What studying political conflict in Europe can tell us about affective polarization

Affective polarization has already been studied extensively (and arguably almost exhaustively) in the USA, so it is essential to ask what studying affective polarization in Europe – or multi-party systems in general – adds to scientific understanding, apart from additional cases. Of course, adding cases is itself important: one simple benefit of looking beyond the USA is to confirm that findings from that unique political system transfer to other settings. Thus, some studies (e.g., Algara and Zur, Reference Algara and Zur2023; Stoetzer et al., Reference Stoetzer, Munzert, Lowe, Çal, Gohdes, Helbling, Maxwell and Traunmueller2023) usefully include the USA as one of their cases. Moreover, at the most basic level, comparative research helps us to place individual cases – such as the USA – within a broader context. Research on affective polarization in the USA shows that partisan hostility seems to have reached alarming levels (Kalmoe and Mason, Reference Kalmoe and Mason2022), but is this a universal phenomenon?

Two findings stand out. First, affective polarization in the USA is by no means unusually high (Westwood et al., Reference Westwood, Iyengar, Walgrave, Leonisio, Miller and Strijbis2018; Gidron et al., Reference Gidron, Adams and Horne2020; Reiljan, Reference Reiljan2020; Knudsen, Reference Knudsen2021;Wagner, Reference Wagner2021; Garzia et al., Reference Garzia, Ferreira da Silva and Maye2023). Moreover, as in the USA, positive partisanship in Europe is not merely instrumental, but also is often strongly expressive, relating to deeply held identities (Huddy et al., Reference Huddy, Bankert and Davies2018). However, the USA may be characterized by particularly strong polarization among the sub-group of those with a partisan identity (Wagner, Reference Wagner2021), so political engagement determines affective polarization more than elsewhere (on this topic, see also Krupnikov and Ryan, Reference Krupnikov and Ryan2022).

Second, the USA is a clear example of increasing affective polarization, but this trend is not typical of all contexts. For example, Boxell et al. (Reference Boxell, Gentzkow and Shapiro2022) study twelve OECD countries over time, and there were about as many countries that experienced increases as experienced decreases in affective polarization; similar results are reported for a larger number of countries by Garzia et al. (Reference Garzia, Ferreira da Silva and Maye2023) and for Nordic countries by Ryan (Reference Ryan2023). The lack of an overall trend towards affective polarization also means that some macro-level explanations – such as increased internet access or the growth of social media – can only be part of the explanation, if at all (Boxell et al., Reference Boxell, Gentzkow and Shapiro2022). A lack of direct effect of social media use on affective polarization was also not found in individual-level analyses in the Netherlands (Nordbrandt, Reference Nordbrandt2023).

Researching affective polarization in multi-party systems such as in Europe can also help us understand what it is about parties that increases or decreases people’s hostility. For example, the extent to which that party is perceived as a threat (Renström et al., Reference Renström, Bäck and Carroll2021) will determine the extent to which citizens dislike that party’s supporters. This threat is likely to be largely the result of ideological distance: the further away from a citizen’s preferences the plans and policies of an out-party, the more it will be seen as a threat (Kawecki, Reference Kawecki2022; Van Erkel and Turkenburg, Reference Van Erkel and Turkenburg2022; Algara and Zur, Reference Algara and Zur2023). This applies to distance both on economic policy preferences, but also and increasingly on cultural topics (Gidron et al., Reference Gidron, Adams and Horne2023). Riera and Madariaga (Reference Riera and Madariaga2023) find that the link between ideological and affective polarization is stronger in countries that are ideologically polarized and have older democracies, parliamentary systems and smaller party systems. To a certain extent, a strong correlation between ideological and affective polarization is problematic, since it then becomes important to show what studying affective polarization adds to what we know based on studying ideological polarization.

Research on why people dislike some parties more than others is related to work on negative partisanship and out-party hostility (Bankert, Reference Bankert2021). Negative partisanship is largely a synonym of negative out-party affect, but can also encompass a negative party identity, where individuals define themselves by what they are not (Bankert, Reference Bankert2021). The concept therefore turns the spotlight away from polarization per se, that is, the spread of affect. Moreover, negative partisanship does not require the simultaneous presence of positive feelings or identification towards an in-party. Instead, this literature focuses on the strongly disliked parties. Negative partisanship, the presence of which is influenced by the institutional context (Anderson et al., Reference Anderson, McGregor and Stephenson2022), reduces the probability of voting for a party over and above the influence of other factors (Mayer, Reference Mayer2017). Negative partisanship is correlated with lower satisfaction with democracy, especially if negative partisanship is towards major parties (Ridge, Reference Ridge2022). However, a key finding is that negative partisanship in Europe is often towards the radical right (Meléndez and Kaltwasser, Reference Meléndez and Kaltwasser2021; Bjånesøy, Reference Bjånesøy2023), and in this case, negative partisanship can however be a bolster for democracy (Meléndez and Kaltwasser, Reference Meléndez and Kaltwasser2021). While these findings are important, research on negative partisanship in multi-party systems should, where possible, show when and where it is based on a social identity, and the terms out-party hostility or negative out-party affect may be more useful and accurate when such a social identity is not present (on measurement, see Rosema and Mayer (Reference Rosema, Mayer, Oscarsson and Holmberg2020) and Bankert (Reference Bankert2021)).

Moreover, one advantage of comparative research on affective polarization is the possibility of examining how it relates to macro-level factors. Studies on affective polarization in Europe thus highlight how institutional arrangements influence affective polarization: for instance, majoritarian political systems lead to contexts less conducive to elite cooperation, perhaps creating a better foundation for inter-party hostility (Gidron et al., Reference Gidron, Adams and Horne2020). Institutional contexts shape elite behaviour, and how elites interact is clearly central for understanding affective polarization (McCoy and Somer, Reference McCoy and Somer2019; Bassan-Nygate andWeiss, Reference Bassan-Nygate and Weiss2022; Bäck et al., Reference Bäck, Carroll, Renström and Ryan2023). Thus, there is observational and experimental evidence that coalitions between parties can reduce the extent to which partisans dislike each other: supporters of parties that govern together feel more warmly towards each other, even controlling for ideological closeness (Horne et al., Reference Horne, Adams and Gidron2023). Interestingly, this interpartisan warmth persists even after the coalitions end: both current and past co-governance positively influence inter-party affect. Recent experimental work provides additional support for this hypothesis (Praprotnik and Wagner, Reference Praprotnik and Wagner2023). More broadly, cross-national evidence also shows that the parliamentary presence of women in a political party tends to decrease levels of partisan hostility towards that party (Adams et al., Reference Adams, Bracken, Gidron, Horne, O’Brien and Senk2023).

One final result from studying affective polarization in Europe is that in many countries patterns of affect among citizens tend to fall into larger groups. In the USA, many conflicts tend towards a common binary, opposing (liberal, highly educated, urban) Democrats and (conservative, less educated, rural) Republicans (Mason, Reference Mason2016). While partisan divides in Europe are more diverse, studying patterns of affect reveals the existence of broader political camps: parties form ‘affective blocs’ (Kekkonen and Ylä-Anttila, Reference Kekkonen and Ylä-Anttila2021; Bantel, Reference Bantel2023). For example, parties on the left that often form coalitions together may not be seen as rivals but as a larger in-group (‘the left’). Hence, even though there are usually more parties in European countries than in the USA, the key patterns of affective polarization nevertheless reduce to a small number of distinct camps.

What studying affective polarization can tell us about political conflict in Europe

At first glance, the affective polarization framework might seem to provide researchers interested in political conflict in Europe with little insight. After all, Europe is a continent that is largely characterized by declining levels of partisanship (Heath, Reference Heath, Fisher, Fieldhouse, Franklin, Gibson, Cantijoch and Wlezien2017). In many countries, such as some of those in Central and Eastern Europe, positive partisanship is comparatively low (Rose and Mishler, Reference Rose and Mishler1998). Thinking about the mutual dislike between partisan supporters could be interpreted as harking back to bygone eras. Perhaps affective polarization was more applicable to societies in the 50s and 60s, when countries such Austria and the Netherlands were characterized by extremely strong partisan organizations (Lorwin, Reference Lorwin1971). Or perhaps affective polarization applied most to societies in the inter-war period – such as Germany and Spain – that were riven by ideologically driven civil conflict (Bermeo, Reference Bermeo2003). Moreover, critics may argue that in Europe the strongest levels of affect are reserved for other kinds of distinctions: between left and right (Bantel, Reference Bantel2023), between pro- and anti-Brexit (Hobolt et al., Reference Hobolt, Leeper and Tilley2021), or between those who support or oppose Catalan independence (Balcells and Kuo, Reference Balcells and Kuo2023), for instance. These might be the labels citizens actually use when thinking about others’ political affiliations, and they might also be the groups that create stronger stereotypes. However, the fact that affective polarization was likely higher in the past and may be useful to explain other types of distinctions does not mean that partisan affective polarization does not have much to teach us about political conflict in today’s democracies.

Most importantly, research on affective polarization in Europe shows that partisan labels still mean a lot to voters: when people see or hear that someone supports or votes for a party, this creates strong in-group bias (Westwood et al., Reference Westwood, Iyengar, Walgrave, Leonisio, Miller and Strijbis2018; Helbling and Jungkunz, Reference Helbling and Jungkunz2020), at least as strong as ethnic group favouritism. Partisanship and people’s political stances do not leave people cold.

A party family that elicits particularly strong reactions are the radical right (Helbling and Jungkunz, Reference Helbling and Jungkunz2020; Reiljan and Ryan, Reference Reiljan and Ryan2021; Harteveld et al., Reference Harteveld, Mendoza and Rooduijn2022; Gidron et al., Reference Gidron, Adams and Horne2023). Gidron, Adams and Horne (Reference Gidron, Adams and Horne2023) demonstrate that radical-right dislike is even higher than their ideological distance and lack of government participation would predict. The radical left is not disliked to a similar degree, but rather largely forms part of the left camp more generally (Bantel, Reference Bantel2023). Harteveld et al. (Reference Harteveld, Mendoza and Rooduijn2022) argue that the uniquely strong dislike towards the radical right stems from their combination of nativism with populism, both of which divide the population in binary groups: either natives versus non-natives or the ‘elite’ versus the ‘people’ (see also Reiljan and Ryan, Reference Reiljan and Ryan2021). This Manichean thinking is conducive to outpartisan hostility, and not just among radical-right supporters themselves. Social norms and social stigma may play an additional role, as radical right parties are clearly labelled as beyond the pale by mainstream actors in many systems (Harteveld et al., Reference Harteveld, Dahlberg, Kokkonen and van der Brug2019). Public tolerance of far-right parties and their supporters thus varies, likely based on the extent to which these parties are clear outsiders excluded from standard political competition or instead regularly included in governing arrangements (Bjånesøy et al., Reference Bjånesøy, Ivarsflaten and Berntzen2023). However, more work needs to be done to explore why the radical right is uniquely disliked. One potential avenue to explore are social norms: perhaps openly expressing dislike towards radical right supporters is seen as more acceptable than dislike towards other supporters, and perhaps such expressions of dislike are even socially desirable in certain environments.

Finally, affective polarization likely has systemic consequences, and comparative research highlights these patterns. One fear is that affective polarization may damage democracy, with McCoy and Somer (Reference McCoy and Somer2019) and McCoy et al. (Reference McCoy, Rahman and Somer2018) even including affective polarization as part of a broader set of ‘pernicious’ developments that endanger democratic quality and stability. Affective polarization has been found to correlate with democratic backsliding (Orhan, Reference Orhan2022), possibly because partisan identities and out-party hostility mean voters are less likely to sanction undemocratic behaviour by politicians they support, partly because of the increased perceived stakes of electoral outcomes (Ward and Tavits, Reference Ward and Tavits2019). Affective polarization also appears to be associated with low social and institutional trust, for example in Spain (Torcal and Thomson, Reference Torcal and Thomson2023) and Sweden (Reiljan and Ryan, Reference Reiljan and Ryan2021). Affective polarization also exacerbates winner–loser gaps (Janssen, Reference Janssen2023) and the tendency to support norm-breaking escalation of political conflict (Berntzen et al., Reference Berntzen, Kelsall and Harteveld2023). However, the research on the link between affective polarization and democratic stability is still in its infancy. Positive effects – such as on political engagement (Ward and Tavits, Reference Ward and Tavits2019; Harteveld and Wagner, Reference Harteveld and Wagner2023) and on exclusion of anti-democratic actors (Meléndez and Kaltwasser, Reference Meléndez and Kaltwasser2021; Reiljan and Ryan, Reference Reiljan and Ryan2021) – still need to be explored more fully.

We need appropriate measures

First, research examining affective polarization in multi-party settings should focus more on testing existing measures and developing appropriate new ones (Gidron et al., Reference Gidron, Sheffer and Mor2022). Thus, the strong use of like–dislike scales in existing research is concerning for two reasons. First, these scales have been in widespread use long before the advent of research on affective polarization. In this research, they have been used as summary evaluations of political parties that contain an ideological and a valence component (Shikano and Nyhuis, Reference Shikano and Nyhuis2019). It is not satisfying to have one single survey measure that has to capture both affective polarization and general party evaluations. While research shows that these scales do correlate with partisan affective polarization (Harteveld, Reference Harteveld2021a) and capture outpartisan hostility (Gidron et al., Reference Gidron, Sheffer and Mor2022), there is also a substantive core to the difference between party and partisan like-dislike measures; for instance, social sorting increases the extent to which like–dislike scores towards parties and partisans correlate (Comellas Bonsfills, Reference Comellas Bonsfills2022).

A second concern is that this measure insufficiently captures what researchers are actually interested in when studying affective polarization. If we are interested in emotional reactions to partisan labels, we should measure this more explicitly (Balinhas, Reference Balinhas2023); if we are instead interested in identities, there are measures for this as well (Huddy et al., Reference Huddy, Mason and Aarøe2015; Bankert et al., Reference Bankert, Huddy and Rosema2017). But arguably, researchers value the concept of affective polarization because it relates to political behaviour and to democratic attitudes. Recently, research by Broockman et al. (Reference Broockman, Kalla and Westwood2023) has shown that experimentally increasing affective polarization (in the form of feeling thermometers) has no effect on democratic attitudes (for a broader perspective on this, see Brauer, Reference Brauer2023). It is quite reasonable to dislike those who do not share our views, especially if these views are dear to us, but treating these people differently in real-world contexts is another matter entirely, and even here the normative questions are tricky. If we justify our interest in affective polarization by its consequences, we may need to focus on those aspects of affective polarization that indeed have the downstream consequences we claim for it.

Another limitation of existing research is that there are two components of affective polarization, positive in-party affect and negative out-party affect, and these should not be conflated (Bankert et al., Reference Bankert, Huddy and Rosema2017). We now have a set of different measures of affective polarization in multi-party systems, and these do a good job at capturing the gap between these two components, with varying approaches and assumptions. However, often researchers are mainly interested in out-party dislike, that is, the extent to which supporters of one party are viewed negatively and treated as an out-group. Because most research uses the term ‘affective polarization’, researchers reach for the polarization measure even when simple out-party dislike could be more appropriate. When designing their analysis, researchers should be careful in thinking about whether they are truly interested in the gap between in-party and out-party affect or whether their theoretical concerns focus only on out-party dislike. In this case, the advantage is that the measures to be used are even simpler, not requiring decisions on the number of in-parties or whether vote share weighting is necessary.

We need a general theory

Second, the field of affective polarization research is in need of a more general theory of the role of group identities for politics and society. Partisan identities are not the only politically relevant identities, and a substantial literature has been developed that examines these in detail (on this point, see Röllicke, Reference Röllicke2023). Most notably, this includes the work of Hobolt et al. (Reference Hobolt, Leeper and Tilley2021) on Brexit identities, but also encompasses political identities based on COVID, for example, in the form of support and opposition to containment measures and vaccination (Bor et al., Reference Bor, Jørgensen and Petersen2023; Henkel et al., Reference Henkel, Sprengholz, Korn, Betsch and Böhm2023) and based on Catalan pro- and anti-independence stances (Hierro and Gallego, Reference Hierro and Gallego2018; Balcells and Kuo, Reference Balcells and Kuo2023) or European identities (Hahm et al., Reference Hahm, Hilpert and König2023). Relevant political identities could also encompass democracy and the party system itself, with social identities forming around opposition or support to political elites or democratic institutions (Moreno, Reference Moreno2019; Meléndez, Reference Meléndez2022; Gessler and Wunsch, Reference Gessler and Wunsch2023; Schedler, Reference Schedler2023). Populism and anti-populism itself can also provide the basis for social divides (Moffitt, Reference Moffitt2018). Such political identities may be particularly likely to develop where there is a strong political tradition of anti-establishment rhetoric and ideology or where there is (a threat of) democratic backsliding.

What this research so far lacks is a general account of how such in- and out-group identities develop and how they lose societal relevance. Existing evidence shows that affective polarization is heightened around elections, partly due to the increase in partisan attachment (Hernández et al., Reference Hernández, Anduiza and Rico2021; Rodríguez et al., Reference Rodríguez, Santamara and Miller2022). Partisan and other political identities can become defining personal characteristics during times of intense conflict, such as the Catalan referendum, the post-Brexit debates and the Covid crisis. Yet, the importance of political identities can also decline, as has clearly happened in the case of Brexit and Covid, and as may occur around national holidays (Levendusky, Reference Levendusky2018). The process by which certain political identities – partisan or policy-based – become dominant and then disappear from relevance deserves further study. It may be that times when these identities are at the forefront of people’s minds are the exception and not the rule. Indeed, most people prefer not to talk about politics and prefer to avoid those who do (Krupnikov and Ryan, Reference Krupnikov and Ryan2022).

Research on affective polarization also needs to engage more with the established literature on cleavages, identities and group conflict in Europe, which has recently experienced a revival of academic interest (Zollinger, Reference Zollinger2024). Related work by Bornschier et al. (Reference Bornschier, Häusermann, Zollinger and Colombo2021) highlights that objective characteristics relate to social identities, often culturally connoted, and that these identities can then be politicized (see also Marks et al., Reference Marks, Attewell, Hooghe, Rovny and Steenbergen2023). Bradley and Chauchard (Reference Bradley and Chauchard2022) show that countries with deeper ethnic divisions also have higher levels of affective polarization. Harteveld (Reference Harteveld2021 b) shows, using both CSES and Dutch panel data, that social sorting – that is, the alignment of political and non-political divisions – increases affective polarization, thus providing a link between affective polarization and social cleavages. The kind of affective polarization between partisans so often studied is thus likely to have its roots in other identities, and these interconnections deserve further study. This work also ties in well with a recent focus on the role of groups in party discourse (Evans and Tilley, Reference Evans and Tilley2017; Thau, Reference Thau2021; Huber, Reference Huber2022; Dolinsky, Reference Dolinsky2023).

These strands of research are highly related, but their interconnections would benefit from being made more explicit and carefully theorized. Work on affective polarization provides the measurement tools and socio-psychological theoretical background to better understand how and when group politics matters, while work on group politics provides the sociological underpinnings for the group attitudes studied by those working on affective polarization. For example, partisan and other political identities may have strong ties to social groups: when people think of those who support certain ideas, they may have stereotypical images of these supporters in their heads. These stereotypes and their implications deserve increased study.

We need evidence of relevance

A key challenge to work on affective polarization is to establish when partisan affect matters in real-world settings. While individuals are able to provide evaluations of groups and react to such descriptions, this does not mean that these characteristics have any relevance in the real world, in everyday interactions. Thus, on a survey, respondents are likely to be able to state whether they hold positive or negative feelings about many groups, including partisans. Similarly, in a vignette experiment respondents may react positively or negatively to partisan identities. For example, Stoetzer et al. (Reference Stoetzer, Munzert, Lowe, Çal, Gohdes, Helbling, Maxwell and Traunmueller2023) show that partisan labels determine the willingness to allocate intensive medical care to individuals. Finally, even tasks with behavioural outcomes such as trust or dictator games will show that people take decisions based on ascribed partisan identities. At the surface, such evidence seems to point to a strong – and potentially worrying – pattern, in that they demonstrate extensive in-group–out-group thinking and the potential for widespread prejudice and discrimination.

However, these findings only show that people react to partisan labels when explicitly provided. Moreover, we know far less about the extent to which people would request that information when encountering new people and thus about how relevant and salient these identities are (Orr and Huber, Reference Orr and Huber2020). Research by Krupnikov and Ryan (Reference Krupnikov and Ryan2022) on the USA also highlights that survey respondents believe that people described as partisan are thought to discuss and talk about politics a lot – and, not surprisingly, this is not something viewed positively by those who do not study and research politics for a living.

Moreover, partisan identities also signal many other characteristics, most obviously political ideology and policy preferences. Interestingly, Hrbková et al. (Reference Hrbková, Voda and Havlk2023) show that immigration attitudes and partisanship both have similar effects on inter-group sympathy in Czechia, so perhaps the policies underlying the partisan label matter just as much as or even more than the group identities. Hence, what respondents react to may not be the identities people have, but rather their ideological stances and the policies they support. One aspect that existing work needs to work much harder at is disentangling (to the extent this is possible) the preferences and attitudes of others from their identities and social group allegiances.

Hence, findings that show affective polarization to be similar across countries need to be interpreted with caution, as the societal relevance of partisan identities may vary widely across contexts. In the USA, identifying oneself as a (loyal) Republican or Democrat might be common and describing people based on this characteristic may occur a lot. However, it is likely that this is much less frequent in other countries, particularly given the declining levels of partisanship found in most European countries (Heath, Reference Heath, Fisher, Fieldhouse, Franklin, Gibson, Cantijoch and Wlezien2017).

As a result, we are left with the possibility that existing results only provide the illusion of partisan affective polarization and that the respondents taking part in our surveys use partisanship as a heuristic for other, more relevant characteristics and would rarely think about partisan identities outside the artificial context we create for them. Future work on partisan affective polarization needs to work harder to show when and why partisan identities matter for people and whether these identities go beyond the policy preferences associated with party support.

We need more normative reflection

A final challenge relates to the normative status of affective polarization. Research on this topic is often justified in terms of the purported negative implications for liberal democracy (McCoy et al., Reference McCoy, Rahman and Somer2018). For instance, recent work shows that the winner–loser gap in political support is greater among affectively polarized citizens (Janssen, Reference Janssen2023). However, there are reasons to challenge this view. For one, the debate is reminiscent of claims that political behaviour should ideally be as devoid of emotional reactions and influences as possible. Yet, as Damasio (Reference Damasio1994) already highlighted, conceiving of decision-making in the absence of emotions is impossible, as emotions are inherent to our thinking and even necessary for us to be able to take decisions. All evidence from social psychology suggests a general human tendency to divide individuals into groups. Of course, these group divisions need not all be conflictual and need not have political implications. Nevertheless, it is hard to conceive of political debates without such group divides: after all, every policy debate separates us into supporters and opponents. If, as Schattschneider (Reference Schattschneider1960) argues, democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties, then democracy is also unthinkable save in terms of affective polarization.

Moreover, affective polarization can also have positive consequences. Research on emotions notes that these motivate action (Valentino et al., Reference Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz and Hutchings2011). Similarly, affective polarization can also motivate political engagement, and indeed there are close links between affective polarization and key emotions such as anger (Webster, Reference Webster2020). Thus, Harteveld and Wagner (Reference Harteveld and Wagner2023) find that affective polarization increases turnout, with Ellger (Reference Ellger2023) showing that it is mainly negative affect that fosters mobilization (see also Serani, Reference Serani2022; Ahn and Mutz, Reference Ahn and Mutz2023).

Another, more debatable positive aspect of affective polarization concerns the legitimacy of its targets. Many feel uncomfortable with the claim the negative affect towards supporters of specific parties is inherently normatively troubling. The argument is that these supporters have chosen to be loyal to this party, so they have freely decided to agree with the aims and values of that party. In other words, partisanship is an acquired identity. Furthermore, it is arguably legitimate to feel negative affect towards people who hold policy stances that we disagree with. So, negative affect towards partisans does not have the same normative status as, say, negative affect based on race, gender or ethnicity. This argument is even stronger when the parties defend values that are inherently threatening, either to liberal democracy as a whole or to the liberties and rights of certain groups, for example, immigrants or LGBTQI individuals. For example, negative party identity towards the radical right is associated with strong support for democratic values (Meléndez and Kaltwasser, Reference Meléndez and Kaltwasser2021). Here, it is important to relate affective polarization to the concept of militant democracy: some forms of negative affect are arguably legitimate when it comes to defending core democratic and liberal values (Capoccia, Reference Capoccia2013).

This discussion becomes relevant when thinking about ways to reduce affective polarization. In the USA, research on ways to reduce affective polarization and partisan hostility has progressed a lot, allowing for robust inferences on what works and what does not (Hartman et al., Reference Hartman, Blakey, Womick, Bail, Finkel, Han, Sarrouf, Schroeder, Sheeran, Van Bavel, Willer and Gray2022; Voelkel et al., Reference Voelkel, Chu, Stagnaro, Mernyk, Redekopp, Pink, Druckman, Rand and Willer2023). Nevertheless, there is a need for a lot more research on this in multi-party systems. What is important is that research also focuses on the downstream consequences of affective polarization that should be prevented (Brauer, Reference Brauer2023). It is not clear, for example, that measures to reduce affective polarization improve democratic attitudes (Broockman et al., Reference Broockman, Kalla and Westwood2023; Voelkel et al., Reference Voelkel, Chu, Stagnaro, Mernyk, Redekopp, Pink, Druckman, Rand and Willer2023), and it is perhaps those we should care about more than simple negative affect.

Future work on how to reduce affective polarization should thus discuss when and why affective polarization needs to be minimized in the first place. In addition, research needs to be clearer on what the negative consequences of affective polarization are. Potentially, research should focus on addressing either those consequences directly or examine whether reductions in affective polarization also have knock-on effects on those consequences.