least initially, to be the most promising framework for developing an argument for the value of authenticity along lines similar to those explored in this article. But more work would be needed to establish what this amplified appropriation through authenticity implies for different moral values.

5. Relation to hybrid and subjective views of meaning in life

How does this view relate to hybrid and subjective accounts of meaning in life? One could argue that some hybrid accounts of meaning in life, such as Susan Wolf’s, already incorporate a notion of authenticity and alienation within their subjective component. According to Wolf, meaning in life arises when subjective attraction or fulfillment meets objective attractiveness (2012: 26). Wolf (Reference Wolf2012) characterizes fulfillment as the absence of alienation, proudly and happily embracing projects as constituting part of what one’s life is about, engaging in actions that are expressive of who one is and wants to be, identifying with projects, or being ‘in those activities’. This is very similar to authenticity as appropriation.

However, there are important differences. First, she also uses the term subjective fulfillment in a broader sense, as subjective attraction or loving engagement. Subjective attraction could also arise, for instance, while someone dissolves into a social role and loses their identity in this role or while someone is not really leading their life but being overly guided by external influences or just drifting through life. It is possible to experience subjective attraction without being authentic. Second, Wolf’s notion of fulfillment is a subjective feeling, whereas authenticity as appropriation is defined via objective criteria. One could be mistaken about being authentic according to the account presented here (e.g., a person unaware that they keep adjusting their opinions to match their admired friend’s), but not whether one is fulfilled on Wolf’s terms. Third, subjective fulfillment is a necessary condition for meaning in life in Wolf’s account, whereas authenticity as appropriation only contributes to but is not necessary for meaning in life. Thus, the argument presented here can also enrich Wolf’s account by refining our understanding of what kind of active engagement with sources of meaning is particularly meaning-conferring without overlapping with her notion of subjective attraction.

However, part of the appeal of accounts that situate meaning in life at the intersection of objective attractiveness and subjective attraction could be lost if the particular meaningfulness of projects that match subjective values, interests, and character is accounted for through the enhancing factor of authenticity. Understanding the role of authenticity as appropriating meaningful actions thus strengthens objective accounts of meaning in life. Objectivists need not invoke subjective attachments to account for the typically personal nature of meaningful projects or relationships but can instead appeal to objective criteria of authenticity conceived as appropriation.

What implications follow for purely subjective accounts? Frankfurt’s subjective view that devoting oneself to what one loves suffices for a meaningful life or Aparly’s desire-satisfaction account of meaning in life are compatible with understanding authenticity as increasing the degree to which loving devotion or desire-satisfaction can add to a meaningful life (Aparly Reference Aparly and Landau2022, Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt, Buss and Overton2002). Authentically devoting oneself to what one loves or fulfilling one’s desires authentically, may contribute more to meaning in life than doing so inauthentically because the devotion and fulfilled desire are more internalized and appropriated by the person. Some subjective accounts already incorporate elements similar to authenticity within their definitions of meaning in life. Svensson (Reference Svensson2017) argues for a desire-satisfaction theory with the specification that only the satisfaction of those desires that are partly constitutive of a person’s identity adds meaning to their lives. When authenticity is already considered necessary for meaning in life, it would be redundant to also claim that it enhances meaning in life through appropriation.

Finally, authenticity can have further effects on meaning in life, besides the one introduced here. For instance, feeling alienated likely undermines feelings of fulfillment and meaning, which can play a role in subjective and hybrid views of meaning in life, or it might stop someone from achieving objectively valuable, meaningful goals. Authenticity might also matter for meaningful relationships in ways that go beyond the argument of this article. The account developed here is compatible with additional ways in which authenticity might affect meaning in life.