The cultural and institutional identity of Hasib Efendi

The social, political, and cultural challenges the Ottoman Empire faced during its last century of existence shaped not only its main vectors of foreign policy but also, and probably most importantly, the mentalities and Self-image of its state servants.Footnote ²⁰ While social privilege and the Westernization of cultural codes may have contributed to “orientalist” trends in Ottoman discourse, fractured and hybrid identities prevailed within the ranks of Ottoman administration, as members attempted to strike a balance between elite cosmopolitanism and Ottoman tradition. The case of Hüseyin Hasib Efendi is particularly revealing in this respect. The son of Debestani Mustafa Reşit Efendi, Hasib Efendi was born on October 23, 1852 (Muḥarram 10, 1269) to a prosperous and illustrious family: his brother, Saffet Bey Atabinen, was a high-ranking officer and the first Muslim to conduct the Ottoman Imperial Orchestra, while his nephew, Reşit Saffet Atabinen, who is most famous for representing the Ottoman delegation at the Lausanne Conference in 1922, occupied crucial positions in the Ottoman administration in both the Imperial and Republican periods.Footnote ²¹ Hasib Efendi’s privileged familial condition may have contributed to his sense of cultural superiority and feeling of belonging to a closed community defined by both ancestral wealth and modern education.

Hasib Efendi belonged to, what Doğan Gürpınar termed, the late Tanzimat generation, which, in contrast to the Young Turks, adhered to the ethos of the empire and was among the main beneficiaries of Tanzimat era education and administrative reforms.Footnote ²² The vast majority of future diplomats pursued their studies in modern educational institutions designed to prepare the new Ottoman intellectual elite to fill the ranks of the imperial army and administration. Hasib Efendi attended a mekteb in the Kumkapı district of Istanbul and continued his secondary education in a ruşdiye school, where special emphasis was placed on geography and European languages.Footnote ²³ After that, Hasib Efendi enrolled in the law school (mekteb-i ḥuḳūḳ) of Galatasaray mekteb-i sulṭānisī (lisesi). Established in Istanbul in 1868 on the French lycée model, mekteb-i sulṭānisī was an excellent choice for those who wished to enter state administration or diplomatic service. It was the old Ottoman practice of social exclusion that shaped the close milieu of Galatasaray lisesi, whose Tanzimat ethos of state service reinforced the Ottoman elite’s sense of cultural superiority.

The French language played a fundamental role in the formation and articulation of late Ottoman subjectivities, notably that of Hasib Efendi. Most of Hasib Efendi’s reports available in the BOA archives are written in French, raising the question of its role in representations of the Ottoman diplomatic Self, as well as the place of translation in the formation of Ottoman political concepts. While the historiography on French as the language of diplomacy highlights the agency of European court aristocracies, Ottoman elites played a similar role in the popularization and transmission of French within the empire.Footnote ²⁴ According to Ottoman interministerial correspondence, Hasib Efendi was born and grew up “abroad,” so he was likely exposed to French from early childhood and used his knowledge to build a successful diplomatic career.Footnote ²⁵ According to Hasib Efendi’s records, he was fluent in both Ottoman Turkish and French and worked as a translator in various departments of hāriciye neẓāretī (Foreign Ministry) until his first appointment as consul general. French was also the language of instruction at the mekteb-i ḥuḳūḳ that Hasib Efendi attended. In addition to its importance to a transnational diplomatic identity, French served as a major marker of social difference within the Ottoman Empire. While only a small portion of Ottoman society was able to master French and use it as the language of bureaucratic correspondence, the teaching of French was strongly associated with the mission civilisatrice of the Ottoman elites. As Hasib Efendi taught French at a medical school (mekteb-i tıbbiye) from 1875, he likely considered himself part of the progressive Ottoman social force belonging to the “civilized” world, in contrast to the uneducated masses. This functional aspect of French would influence Hasib Efendi’s discourse on foreign policy.

It would be erroneous, however, to speak of the “transfer of concepts” from French to Ottoman Turkish. Many Ottoman concepts lost their initial meaning when translated into French, while many French concepts acquired different meanings in the Ottoman context. The French spirit of civilisation and laïcité, which dominated diplomatic reports, did not necessarily convey the intricacies of the Ottoman discourse rooted in the Islamic rhetorical tradition and Ottoman bureaucratic style.Footnote ²⁶ It should also be noted that the modernization of the Ottoman education system during the Tanzimat period was an uneven and incomplete process: there was no uniform discourse in the social sciences in late Ottoman textbooks and students were exposed to conflicting narratives, especially regarding the concepts of “civilization” and “tribalism.”Footnote ²⁷ Moreover, religion remained one of the core subjects in the ruşdiye curriculum, while most Ottoman diplomats and civil servants studied Persian and Arabic in medrese (Hasib Efendi’s knowledge of Persian and Arabic is also mentioned in his ministerial record).Footnote ²⁸ Finally, the discrepancy between traditional Ottoman culture and the new European lifestyle caused profound psychological shock for many Ottoman functionaries, who described the process of identity negotiation in their correspondence and memoirs.Footnote ²⁹

Hasib Efendi’s professional trajectory was shaped by late 19th-century Ottoman attempts to protect the empire’s sovereignty within the Europe-led hierarchy of states while preserving its Islamic identity. His main “specialization” appeared to be the empire’s relations with Russia, as he carried out diplomatic duties in Greece, Transcaucasia, and Iran—regions particularly susceptible to Russian influence. Hasib Efendi began his service in the translation department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1870, where he gained experience in Iranian affairs as undersecretary (müsteşer) at the Ottoman embassy in Tehran.Footnote ³⁰ In 1882, he was appointed consul general in Athens, and became consul general in Tiflis in 1885.Footnote ³¹ From Tiflis, Hasib Efendi wrote to Istanbul in 1887, noting that Russian politics in the Caucasus aimed at “taking the spirits of the Muslims away from the Caliphate” and suggested using the Turkish-language periodical Keşkül to boost Ottoman prestige in this border region.Footnote ³² Following the pan-Islamist trend of Abdülhamid II’s foreign policy, Hasib Efendi’s view of Islam had little in common with the militant secularism of the Young Turks. His next assignment was to assist Şakir Paşa, the chief of the General Inspectorate of Anatolia, who was notorious for implementing violent policies against the Armenian population in the late 1890s.Footnote ³³ As a member of Şakir Paşa’s inner circle, Hasib Efendi soon became the governor (mutasarrıf) of Malatya and was later appointed to the Council of State (Sūrā-yi Devlet). Shortly after the revolution of 1908, Hasib Efendi moved to Istanbul, where he was appointed Ottoman ambassador to Tehran in 1909.Footnote ³⁴ During his diplomatic service in Iran, Hasib Efendi was actively involved in matters concerning the Iranian Constitutional Movement and played a significant role in normalizing Irano-Ottoman relations, concluding the border agreement in 1912. Hasib Efendi was recalled from Tehran in 1913; his later life remains unknown.

Contrary to Şemseddin Bey, the longest-serving Ottoman ambassador to Tehran, who frequented constitutionalist circles and corresponded with the leaders of the Constitutional Movement, Hasib Efendi had little appreciation for the leaders of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and did not act against the official policy line.Footnote ³⁵ A stark continuity can be observed in his professional trajectory, which was not interrupted by the 1908 revolution and reaffirmed his ultimate loyalty to the Ottoman state.Footnote ³⁶ Hasib Efendi’s entire career revolved around questions of Russo-Ottoman competition and Ottoman security architecture, which largely determined his discourse on Irano-Ottoman relations.

Hasib Efendi’s perception of Iran and the Iranian Constitutional Movement

Before discussing Hasib Efendi’s perception of Iranian society, it is essential to recall the Ottoman administration’s traditional portrayal of Iran. In this regard, multiple discourses coexisted within both Irano-Ottoman official exchanges and Ottoman internal bureaucratic correspondence. From the establishment of the Safavid Empire, Ottoman authorities had viewed Iran as both an existential danger arising from the Shi‘i Other and a potential ally against European enemies, considering Iran a subordinate polity within the Ottoman international order.Footnote ³⁷ Both the Ottoman sultan and bureaucracy often referred to the Iranian shah as a rebel against the sultan (bağı) or accused him of failing to observe Islamic law. At the same time, the Porte reminded the shah that the Ottomans and Safavids were bound by the “brotherly” peace concluded in 1639 at Zohab (Qaṣr-i Shīrīn). Throughout the 19th century, as Irano-Ottoman relations became increasingly influenced by Anglo-Russian presence in the Caspian region, the corrupt nature of the Iranian state and its pathological weakness emerged as central tropes in Ottoman discourse. For example, Seyyed Refi Efendi, the Ottoman envoy to Iran from 1807–1808, described the Iranian people as overly proud, arrogant, and wild, attributing their misery and poverty to Qajar oppression and resource extortion.Footnote ³⁸ Similarly, Mehmet Tahir Münif Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador to Tehran in the 1870s and 1890s, noted in 1873: “These lands are beyond what one can imagine in terms of how badly they are governed.”Footnote ³⁹ In another letter, Münif Paşa stated: “in Istanbul they are under the impression that Iran possesses a state… they do not understand that what you see here is the opposite of how things actually are.”Footnote ⁴⁰ The establishment of the Executive Council (Shūrā-yi Dawlat) in Tehran in 1873 was also met with utmost skepticism by Münif Paşa. Thus, the concept of a subordinate and rebellious ruler, which had been used to describe the Shi‘i Other, was replaced with that of a dysfunctional state incapable of any consequential centralization efforts. Such rhetoric aligned with the agenda of Hamidian regional expansion and legitimized the Porte’s attempts to undermine Qajar rule.

When Hasib Efendi arrived in Iran in 1909, Irano-Ottoman relations remained extremely tense, primarily due to the Ottoman occupation of western Iranian territories. The constitutional government in Tehran, led by ‘Alī Qulī Khān Sardār-i As‘ad Bakhtiyārī (1909–1910), was grappling with provincial unrest and an economic crisis exacerbated by civil war, which also endangered Ottoman commercial interests. The insecurity prevailing along the Shiraz-Isfahan route, as well as continuous Kurdish attacks on Ottoman caravans along the Baghdad-Kermanshah route, proved particularly detrimental to Ottoman commerce in Iran.Footnote ⁴¹ It is thus not surprising that Hasib Efendi lacked sympathy for the Bakhtiyārī-dominated Iranian government, whose very existence was supported by the Bakhtiyārī tribal cavalry and revolutionary troops led by the Armenian Ephrem Khan. The Ottoman embassy continued to support radical Iranian revolutionaries, with Hasib referring to the ruling elites as a “terrorist party.”Footnote ⁴² His reflections on the corruption of the Iranian elite and the “unpreparedness” of Iranian society for constitutional rule combined elements of the centuries-old Ottoman criticism of Iranian rulers with modern “scientific” arguments regarding the “backwardness” of nomads:

At first glance, the “backwardness” of Iran regularly emphasized by Hasib in his reports seems to be a classical orientalist concept appropriated by the Ottoman elite. However, Hasib’s reference to the “perpetual cycle of Persian history” suggests engagement with non-linear historical time and a more complex relationship between Ottoman and Western rhetorical traditions.

The “perpetual cycle” of “extortion and exploitation” may be seen as the inverted image of the “Circle of Justice”: a just ruler ensures the wellbeing of his subjects—namely, the peasants—and thus has enough revenue to sustain an army and protect the Islamic faith.Footnote ⁴⁵ As the wellbeing of the king’s subjects depends on his capacity to defend Islam, the history of any Islamic polity can be viewed as a cycle of tax collection and military campaigns. The concept of the “cycle of extortion” perpetuated by nomads against the sedentary population also recalls the diametrically opposite principle of nomadic revival rooted in the Arabo-Islamic intellectual tradition. Indeed, in the first half of the 19th century, the Ottoman bureaucracy continued to reference the discourse of Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) regarding nomadic (badawī) and sedentary (ḥaḍārī) populations, in which nomadism was associated with military prowess and spiritual uplift. Later policies of sedentarization applied to Arab populations in Syria were accompanied by an entangled Ottoman discourse that transformed the binary of “sedentary/nomadic” into “civilized/uncivilized.”Footnote ⁴⁶ This transformation was preceded by the spread of European orientalist literature on Iran, such as The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan (1824) by James Justinian Morier, the opening chapters of which describe Turkmen raids on Iranian merchants and subsequent chapters emphasize the nomadic lifestyle of the Qajars.Footnote ⁴⁷ Thus, Hasib’s hybrid discourse on Iranian “backwardness,” rooted in its nomadic culture, embodies a principle of creative adjustment of Western orientalist concepts to the Ottoman rhetorical tradition and political agenda of the early 20th century. Caught between the Perso-Islamic rhetorical tradition and modern Western discourse on civilization, Hasib expressed in his reports a dual worldview formed from the clash between traditional Ottoman and modern Western education.

Similarly, to underscore the weakness of the Iranian government, Hasib regularly resorted to the concept of “anarchy” (e.g., “anarchy reigns currently in Azerbaijan” or “internal anarchy maintained by three million nomads”), which bore two different connotations in Ottoman diplomatic correspondence.Footnote ⁴⁸ Hasib’s use of “anarchy” echoed the late 19th- to early 20th-century European concept of “anarchism,” encompassing notions of unlawfulness, adventurism, and terrorism. Hasib deliberately emphasized the criminality associated with those involved in social unrest in Iran, as well as their foreign nationality:

A slightly different use of the term ānārşī can be found in Ottoman consular reports from the west of Iran, where local authorities had grappled with the problem of nomadic unrest since the early years of the Iranian Constitutional Movement. The military campaign launched by the Iranian ex-Shah Muḥammad ‘Alī and his brother, Prince Sālār al-Dawlah, in 1910 further contributed to the decentralization in the north and west of Iran, where local Kurdish chiefs were solicited by Sālār al-Dawlah. Ottoman reports written during that period used the word ānārşī to describe shifting tribal alliances in the border region, a centuries-old phenomenon that formed the foundation of Ottoman policy on Iran.Footnote ⁵⁰ Certainly, the adoption of such terminology was part of the gradual criminalization of nomadism, aligning with the Ottoman civilizing mission discourse regarding the Kurds.Footnote ⁵¹ By the end of the 19th century, the Porte was pursuing the incorporation of Kurdish notables into the Ottoman imperial elite through policies of career promotion and exile.Footnote ⁵² At the same time, the appropriation of the Western concept of “anarchy” did not lead to the creation of appropriate legal institutions or policy changes; thus, ānārşī denoted an uneasy relationship with imperial clients. As Janet Klein’s study shows, the establishment of the Hamidiye regiments resulted in the retribalization and atomization of Kurdish society, thereby reinforcing traditional patterns of patronage in areas distant from the Ottoman capital and difficult for troops to access.Footnote ⁵³

Besides the concept of nomadism, religion occupied a significant place in the Ottoman perception of the Iranian Constitutional Movement. Young Turk secularism is often cited as one of the main reasons for Ottoman suspicion of the Iranian revolution. However, both Ottoman policy and the accompanying discourse mirrored earlier Ottoman attitudes toward the Shi‘a. Throughout the 19th century, Istanbul faced a wave of Shi‘itization in Ottoman Iraq due to the massive migration of Bedouin tribes, the rise of Wahhabism, changes in the flow of the Euphrates, and the Ottoman sedentarization campaign.Footnote ⁵⁴ Although the Ottomans often relied on Shi‘i mujtahid to quell tribal unrest and facilitate sedentarization, the spread of Shi‘ism ultimately weakened Ottoman authority; by the end of the century, conversions had become common even among the ranks of the Ottoman gendarmerie.Footnote ⁵⁵ Simultaneous with the short-lived Ottoman pan-Islamic project promoting the unity of Sunnis and Shi‘a, the Porte launched a series of repressions alongside an anti-Shi‘a educational campaign in the 1890s.Footnote ⁵⁶ Concerned about the potential for social unrest within the empire, the Porte sought to strengthen its ties with the Shi‘i clerics of the ‘atabāt, as suggested by Hasib’s predecessors.Footnote ⁵⁷ In November 1910, Hasib wrote to Istanbul:

The distinction Hasib made between religious and political agency reveals his secular conception of politics, which was predominantly reserved for Sunnis. Although he had previously promoted the Ottoman ideology of pan-Islamism in Transcaucasia, Hasib expressed significant suspicion toward the “Islamophilic meeting” in Constantinople on October 28, 1910, protesting the British ultimatum to the Iranian government. The meeting included participants from Iranian, Arab, Turkish, Azeri, and other backgrounds, but its primary focus on Iran may have disturbed the Ottoman ambassador.Footnote ⁵⁹ In Hasib’s words, the “Persian nation” was “more accessible to the voice of its clergy than to that of pure patriotism or reason of state.”Footnote ⁶⁰ On one hand, this statement echoes Russian accounts of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution that denied agency to Iranian society.Footnote ⁶¹ On the other hand, however, Hasib’s ideas of the role of Shi‘i clerics in Iranian politics were influenced by the traditional Ottoman stance on irrational Shi‘i bigotry, now framed as an outward sign of Iranian “backwardness.” In the pre-colonial Ottoman rhetorical tradition, the Shi‘a were described as those who did not respect Islamic law and betrayed the sultan as a result of their insolence. The same rhetoric was adopted by Ottoman bureaucrats in the 1890s, who characterized the wave of conversions as a continuation of Safavid-Ottoman conflict.Footnote ⁶² New entangled elements were added to this old rhetoric by associating Shi‘ism with nomadism, as well as with a popular lack of education—this latter pattern being inspired by Protestant educational strategies aimed at facilitating the conversion of Armenians.Footnote ⁶³ Yet, the Ottoman discourse on Shi‘ism was strikingly different from Western perceptions and was firmly grounded in the domestic challenges the Ottoman Empire faced in the 19th century. In 19th-century Europe, Shi‘ism was often associated with Aryan superiority within racial theories; the Russians viewed Shi‘ism as closely aligned with the Orthodox faith and as the foundation of Iranian governance.Footnote ⁶⁴ Conversely, the British described Iranian Shi‘i Islam as a motor of civilization and progress during the years of the Iranian Constitutional Movement.Footnote ⁶⁵ The Ottoman’s selective approach to the tropes and concepts defining Shi‘ism was thus a product of the continuous process of redefining and adjusting earlier discursive traditions.

Hasib Efendi’s justification of Ottoman expansionism

The years of the constitutional movement, marked by the rise of both Ottoman and Russian influence in Iran, coincided with increasing Russo-Ottoman tensions preceding the direct armed conflict of World War I. The expansion of Russian and Ottoman consular networks, escalating clashes between Russian and Ottoman protégés along the Irano-Ottoman border, and Russo-Ottoman antagonism during the Iranian civil war led many scholars to view Iran as a “shatterzone” between the two weakening empires.Footnote ⁶⁶ Naturally, Ottoman expansionism to the east has often been perceived as a defensive response to the Russian threat. However, most Ottoman statesmen were keen to maintain the status quo with Russia along the eastern border prior to WWI. Furthermore, in light of the intensifying process of modern state formation within the Ottoman Empire, the Irano-Ottoman frontier dispute was destined to acquire a new strategic dimension related to the establishment of modern state borders. Ultimately, the issue of Ottoman presence in Iran quickly became a matter of great symbolic significance to Ottoman administrative elites aiming to enhance their status on the international stage.

Although the growing Russian presence in Azerbaijan was detrimental to the Ottoman’s overall security architecture, escalating Russo-Ottoman tensions surrounding the Straits—the heart of Russo-Ottoman discord—were only indirectly related to the “great power” rivalry in Iran.Footnote ⁶⁷ The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, partitioning Iran into zones of influence, elicited a rather moderate reaction from the Yıldız Palace.Footnote ⁶⁸ The large-scale Russian military intervention in Iran in December 1911 did not come as a surprise to the Ottomans, who had been anticipating further Russian “recriminations” in response to the constitutional movement in Azerbaijan.Footnote ⁶⁹ Rifat Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris, associated the recall of the Russian ambassador from Istanbul in March 1912 more with Russo-Ottoman tensions in Iran than with the Straits issue, as the Ottomans could rely on British support for the latter. Undaunted, Rifat Paşa recommended maintaining Ottoman forces in Azerbaijan under the pretext of preserving social order and economic security.Footnote ⁷⁰ Consequently, the Ottomans did not view the Iranian question as a potential cause for large-scale military conflict with Russia; rather, the issue of Russo-Ottoman tensions in Iran held more symbolic than strategic significance.

Nor was the Porte acting as a “third force” questioning the legitimacy of the Russian and British semi-colonial presence in Iran. The revisionist trends, outwardly evident in German policy in the Muslim East, were far from being at the top of the Ottoman agenda. Although Ottoman subjects and companies did not enjoy the same rights in Iranian territory as their Russian and British counterparts, most of the concerns Hasib expressed to Aḥmad Shāh revolved around the rights and status of Iranian citizens of Turkic origin.Footnote ⁷¹ Hasib’s complaints about the constitutional government’s mistreatment of Turks displayed striking continuity with traditional Ottoman claims regarding the mistreatment of Iranian Sunnis by Iranian Shi‘i rulers, which predated the Anglo-Russian presence and contrasted with the cosmopolitan diplomatic rhetoric of humanitarianism toward religious minorities. In addition, according to Hasib, the Turco-German “revisionist alliance” in the Qajar kingdom was not an absolute priority; rather, it represented a risky enterprise with the potential to harm the Ottoman position on the international stage. He insisted that Germany was using the Ottoman Empire to undermine Russian and British influence in the region—a strategy not necessarily beneficial for the Porte. Therefore, Hasib recommended that the Ottoman government leverage German support to achieve a status quo with St. Petersburg while distancing itself from Berlin and strengthening ties with London.Footnote ⁷² In no way did Hasib envisage Iran’s emancipation from Anglo-Russian domination; his ultimate goal was to secure a legitimate Ottoman position within the “consortium of powers” without compromising the Russo-Ottoman status quo.

The centuries-old Irano-Ottoman border tensions, which were central to Ottoman expansion in the early 20th century, were also significant to the formulation of Ottoman foreign policy. Since the mid-19th century, the Ottomans had relied on British support in dealing with the Iranian government around border issues, but by the early 1910s, both Istanbul and St. Petersburg were eager to downplay these tensions.Footnote ⁷⁴ The alarmist Russian press often exaggerated the regional activities of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) officers, and in 1912, Yıldız Palace denounced rumors of a planned Ottoman annexation of Sulaymaniyah.Footnote ⁷⁵ The creation of a joint Irano-Ottoman border commission contributed to a relative détente in Russo-Ottoman relations, even though the Russian members of the commission systematically supported Iranian claims.Footnote ⁷⁶ It was within this context of general appeasement that Hasib Efendi sought to leverage his connections with Iranian authorities to establish a semi-independent buffer state along the Irano-Ottoman border:

Hasib’s attempt to resolve Irano-Ottoman border tensions without engaging in the tedious process of border delimitation confirmed the persistence of pre-modern Ottoman policy toward Iran, which relied on buffer client states. In the Ottoman Empire, hükümets were traditionally considered mafrūz al-qālim and maqṭū’ al-qadim, meaning they were immune from Ottoman military and administrative interventions, allowing local chieftains to enjoy varying degrees of autonomy.Footnote ⁷⁸ Since the mid-19th century, the hereditary privileges of Kurdish noble families began to diminish as a result of the modernization of the Ottoman administrative system, both from above and below. However, the Porte’s relations with Kurdish chieftains in both the border region and Iranian territory were still largely governed by pre-modern patronage logic, even if the overall modernization agenda was framed in terms of direct rule.Footnote ⁷⁹ The agency of Kurdish chieftains, whose understanding of power relations was rooted in the patronage model, was crucial in the contested areas along the eastern imperial border. Moreover, the establishment of a semi-independent hükümet would afford the Ottomans the advantage of a thick border with Iranian Azerbaijan, where Russian troops were concentrated. This arrangement would help alleviate Russo-Ottoman border tensions and provide the Ottomans with new tools to expand their influence.Footnote ⁸⁰ Finally, Hasib’s dealings with the Qajar court reflected traditional Ottoman paternalistic benevolence toward the Iranian ruling dynasty. He framed Ottoman military presence in the border region as a benevolent gesture toward Iranian authorities, who desperately needed Ottoman “help” to curtail Kurdish raids:

Hasib Efendi now framed centuries-old patterns in Ottoman-Iranian relations as part of the Ottoman civilizing mission concerning the tribal periphery—a discourse that added new symbolic value to Ottoman influence in Iran within the West-dominated system of international relations. The emulation of Russian and British policies, along with the correspondence between Ottoman and Western strategies in Iran, emerged as a leitmotif in Hasib’s correspondence with Istanbul. In the early 1910s, Hasib justified the instrumentalization of Kurdish tribes by pointing out that London and St. Petersburg were strengthening their ties with tribal chiefs in Iran.Footnote ⁸² In January 1912, he noted in a report to Istanbul: “The British and the Russians have resorted to the measures whose application I recommended in my dispatch of November 8.”Footnote ⁸³ Hasib framed the Ottoman imperial “art of the possible,” which was largely dependent on local power dynamics, as symbolic proof of the empire’s “great power” status.Footnote ⁸⁴

Following well-established patterns of European colonial discourse, Hasib Efendi employed the rhetoric of humanitarianism and imperial prestige to justify Ottoman interference in Iran. While Russian and British authorities were eager to project their regional status through Iranian “clients” such as the Shahseven tribal chief Raḥīm Khān or Qajar prince Ẓill al-Sulṭān, the Ottoman ambassador was keen to extend the political influence of his own “protégés.”Footnote ⁸⁵ For example, Hasib referred to the Iranian constitutionalist Sardār-i Muḥyī, who, with Ottoman assistance, organized a meeting of influential Iranian political actors and religious authorities, as the embassy’s “halo of prestige” (auréole du prestige).Footnote ⁸⁶ Hasib also emphasized the “humanitarian aspect” of Ottoman interference—in this case, the granting of refuge (bast) to Iranian “revolutionaries” in the Ottoman embassy—as proof of the empire’s “great power” status.

While Hasib’s ambitious projects in Iran can be characterized as “imperialist,” the reality of Ottoman occupation was more ambiguous: taxes for commoners were lowered, security in the border region improved, and local governance with formal affiliation to Istanbul was maintained.Footnote ⁸⁸ Although the Young Turk government did not act as an ally to Iran in the face of Russian and British imperial expansion, it also did not pursue a colonial agenda based on resource extraction. Hasib Efendi’s appropriation of Western diplomatic jargon reflected his desire to elevate the empire’s symbolic status within the international hierarchy, as well as the significance of the civilizing mission discourse for late Ottoman elites. In the age of European imperialism, Ottoman imperial identities engaged with Western rhetoric on cultural difference to ensure their ontological security, yet the extent of Ottoman “imperialist mimetism” remained conditioned by mental frameworks rooted in the pre-modern period.Footnote ⁸⁹ The “Russian menace in the East” can thus be framed as a manifestation of long-standing Ottoman diplomatic anxieties, deeply intertwined with regional history and late Ottoman culture.