3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Conceptual Framework
Utilizing a quasi-empirical methodology, this chapter teases out and reflects on certain antinomies and aporias that tend to characterize the broad sets of international human rights solidarity argumentation that emanate from each of the Global North and Global South. The chapter focuses on the broad tendencies within each of these bodies of argumentation regarding the appropriateness or otherwise of the imposition of international legal obligations on states to express international solidarity to victims of human rights violations and deprivations around the world. The targeted Global North/Global South bodies of argumentation tend to focus chiefly on who is obligated to extend such international human rights solidarity, to whom, and in what ways.
The concern here is not just with the mere fact of the existence of significant antinomies and aporias within each of the Global North’s and Global South’s broad sets of international human rights solidarity argumentation. It is also with the rather ironic circulation and eclipsing of these antinomies and aporias in plain sight; their relationships to state sovereignty argumentation; and their connections to global power relations as ideationally constitutive forces. In the last respect, the key question is what the relative roles of values/norms in international human rights solidarity argumentation are, vis-à-vis global power relations. All of these issues raise the key question of the extent to which global power asymmetries, significantly more than human rights ideals, continue to condition when, how, and in relation to what or whom, scholars and practitioners ask the solidarity question today, including in relation to UN (human rights) bodies.
To illustrate, the kind of more specific sub questions that drive this enquiry include, for example, why the so-called responsibility to protect (or R2P) as a hard law obligation (not its soft law or “charity based” form) is not much more widely viewed in either UN or Global North official human rights discourse as extending either at all, or nearly as much, to economic and social rights deprivation and protection in much poorer countries.Footnote 1 Why does legally binding R2P, at least as a concept and discourse, appear to focus near exclusively, if not totally, on civil and political rights deprivation and protection in the same much poorer countries?Footnote 2 Why, for example, have the ostensibly protective impulses and logics undergirding legally binding R2P not yet been extended to any significant degree to the area of access to COVID-19 vaccines in most of the world? With notable exceptions, Global South countries tend to stand firmly in favor of ensuring that the two positions outlined here are “righted,” while Global North countries have not tended to be nearly as enthusiastic.
On the other hand, why do the very same Global South countries who tend to strongly endorse binding international human rights solidarity obligations on the global level in favor of the advancement of economic and social rights within their territories also tend to oppose binding obligations or authority in favor of Global North states to intervene (not necessarily forcibly) to help protect against egregious violations of civil and political rights in those same places. Significant exceptions do, of course, exist in this regard, including in the case of intra-African interventions in such cases by African regional bodies.Footnote 3
To what extent can the answers to these kinds of questions, and the positions taken in relation to them across the Global North/South axis, be chiefly attributed to the immanent and/or social power of human rights norms and values? One does not have to be an international relations “realist” to see that there seems to be a lot more at play in the kinds of arguments favored by states on both sides of the Global North/South axis than simply strong beliefs in, or adherence to, international human rights ideas, values, and norms.
To be clear, however, the point of this chapter is not to argue in favor of either the Global North or South positions on such questions at hand, but to demonstrate and critically reflect on the nature and implications of the antinomies and aporias that appear to be present in each of the targeted Global North/South bodies of discourse (concerning the obligatoriness of expressing international human rights solidarity in specific contexts).
3.1.2 Methodology
A quasi-empirical approach is adopted in order to grapple with the chapter’s key concerns in a more concrete way. The overarching question that is raised in this introductory section is systematically investigated through a survey, and analyses, of the specific sample slices of international human rights argumentation described in this chapter. In order to ensure the feasibility of the research that animates the chapter, its focus is limited to an investigation of official (i.e. state-made) international human rights solidarity argumentation, within specific UN bodies. Thus, the bodies of such argumentation that are analyzed here are limited to statements made, and votes taken, within the UN General Assembly (UNGA), Security Council (UNSC), and Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The purposive selection of the UN itself and these specific UN bodies as the primary sites within which to analyze the targeted type of argumentation was suggested by the very nature of that argumentation.
The investigation of these UNGA, UNSC, and UNHRC statements and votes focused, in turn, on relevant statements made and positions taken by a purposively selected, but broadly representative, sample of key states and regional bodies from each of the Global North and South. The selection of a state as “key” was a function of its relative power and influence within its geopolitical region (though, due to space constraints, not all key countries could be included). In the end, whatever its policy choices, each selected state tends to typify countries identified as either belonging to the Global North or the Global South. The purposive nature of this sample, and the aforementioned inbuilt “controls,” were deemed appropriate, given the well-established historical trend, as recorded in the relevant literature (discussed throughout this chapter). The tenor of this literature suggests that there was little to no reasonable expectation that a different slate would yield a different result. These purposively selected countries and regional bodies are as follows: Global North states/regional bodies – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the European Union; and Global South states/regional bodies – India, Nigeria, Brazil, the African Union, and China.
Regarding the inclusion of China in the Global South, it should be noted that, although that state is now, in many respects, economically, politically, and militarily powerful and influential enough to be characterized as a Global North state, its continued subordination to the United States in some respects (such as in UN politics and in regard to being mostly at the receiving end of the US/China economic sanction “war”),Footnote 4 and its enduring close alignment with the Global South group at the UN,Footnote 5 leaves its location in the typology employed here at least open to serious debate. However, given the vastly dominant orientation toward the Global South of its historical and current UN praxis, it is treated here as – on balance – a Global South state.Footnote 6 In any case, as Karin Mickelson has taught us, countries ultimately self-identify (or not) as part of the Global South.Footnote 7
Regarding the UNGA, extensive searches of key and related proxy terms and expressions (such as international solidarity, responsibility to protect, intervention, humanitarian intervention, military intervention, sanctions, and Chapter VII) were conducted. Four hundred meeting records were read.
There were 64 meetings in which relevant issues were discussed. During those meetings, the United States made a total of 19 statements in the debates and votes at these sampled meetings, the United Kingdom made 6, France 7, Russia 18, the European Union 11, China 18, India 10, Nigeria 8, Brazil 8, and the African Union made none. It should be noted here that the fact that certain selected states or international organizations sometimes did not make any statement or vote does not raise any significant methodological issue. For example, survey participants sometimes abstain.
Regarding the UNSC, the focus was also on official statements and votes in that body. In phase one of this research, hundreds of meeting records (from the 5615th meeting on January 11, 2007 to the 8950th meeting on January 19, 2022) were surveyed looking for similar key words and expressions as were focused on in the research into UNGA debates. One hundred and three meetings met the criteria. During these meetings, the United States made 33 statements in the debates/votes at these sampled meetings, the United Kingdom made 25, France 37, Russia 36, the European Union 2, China 23, India 7, Nigeria 6, Brazil 10, and the African Union 2. In phase two of this aspect of the research, all UNSC debates that had human rights on their agenda were searched. There were about ten records that fit this description. Only four of those meetings debated to a significant extent any of the issues related to the current research. During this sub-set of meetings, the United States made 1 statement in those four meetings, the United Kingdom made 2, France 2, Russia 4, the European Union none, China 2, India 1, Nigeria none, Brazil none, and the African Union none.
Regarding the search of the records of UNHRC meetings, the focus of the survey was mainly on the votes taken in that body on the international legal obligations of states to aid in the realization of economic and social rights around the world. Six recent UNHRC resolutions that were adopted by recorded votes were analyzed closely to assess the voting records on these issues of the eight purposively sampled states and regional bodies already identified. These six UNHRC resolutions were adopted between July 2020 and April 2022. Although this is a shorter historical period than was focused upon in our search of meeting records of the UNSC and UNGA, there is ample evidence in the literature to suggest that the observed voting pattern of these states was not significantly different on the questions at issue in this chapter in the two decades before the period July 2020.Footnote 8
In the end, the body of evidence thus collected was analyzed against the conceptual framework outlined here for the extent to which it supports or troubles the content and orientation of that frame.
3.1.3 Limitations of the Research
Since the focus of the research on which this chapter is based was on official human rights solidarity argumentation within the UN, the chapter does not necessarily account for the tendencies within and orientation of other types of international human rights solidarity argumentation (as for e.g. those made by civil society groups). What is more, the chapter does not incorporate data from debates and votes in other UN rights organs or specialized agencies. Secondly, the focus of this chapter is on international human rights solidarity argumentation at the global level, and not on similar kinds of argumentation at various regional levels (e.g. at the African Union, European Union, Commonwealth, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Organization of American States).
It should be noted, however, that none of these limitations is fatal to the argument developed in this chapter. This is because the evidence canvassed is from the proceedings of the UN’s three major, and arguably most important, organs. In any case, the preexisting literature strongly suggests that the positions taken in these three UN organs by the purposive sample of states that are focused on in this chapter tends to represent both the positions they have taken in other fora and the behavior of similarly situated or peer states.Footnote 9
3.1.4 Definitions
The key terms and expressions that animate and frame the discussion in this chapter require definition. Regarding the concept of international human rights solidarity, I adopt the latest version of the definitions offered by successive UN Independent Experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council to study it and its implications in and for international law and relations. According to these experts, this expression denotes: “The expression of a spirit of unity among individuals, peoples, States and international organizations, encompassing the union of interests, purposes and actions and the recognition of different needs and rights to achieve common goals.”Footnote 10
As it is used in this chapter, the term antinomy simply refers to “logical contradictions.”Footnote 11 This definition is preferred despite the availability of more complex definitions within various academic disciplines. As used here, the term aporia is defined as an irresolvable internal contradiction or logical disjunction in an argument or set of arguments. I do, however, retain a hint (only a hint) within my usage of the term aporia of its quality of serving as a kind of “creative force,” or at least, as “possibly creative,”Footnote 12 reflecting the Socratic use of aporia as a way to bring to light a need for further investigation.Footnote 13 And so, of course, even within the antinomies and aporias that are observed, some emancipatory potential may be evident. For, as Upendra Baxi has taught us, have not even human rights discourses and praxis themselves always accommodated both politics of emancipation and politics of domination – and has it not done so in every single epoch and at one and the same time?Footnote 14
The concept of power that is deployed in this chapter is largely Weberian. And so, it primarily denotes “the probability of forcing one’s will on the behavior of others.”Footnote 15 This conception of power is, however, modified by Foucault’s crucial and well-known caveat that power is relational.Footnote 16 As used here, the term interest refers to “something that improves [or is perceived as likely to improve] one’s position with respect to either of these is in his interest.”Footnote 17
The concept of norms that is preferred here refers to authoritative standards for assessing conduct (as opposed to denoting a pattern of accepted behavior).Footnote 18 Connected, but different from “norms,” the term values is used here as denoting “what is deemed good, such as when we say that knowledge or justice are values, which ought to be promoted. Talk about values is also often talk about ideals that guide one’s actions.”Footnote 19
3.2 On the Antinomies and Aporias that Characterize Official Human Rights Solidarity Argumentation across the Global South/North Axis
3.2.1 The Tendency to Antinomy and Aporia in Official Global North International Human Rights Solidarity Argumentation
3.2.1.1 The Character of the Broad Set of Arguments that Tend to be Made by Global North States
Their Broad Position on a Binding International Civil and Political Rights Solidarity Obligation
The studied UNSC debates and votes reveal certain dominant patterns in the official international human rights solidarity argumentation of the sample of Global North states/regional bodies that are focused on in this chapter. These Global North states and regional groups (namely the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the EU) tended to affirm the existence of a binding international civil and political rights solidarity obligation and also strongly support the imposition of sanctions or of intervention, at the very least by the UNSC, ostensibly in order to protect civil and political (CP) rights around the world. Thus, despite their consistent opposition to the UNHRC’s appointment of a UN Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity,Footnote 20 as is well known, Global North states in the UNSC have tended to strongly support the expression of international solidarity in aid of the protection of CP rights the world over, and have usually done so on the basis of their view that this kind of praxis is both authorized by, and required under, international law.Footnote 21
A few examples from the records of these UNSC debates and votes will suffice to illustrate these interconnected points. First, in the debate during UNSC meeting No. 8945 on the “Situation in Mali,” the United States strongly supported intervention to protect lives, property, and freedom of movement in that Global South country, stating that MINUSMA (the UN intervention force there) “needs, following the Secretary-General’s proposal, an increase to its troop ceiling. That will help protect civilians in central Mali with more quick-reaction forces and air assets.” Despite its opposition to the use of the UNSC’s Chapter VII authority in dealing with the situation in that particular area, the US delegation supported MINUSMA during UNSC meetings Nos. 8809, 8273, and 8794. The United States also supported external interventions of one type or other to protect civilians during UNSC meetings Nos. 8859 and 8290 on “Sudan and South Sudan.” The positions taken by France and the United Kingdom during the sampled UNSC meetings fit into the same mold. In all of these cases, the tenor of the records of the meetings also show that:
(a) the United States, France, and the United Kingdom supported a binding legal obligation on states (and certainly on members of the UNSC) to express a type of international solidarity by intervening in suitable situations around the world in aid of the protection of certain human rights;
(b) these Global North states appeared to be acting in conformity with the conception of the responsibility to protect (R2P) that is outlined in the text of the relevant paragraphs of the UN Summit Outcome document; and
(c) the human rights interventions that these states supported were almost entirely aimed at protecting CP rights, such as the rights to life, freedom of movement, and property.
To be sure, there were in very few cases some mention (especially by France) of the extension by Global North states of humanitarian aid to the populations of the countries in which the interventions at issue were being undertaken, but these were references to charitable gestures rather than to the implementation of a binding international legal obligation to express international solidarity. Overall, the dominant pattern revealed here is very much in line with the historical behavior of these particular states, and of Global North states in general.Footnote 22
It should be noted, however, that Russia (which – though largely non-Western in alignment – can only be reasonably characterized as a Global North state) tended to buck this trend. In the UNSC meetings canvassed, Russia almost always rejected the imposition of sanctions or of intervention as a means of protecting CP rights in other countries. Russia has also not tended to see the imposition of such sanctions as an action that is required by international law.Footnote 23
It is also noteworthy that the sampled UNGA debates and votes (as are described in Section 3.1) showed similar trends to those reported with regard to the debates and votes in the UNSC. For instance, France mostly supported military intervention and sanctions in aid of the protection of CP rights in other lands. As might be expected from the preceding discussion, Russia mostly rejected the imposition of such sanctions/interventions, arguing that they tend to threaten international peace and security.Footnote 24
Their Broad Position on a Binding International Economic and Social Rights Solidarity Obligation
Despite the strength of the commitment of the sampled Global North states to implementing an international legal obligation on states (read powerful states) to express international solidarity to victims of CP rights violations around the world, there is little evidence in the studied UN debates and votes of significant Global North state support for a binding international legal obligation to express international solidarity to poorer states in aid of the fuller realization of economic and social (ES) rights in those countries. Indeed, there is explicit evidence in the records of the UNHRC that these Global North states tend to strongly oppose the existence of a binding international legal obligation on states to aid in the realization of ES rights beyond their national frontiers.Footnote 25
In addition to the tenor of this evidence from the records of the proceedings of the UNHRC, it is significant in the current respect that, during the negotiations for the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP ICESCR), almost all Global North states involved argued that international cooperation and assistance (a key component of the international human rights solidarity obligation) was merely a moral rather than an international legal obligation under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), while Global South states argued the opposite.Footnote 26 It is pertinent to note that this position contrasts with the view of the authoritative interpreter of the ICESCR, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.Footnote 27 This committee has emphasized that it is “particularly incumbent on states parties and other actors in a position to assist” (i.e. almost always Global North states) to provide international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to enable developing countries to fulfil their “core and other obligations” under the Covenant.Footnote 28
And, further, the overwhelming orientation of the evidence gleaned from the targeted UNHRC proceedings indicates that these same Global North states are extremely reluctant to agree to, or endorse the implementation of any UNHRC mandated, or even strongly hortatory, measures designed to implement international ES rights solidarity obligations in a robust way. For example, following debate in the UNHRC on Resolution A/HRC/RES/49/15 (“effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of states on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights”), adopted March 31, 2022, all EU states (France included) and the United States voted against its adoption. Among other things, this resolution “reiterates the call on industrialized countries [i.e. the Global North] to implement the enhanced programme of debt relief without further delay and to agree to cancel all the official bilateral debt of those countries covered by the programme in return for their making demonstrable commitments to poverty reduction,” so as to enhance poverty reduction in the Global South. While there were other reasons offered by these Global North states for their opposition to the adoption of this resolution,Footnote 29 logically, the fact that this text called upon them to begin implementing a robust debt relief program of a kind that they have largely failed to do for decades was most likely one of those reasons.
A very similar story unfolded in regard to the otherwise successful votes on the adoption of the following UNHRC resolution: A/HRC/RES/49/19 (“promoting and protecting economic, social and cultural rights within the context of addressing inequalities in the recovery from the COVID-10 pandemic”), adopted April 1, 2022, which “stresses that it is essential to scale up international cooperation to support developing and least-developed countries and those in marginalized and vulnerable situations who are disproportionately bearing the socio-economic impacts of the pandemic … as part of the global response and recovery efforts based on unity, solidarity, multilateral cooperation and the principle of leaving no one behind.” This was also the case with A/HRC/RES/47/11 (“the contribution of development to the enjoyment of all human rights”), adopted July 12, 2021, which “calls upon Member States and the United Nations system, including its funds and programmes and specialized agencies, in accordance with their mandates, to continue to mobilize resources to carry out development cooperation and to assist States, particularly developing and the least developed countries, upon their request, in promoting sustainable development.”
The Global North opposition and resistance to the imposition of any kind of international legal mandate on them to express international solidarity in aid of the realization of ES rights in poorer countries (including even soft international legal obligations) has perhaps been at its strongest in regard to the enunciation and implementation of the duty to cooperate in aid of the fuller realization by various peoples in the Global South of their right to development.Footnote 30 For example, EU states voted against UNHRC resolution A/HRC/RES/48/8 (“promotion of a democratic and equitable international order”), adopted October 8, 2021, which – among other things – emphasized
(c) the right of every human person and all peoples to development; … (e) The right to an international economic order based on equal participation in the decision-making process, interdependence, mutual interest, solidarity and cooperation among all States; … (m) The promotion of equitable access to benefits from the international distribution of wealth through enhanced international cooperation, in particular in international economic, commercial and financial relations.
A very similar voting pattern was observed in relation to UNHRC resolutions A/HRC/RES/48/10 (“the right to development”), adopted October 8, 2021, which emphasized “the need to strive for greater acceptance, operationalization and realization of the right to development at the international level while urging all Member States to undertake at the national level the necessary policy formulation and to institute the measures required for the implementation of the right to development as an integral part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
The same kind of story played out with regard to UNHRC resolution A/HRC/RES/44/18 (“enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights”), adopted July 17, 2020, which “urges States to take, upon request by affected Member States, the measures necessary to enhance bilateral, regional and international cooperation aimed at addressing the adverse impact of consecutive and compounded global crises, such as … financial and economic crises … on the full enjoyment of human rights.”
It is telling, for the purposes of the argument being made, that this pattern of opposition and resistance on the part of the Global North to legally binding duties on states that are in a position to do so, to positively express international economic and social rights solidarity toward much poorer states, has remained so, despite the fact that, at most, only a handful of states (such as the United States) continue to explicitly deny the status of economic and social rights as human rights.
3.2.1.2 The Antinomies and Aporias within this Broad Set of Global North Arguments
An analysis of the largely opposing approach(es) to international solidarity that has been adopted by these sample Global North states in their UNSC, UNGA, and UNHRC praxis, depending quite significantly on whether it is CP or ES rights that are engaged, suggests that their broad body of international human rights solidarity argumentation is marked by antinomy and aporia.
If, by antinomy, we mean a contradiction or a paradox, then there is certainly a significant conceptual contradiction or paradox in accepting (as almost all of these Global North states do, save the United States) that ES rights are human rights that are indivisible from, inextricably tied to, and interdependent with CP rights;Footnote 31 arguing strongly in favor of an international legal obligation to express international human rights solidarity when CP rights have been or are likely to be breached; and then rejecting a similar obligation in the face of ongoing or potential ES rights breaches.
What, however, is the creative potential, if any, and howsoever mild, of this aporia? Could it be that highlighting it more could trouble Global North officialdom’s narratives and self-images enough to produce a measure of change in the opposing direction, toward the greater acceptance of binding international ES rights solidarity obligations and therefore in favor of significantly greater enjoyment of the fruits of international ES solidarity praxis around the world? This may well be so, but it should be noted that faith and even hope in this possibility may not account as fully as it ought to for the materiality and persistence of the power/interest calculus that has contributed appreciably to the generation of this aporia in the first place.Footnote 32
3.2.2 The Tendency to Antinomy and Aporia in Official Global South International Human Rights Solidarity Argumentation
3.2.2.1 The Broad Character of the Arguments that Tend to be Made by Global South States
Their Broad Position on a Binding International Civil and Political Rights Solidarity Obligation
The sampled UNSC debates and votes described in Section 3.1 indicate certain key patterns. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the dominant tendency to hesitation and ambivalence (and certainly not robust support) of Global South states toward the implementation (even by the UNSC) of a binding international CP rights solidarity obligation. First of all, China has – at best – been largely lukewarm toward the (robust) implementation of such an obligation and has, thus, tended to view international sanctions and interventions to protect such human rights as the right to life, property, and freedom of movement with a significant degree of suspicion or hesitation. It expressed this position for instance in the debates on the following situations: UNSC meeting 8945 on Mali (during which it exhorted fellow UNSC member states to listen to Mali’s point of view); meeting 8859 on South Sudan (where it called on the UNSC to heed the AU’s call to lift sanctions on that country); meeting 8710 on Libya (during which it urged the council to rather enforce the arms embargo on Libya instead of authorizing a military intervention in that country); meeting 8468 on Darfur (where it called on the council to primarily focus on strengthening Sudan’s internal state capacity and to lift the sanctions it imposed on that country); and meeting 8288 on Mali (during which it urged the international community to support the people of Mali in making their own decisions).
India tended to remain quite wary of international (read Global North) intervention in the affairs of other states ostensibly to protect CP rights (read Global South states), as it has almost always been throughout its history.Footnote 33 For example, in UNSC meeting 8906, it urged the much greater use of the less forceful process and authority in chapter 6 of the UN Charter, rather than what it saw as too ready a resort to chapter 7 of that constitutional document. In meeting 7019, it argued that the protection of civilians during armed conflict was primarily a national responsibility and that international intervention to do so should not be resorted to too readily.
Brazil tended to argue that the imposition of sanctions or of interventions ought to be utilized as a last resort – reflecting a regional historical tendency to be generally wary of Global North intervention allegedly in aid of CP rights in the Global South.Footnote 34 For example, in UNSC meeting 7247, on the maintenance of international peace and security, it warned against coercive (not necessarily military) interventions to protect (mainly) CP rights and argued that: “it is necessary to abandon the reflex of resorting to coercive measures as the very first option. Unilateral sanctions, for example, corrode the credibility of the international order, frequently harm the civilian population and have demonstrably revealed themselves to be inadequate in changing behaviour.”
The sampled UNGA debates/votes showed similar trends. For example, during the UNGA debate held in October 2015 on its Agenda item 84, Nigeria’s argument reflected the dominant tendency among Global South states. It argued that:
The imposition of unilateral sanctions [including in aid of the protection of CP rights] runs counter to sovereign equality and international law. Imposition of sanctions on any sovereign State should always be in conformity with the provisions of the Charter. It was noteworthy that almost all existing sanctions targeted developing countries belonging to the African Union, the Group of 77 and China and the Non-Aligned Movement. Sanctions should be applied only as a last resort, after exhaustion of all other peaceful means of dispute settlement … The frequency of the resort to sanctions should be reduced, their scope narrowed and their duration shortened to avoid prolonged damage to the interests of targeted States and their populations.
It is of course true that Global South states do, at times, support or fail to strongly object to international intervention in aid of the protection of CP rights, especially in situations where there have been egregious violations of those rights over some period. And this is well reflected in the record of the UNSC and UNGA meetings studies. Nevertheless, the overall point being made here, regarding the dominant tendency of these states to be suspicious or hesitant about both binding obligations on states (read more powerful states) to express international CP rights solidarity and the expression of such solidarity toward them, remains valid.
Their Broad Position on a Binding International Economic and Social Rights Solidarity Obligation
Despite the historical reluctance of most Global South states to strongly embrace the notion that international law requires, or even authorizes, states to positively express international solidarity to victims of CP rights violations around the world (especially in a unilateral, robust or coercive manner), the studied UN debates and votes strongly demonstrate robust and near total Global South state support for the binding international legal obligation on all states that are able to do so (usually Global North states) to positively express international economic and social rights solidarity to poorer states.Footnote 35
This dates back to, at least, the early 1960s, in which the then newly postcolonial Global South argued for the prioritization of “collective” ES rights over “individual” CP rights.Footnote 36
What is more, as we have already seen, unlike their Global North counterparts, these Global South states adopted a similar position during the negotiations for the adoption of the OP ICESCR, arguing – in effect – that, under the ICESCR, the expression of international ES rights solidarity was not merely a moral obligation on all states, but was also a binding international legal obligation.Footnote 37
Secondly, unlike almost all the Global North states, Global South states tend to very strongly support the implementation of UNHRC mandated measures on states, or strong exhortations by that body on them, to implement robust international ES rights solidarity obligations. This is clear from the affirmative votes by Global South states in favor of all the following already discussed resolutions: A/HRC/RES/49/15; A/HRC/RES/49/19; A/HRC/RES/47/11; A/HRC/RES/48/8; A/HRC/RES/48/10; and A/HRC/RES/44/18. It should be noted, however, that Brazil (under Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency) was the only Global South state that either abstained or voted against any of these resolutions.
Global South support for an international legal mandate on all states that are in a position to do so to positively express international ES rights solidarity toward poorer countries does perhaps climb to its apex in relation to the duty on all states to cooperate toward the fuller realization of the right to development.Footnote 38 For example, all Global South states (save Brazil under Bolsanaro, which abstained in each case) voted in favor of the following UNHRC resolutions that seek to implement this right in fuller measure: A/HRC/RES/48/8; A/HRC/RES/48/10; and A/HRC/RES/44/18.
3.2.2.2 The Antinomies and Aporias within this Broad Set of Global South Arguments
The foregoing analysis of the behavior of our sample Global South states within three major UN bodies suggests that their broad approach(es) to international human rights solidarity also varies to a significant degree, depending on whether it is CP or ES rights that are at issue. This does suggest that their broad body of international human rights solidarity argumentation is also marked by antinomy and aporia, though in a flipped, and certainly different, kind of way. The antinomy and aporia that is thus revealed in this Global South state case appears to be in a reverse relationship to the antinomy and aporia that marks Global North international human rights solidarity argumentation.
There is certainly a paradox in accepting (as almost all of these Global South states do) that CP rights are human rights that are indivisible from, inextricably tied to, and interdependent on, ES rights;Footnote 39 arguing strongly in favor of an international legal obligation to express international human rights solidarity when ES rights (including the right to development) have been or are likely to be breached; and then so often rejecting or hesitating about the existence or robust implementation of a similar obligation in the face of ongoing or potential CP rights breaches.
What is more, there is also – to a significant degree – an aporia (seen as a basically irresolvable logical disjunction) within the broad set of Global South argumentation on international human rights solidarity that has just been outlined and analyzed. For, how can one easily resolve an internal contradiction that stems from arguing in favor of an international legal obligation to express international solidarity in aid of the protection abroad of one category of human rights (i.e. ES rights), while so often arguing against the existence of a similarly robust international legal obligation to assist in the realization of another type of human rights (i.e. CP rights), when one has already acknowledged that these CP rights are inseparable/indivisible from ES rights?
The possible creative potential, if any and howsoever mild, of this aporia in Global South state international human rights solidarity argumentation, would appear to be akin – in some ways – to that outlined already in connection with the discussion on the aporia in the dominant Global North state argumentation on this topic. First, highlighting this aporia even more than it already has been help trouble Global South officialdom’s narratives and self-images enough to produce a measure of change in the opposing direction, at least toward even greater discursive acceptance by these states of binding international CP rights solidarity. This could over time enure in favor of significantly greater benefits from such international CP solidarity praxis – if with all the serious caveats that must be entered regarding the ways in which global power dynamics can deeply complicate and render that possibility undesirable to a large extent.
3.3 Recovering the Power/Interest, Norms/Values Nexus
In my view, the foregoing discussion has at least two conceptual implications. The first relates to the relationship between international human rights solidarity argumentation and its state sovereignty counterparts. The second concern is entailed but not necessarily limited by the first. It is with regard to the necessity for a more accurate calibration of the power/interest, norms/value nexus in international human rights solidarity argumentation. This is necessary given the circulation in plain sight of explicit or implied representations of that conceptual nexus that do not bear as accurate a relationship to the actually existing one as they ought to.
3.3.1 International Human Rights Solidarity Argumentation and its State Sovereignty Counterparts
It seems that one of the things going for the targeted sets of Global South bodies of international human rights solidarity argumentation is that their orientations on either side of this axis tend to map onto the orientations of state sovereignty argumentation. Global North states appear to make arguments that they view as protective of their state sovereignty and interest (understood as freedom of action). This is evident in their position against binding international ES rights solidarity obligations that would mandate them to part with a significant amount of resources, with considerably less wiggle room to deploy such resources to gain influence, but in favor of binding international CP rights obligations which tend to advance their power and influence over the governance of Global South states.
Global South states essentially act similarly. They appear to make international human rights solidarity arguments that they view as protective of their state sovereignty and interests. This is the case with their tendency to argue against binding international CP rights solidarity obligations that significantly constrain the control their governing elites have over their own societies, while embracing binding international ES rights solidarity obligations that would mandate a flow of much needed resources to them without such resource flows tending to diminish their freedom of action by being tied to the even closer alignment of these Global South states with Global North interests and priorities.
And so, similar forces seem to be at play across both sides of the Global North/South axis, if with different consequences. And, with notable exceptions, such as in China’s case, similarly situated countries (historically, socio economically and political power wise) tend to make similar arguments about both international human rights solidarity and state sovereignty. And so, the former kind of argumentation implicates the latter, and vice versa. All this in turn also seems significantly more related to the character and potency of global power relations than to the immanent or social force of human rights values/norms themselves.
Another way to put this is that, from the discussion in Section 3.2, official international human rights solidarity argumentation across the Global North/South axis seems to be significantly more about political and socio-economic struggles regarding the assertion, diminishment, or denial of state sovereignty than it has been about the advancement of human rights values and norms themselves. Norms tend to become more displaced or shifted further to the margins when either side is convinced that its enjoyment of freedom of action is at risk. Too often, this has produced flips and flops in positions taken in both international human rights and state sovereignty argumentation, depending on the specific values/norms at issue and their perceived implications for the freedom of action of the Global North or South states that are engaged. And so, as it turns out, by observing these flips and flops in international human rights solidarity argumentation, we may be able to demonstrate that state sovereignty is definitely not passé or as diminished as many would like to think!Footnote 40 As well, by observing the flips and flops in state sovereignty (as freedom of action) argumentation within international human rights solidarity debates, we may be able to show that international human rights solidarity (even in its hard law forms) will remain with us in some form(s) for a long time yet. This is because both geo-political blocs that debate international human rights solidarity favor it in one form or the other. And so, either way, solidarity will continue to be affirmed. Perhaps, these realizations should lead us to calibrate better our understandings of the relative roles played by global power and norms/values in international human rights solidarity argumentation and the relationship between power/interest and norms/values in such argumentation.
However, it should be noted that the goal here is not to exemplify IR realism – at least not uncritically. In fact, as I have argued extensively elsewhere,Footnote 41 its near counterpoint in international relations theory, social constructivism,Footnote 42 is a stronger set of ideas for understanding much international law and relations praxis. The point remains, nevertheless, that the power/interest and norms/values nexus needs to be better calibrated. For, as Anghie has taught us, claims of international (human rights) solidarity have had a very long history and career of being driven by, and projecting/facilitating, Global North/South advantage and domination.Footnote 43 As this chapter has shown, the projection of, or resistance to, power has been central in both the Global North’s and South’s international human rights solidarity praxis. The extent to which this kind of domination/resistance dynamic continues to be at play in contemporary international human rights solidarity argumentation, and its exact nature, should therefore be an important subject of scholarly enquiry.
3.3.2 Recovering the Power/Interest, Norms/Values Nexus
Also, as already hinted at in the foregoing discussion regarding the international human rights solidarity/sovereignty argumentation connections, the evidence analyzed in Section 3.2 strongly indicates that, much more than values and norms, the nature of global power relations appear to play much more of a role in shaping or calibrating positions taken on international human rights solidarity on either side of this Global North/South geopolitical axis than is readily admitted by the relevant states. Yet this reality tends to be elided in official pro-international human rights solidarity (including prodemocracy and pro-humanitarianism) discourse. Even well-meaning academics are too often not free of blame in this regard.
It is therefore important for critical internationalists to continue to expose and recover more fully the actually existing calibration of the nexus between power/interest and norms/values in international human rights solidarity argumentation. It is key that the relationship between these two sets of factors is more accurately depicted toward a better understanding of the character of official international human rights argumentation (and indeed praxis).
A better understanding of this specific power/interest and norms/values nexus will have important implications for our (re)understandings of official international human rights argumentation: how these bodies of argumentation come to be constituted; by whom?; how certain versions of that discourse become dominant; how we come to “know” who the “good actors” who show international human rights solidarity are and are not; and how we come to “know” who the “bad actors” who do not express international human rights solidarity are and are not.
It should also be noted that, although the role of values in international human rights solidarity remains significant, detailed analysis of this is beyond the scope of this chapter.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter utilizes a quasi-empirical methodology to demonstrate and reflect upon the character of official (state-made) international human rights solidarity argumentation across the Global North/South axis and its socioeconomic and political contingency. It first maps the antinomies and aporias in each of these bodies of international human rights solidarity argumentation (their respective flips and flops) as the issues at hand and the foci of the debates change from civil and political (CP) rights to economic and social (ES) rights, and vice versa. It thereafter shows how these flips and flops in the official international human rights solidarity argumentation of Global North and South states map closely onto their state sovereignty (as freedom of action) argumentation/positions. The chapter also argues that this phenomenon is more closely linked to the nature and orientation of global power/interest relations than to the immanent force of, or belief in, human rights norms/values by states across this divide. Such beliefs are, of course, important. The point is that they are not nearly as determinative as seems to be too often suggested. Lastly, the chapter also argues that a better calibration and understanding of the power/interest and norms/values nexus in official international human rights solidarity argumentation across the Global North/South axis will have certain important constitutive implications for understanding of that discourse itself and its related praxis.
It should be noted, however, that the chapter does not make a simple argument regarding the ways in which states project global power in pursuit of their perceived interests. Instead, it demonstrates how their projection of global power in pursuit of their interests has produced antinomies and aporias in their official international human rights solidarity argumentation, and its deeper implications for our very conception of who and what “good” international human rights solidarity actors are or are not.
These points provide important insight into how to respond to the overarching question that this volume tackles: how to talk about solidarity today. They illuminate for us the extent to which global power asymmetries, significantly more than human rights ideals, continue to condition when, how, and in relation to what/who, scholars and practitioners ask the international solidarity question today, including in relation to UN (human rights) bodies.
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