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Stability justice: Petitioners versus non-petitioners in China's criminal adjudication

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Abstract

Different from “judicial repression,” stability justice targets ordinary individuals under the guise of formal judicial procedures, to maintain both social stability and governance legitimacy. Drawing on published judgments and the authors' interviews with judges and prosecutors in China, we find that, in conjunction with the gradual abandonment of traditional violent repression strategies, stability justice has been employed as an alternative tool for managing petitioning activities at the local level. Through the covertly biased application of legal rules and procedural norms, petitioners accused of threatening social stability receive longer terms of pre-trial detention, higher rates of detention before politically sensitive periods, longer custodial sentences, and fewer opportunities for probation. Our findings add new fuel to studies on comparative judicial politics and shed light on judicial behavior in contemporary China.

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© 2022 Law and Society Association.

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