Introduction
The State Parties … agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 13(1)Footnote 1
In the aftermath of World War II, the international community affirmed the centrality of human dignity as a safeguard against the recurrence of barbaric acts, as reflected in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).Footnote 2 Since then, human dignity has remained a foundational concept in international human rights law (IHRL), underpinning the protections that it provides. Similarly, respect for human dignity lies at the core of international humanitarian law (IHL).Footnote 3 Under both legal regimes, the concept of human dignity refers to the inherent worth of every individual by virtue of being human.Footnote 4
Yet despite its pivotal role in both IHRL and IHL, human dignity is frequently undermined amid the global proliferation of armed conflicts, with children enduring gross violations, most notably the systematic denial of their right to education. This article argues that human dignity should be reaffirmed as central to international legal protection, particularly regarding education during armed conflict. This is not a call for new rights, but a reaffirmation of existing ones. Indeed, as Article 13(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) affirms, the right to education is both grounded in human dignity and essential to its realization.Footnote 5
While the link between the right to education and human dignity is established in IHRL, it remains neither explicitly recognized under IHL nor adequately explored in scholarly discourse. This article’s novel contribution is to reframe the denial of education in armed conflict not merely as a legal violation but as a direct assault on the human dignity of the child. This interpretive framework, rooted in IHRL’s recognition of the relationship between the right to education and human dignity, offers a normative foundation for strengthening legal protections during armed conflict. Thus, while IHL is traditionally viewed as lex specialis in armed conflict,Footnote 6 this article shows that it does not always provide the most comprehensive protection, particularly regarding education. Therefore, its interpretation should be informed by the IHRL nexus between education and human dignity, recognizing that children’s right to education is foundational to realizing other rights essential to their holistic development and human dignity.Footnote 7
The urgency of this approach is evident in the scale and scope of ongoing violations. According to a 2024 report by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), between 2022 and 2023, approximately 6,000 attacks on students, educators and schools were recorded in the context of armed conflict.Footnote 8 These are not isolated acts of violence, but part of a growing global pattern of escalating armed conflicts that continue to undermine children’s right to education. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warns that the denial of education in conflict settings not only undermines the future of children but also deprives societies of essential human capital for recovery.Footnote 9
Globally, an estimated 234 million school-aged children are affected by armed conflict, of whom 85 million receive no education at all.Footnote 10 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Save the Children reports that approximately 375,000 children in North Kivu alone have been deprived of education due to a surge in violence since January 2025.Footnote 11 In Sudan, now facing the world’s most severe education crisis, 19 million children are out of school and 90% of schools remain shut.Footnote 12 In Gaza, nearly all school-aged children, over 660,000, have reportedly been left without access to education following the destruction of 95% of educational infrastructure.Footnote 13 In Ukraine, a United Nations (UN) report has noted that 5.3 million children struggle with disrupted learning and approximately 115,000 are completely out of school.Footnote 14
These figures underscore a profound systemic failure. The issue is not the absence of legal protection, as children’s access to education during armed conflict is protected under both IHRL and IHL. Rather, the core problem lies in the persistent failure to implement and enforce these existing protections, alongside the continued marginalization of the right to education during and after conflict.Footnote 15 Weak accountability mechanisms, for both States and non-State armed groups (NSAGs), mean that legal guarantees too often remain aspirational rather than operational. Accordingly, this article argues that a new approach is urgently needed, one that reaffirms the intrinsic link between education and human dignity and places this relationship at the centre of legal interpretation and enforcement of obligations.
Methodologically, this article uses a doctrinal and normative approach. However, unlike case study-based approaches, which provide detailed insights into specific contexts and countries but risk limiting generalizability and inadvertently promoting selectivity by leaving other situations unaddressed, this article deliberately avoids focusing on a single case. Instead, it examines children’s right to education across diverse conflict settings. This choice is deliberate, reflecting that the right to education for children living in Gaza or Ukraine matters just as much as for those in less studied but equally devastating contexts such as Sudan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The article is structured as follows. First, it offers key conceptual clarifications, defining the terms “education”, “child”, “armed conflict” and “human dignity” in international law for analytical precision. Second, it critically examines the existing international legal framework governing children’s access to education during armed conflict under both IHRL and IHL. It further identifies the limitations of this framework and explains why these protections remain inadequate in practice. Building on this critique, the article then develops its central argument by elaborating a human dignity-centred approach and demonstrating how such an approach reframes and strengthens IHL obligations. Finally, it explores how this approach can be operationalized in real conflict settings, outlining the strategies, opportunities and possible challenges involved.
Conceptual clarifications
Education
Education is a fundamental human right enshrined in international law and a cornerstone of global development.Footnote 16 However, international human rights treaties do not explicitly define the term “education”, and consequently it is generally defined in two complementary ways: broadly and narrowly.Footnote 17 Broadly, education encompasses the entire process by which a society passes on its beliefs, culture and values from adults to the younger generation.Footnote 18 Narrowly, it refers to formal, institutionalized instruction, namely primary, secondary and higher education.Footnote 19 While some scholars interpret international law as protecting the right to education primarily in this narrower, formal sense,Footnote 20 the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) have clarified that the right to education encompasses both formal and non-formal education.Footnote 21
That said, in contexts of armed conflict, the question of which forms of education are protected under international law assumes particular importance. For analytical precision, this article focuses on the narrower, formal dimensions of education because they are primary targets of attacks during armed conflict. Moreover, the formal education system is explicitly referenced in key provisions such as Articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR and Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which emphasize access to primary and secondary education and the functioning of educational institutions. Accordingly, this focus allows for a more concrete assessment of how IHL and IHRL protect children’s access to education in situations of armed conflict.
Children
While the right to education is universal and applies to individuals of all ages, children are its primary beneficiaries.Footnote 22 Accordingly, this article focuses exclusively on children, with the aim of strengthening the protection of their right to education and preserving their human dignity during armed conflict. Although different legal contexts may define “child” differently, this article adopts the definition set out in Article 1 of the CRC, which defines a child as everyone below the age of 18.Footnote 23
Armed conflict
An armed conflict exists “whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State”.Footnote 24 Thus, IHL distinguishes between two types of armed conflicts: international armed conflicts (IACs) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).Footnote 25 IACs are governed by the four Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I (AP I) and customary IHL. They arise when there is armed violence between two or more States,Footnote 26 whether through their regular armed forces or through other entities acting on behalf of a State.Footnote 27 IHL of IACs also applies to situations of belligerent occupationFootnote 28 – that is, the occupation of a State’s territory without its consent.Footnote 29 Moreover, under AP I, wars of national liberation are also qualified as IACs.Footnote 30
By contrast, NIACs refer to situations of “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State”.Footnote 31 For a NIAC to exist, two criteria must be satisfied, relating to (1) the intensity of hostilities and (2) the degree of organization of the armed groups involved.Footnote 32 NIACs are governed by Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (common Article 3), Additional Protocol II (AP II) and customary IHL.
The classification of an armed conflict as either an IAC or a NIAC determines the specific IHL rules that apply. Although this legal distinction remains significant, the present article does not engage in a detailed doctrinal analysis of the differences between IACs and NIACs. Instead, it adopts a broad approach, focusing on the overarching IHL protections relevant to access to education in armed conflict while acknowledging specific distinctions only where legally necessary.
Human dignity in international law
The concept of human dignity gained formal legal prominence in the nineteenth century,Footnote 33 fundamentally reshaping the “architecture of international law”.Footnote 34 It emerged to challenge the ancient notion of “sovereign dignity”, in which dignity was reserved for a select few whose legal status was defined by honour, title, powers and responsibilities.Footnote 35 Although there is no single, universally accepted definition in international law,Footnote 36 both IHRL and IHL share a core understanding of human dignity as the inherent worth of every individual simply by virtue of being human.Footnote 37 Guided by this common premise, both bodies of law establish “minimum standards of humanity” to ensure respect for human life and the intrinsic value of every person.Footnote 38
Historically, two broad approaches have shaped the concept. The first is a religious conception, which grounds dignity in the divine or in metaphysical understandings of human value.Footnote 39 The second is a secular conception, which has underpinned the emergence and growth of contemporary human rights.Footnote 40 The recognition of human dignity in international legal instruments reflects primarily this latter, secular tradition,Footnote 41 even while resonating with broader moral and philosophical foundations.
International legal framework: Protection of children’s right to education during armed conflict
The protection of children’s right to education during armed conflict is addressed by three complementary branches of international law: IHRL, IHL and international criminal law.Footnote 42 This article focuses specifically on IHRL and IHL, examining how these two bodies of law protect access to education for children during armed conflict.
Protection under international human rights law
Legal basis of the right to education
The right to education is enshrined in various international and regional human rights instruments,Footnote 43 underscoring its universal importance. At the international level, the 1948 UDHR,Footnote 44 though not legally binding, affirms in Article 26(1) that everyone has the right to education, with an emphasis on making primary education free and compulsory. Article 26(2) outlines the objectives of education, which include the full development of the human personality and the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The 1966 ICESCR gives binding force to the right to education.Footnote 45 Article 13(1) affirms that everyone, including children, is entitled to education, which must promote the full development of the human personality and a sense of dignity. Like Article 26(1) of the UDHR, Article 13(2) of the ICESCR requires primary education to be compulsory and free, while secondary and higher education must be made progressively accessible. Article 14 obliges States to adopt a detailed plan, within two years of ratification, for the implementation of free primary education.
The 1989 CRC explicitly enshrines the right to education for children.Footnote 46 Like the UDHR and ICESCR, Article 28(1) of the CRC mandates free and compulsory primary education, while Article 29(1) outlines education’s aims, including the child’s holistic development and preparation for a responsible life in a peaceful society.
In addition to these instruments, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) requires States Parties,Footnote 47 under Article 24, to ensure an inclusive education system at all levels, emphasizing accessibility, participation and the full development of human potential and dignity. The CRPD’s focus on inclusivity strengthens the broader human rights framework by affirming that all children, regardless of disability, retain their right to quality education, including in situations of heightened vulnerability such as armed conflict.
States’ obligations
Under IHRL, States have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right to education.Footnote 48 The obligation to respect requires States to abstain from acts that interfere with the process of educationFootnote 49 – for example, in its 2010 concluding observations on Sri Lanka, the CRC Committee urged Sri Lanka to end the military use of schools, comply with IHL and the principle of distinction, and promptly restore any damaged educational infrastructure.Footnote 50 The obligation to protect, meanwhile, requires States to prevent third parties, including NSAGs, from interfering with the right to education.Footnote 51 The CRC Committee, for instance, has criticized the DRC for failing to protect children from attacks against schools by such groups.Footnote 52 Finally, the obligation to fulfil requires States to ensure the availability of education; while temporary school closures during armed conflict may be justified for security reasons,Footnote 53 they must be proportionate and replaced with alternatives within a reasonable time.Footnote 54
To realize the right to education, States must ensure that education remains available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable (known as the 4As framework).Footnote 55 Availability requires enough functioning schools and programmes,Footnote 56 while accessibility encompasses non-discrimination and physical and economic access.Footnote 57 Acceptability ensures that education is of appropriate quality and aligned with Article 13 of the ICESCR, guided by the student’s best interests,Footnote 58 and adaptability requires education systems to respond to diverse needs and evolving societal contexts.Footnote 59 Building upon this framework, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in its General Comment No. 4,Footnote 60 has emphasized that inclusive education must also be of good quality and responsive to all learners’ needs.Footnote 61
These obligations, both positive and negative, remain applicable even during armed conflict.Footnote 62 The existence of armed conflict cannot, in itself, justify the denial of education,Footnote 63 particularly given its essential role in a child’s development.Footnote 64 The CESCR has outlined minimum core obligations that all States are obliged to ensure, irrespective of any prevailing circumstances.Footnote 65 In its General Comment No. 13, the CESCR has stated that
[i]n the context of article 13 [of the ICESCR], this core includes an obligation: to ensure the right of access to public educational institutions and programmes on a non-discriminatory basis; to ensure that education conforms to the objectives set out in article 13(1); to provide primary education for all in accordance with article 13(2)(a); to adopt and implement a national educational strategy which includes provision for secondary, higher and fundamental education; and to ensure free choice of education without interference from the State or third parties, subject to conformity with “minimum educational standards” (art. 13(3) and (4)).Footnote 66
These core obligations are not subject to progressive realization – if a State claims that it cannot meet the obligations due to a lack of resources,Footnote 67 it bears the burden of proving that every effort has been made and that all available resources have been exhausted to fulfil these minimum standards.Footnote 68 In assessing such claims, the CESCR applies a non-exhaustive list of six criteria to determine whether the measures adopted were adequate and reasonable.Footnote 69 These criteria are: whether the steps taken were deliberate, concrete, and targeted towards the realization of ICESCR rights; whether the State acted in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary manner; whether resource allocations were consistent with international human rights standards; whether the chosen policy option least restricts ICESCR rights; the time frame in which the steps were taken; and whether the measures prioritized disadvantaged and marginalized groups, and/or grave situations or situations of risk.Footnote 70
The obligations of progressive realization require States to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps “to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards the full realization of Article 13 of the ICESCR.Footnote 71 For example, while States must give priority to the provision of free and compulsory primary education, they also have a continuing obligation to work towards making secondary and higher education progressively free and accessible to all.Footnote 72 The CESCR has described progressive realization as a necessary “flexibility device”, but it has also cautioned that this concept should not be interpreted in a manner that would deprive the obligation of meaningful content.Footnote 73
Protection under international humanitarian law
Legal basis and State obligations
IHL regulates the conduct of parties to armed conflict, in both IACs and NIACs. Its primary aim is to limit the effects of hostilities by protecting individuals who are not, or are no longer, directly participating in the conflict, and by imposing restrictions on the means and methods of warfare.Footnote 74 Although IHL does not explicitly recognize a right to education or specify the elements of that right, it nevertheless protects education in two principal ways:Footnote 75
First, IHL protects education through the general protection of civilians and civilian objects.Footnote 76 Under IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities, the principle of distinction prohibits attacks against students, educational staff or school infrastructure, as these are civilian in nature.Footnote 77 However, students and education personnel may lose their protection if and for such time as they take direct part in hostilities,Footnote 78 and schools may become military objectives if used for military purposes.Footnote 79 Under IHL, a civilian object loses its protection from attack when, by virtue of its nature, use, location or purpose, it makes an effective contribution to military action and its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.Footnote 80 Even then, the principle of proportionality prohibits attacks causing excessive incidental civilian harm in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.Footnote 81 Moreover, parties to the conflict must take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects, including by verifying targets and cancelling or suspending attacks where required.Footnote 82 Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, including those not directed at a specific military objective or employing means or methods of warfare whose effects cannot be limited as required by IHL.Footnote 83
Second, IHL imposes specific obligations on parties to a conflict to facilitate access to education.Footnote 84 Article 24 of the Geneva Convention IV requires States which are parties to a conflict to take the necessary measures to ensure that children under 15 who are orphaned or separated from their families due to the conflict are not left to their own resources, and that their maintenance and education are facilitated.Footnote 85 In situations of occupation, Article 50 obliges the Occupying Power to facilitate the proper functioning of all institutions dedicated to child education and care, and where local institutions are inadequate, to make arrangements for the maintenance and education, if possible by persons of their own nationality, language and religion, of children who are orphaned or separated from their parents as a result of the war.Footnote 86 As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes, this duty entails both negative and positive obligations: Occupying Powers must refrain from interfering with existing educational services and take active measures to ensure their continuity.Footnote 87
Furthermore, customary IHL, as reflected in the ICRC Customary Law Study, recognizes that children are entitled to special respect and protection,Footnote 88 thereby reinforcing the obligation to safeguard their education during armed conflict. In addition, customary IHL requires parties to an armed conflict, whether international or non-international, to respect and protect cultural property.Footnote 89 While educational facilities are not explicitly enumerated as cultural property in IHL treaty law, State practice suggests that buildings devoted to education may nonetheless be regarded as such in both IACs and NIACs.Footnote 90 In particular, parties to a conflict must take special care during military operations to avoid damage to educational buildings unless they qualify as military objectives,Footnote 91 and their seizure, destruction or wilful damage is prohibited.Footnote 92
Education also receives explicit protection in NIACs, other than through the basic principles of IHL.Footnote 93 Article 4(3)(a) of AP II establishes that children should receive an education consistent with the wishes of their parents or those responsible for their care. This provision ensures that education remains acceptable and continues to reflect cultural, linguistic and familial values, thereby safeguarding an essential aspect of the child’s identity. As noted by the ICRC, Article 4(3)(a) is particularly significant where the content of education becomes contested, as it effectively anchors the substance of education in parental choice rather than in the preferences of the parties to the conflict.Footnote 94 The ICRC Commentary on AP II further explains that this rule aims to prevent children separated from their families from being uprooted or indoctrinated into a culture, religion or moral code inconsistent with their parents’ wishes, thereby reducing the risk that they may be exploited as “political pawns”.Footnote 95
Although not legally binding and not part of the conventional sources of IHL, the Safe Schools Declaration,Footnote 96 endorsed by over 120 States, plays an important protective role. By endorsing it, States commit to refraining from the use of schools and universities for military purposes and to strengthening the protection of education and children during armed conflict, reflecting a growing consensus that education should remain a neutral and protected space, even amid hostilities. As the ICRC notes, the accompanying Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict provide practical recommendations to help parties to conflict to minimize the impact of military operations on the delivery of education.Footnote 97
Child-related obligations of NSAGs
Contemporary armed conflicts increasingly involve NSAGs,Footnote 98 which are frequently responsible for attacks on students, teachers and educational infrastructure, constituting serious violations of children’s right to education.Footnote 99 Under IHL, the applicability of legal obligations to NSAGs is well established.Footnote 100 Common Article 3 and AP II impose obligations on all parties to a NIAC, including NSAGs, to protect civilians, including children, and schools as civilian objects. Accordingly, when an armed group qualifies as a party to an armed conflict, it is required to respect the civilian character of educational facilities, personnel and children, and to comply fully with IHL obligations.Footnote 101
In contrast, the application of IHRL to NSAGs is more contested – however, increasing support exists for the recognition of their responsibilities, particularly where they exercise effective control over territory and perform government-like functions.Footnote 102 For example, the UN Human Rights Council has affirmed that such groups must respect human rights when their actions impact individuals under their authority.Footnote 103 This includes respecting and protecting children’s right to education and safeguarding educational facilities.
NSAGs that do not control territory are not exempt from the obligations to protect children’s right to education.Footnote 104 The UN Security Council has repeatedly called on all armed groups, regardless of territorial control, to adhere to international law, including refraining from attacks on schools and complying with norms protecting children during armed conflict.Footnote 105 Additionally, mechanisms such as the Deeds of CommitmentFootnote 106 developed by Geneva Call provide a practical and symbolic means by which NSAGs can voluntarily pledge to adhere to IHL.Footnote 107 This underscores the evolving proposals to engage NSAGs to protect education.Footnote 108
The relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law
It is now well established that human rights continue to apply during armed conflict,Footnote 109 including the right to education.Footnote 110 However, the question of how to address potential overlaps or conflicts between IHRL and IHL norms remains a subject of debate.Footnote 111 Two primary approaches have emerged in this regard. The first, often referred to as the lex specialis doctrine, holds that IHL, as the body of law specifically designed for situations of armed conflict, prevails over the more general norms of IHRL in cases of conflict.Footnote 112 Under this view, IHL provides the specific legal criteria for determining the lawfulness of conduct during armed conflict, even where human rights norms are engaged.Footnote 113 This approach, however, has been rightly criticized for potentially diminishing the effectiveness of human rights protections during armed conflict.Footnote 114 As Milanović notes, interpreting human rights treaties in light of IHL can introduce much-needed flexibility in armed conflict, ensuring that the application of human rights law remains realistic and practical.Footnote 115
The second approach advocates for a complementary interpretation of IHL and IHRL, emphasizing that the two regimes are not mutually exclusive but rather operate in tandem.Footnote 116 In the context of the right to education, this approach recognizes that both IHL and IHRL pursue a shared objective: to safeguard children from the effects of armed conflict, including disruptions to their education.Footnote 117
This article adopts the complementary approach, arguing that a human dignity-centred perspective on children’s right to education, elaborated in the following sections, further reinforces the mutually supportive relationship between IHL and human rights law. By recognizing education as integral to the realization of children’s human dignity, the denial of which during armed conflict constitutes a direct assault on that dignity, this approach underscores the shared normative foundations of IHL and IHRL. Viewed through this lens, the complementary approach affirms a harmonious relationship between IHL and IHRL, emphasizing their mutual reinforcement in protecting children’s rights rather than a dynamic defined by normative tension or legal hierarchy.Footnote 118 On this basis, as will be demonstrated later, the article argues that in the context of children’s right to education, IHL should not be considered the lex specialis; its interpretation can and should be informed by human rights law.
Limits of the current international legal framework: The need for normative reorientation
The above analysis has demonstrated how IHL and IHRL protect children’s access to education during armed conflict. While both legal regimes offer important protection, they do so differently. IHRL explicitly enshrines the right to education, imposing binding positive and negative obligations on States that continue to apply even amid armed conflict. IHL, by contrast, protects children, education personnel and schools primarily through their civilian status, with a few specific safeguards such as in the contexts of occupation and NIACs. This analysis has also highlighted the increasing involvement of NSAGs in contemporary armed conflicts, and the growing recognition that, where such groups exercise effective control, they may bear de facto human rights obligations, including in relation to children’s education.
However, despite these legal protections and the reaffirmed applicability of children’s right to education during armed conflict, grave and recurring violations persist,Footnote 119 as demonstrated at the outset of this article. These ongoing violations underscore the urgent need to strengthen the protection of this right. Limiting assessments of the impact of armed conflict on children’s right to education – whether in Gaza, Sudan, Ukraine, the DRC or elsewhere – to the current legal framework fails to capture the full picture. The denial of education during armed conflict is not only a violation of legal obligations under IHRL and IHL but also a profound assault on the human dignity of the child. Accordingly, there is a pressing imperative to articulate a holistic, human dignity-centred framework that situates the right to education within this foundational principle shared by IHRL and IHL. In this reorientation, further elaborated below, protecting a school means protecting the dignity, future and humanity of the child.
Reframing the legal approach: Linking the right to education, human dignity, and IHL
Human dignity as the core of IHRL and IHL
As already mentioned, there is no single, universally accepted definition of human dignity. Nevertheless, Andorno argues that it would be a mistake to see this concept as a mere rhetorical strategy.Footnote 120 Indeed, as affirmed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Furundžija case,
The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person …. The general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic underpinning and … raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human rights law.Footnote 121
While both legal regimes recognize human dignity as being the inherent worth of every person, Kleindienst distinguishes between “initial dignity”, the intrinsic value that every person holds by virtue of being human, and “realized dignity”, which refers to the actual experience and recognition of that worth in practice.Footnote 122 This article draws on that distinction,Footnote 123 arguing that the right to education not only arises from initial dignity but is also essential to realizing human dignity, particularly for children living in armed conflict.
To demonstrate the claim for a human dignity-centred approach to the right to education, it is necessary to contextualize the meaning and significance of human dignity within IHRL and IHL. As will be shown below, in IHRL, human dignity serves as both the moral foundation and the interpretive lens for all human rights. In IHL, human dignity underpins the very structure of humanitarian protection and provides ethical justification for limits on the conduct of hostilities. Together, these two regimes reveal a shared normative commitment: the protection and promotion of human dignity is the ultimate aim of law, even – and especially – in times of war.
Human dignity under IHRL
The UDHR popularized the concept of human dignity within international human rights discourse.Footnote 124 Its preamble identifies dignity as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace, while Article 1 declares that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.Footnote 125 Subsequent treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and ICESCR, affirm that the rights they enshrine “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”.Footnote 126 Similarly, the CRC in its preamble considers that children should grow up in an environment of dignity, preparing them to lead independent lives within society.Footnote 127 These instruments collectively present human dignity as both a foundational value and a binding normative principle that shapes the interpretation and implementation of all human rights.
Despite its widespread use, human dignity remains undefined in precise legal terms within international human rights instruments.Footnote 128 Nonetheless, McCrudden’s influential analysis of judicial interpretations across different international, regional and national jurisprudence identifies a broadly accepted core meaning, comprising three interrelated elements.Footnote 129 The first is the ontological claim, which asserts that every human being possesses inherent worth simply by virtue of being human.Footnote 130 The second is the relational claim, which requires that this inherent worth be recognized and respected by others, including the State.Footnote 131 The third is the limited-State claim, which holds that the State exists to serve the individual and must never treat individuals as mere instruments of its power.Footnote 132 Together, these elements establish a normative foundation that gives human dignity both philosophical coherence and legal relevance across diverse human rights contexts.Footnote 133
Human dignity under IHL
The concept of human dignity entered IHL formally with the Martens Clause and gained significant prominence with the post-World War II adoption of the Geneva Conventions.Footnote 134 According to Le Moli, human dignity plays a multifaceted role within IHL, functioning in four distinct ways.Footnote 135 First, it serves as a foundational and structural principle, underpinning the entire framework of IHL.Footnote 136 Second, it acts as the moral basis from which specific humanitarian protections are derived, providing ethical justification for the rules that govern armed conflict.Footnote 137 Third, human dignity functions as a legal obligation-creating principle, giving rise to enforceable duties under IHL.Footnote 138 Finally, it is recognized as a protected interest, the violation of which may constitute an international crime.Footnote 139
McCrudden further emphasizes that human dignity, as a central tenet of IHL, requires that all individuals not actively participating in hostilities must be treated with respect and protected from the harmful effects of war.Footnote 140 Hence, the principle of distinction,Footnote 141 which obliges parties to distinguish between combatants and civilians, is ultimately grounded in the recognition of human dignity.Footnote 142 In its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the principle of distinction “is one of the cardinal principles … constituting the fabric of humanitarian law”Footnote 143 and one of the “intransgressible principles of international customary law”.Footnote 144 At the basis of this principle is the need to strike a balance between human dignity and considerations of military necessity.Footnote 145 The principle of distinction is further supplemented by the principles of proportionalityFootnote 146 and precaution.Footnote 147
More importantly, under IHL, the concept of human dignity is intrinsically connected to the principle of humanity that underpins the entire body of humanitarian law. As Le Moli observes, “[t]he protection of human beings in times of conflict is warranted by the inherent dignity of the human person and any conduct assaulting this essence in times of war, this humanness, is then an action against humanity”.Footnote 148 In this sense, human dignity provides the substantive moral value that justifies the existence of humanitarian limits in armed conflict. The principle of humanity, in turn, functions as the normative and operational expression of that value: it translates the inherent worth of the human person into concrete obligations requiring parties to spare persons from unnecessary suffering, to treat them humanely and to preserve a minimum standard of humane treatment even in the midst of hostilities. Thus, the principle of humanity gives practical legal effect to the foundational concept of human dignity within IHL.Footnote 149
In the context of NIACs, common Article 3 establishes a guarantee of humane treatment for all non-combatants. It provides that such individuals “shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria”. As Scarffe observes, through this provision, the Geneva Conventions do not solely claim that the rights they contain derive from the inherent dignity of the human person; rather, they affirm that all non-combatants in an armed conflict possess a right to be treated with dignity.Footnote 150
The nexus between the right to education and human dignity
As outlined at the outset, this article adopts a narrow understanding of education, limited to formal and institutionalized learning at the primary, secondary and higher education levels.Footnote 151 The right to education, like all human rights in IHRL, is rooted in human dignity, which provides both its legal and moral basis.Footnote 152 This article further contends that the right to education is not only grounded in human dignity but is also essential to realizing it,Footnote 153 especially for children affected by armed conflict. To support this claim, it is therefore necessary to demonstrate this link between the right to education and human dignity as established under IHRL. The focus on IHRL, rather than IHL, is warranted because only IHRL, as will be shown below, expressly identifies education as essential to the realization of human dignity.
Edeji observes that the “need to heal the wounds of WWII and the recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings” formed the justification and purpose of the right to education in a plural and culturally diverse world,Footnote 154 first recognized in Article 26 of the UDHR, as noted above. He argues that although the right to education may be shaped by cultural contexts, the inherent dignity of every person, and the need to realize this dignity through the development of cognitive capacities, provides a universal foundation.Footnote 155 No culture, Edeji correctly contends, denies the humanity and dignity of the individual or the necessity of nurturing and safeguarding that dignity through learning.Footnote 156
Article 13(1) of the ICESCR explicitly affirms that education “shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity”. Similarly, Article 29 of the CRC emphasizes the role of education in nurturing children’s personality, talents and abilities. Therefore, both provisions underscore education’s central role in advancing human dignity. In this sense, education fosters autonomy, self-worth and social participation, making it a key component of a dignified life.Footnote 157 Indeed, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized in the Street Children case that opportunities for education which enable the full development of personality are a condition necessary for a dignified existence.Footnote 158
The CESCR describes education as transformative and empowering, with relevance across all categories of human rights.Footnote 159 The CRC Committee likewise affirms that the educational aims set out in Article 29 reflect the Convention’s commitment to protecting the innate dignity of every child.Footnote 160 In this way, both the CESCR and the CRC Committee rightly affirm that the right to education exemplifies the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights.Footnote 161 It serves as a gateway to the realization of other fundamental rights, such as the rights to food, health, work and an adequate standard of living, all of which depend, to some extent, on the attainment of basic education.
In sum, education is not only rooted in the principle of human dignity but is also an instrument for achieving its fulfilment.Footnote 162 Consequently, this article argues that, recognizing education as foundational and transformative, children are not only rights holders but also individuals whose dignity is nurtured and protected through meaningful access to education, especially in contexts of armed conflict.
Reframing IHL obligations through a human dignity-centred approach
While the concept of human dignity is central to both IHRL and IHL, it is primarily within IHRL that a direct nexus is made between the right to education and human dignity,Footnote 163 not only as a right grounded in human dignity but also as a means of realizing it.Footnote 164 Nevertheless, this relationship remains under-explored in scholarship,Footnote 165 particularly within IHL. This article argues that the human dignity-based understanding of education found in IHRL should inform the interpretation of IHL obligations.
Before drawing on IHRL, however, it is necessary to explain why IHL alone does not provide a sufficient human dignity-based foundation for protecting education. As already explained, IHL is grounded in the principles of humanity and humane treatment, both of which aim to safeguard human dignity during armed conflict. In this sense, one could argue that a human dignity-centred understanding of education might already be located within IHL’s internal logic. However, under IHL, as already demonstrated, education is protected mainly because schools are considered as civilian objects, and children as civilians. Although there are a few specific provisions addressing education in armed conflict, they do not explicitly articulate its connection to human dignity. This doctrinal silence means that a human dignity-based understanding of education cannot be fully developed within IHL alone, and it is therefore necessary and methodologically appropriate to draw on IHRL. IHRL’s explicit recognition of education as both grounded in and constitutive of human dignity does not replace IHL, but enriches and clarifies IHL’s own humanity-based protections by making explicit what remains implicit in IHL.
While scholars such as Rowe argue that IHL already provides adequate normative protection for education in armed conflict (a view that is debatable Footnote 166), they also acknowledge that “the key issue is how, at a practical level, education can be protected”.Footnote 167 Indeed, the reality on the ground demonstrates that these protections are not complied with, as schools continue to be attacked, bombed or repurposed for military use in contravention to IHL.Footnote 168 This article does not suggest that IHL fails to protect access to education or schools as civilian objects; rather, it argues that IHL does not explicitly articulate education as a value closely connected to human dignity, and that this may influence how existing obligations are interpreted and applied in practice.Footnote 169 In the absence of such an interpretive framing, military and political actors may not always accord sufficient weight to the protection of education when applying IHL rules governing the conduct of hostilities. A strengthened interpretive approach, one that integrates IHL with the human dignity-based understanding of the right to education found in IHRL, can reinforce the application of existing IHL obligations and enhance the protection of education in armed conflict. Without a clear recognition of the nexus between education and children’s human dignity, military and political actors may not consistently comply with IHL obligations protecting access to education and schools as civilian objects.
Accordingly, this article argues that the human dignity-based understanding of education found in IHRL should inform the interpretation of IHL obligations. Integrating this perspective would strengthen the normative coherence of IHL and offer stronger protection for children’s right to education in armed conflict. Beyond mitigating harm, a human dignity-based approach requires a deeper commitment to preserving the conditions necessary for human development.Footnote 170 In this light, IHL provisions protecting schools should be interpreted not merely as rules to avoid damage, but as obligations to uphold the intrinsic value of every child. Although IHL does not explicitly prohibit the military use of schools, framing education as essential to human dignity reinforces the case for a complete ban,Footnote 171 an approach consistent with Bart’s position and evolving international commitments such as the Safe Schools Declaration and its associated Guidelines.Footnote 172
The human dignity-based approach to education also reshapes how the principle of proportionality under IHL should be applied during the conduct of hostilities. This principle prohibits attacks where the expected harm to civilians or civilian objects is excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage to be gained,Footnote 173 and a human dignity-centred approach deepens this assessment. It calls for greater recognition of the broader harm caused by attacks on educational institutions, not only as physical destruction but as a significant disruption to children’s development and the realization of their dignity. Schools are not merely structures; they are vital spaces where children learn, find stability and prepare for the future.Footnote 174 Attacking these environments endangers more than infrastructure – it undermines children’s safety, psychosocial well-being and long-term prospects.
A proportionality assessment grounded in human dignity should therefore account for both the measurable and intangible effects of an attack, emphasizing the broader impact on civilian life and human potential. In operational terms, assessing such intangible effects does not require quantifying them with mathematical precision but rather recognizing them qualitatively using established indicators such as long-term educational disruption, psychosocial harm, loss of safe learning environments, and the cumulative impact on children’s development and future opportunities.Footnote 175 This more comprehensive evaluation raises the threshold for lawful attacks on educational facilities and strengthens the legal and moral imperative to protect children in times of armed conflict.
Moreover, a human dignity-based approach also requires attention to quality education, not merely physical access. Human dignity, as articulated in instruments like the ICESCR and CRC, demands education that enables the full development of the child’s personality, talents and abilities.Footnote 176 In conflict settings, this means that education must be safe, inclusive and meaningful, not merely symbolic.Footnote 177 Ensuring quality entails adequate teaching conditions, protection of educators, psychosocial support, and learning content that reflects the needs and experiences of children affected by war.Footnote 178 By interpreting IHL obligations through this broader understanding of dignity, the focus shifts from minimal compliance to positive measures that actively support the child’s humanity, agency and future potential.
In short, the above demonstrates that the concept of human dignity offers a compelling normative basis for strengthening the protection of children’s right to education during armed conflict. By situating education within the shared legal and moral foundations of IHRL and IHL, it argues for a human dignity-centred interpretation of IHL obligations that goes beyond harm reduction to actively promote children’s full development and agency. Recognizing education as both rooted in and essential to human dignity, this approach calls for a shift toward more integrated and proactive legal approaches. However, legal recognition and normative clarity alone are insufficient to ensure the effective protection of this right. To translate this human dignity-centred approach into tangible outcomes, it is important to explore how it can be implemented in practice, including possible challenges.
Operationalizing the human dignity-centred approach: Strategies, opportunities and challenges
Strategies for implementation
This article now turns to the practical question of how a human dignity-centred approach can be implemented in real armed conflict settings. Although the preceding analysis has focused on the legal and normative foundations of this approach, its realization depends heavily on the practices adopted not only by States but also by humanitarian actors. In many conflict-affected contexts, humanitarian organizations play a central role in providing, supporting or restoring access to education. For this reason, operationalizing a human dignity-centred framework necessarily involves strategies situated at the intersection of legal obligations and humanitarian action. The following therefore outlines key avenues for implementation.
Mainstreaming education as a core humanitarian and legal priority
Although international law protects the right to education, during armed conflict education is often overshadowed by other essential services like food, shelter and health care.Footnote 179 However, as the UN Special Rapporteur on Education noted in 2008, aid that merely feeds bodies but ignores education reduces people to “things”.Footnote 180 Despite evolving attitudes within the humanitarian sector,Footnote 181 education still receives only about 3% of humanitarian aid, according to the World Bank.Footnote 182 The Education Cannot Wait 2024 Annual Results Report further highlights that education remains one of the most underfunded sectors, despite its centrality to children’s rights.Footnote 183 A human dignity-centred approach requires that education be treated as essential, not optional, by integrating it into emergency planning, funding, and protection efforts. Humanitarian action should aim not only at keeping people alive but also at upholding their human dignity.Footnote 184 This entails prioritizing education alongside basic survival needs to ensure that children in conflict zones have access to safe, inclusive and meaningful learning opportunities which support their development and future potential.
Ensuring safety and protection in and around learning environments
Safety within the learning environment is an integral component of the right to education, particularly in situations of armed conflict.Footnote 185 This requires ending the militarization of schools and their use for recruitment.Footnote 186 The aforementioned 2024 report by the GCPEA noted that attacks on education were frequent and widespread in 2022 and 2023, with around 6,000 incidents reported globally.Footnote 187 In Colombia, a rise in armed violence in 2022 resulted in child recruitment and the militarization of educational facilities.Footnote 188 Although the military use of schools is not per se prohibited under IHL, it may change the protection they enjoy as civilian objects and can expose children to significant harm.Footnote 189 Even when a school becomes a military objective, any attack on it must still comply with the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. Child recruitment, on the other hand, not only violates IHLFootnote 190 but also breaches Article 38 of the CRC,Footnote 191 which obliges States to protect children from the effects of armed conflict and prevent their involvement in hostilities. A human dignity-centred approach reinforces these legal obligations by urging States to proactively prevent the military use of schools, integrate school protection into military planning and endorse instruments like the Safe Schools Declaration. Beyond legal compliance, this approach affirms that attacks on schools are violations of children’s human dignity, and that ensuring safe learning environments is essential to enabling education’s protective and transformative role during armed conflict.
Supporting reparation and long-term educational recovery
While this article focuses on protecting the right to education during armed conflict, a human dignity-centred approach must also address post-conflict recovery and reparation. A detailed discussion of this topic lies beyond the scope of this article,Footnote 192 but it is important to acknowledge its relevance to a comprehensive understanding of education and human dignity. In this context, as Ramírez-Barat and Duthie argue, education serves two vital purposes: first, to develop children’s skills and capacities for meaningful participation in a country’s economic, social and political life; and second, to enhance their ability to reflect critically on the past and present in order to build a more just and peaceful future.Footnote 193 Illustrative cases of education serving as reparations can be found in Chile, Peru and Sierra Leone, and through Colombia’s Victims’ Law.Footnote 194 A human dignity-centred approach supports this growing recognition of the relationship between education and transitional justice,Footnote 195 emphasizing education’s role in peacebuilding,Footnote 196 system reform and the reintegration of conflict-affected children. Crucially, this approach underscores that reparations must go beyond infrastructure and access and must actively work to restore children’s sense of dignity through psychosocial support, inclusive curricula and truth-telling initiatives that acknowledge the harms they have endured.Footnote 197 In doing so, education becomes not only a right to be protected but also a means of redress, healing and transformation in the aftermath of conflict.Footnote 198
Opportunities and challenges for implementation
Operationalizing a human dignity-centred approach to protect children’s right to education during armed conflict presents both significant opportunities and complex challenges. While the strategies outlined above are not exhaustive, they highlight the transformative potential of this approach in reshaping how education is conceptualized and implemented in armed conflict settings. By affirming education as integral to human dignity, as recognized under IHRL, these strategies transcend basic survival-focused responses and instead promote a holistic vision of education as protective, empowering, and oriented toward long-term recovery and development. This approach urges a shift in perspective, viewing education not simply as a right to which children are entitled, but as intrinsically linked to their human dignity. It emphasizes that human dignity is both the foundation of the right to education and a central objective of its fulfilment.Footnote 199 Accordingly, this framework invites a reinterpretation of obligations under IHL to reflect the shared centrality of human dignity in both IHRL and IHL, reinforcing the imperative to prioritize education during armed conflict.
Although there is no universally agreed definition of human dignity, this does not render the concept too abstract to be meaningful. As Carrozza argues, human dignity and human rights are not lived as theoretical constructs; they hold tangible significance and practical weight.Footnote 200 As demonstrated throughout this article, human dignity lies at the core of both IHRL and IHL, denoting the inherent worth of every human being.Footnote 201 Within this framework, the right to education is more than mere access to learning – it serves as a vital mechanism for affirming and realizing that intrinsic worth. When the right to education for children in armed conflict is violated, this article contends that the harm extends far beyond what current legal frameworks tend to emphasize. A human dignity-centred approach reveals that such violations are not only breaches of legal obligations but also direct assaults on children’s human dignity and a denial of the broader spectrum of rights that education enables.
Despite the promise of a human dignity-centred approach to strengthening protections for children’s right to education, a key challenge lies in the persistent non-compliance with IHL and IHRL not just in relation to education but across the broader spectrum of civilian protection.Footnote 202 This article argues that re-emphasizing human dignity, a concept that gained prominence after World War IIFootnote 203 as a moral response to barbarism, offers a vital normative reminder of why these protections matter. Anchoring education in human dignity reframes violations against education not just as legal breaches but as profound affronts to the dignity of children. Hence, the notion of human dignity functions as a normative constraint on educational interferences,Footnote 204 whether by States or NSAGs.Footnote 205
Conclusion
This article has examined the current protection of children’s access to education during armed conflict under IHRL and IHL. It has shown that, although both regimes provide protection, albeit differently, persistent violations of children’s right to education in contemporary armed conflicts highlight the need to strengthen that protection. Accordingly, this article has proposed a new approach that emphasizes the established link between education and human dignity, as recognized in IHRL, and has argued that this nexus should guide the interpretation and enforcement of IHL obligations. By adopting this perspective, the denial of education in armed conflict is reframed both as a legal violation and as a direct encroachment on the human dignity of the child.
Under this approach, the right to education during armed conflict will no longer be treated as a secondary priority but as a fundamental condition for a dignified life, access to which must be ensured at all times. Furthermore, by recognizing education as essential to the realization of children’s human dignity, this right must be guaranteed to all children affected by armed conflict, regardless of gender, sex, race, disability, migration status or background. Importantly, because human dignity is a central concept in both IHRL and IHL, this approach also provides a means to strengthen the relationship between these two legal regimes, offering a more coherent and effective framework for protecting children’s right to education in armed conflict.
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