Debating agency in the construction of historical representations

A common past, preserved through institutions, traditions, and symbols, is a crucial instrument in the construction of collective identities in the present. Olick (Reference Olick1999, 342) sees the processes of remembering and forgetting as performative: simultaneously as people remember as members of a group, the act of re-member-ing constitutes these very groups. In the era of nation-states, states want to influence what is remembered and how. In the processes of selecting what is forgotten and what is remembered ‘the past is being continually re-made, reconstructed in the interest of the present,’ as Bartlett puts it in his seminal study Remembering (Bartlett Reference Bartlett1932, 309). Widely shared perceptions of the past shape the narrative people tell about themselves, linking past, present and future (Bell Reference Bell and Bell2006, 2; Liu and Hilton Reference Liu and Hilton2010, 537). As the past is necessarily constructed, what nations choose to remember and forget are telling examples of their values and perceptions (Gong Reference Gong2002, 26). Thus, from the perspective of values and perceptions, felt or perceived history matters more than chronological or factual history (Guibernau Reference Guibernau2007, 12). Remembering and forgetting structures also vary according to national conditions and shape the ways history issues affect policy (Gong Reference Gong2002, 30).

In most countries a group’s representation of its history builds heavily on a central master narrative, which provides a foundational myth for the society and legitimizes existing power structures. Liu and Hilton refer to such master narratives as charters. They note that all peoples do not have a consensual social representation of their history, let alone a hegemonic charter. Charters are not only about self-understanding or in-group identification as they provide an agenda for future actions (Liu and Hilton Reference Liu and Hilton2010; see also Seixas Reference Seixas and Seixas2004, 10).

Although the constructed nature of the past applies to all countries, social scientific research on historical representations tends to debate agency. That is, how much agency individuals or the population are thought to have with regards to their views of national history. Historical narratives strengthen ingroup identification and define the boundaries of ingroup and outgroups (Seixas Reference Seixas and Seixas2004, 5–6). Social identity theory (SIT) sees people’s inherent ‘groupness’ and creation of boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as natural. In contrast, studies in politics reveal ways in which ‘othering’ is used for political purposes, portraying acts emphasizing differences between ingroups and outgroups as artificial and manipulative. Political leaders are well-aware that a common threat from outgroups increases ingroup cohesion and loyalty, and conveniently directs attention away from internal issues (Brewer Reference Brewer1999; Klymenko and Siddi Reference Klymenko and Siddi2020). Propaganda campaigns manifest that there are ways to influence identity coherence at the group level. The tension between manipulation of national identity construction and agency is very much emphasized when we look at identity formation in an authoritarian context such as China and the role historical representations have in national identity construction.

Nationalist historical beliefs are thought to form a vital part of Chinese national identity. In understanding contemporary Chinese national identity construction, extant literature has concentrated on the role of nationalism as a political ideology aiming to form a common national identity. There is wide agreement on the fact that using nationalism to shore up legitimacy has helped Chinese leaders to increase their domestic support in authoritarian conditions in which legitimacy is not based on elections (Downs and Saunders Reference Downs and Saunders1999; Zhao Reference Zhao2004; He Reference He2009; Zheng Reference Zheng, Wang and Zheng2008). Here, Chinese history and the CCP’s role in it is used to propagate a narrative increasing CCP’s legitimacy. Still, literature on national identity in China tends to be polarized to those emphasizing state’s coercive power and to those claiming that despite centralized power and strong state apparatus, people have agency even in an authoritarian context.

Proponents of the ‘top-down approach’ view nationalism instrumentally as something that can be used to manipulate the masses (Zhao Reference Zhao2004; Zhao Reference Zhao2013; Zheng Reference Zheng1999, 12; Wang Reference Wang2012, 10–11). This approach has been dominant in the debate on national identity construction starting from Dittmer and Kim’s seminal book China’s Quest for National Identity in which they argue that ‘The state, with its legitimate monopoly of violence and its controlling interest in terms of manipulating the national symbol system, plays a determining role in the construction and management of national identity dynamic’ (Dittmer and Kim Reference Dittmer, Kim, Dittmer and Kim1993, 244). The CCP’s concern about its legitimacy deficit and attempt to overcome it by shaping national identity can be seen in Jiang Zemin’s patriotic education policies, which Wang accuse for the ‘rising nationalism among young people’ in China (Wang Reference Wang2012, 10–11). The ‘bottom-up approach’ points out that merely focusing on government repression denies agency on the societal level by dismissing popular opinion as irrelevant and viewing significant resistance as impossible (Callahan Reference Callahan2004, Reference Callahan2006, Reference Callahan2010; Gries Reference Gries2001; Gries and Rosen Reference Gries, Rosen, Gries and Rosen2004).

Despite state efforts to curate representations of history, the state institutions cannot have a monopoly of information production in the information age. The role of the mass media in disseminating information related to history has changed the ways history is present in people’s everyday life and participated in creating new uses for history as a cultural product. In China, red tourism concentrating on visiting places significant in the history of Chinese communism, has been on the increase since the early 2000s (Li and Hu Reference Li and Hu2008). In the internet sphere, commercial actors try to profit from patriotic sentiments, sometimes clashing with the Party-state (Zhang and Ma Reference Zhang and Ma2023). There is a great deal of variance with regards to history consumption in different countries. Even in authoritarian states economic growth has diversified the use of history in society.

Chosen trauma and chosen glory

A master narrative solidifying existing power structures can certainly help the ruling elite, but foundational myths also include more puzzling elements. Mock states that ‘Violent death can be found, in some form or another, at the core of nearly every society’s foundational myth’ (Mock Reference Mock2012, 66). While some of such myths deal with victorious battles, a significant part handles defeat. Selecting negative events at the core of national master narratives raises the question, why a national ideology, ‘whose purpose is to reinforce the strength and legitimacy of the nation and its efficacy as a means to identity and political autonomy,’ would build its foundational myths on stories of conquest and humiliation (Mock Reference Mock2012, 6)?

In the Chinese case, ‘hundred years of national humiliation’ (百年国耻) is often defined as China’s foundational myth (Callahan Reference Callahan2004; Wang Reference Wang2012). It has long roots – in the early 20^th century Chinese even celebrated national humiliation (Callahan Reference Callahan2004, 210). The humiliating era covers the First Opium War (1839-1842), the Second Opium War (1856-1860), the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the invasion of the allied forces of eight countries (1900), the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931) and the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945) (Wang Reference Wang2012, 48). In the international context, Chinese concentration on ‘hundred years of national humiliation’ is not an isolated case, but one among many chosen traumas of large groups functionally similar to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 for Serbians, fall of Constantinople in 1453 for the Greek, the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 for the Czech and Yaa Asantewaa’s failed rebellion against British colonial rule in Ghana in 1900 (Mock Reference Mock2012, 2–5; Volkan Reference Volkan2014, 24–25).

Volkan has researched the prevalence of traumas and glorified stories in national narratives. Chosen glories increase collective self-esteem, and Volkan defines them as ‘shared mental representations of a historical event and heroic persons attached to it that are heavily mythologized over time’ (Volkan Reference Volkan2014, 25). Volkan sees chosen traumas as stronger large-group markers than chosen glories. He explains that this is because chosen traumas involve more complex emotions (Volkan Reference Volkan2005).

The role(s) of violence in increasing ingroup coherence are complex and manyfold involving mixed and contradictory emotional responses. Embryonic forms of present-day culture of chosen traumas as core building blocks of national identity can be traced back to hunter-gatherer tribes, who learned to deal with the need to control the use of violence as well as guilt associated with its use. For example, animals hunted for food became worshipped totem animals, who were begged for forgiveness before they were killed. Totem animals also came to symbolize the tribe (Mock Reference Mock2012, 50–91).

Violence and its control are at the heart of survival of human communities as the largest threat comes from within the community in the form of violence among in-group members. ‘At the large-group level, people need enemies to prevent aggression from turning inward in their large group, to maintain a favorable large-group identity, and to establish peace in their large group’ (Volkan Reference Volkan2014, 28). Rules about when violence is accepted protect the in-group. Durkheimian instrumentalist take on religion sees its primary function in enforcing social order by providing rules for uses of violence (Mock Reference Mock2012, 52–53). Durkheim’s follower Halbwachs continued to study the role of religion in society and came to emphasize the role of collective memory as a group identifier. Halbwachs noted that religious rites are largely commemorative in nature and religions such as Christianity focus on remembering the life and teachings of their leading figures. (Halbwachs Reference Halbwachs1992). In other words, religions utilized commemoration for increasing in-group coherence before nation-states.

Violence in foundational myths tends to also encourage individuals to sacrifice themselves, even their own life, for the common good. Expecting such behavior from individuals is linked with the functions group identity provides for its members. Smith characterizes nations as a kind of religion, which brings continuity and helps to overcome the idea of personal oblivion. ‘Identification with the nation in a secular era is the surest way to surmount the finality of death and ensure a measure of personal immortality’ (Smith Reference Smith1991, 160–161).

Over time, chosen memories of trauma can be socially institutionalized and become part of individual and collective identities (Kinnvall Reference Kinnvall2002). Still, national master narratives are far from static. Forgetting and omissions are part of their construction as they must evolve to frame responses to new challenges (Liu and Hilton Reference Liu and Hilton2010, 538). There appears to be several reasons for changes in the content of master narratives. Traumatic events may be too traumatic for the generation that experienced them leading into transgenerational transmission. Although many factors in the social environment shape the ways people approach the past, it is often generalized that survivors are too close to the events to begin working with mourning and overcoming the events, but the second generation has another chance to process the issues and to come in terms with the past (Wydra Reference Wydra, Langenbacher, Niven and Wittlinger2013, 31). Transgenerational transmission of shared trauma takes place, when the group cannot deal with its feelings of helplessness and humiliation and transfers these unfinished psychological tasks to future generations (Volkan Reference Volkan2014, 57). In addition, rise of new narrative templates relates to national identity dynamics, some of which are clearly politically orchestrated. In the 1980s, Slobodan Milosevic stirred national sentiments by declaring Prince Lazar a saint and touring his body around the country, as well as building huge monuments to commemorate the battle of Kosovo. Years of boosting Serbian nationalism were followed by among others, the Srebrenica genocide in 1989 (Volkan Reference Volkan2014, 89–97; see also Mock Reference Mock2012, 2–3 and 155–231).

In the Chinese case, existing literature has identified a war memory ‘curve’: during the years of Mao when China was relatively weak, the dominant narrative focused on class struggle and the role of the CCP in defending China (Gao Reference Gao and Kim2016; Dian Reference Dian2017, 192–213). CCP’s role is codified in the preamble of the Chinese constitution (1982). Unlike constitutions of most Western liberal democracies, it does not start with defining individuals’ liberties and rights or a value-laden description of the kind of society the state institutions aim to create. Instead, it starts with a historical account of China’s development since 1840 and explains how China became a socialist country. The description of the desired society comes only after the historical narrative and is defined in terms of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The narrative promoted in the preamble culminates into year 1949, when

Although estimates of casualties during the Sino-Japanese War reach up to 20 million and around 100 million Chinese were dislocated at some point of the war, it was dealt with in a cursory manner publicly and in education during the Mao years (Mitter Reference Mitter2003). In the early 1990s, China’s national identity discourse shifted from emphasizing the victor narrative to one highlighting Chinese victimhood in the hands of foreign aggressors, and the Anti-Japanese War became the core of the national humiliation narrative. This discursive shift in the 1990s indicates changes in national identity dynamics (Callahan Reference Callahan2004, Reference Callahan2010).

Adopting a victim status served multiple purposes both in the domestic and international realms. In China’s Good War, Mitter explains why the Sino-Japanese war became China’s dominant narrative for new Chinese nationalism. It had the advantage of not being the fault of the Chinese unlike many other major events in the 20^th century such as the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution. In the 1990s economic growth was slowly taking off, and economically the country was in much better shape than at any point between 1949 and 1976. Yet the CCP needed to strengthen its legitimacy and new nationalism served this purpose (Mitter Reference Mitter2020).

In the international realm, China’s changing international status also contributes to explaining the somewhat sudden rise of the national humiliation narrative. In the 1990s China was trying to improve its image after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, which led to international sanctions. Moreover, it aimed at reducing US and Japanese power in East Asia (Mitter Reference Mitter2003). Talking about past humiliations served the efforts to turn the discourse towards a moral argument for more power and prestige for China in the present and future. As the Chinese example demonstrates, self-assigned victim status does not necessarily indicate weakness, rather it ‘provides strength vis-a`-vis the international community, which usually tends to support the victimized side in the conflict’ (Bar-Tal et al. Reference Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori and Gundar2009, 241).

Patriotic and history education in China

Changing social representations of history are reflected in the content of history textbooks and education more broadly. History education varies according to national practices and goals and can be a powerful instrument in promoting dominant historical representations. In China, schools and universities have a legal obligation to transmit specific socio-political values to students, and teachers are required to assess how well students have absorbed the required information (Fairbrother Reference Fairbrother2005; Law Reference Law2006). Teachers and their attitudes and values are also under surveillance: Chinese Ministry of Education undertakes surveys on their attitudes to find out their views on the principles of socialism with Chinese characteristics (Zhang and Liu Reference Zhang and Liu2005, 85).

Historical narratives are core content of China’s patriotic education campaign. Shift in national identity discourse in the 1990s resulted in a nationwide campaign, which utilizes China’s humiliating experiences in the hands of foreign powers, offers one CCP dictated version for how to love China and tends to stir up anti-Japanese sentiments. Zhao names Chinese tradition and history, territorial integrity and national unity as the broader themes that have been dominant in the patriotic education campaign (Zhao Reference Zhao2004, 9). Cultural governance in all its forms is the core of patriotic education. According to Zhao, the study of China’s modern history underlined things such as being invaded by imperialists, and China’s national characteristics (国情), especially as they are purported to be incompatible with Western democratic values (Zhao Reference Zhao2004, 223–231).

History teaching on all levels includes goals of enhancing patriotism among children and young people. Regarding compulsory education, the 2001 History Curriculum Standards for Full-time Compulsory Education (trial) state that history education should teach students to ‘gradually understand China’s national characteristics’, and to ‘cultivate patriotic feelings’ (Chinese Ministry of Education 2001). For high school students, History Curriculum Standards for Ordinary High Schools from 2003 also list ‘stimulating a sense of pride--- and fostering patriotism’ among the purposes of teaching (Chinese Ministry of Education 2003a, 5). Outline of Modern Chinese History, a compulsory ideological course at the undergraduate level defines ‘further enhancing national self-esteem, self-confidence, and pride’ among its goals and wants the students to ‘understand the historical inevitability of the Chinese people embarking on the socialist road with the Communist Party as its leader’ (Writing team of the Higher Education Press 2009).

In the 1990s, after the Party’s new education guidelines were made, new history textbooks came out and the theme of national humiliation gained emphasis. The first history textbook since 1937 emphasizing national humiliation was published in 1990 as part of ‘History, Patriotism, and Socialism’ books (Callahan Reference Callahan2006, 186). In the 1950s and 1960s textbooks emphasised the victories of the Communist troops and downplayed the Kuomintang’s role in fighting against the Japanese in line with the CCP’s general approach to history. The main emphasis was on slandering the Kuomintang rather than condemning the Japanese actions (He Reference He2009, 136–138; Rose Reference Rose, Morris, Shimazu and Vickers2013). This emphasis shifted in the 1990s and memories of Japan’s past aggression have since been systematically used as part of the patriotic education campaign to shift the focus of the youth from domestic problems and redirect protest toward the foreigner as an enemy, as an external ‘other’ (Callahan Reference Callahan2006, 185–186; Hughes Reference Hughes2006, 147).

While patriotic education campaign affected content of history education, there have also been other factors shaping history textbooks. In 2001, the Ministry of Education published the Compendium of Curriculum Reform for Basic Education (Experimental), which somewhat diversified the textbook markets. Even then, publishers had to seek approval from the Ministry of Education for books aimed for national use or from the provincial textbook review commission for books intended for local use (OECD 2016). Before the 2001 reform, textbook production was centralised, except for Shanghai, which is an independent experimental area of curriculum reform set up by the Ministry of Education in the late-1980s (Yin Reference Yin2013). Despite continued political control, publisher diversification in the 2000s enabled local experiments, and a popular education philosophy, the so-called ‘quality-oriented education’ (素质教育), further influenced education objectives emphasizing the importance of teaching critical thinking skills and criticizing memorization (Vickers and Yang 2013/Reference Vickers and Yang2014; Yin Reference Yin2013). As mentioned in the introduction, China returned to using a single series of history textbooks in 2017.

Vickers and Yang studied three editions of senior high history textbooks used in Shanghai from 1995, 2004 and 2007. The 2004 edition tested a thematic approach in history teaching instead of the traditional chronological approach, and integrated Chinese history with global history in Shanghai’s regional curriculum. In the end the authorities judged the new approach to be too ‘anti-ideological’, and textbook authors returned to a more traditional approach in the 2007 history book edition (Vickers and Yang 2013/Reference Vickers and Yang2014).

In terms of using the Anti-Japanese War to propagate patriotism, history textbooks form only a piece of the puzzle. Rose studied senior high history textbooks from four publishers and found that the amount of content dedicated to the Anti-Japanese War has declined in all textbook editions over the years. This is because the 2002 Teaching Outline reduced the hours allocated to history overall, and the 2003 high school history curriculum standards further reduced the coverage of the Anti-Japanese War in textbooks. While details of the war have been reduced, the effect of the remaining information is ‘potentially greater’, according to Rose (Reference Rose, Morris, Shimazu and Vickers2013, 144). Furthermore, things written about Japan should be understood in the context of what is left out of Chinese history. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution get very little coverage in the Shanghai textbooks (Vickers and Yang 2013/2014, 37).

To situate the handling of the Anti-Japanese War and ‘hundred years of national humiliation’ into the broader context, it is useful to have a brief look at the content of compulsory history education from the primary school stage to the university level.Footnote ¹ In China’s 9-year compulsory education history is divided into six areas: ancient, modern, and contemporary Chinese history on the one hand, and ancient, modern, and contemporary world history on the other hand. History teaching starts in junior middle school, or in seventh grade. It had two lessons per week from grade seven to grade nine, according to the 1992 class structure (Chinese Ministry of Education 1992). This allocation has remained the same in the 2022 class structure (Chinese Ministry of Education 2022).

The three broader sections on Chinese history are divided into a total of 23 subsections. The first theme, China’s ancient history, is defined to begin when humans appeared to the Chinese territory and to end in 1840. It has the following nine subsections: the origin of Chinese civilization; national evolution and societal transformations; construction of a unified country; political divisions and merging of ethnic groups; prosperous and blossoming society; economic sectors and relations between ethnic groups; consolidation of a unified multi-ethnic country and societal crises; science and technology; and about civilization and culture. The second larger theme is China’s modern history (1840-1949), which is divided into seven subsections: big powers’ aggression and China’s resistance; the start of modernisation; the rise of new democratic revolution; the Anti-Japanese War; victory of the liberation war against Kuomintang; the economy and societal life; and science, technology and ideological culture. The third theme looks at China’s contemporary history (from 1949 onwards), which is divided into seven subsections: establishment and consolidation of the People’s Republic of China; exploring the road to socialism; building socialism with Chinese characteristics; ethnic groups and national unity; building national defence and achievements in foreign relations; science, education and culture; and societal life. (Chinese Ministry of Education 2011).

On the high school level, Modern and Contemporary Chinese History became compulsory effectively from 1992 onwards. Between 1992 and 1996, these classes were allocated two hours per week. In 1996, this weekly allocation was raised to three per week. (Rose Reference Rose, Morris, Shimazu and Vickers2013, 131). In April 2003, the Ministry of Education issued new (trial) history curriculum standards and a class structure for ordinary high schools, which listed three history courses as compulsory, each of which included 36 hours of classes (Chinese Ministry of Education 2003b). After the 2003 curriculum standards were implemented, teaching content was no longer chronologically arranged; rather, a new topic-based format was adopted (Rose Reference Rose, Morris, Shimazu and Vickers2013, 113). The first compulsory class, History 1 covers nine topics related to politics: ancient Chinese political systems; Great Power invasions and the Chinese people’s struggles of resistance (including the European invasion of China and the Anti-Japanese War); modern China’s democratic revolution; contemporary Chinese politics and national unification; the foreign relations of contemporary China; ancient Greek and Roman political systems; the establishment and development of the Western capitalist system; from scientific socialist principles to the establishment of a socialist system; and the structure of present day world politics and the trend of multi-polarity. The second compulsory class, History II, includes eight topics concentrating on economic issues from ancient China to the present day, and finally the third course, History III, lists eight topics focusing on science and technology (Chinese Ministry of Education 2003a).

Also university level has compulsory history classes for all majors. In the 1990s, there were two ideological courses focusing on Marxism theories and moral education. In 2005, the curriculum structure was changed to include four separate ideological courses: Marxism theories; Maoism, Deng’s theories and the Three Representatives; the Outline of Modern Chinese History; and Moral cultivation and Law. (Zhang and Fagan Reference Zhang and Fagan2016, 123). The teaching guide for the university level history course covers Chinese history from 1840 onwards. The content is taught in 32 hours and it has three sections. The first one starts from the Opium Wars and covers the period until the May 4^th Movement in 1919.Footnote ² This section deals with foreign aggression against China and China’s response, awakening of China’s national consciousness, the Taiping rebellion, the Wuxu reform in 1898 and the end of imperial China and the establishment of Republic of China. The second section covering years 1919 to 1949 is titled ‘Thirty Years of Earth-shaking’. It discusses the New Culture Movement and the May 4th Movement, spread of Marxism in China, founding of the Communist Party of China, the civil war (in two separate sections), the Anti-Japanese War, the victory of the Anti-Japanese War and its significance, and finally explains how the people chose the People’s Republic as their new form of governance. The final theme deals with the founding of New China and socialist modernization – that is, the years between 1949 and 2007. Its contents include the establishment of the basic socialist system in China, socialist industrialization and the development of the agricultural cooperative movement, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the period of Reform, Opening Up and Modernization, and opening up broader development prospects for socialism with Chinese characteristics. (Writing team of the Higher Education Press 2009).

In sum, while middle and high school teaching include plenty of content on China’s history from 1840 onwards, teaching standards also contain multiple sections on ancient Chinese and world history. On the high school level, two thirds of the teaching content focus on economic issues and scientific developments and only the first compulsory course deals with political content.

In addition to history books, patriotic education includes visits to museums and monuments as well as military training (军训) (Genevaz Reference Genevaz2019; Müller Reference Müller, Bevernage and Wouters2018; Naftali Reference Naftali2020). China is covered by a net of ‘model patriotic education bases’ consisting of memorials and museums (Müller Reference Müller, Bevernage and Wouters2018). Military training is organized as a week-long course first in the summer prior to the entry into middle school and later into high school (Naftali Reference Naftali2020). Courses organized for students entering universities last for two weeks and focus on formation drills but also include collective singing and military theory (Genevaz Reference Genevaz2019). Patriotic education is not limited to school environment as prime-time television should offer ‘patriotic’ programs according to state rules. Such programs tend to concentrate on the Second Sino-Japanese War or revolutionary history (Müller Reference Müller, Bevernage and Wouters2018, 344).

Thirty years after its launch, the themes of the patriotic education campaign still very much influence Chinese education reforms. In November 2019, the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the State Council published a new guideline for patriotic education. It mentions that both the Party Central Committee and Xi Jinping attach great importance to patriotism education. As the earlier guidelines, the 2019 guideline concentrates on enhancing students’ patriotism, as they are the main target group of patriotic education. In addition to traditional classroom teaching, the 2019 guideline relies on online materials and social media platforms such as Weibo and WeChat and new methods such as adding patriotic content to video games. It also identifies a need to strengthen national defence education (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 2019).

Representations of history among elite university students

Younger people have received patriotic education most of their lives and are sometimes described as the ‘generation of patriotic education’ with the inclination that this generation is more nationalistic than some previous generations (Wang Reference Wang2008, 800). Studies conducted in China have shown that the media environment influences educated respondents’ views even when they recognise that the media is biased in its reporting (Sinkkonen and Elovainio Reference Sinkkonen and Elovainio2020). One study found that university students from the mainland supported the official stance in issues related to national security and were more nationalistic in security matters than their peers who received their education in Macao or Hong Kong (Yang Reference Yang2022). On the other hand, there is plenty of research emphasizing that youth are not passive recipients of schooling (Fairbrother Reference Fairbrother2008; Porat Reference Porat2004). Thus, it is useful to study empirically what kind of representations of history dominate among students.

Earlier empirical research analyzing social representations of history has found that such representations tend to focus on conflicts (Liu Reference Liu1999; Liu et al. Reference Liu, Goldstein-Hawes, Hilton, Huang, Gastardo-Conaco, Dresler-Hawke and Pittolo2005). Liu found that when asking respondents from Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand to list important events in world history, the representations tended to focus on the recent rather than distant past and on conflicts, especially on the two world wars (Liu Reference Liu1999). Techio et al. discovered that asking respondents to list important events using an open-ended response format resulted in more war-related events, whereas pregiven list of options including scientific breakthroughs diversified the views on what should be considered important (Techio et al. Reference Techio, Bobowik, Páez, Cabecinhas, Liu, Zubieta and Espinosa2010).

Social representations of history are linked to attitudes such as willingness to fight for one’s country. Paez et al. discovered that the more positive evaluation of the Second World War was reported, the more willing respondents were to fight for their country in future wars. Recalling wars in general was unrelated to willingness to fight. The study included student samples from 22 countries including China (Paez et al. Reference Paez, Liu, Techio, Slawuta, Zlobina and Cabecinhas2009).