1 Richard Abel objects for good reasons to calling the approach a monopoly control rather than a market control framework, since the profession would constitute a cartel rather than a monopoly. However, monopoly control is the commonly used term, and for that reason I will use it. Howard Erlanger was an ideal editor, generous and helpful with his suggestions.Google Scholar

2 See also Peltzman, Sam, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” 19 J. L & Econ. 211 (1976); and George Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” 2 Bell J. Econ & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) (“Larson, Rise of Professionalism”).Google Scholar

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5 This sketchy history has been told in more detail. See Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions ch. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) (“Abbott, System of Professions”); Gerald Geison, “Introduction,” in Gerald L. Geison, ed., Professions and Professional Ideologies in America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983) (“Geison, Professions”).Google Scholar

6 Geison, Professions; Terence Halliday, Beyond Monopoly (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) (“Halliday, Beyond Monopoly”); Thomas Haskell, The Authority of Experts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). At the same time, the critical approach to professions by no means always excludes studies of expertise. Larson explores the “ideological hegemony” of the professions.Google Scholar

7 Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis, Lawyers in society: Vol. 3, Comparative Theories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) (“Abel & Lewis, Comparative Theories”).Google Scholar

8 Halliday, Beyond Monopoly. For a critique, see Abel & Lewis, “Putting Law Back Into the Sociology of Lawyers,” m Abel & Lewis, Comparative Theories 503.Google Scholar

9 See also Erlanger, Howard S., Chambliss, Elizabeth, & Melli, Marygold S., “Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context,” 21 Law & Soc'y Rev. 585 (1988). For a discussion of negotiation in Britain in personal injury cases, see Genn, Hazel, Hard Bargaining (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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11 See Terence C. Halliday, “Legal Professions and Politics: Neocorporatist Variations on the Pluralist Theme of Liberal Democracies,” and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “Comparing Legal Professions: A State-centered Approach,” in Abel & Lewis, Comparative Theories.Google Scholar

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21 See also Abel, Richard L., “Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions,” in Abel & Lewis, Comparative Theories 97.Google Scholar

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24 In a synthetic article of breathtaking scope in volume 3, Abel discusses national differences while analyzing them as different strategies of attaining control over a market. Richard L. Abel, “Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions”in Abel & Lewis, Comparative Theories.Google Scholar

25 Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law (New York: Basic Books, 1981). See also K. Morello, The Invisible Bar (New York: Random House, 1986).Google Scholar

26 Abbott has done an extensive survey of occupations generally called professions in the United States and England and argues that they have not routinely developed many of the traits considered characteristic. Abbott, System of Professions 16–18.Google Scholar

27 Powell, Michael, “Developments in the Regulation of Lawyers: Competing Segments and Market, Client, and Government Controls.” 64 Soc. Forces 281 (Dec. 1985).Google Scholar

28 Abbott, System of Professions 143–76, 315–19.Google Scholar

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30 Id.; Michael Powell, From Patrician to Professional Elite (New York: Russell Sage, 1989) (“Powell, Patrician”).Google Scholar

31 For a discussion of the slippage between membership and leadership in organizations, see Terry Moe, The organization of Interests (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).Google Scholar

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62 David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), addresses the structure of the administrative process.Google Scholar

63 Lewis outlines these issues in Abel & Lewis, The Common Law World ch. 1.Google Scholar