2.1 Sacrifices for Happiness

A sacrifice for happiness is done for the sake of accomplishing an end, typically an end expected to satiate a desire or inclination. For example, in chess, a sacrificial move is one where a piece or advantageous position is sacrificed for the sake of securing a better advantage later. Here, the player performs a cost-benefit analysis and determines that allowing a piece to be taken now will help her achieve her end: winning the game. A sacrifice for happiness can also be made by supressing one's immediate inclination for the sake of a hoped-for future reward. For example, a shopkeeper may supress her immediate inclination to overcharge an inexperienced customer for the sake of ensuring that the customer will continue to patronise her store in the future, thereby sacrificing her immediate desire to acquire money in the short term for the sake of securing more money in the long term.

Most, if not all, organisms are able to make the kinds of decisions that underpin sacrifices for happiness. These sacrifices require that the subject can compare competing inclinations and choose which option is likely to have the best pay-off. Even relatively simple organisms, like insects, routinely need to make decisions about how to proceed, and these decisions require that the insect sacrifices one option for the sake of another. For example, when foraging for nectar, the bumblebee must decide whether it should continue to exploit its current cluster of flowers or move on to a new patch. Both options have potential benefits and drawbacks: on the one hand, continuing to exploit a proven food source may be the best way to proceed if the organism's goal is to harvest a large amount of nectar in a short amount of time; on the other hand, moving from flower patch to flower patch is the best course of action if the bee hopes to collect only the best nectar. This second option will satisfy the bee's desire to gain the best quality nectar the environment has to offer but it will require that the bee invests more time and energy flying between flowers. Despite the potential rewards and drawbacks associated with each strategy, the bumblebee is able to make a decision and will not become paralysed by indecision or continuously waiver back-and-forth between the two options.Footnote ⁵ The bee is able to make a decision and, in doing so, it chooses to sacrifice one inclination for another.

The ability to make these sorts of decisions is needed not only in foraging situations, but in all areas of an organism's life. Organisms routinely need to decide between competing inclinations and desires, for example, they need to balance their desire for food, fun, or mates with their fear of predators and competing conspecifics. Ultimately, choosing to act in one way rather than another will always involve sacrifice: in choosing option A, the organism is giving up the ability to act on option B.

Non-human animals will even supress an immediate desire for the sake of securing an expected future reward. Although my dog shows a deep mistrust of the mailman, he will, on occasion, overcome his desire to bark at the mailman for the sake of securing praise or a treat. My dog's sacrifice here is no different in kind from that made by the shopkeeper, as both are deciding to give up something of value right now (either the desire for money in the short term, or the desire to stand guard) for the sake of potential happiness in the future.

At this point, my reader may question whether these animals are indeed making a sacrifice, as a sacrifice implies that the actor knows that she is making a sacrifice and makes this sacrifice precisely because she intends to do what is in her best interest. Acting in one's best interest seems to require that the subject has a concept of her own best interest, and such a concept requires that the subject can (a) represent her future possible states, and (b) be motivated by the abstract concept of her long-term wellbeing (cf. Korsgaard, Reference Korsgaard and Ober2009, p. 102). If the animal has no concept of what is in its best interest and does not understand that it has supressed one inclination for the sake of another precisely because it intended to do what is in its best interest, it becomes unclear as to whether we ought to properly call the animal's act an act of “sacrifice.” It would seem rather, so this objection goes, that the animal's behaviour is wholly determined by instincts and mechanisms that lie outside of its control.

I do not think that there is a deep discontinuity between the sacrifice made by the chess player or shopkeeper and those made by animals. There is likely a difference in the degree to which humans and animals are able to reflect on the concept of their own wellbeing and the extent to which they are in fact acting in accordance with a principle that will bring about their long-term wellbeing, but ultimately, this will be a difference in degree and not in kind. I also think that it should be clear that animals intend their actions. An animal's behaviour is guided by its perceptions: my dog barks because he hears the mailman's distinctive footsteps. Moreover, an animal's perceptions of its environment ought to be thought of as intentional. That is, when my dog barks at the mailman, it is because he perceives this person as a threat. If he did not, there would be no way to explain why he barks at the mailman, but not at other people. My dog's ability to perceive the mailman as a threat indicates that he has at least a vague concept of his own wellbeing and in some sense must represent the mailman, and the letters he slides through the letterbox, as a threat to his safety, family, and territory.

Although I think that it is clear that animals have some means of calculating what to do in a given situation and at least a vague sense of what is in their best interest, it is equally clear that they cannot represent their options or understand their motivations for acting to the same extent that humans can. However, an ability to fully understand one's motivations or practical principles is not a necessary condition for making a sacrifice. A sacrifice is made whenever a subject supresses one inclination for the sake of another, or destroys something of value for the sake of securing something deemed even more valuable. Fully understanding why or how the sacrifice was made is not integral to making the sacrifice itself. As such, it appears that all organisms, be they human or non-human, are capable of making what I have called “a sacrifice for happiness.” Indeed, the ability to make these types of sacrifices is likely a necessary requirement for the ability to flexibly deal with one's environment and thus we should not be too surprised to find that all self-moving organisms are able to make this type of sacrifice. Yet, at the same time, if all self-moving organisms are capable of making sacrifices of this kind, sacrifices for happiness cannot be that marker by which we judge whether non-human organisms are persons.

2.2 Moral Sacrifices

A moral sacrifice, on the other hand, is performed not because the subject thinks the action will secure her some future advantage, but because she thinks that she ought to make the sacrifice, regardless of the potential consequences. For example, a subject may choose to give up wealth, power, or even her own life rather than renounce her religious or political beliefs; someone may risk mutilation or her life by going to war for the sake of her country; or a caregiver may postpone her own career goals and life plans to care for a family member.

Of course, in most cases, a single act of sacrifice can be seen as serving multiple purposes — the soldier may enlist because she thinks that any citizen ought to risk her life for her country while also expecting to receive a future benefit (e.g., a secure job or admiration from friends and family), and the caregiver may postpone her career ambitions to care for her ailing mother not only because doing so aligns with her representation of what she owes her mother, but also because she expects that this selfless act will give her a leg up on a sibling who refused to make the same sacrifice. In any particular case, it may be difficult to determine the agent's genuine motivations, but these two forms of sacrifice do conceivably come apart, as it is possible to conceive of an agent making a sacrifice for the sake of doing what is right while also expecting to receive no recognition for her act, or perhaps even expecting to be punished for it.

The distinction I have been drawing here between sacrifices for happiness and moral sacrifices are highlighted in Kant's example of the Gallows Man. As we will see, the Gallows Man's status as a free and responsible person is only highlighted when he is called to make a moral sacrifice.

4.1 Self-Sacrifice and Personhood

Imagine the following situation. You come across a small but hardy group of aliens. You determine that they would make excellent labourers and that they are small and tame enough that they are unlikely to prevent you from dominating them. Initially, from your perspective, these aliens show no outward displays of freedom, so using them as you would an animal on your farm appears morally justifiable. Now imagine that rather than living as slaves these aliens decide to take their own lives. If the aliens do not tend to risk their lives haphazardly for the sake of mere interest or private end, would their actions not arouse a feeling of respect within you, and would any action aimed at using them as mere means not arouse in you a feeling of disgust?

I submit that the ability to commit suicide is an indication of personhood, but only if it is grounded in the right reasons. Let's consider what Kant considers to be the wrong reasons for taking one's own life. Consider Cato the younger's suicide after Caesar's victory at the Battle of Thapsus, where he is said to have killed himself because living subjected to Caesar's will was intolerable. At first glance, Cato's act may look like it was done for the sake of preserving his freedom; if Caesar became emperor, Cato could no longer continue living as Cato — that is, as a senator with the freedom to impact politics — and so he thought he could not go on living at all (cf. LE, 27:371).

But why would living in a Rome governed by Caesar prove so intolerable? Cato would have surely lost the special powers afforded to him as a senator, but he had very little reason to fear that Caesar would have enslaved him. During the Roman civil war, Caesar was well known for pardoning his enemies if they remade allegiance to Rome and would even allow old enemies to keep property and high social offices. In effect, Cato could have continued to live the good life of a free Roman citizen under Caesar had he agreed to give up some social power. So why was apologising seen as a fate worse than death? Likely because apologising to and serving an old enemy would cause Cato to lose face. Cato's sacrifice is then grounded in inclination and done for the sake of preserving a type of freedom connected with hierarchical dignity, not the inherent dignity of one's person. Cato's act of self-sacrifice is thus not a moral self-sacrifice but a sacrifice for happiness.

Kant is typically read as strictly condemning all forms of suicide for at least two reasons: (1) in committing suicide, the subject uses her humanity as a mere object, and (2) the subject uses her freedom to flee from freedom and responsibility.Footnote ¹¹ I will briefly review Kant's reasons for condemning suicide and then argue that they do not apply in instances where one's duty to preserve one's physical life conflicts with the higher, unconditional moral duty to respect one's person.

In terms of (1), suicide makes use of the humanity in oneself “merely as a means to maintaining a tolerable living condition up to the end of life” (CPrR, 4:429). That is, Cato (and anyone committing suicide for similar reasons) uses himself as a mere object that can be used and, if needed, destroyed to achieve a subjective end. Since using oneself as a mere means to an end debases one's humanity and violates a perfect duty to oneself, suicide is forbidden.

Kant's justification for (2) is more complicated. Here, he argues that suicide violates the categorical imperative by using one's freedom to destroy the very grounds that make freedom and agency possible. That is, as finite embodied beings, if we destroy our bodies, we simultaneously destroy the possibility of personal autonomy. So, were I to will the maxim “out of self-love, I will kill myself when life is no longer tolerable” (GMM, 4:4222), I am in fact willing that I use my freedom and responsibility to “withdraw from all obligation” and to “root out the existence of morality itself, as far as one can, even though morality is an end in itself” (MM, 6:422–3). This principle cannot be consistently willed as universal law because it entails a contradiction: if one wills suicide, one wills that life brings about lifelessness.

Moreover, in his Lectures on Ethics, Kant argues that committing suicide out of self-love conflicts with the duty of self-preservation:

Suicide is the most horrifying thing Kant can imagine because human freedom, which is the final end of life itself, is being used to destroy life. Thus, not only can suicide not be willed as universal law, but it also undermines the vocation of life in general, and thus suicide attempts to pervert the ends of nature.

Although Kant tends to be read as strictly condemning any form of suicide, I find that he does leave room for morally permissible acts of intentional self-killing. Just because suicide cannot be willed as one's end does not entail that we have an absolute duty to preserve our bodies in any situation, and I will now argue that suicide is morally permissible if it is used as a means of preserving the inherent dignity of one's person.

Kant clearly does not think that we have an absolute duty of self-preservation. There are principles worth dying for and chief among them is the principle of freedom and self-autonomy. In his Lectures on Ethics, Kant argues:

Here, and in cases like that of the Gallows Man's, Kant is indicating that the duty to preserve our lives can conflict with other, higher duties, and when this happens, we must choose which duty to prioritise. Consider again the Gallows Man's dilemma. There is no way to simultaneously preserve his life and refrain from telling a lie. The Gallows Man must choose whether to preserve his physical or moral life, but not both. In such cases, it becomes clear, Kant says, that our mere physical lives are “[…] in no way to be highly prized, and I should seek to preserve my life only insofar as I am worthy to live” (LE, 27:372). That is, the type of life one ought to preserve is one's moral life as a person and not one's mere life as an embodied animal; the duty to preserve one's physical life is only binding insofar as it is used to preserve the life and dignity of one's person. As such, if the Gallows Man told a malicious lie that resulted in the death of an honourable man, he may no longer consider himself worthy to live as a moral person and, in this case, he would be permitted to allow his physical body to be executed to ensure that his moral life is saved. In this case, allowing himself to die would be to act with respect to his duty to himself.

I think this reading matches our common-sense moral intuitions. If the Gallows Man allowed himself to die in this situation, he would be elevated to the status of a moral hero: someone who is to be emulated because he had the courage to do his highest duty even at great personal cost. No one could justifiably think that the Gallows Man acted viciously or failed to act in accordance with his obligation to preserve his life because he allowed himself to die. On the contrary, the Gallows Man's sacrifice would demonstrate that he recognised himself as more than a mere animal. It indicates that he recognises himself as a rational being who is bound completely by his rational obligation.

It should be equally clear that Kant would not consider the Gallows Man's sacrifice an act of suicide. There are many cases where an agent's act may shorten her life that do not count as suicide. She, like the Gallows Man, may allow herself to be executed rather than tell a lie, or she may shorten her life through acts of intemperance and imprudence. But even in those cases where the subject could have reasonably foreseen that her acts would bring about her death — e.g., fighting to the death, or eating nothing but artery-clogging, high-fat foods — if the subject did not will her own death as her explicit end, she did not commit suicide (LE, 27:372). Thus, although some (e.g., Cooley, Reference Cooley2013) may characterise the Gallows Man's case as an act of assisted suicide, Kant would not. The act would instead be characterised as a means to an end (doing one's duty).

For Kant, there is a difference between allowing oneself to be killed and killing oneself. But why is this difference worth focusing on? If the subject kills herself to do her duty, she has neither killed herself from self-love nor made suicide her end. She has killed herself as a means of doing her highest, moral duty; suicide itself was not the subject's end and thus the problems with committing suicide raised above do not arise in such cases. I find, then, that Kant does implicitly allow for some forms of morally permissible acts of suicide, so long as the suicide is done for the sake of preserving one's moral life.

Consider once more the aliens facing the possibility of enslavement. If these aliens were to commit suicide as a means of avoiding becoming slaves, their self-incurred deaths would be done to preserve the dignity of their persons, something that could not be preserved were they made to live under the absolute will of another (cf. LE, 27:377). Thus, the alien who kills itself rather than become a slave is acting on the following maxim: “if I can only preserve my moral life by sacrificing my physical life, I will.” This maxim can be made into a universal law of nature without entailing a contradiction (cf. Cooley, Reference Cooley2013, p. 368).

Although the alien would be using its physical life as a means to an end (namely, the end of preserving its moral life), this causes no problem. The type of life that must be preserved at all costs is one's moral life, not one's mere physical life. Since one's mere physical life has no absolute worth in itself, in cases where an agent commits suicide to preserve her moral life, she is not using her humanity as a mere means to an end, nor is she using her freedom to destroy the grounds of her own freedom. She is instead using her freedom to ensure her own dignity. Even though she sacrifices her bodily freedom and her physical life, in choosing suicide rather than living the life of a slave, the alien is showing that it is aware that it has an absolute duty to preserve its moral life, but only a conditional duty to preserve its physical life.

Kant would likely object to my position by arguing that the alien ought to allow itself to die rather than take its own life. For example, he may argue that the aliens ought to fight to the death rather than submit to the would-be enslavers (see Kant's comments on Lucretia's suicide, LE, 27:371) or perhaps the aliens should, once enslaved, refuse food and drink thereby allowing themselves to die rather than live as slaves. I imagine that Kant would argue that taking one's own life immediately upon being enslaved, rather than stoically going on a hunger strike or valiantly fighting to the death, would only result in destroying one's autonomy faster than the slave owner could (cf. Latham, Reference Latham2007 p. 51).

In response, I agree that perhaps there are, in some cases, other actions the aliens could take that would allow them to die without committing suicide. However, it is unclear that either option would always be available to enslaved beings, nor is it clear that enslaved beings would be afforded the autonomy needed to take their own lives. In terms of fighting to the death, typically, by the time it is clear that one is being enslaved, she is already shackled and there is no possibility of fighting one's enslaver. Likewise, it's unclear that the alien would be given the opportunity to behave in a manner that would result in its death. We need not look far to find examples of enslaved persons who attempt to flee their situations by causing their own deaths but were prevented from doing so. For example, during the transatlantic slave trade, slaves were not even granted the freedom to refuse food and drink. Those slaves who attempted to end their lives by refusing to eat were forced to wear the speculum oris, a tortuous implement used for force-feeding. More likely than not, the alien would not be permitted to refuse food and drink and were it to disobey the enslaver, in the hopes that disobedience would lead to its death, its actions would likely result in severe punishments not just for that alien, but also those close to it. As such, we can ask: would it be moral to disobey in a manner that not only causes your own death but also increases the suffering of those near and dear to you? Likely not.

I take it, however, that such an objection is not concerned with pinpointing specific behaviours that would allow the aliens to die without committing suicide in the imaginary situation I have outlined above. As I see it, this objection belongs to a larger class of objections that are centered around the intuition that there are actions other than suicide that can highlight one's personhood. Indeed, moral sacrifices are not limited to acts of suicide. A subject commits a moral sacrifice, and thereby displays her freedom and personality, whenever she acts from moral principles at the expense of her happiness, and my reader would be right to point out that many behaviours should count as moral sacrifices. For example, if a subject refuses to tell a lie that would secure her a hoped-for promotion, she has made a more sacrifice, as she has given up something she wants (the promotion) for the sake of doing her duty (refusing to tell a lie). Suicide may be an especially vivid instance of a moral sacrifice, but my reader may wonder why I am not considering a broader range of behaviours.

Although I agree that many behaviours other than suicide could be included under the heading “moral sacrifice,” I want to stress that these behaviours only display an organism's freedom if a prior judgement has been made determining that the subject in question is capable of acting from moral principles. By themselves, behaviours like fighting to the death, refusing food and drink, and refraining from lying cannot be used to indicate that the subject is a person rather than an animal, as an onlooker can always read such behaviours as grounded in instinct. But I maintain that suicide is a behaviour that persons alone are able to commit and thus that committing suicide will always indicate that the organism in question ought to be considered a person. Why? Because committing suicide requires that the agent has a representation of the type of life she ought to be living and the ability to judge that she is not living that life, and likely never will. The very possibility of making sense of the alien's act of suicide requires that we posit moral-rational capacities in them, as there is nothing empirical that could ground such an act. Thus, in order to explain the alien's self-sacrifice, we must think that it is a free subject that is conscious of the moral law and affirms its ability to do what that law demands. I can think of no other action that can only be explained by means of positing freedom in the individual.

To conclude this section, I believe that, despite Kant's own strict condemnation of suicide, there is some allowance that makes suicide, in some rare circumstances, morally permissible. The case of the would-be enslaved aliens is just such a case. More importantly for my purposes here, were these aliens to commit suicide rather than live as slaves, their behaviour would arouse a feeling of respect within a human onlooker as their act of destroying their physical lives would be interpreted as done not out of self-love or imprudence, but out of a respect for the moral law and a desire to preserve the dignity of their personhood. My suggestion that the alien's suicide would arouse a feeling of respect in onlookers should not be too shocking. Towards the end of the 18^th century and into the 19^th, similar stories of self-destruction were used to demonstrate the personhood of enslaved humans and the contradiction inherent in using persons as property.Footnote ¹² See, for example, Thomas Day and John Bicknell's popular Reference Day and Bicknell1775 poem, The Dying Negro. This poem, based on a true account, recounts the story of an ex-slave in England who killed himself when he was seized and prepared for transportation back to America. This poem was widely reprinted in both England and America and was used (along with other similar accounts) to show that the suffering experienced by enslaved persons and the willingness to kill oneself rather than live as a slave marked out their humanity (or, what in Kant's language would be called “personality”).

In these depictions of suicide, we see that there is a move from witnessing a single individual committing suicide to the judgement that every member of that individual's race is capable of making the same moral sacrifice. Namely, the individual depicted in the poem shows that he has an inbuilt capacity for reason, including practical reason, and this capacity is taken as not merely a contingent, individual trait. It is taken as a necessary capacity and thus it extends to all members of his group. Likewise, we would not need to see that every single alien would commit suicide rather than live as a slave. Onlookers need only see that one would make this sacrifice in order to judge that the species as a whole has the capacity.