Is Political Ambiguity Politically Costly or Beneficial?

Early models of campaign communication argued that political candidates have few incentives to use ambiguity in their election appeals, mainly because voters dislike it (Bartels Reference Bartels1986; Shepsle Reference Shepsle1972). Since these early theoretical arguments, several empirical studies have shown that the use of ambiguity by political candidates can reduce voter support and trust. One of the key studies by Tomz and Van Houweling (Reference Tomz and Van Houweling2009) uses experimental methods to demonstrate that voters tend to prefer candidates who take clear and specific policy positions. Their findings suggest that ambiguity undermines electoral support by creating uncertainty about a candidate’s future actions, leading to lower levels of trust. Voters penalize candidates who use ambiguity, particularly when clarity is expected on important issues. Similarly, Lo, Proksch, and Slapin (Reference Lo, Proksch and Slapin2016) argue that while ambiguity may offer short-term benefits in attracting a broad audience, it often results in long-term voter dissatisfaction and distrust. Their analysis of political speeches and electoral outcomes through text analysis reveals that ambiguous messaging is negatively correlated with satisfaction among voters. Over time, voters tend to respond to such messaging with skepticism, leading to a decline in trust toward ambiguous candidates. Further, Bowler and Karp (Reference Bowler, Donovan and Karp2004) suggest that voters often interpret ambiguous positions as signs of opportunism. Politicians who fail to take clear stances are seen as less trustworthy, and this perception damages their credibility with the public. Finally, Tomz and Van Houweling (Reference Tomz and Van Houweling2009) examine how voters react to issue ambiguity, finding that voters tend to view ambiguous positions negatively, often perceiving them as attempts to conceal a candidate’s true intentions. This perception is particularly harmful in contexts where transparency is highly valued, leading to significant drops in both trust and support. These studies collectively highlight the risks that political ambiguity poses to voter confidence and electoral success.

Despite the general public’s dislike of ambiguous political communication, political parties often blur their political messages. In fact, many election campaigns are replete with examples of parties and party leaders taking ambiguous stances on important issues, so much so that parties’ use of strategic ambiguity has received considerable attention from scholars and practitioners. In the United States, presidential candidates are frequently criticized for remaining vague on key policy issues (Bartels Reference Bartels1986; Tomz and Van Houweling Reference Tomz and Van Houweling2009). For instance, Joseph Biden won the 2020 presidential election while remaining vague on key issues including US policy toward China (BBC 2021). Before the German federal election, Social Democratic Party leader Gerhard Schröder used vague language on policies to reduce unemployment (Andrews Reference Andrews1998). During election campaigns held in Greece in the midst of economic crises in 2012 and 2015, the main parties of the left and right made vague promises about changing the terms of Greece’s bailout deal without offering specifics as to what those changes would be or how they would get creditors to agree. Even in the United Kingdom, where governing parties usually expect to govern alone and are able to fulfill most of their campaign promises, the Conservative Party was criticized for vague and conflicting statements on tax policy before the 2010 general election (Watt Reference Watt2010).

Despite voters’ dislike of ambiguity, parties can benefit from using it strategically (Nasr Reference Nasr2022) and therefore may sometimes find it expedient to “becloud” their policy positions (Downs Reference Downs1957: 136). Parties often aim to build broad coalitions of support, and using ambiguous language can allow them to appeal to a wider range of voters, including those with divergent or undecided preferences (Somer-Topcu Reference Somer-Topcu2015). Downs’ foundational work (Reference Downs1957) suggests that rational political actors use ambiguity to increase their appeal across a spectrum of voter preferences. By avoiding overly specific policy commitments, a party can maintain flexibility and reduce the likelihood of alienating any particular group.

Empirical studies provide evidence that when used strategically ambiguity can help political parties to broaden their appeal (e.g., Hersh and Schaffner Reference Hersh and Schaffner2013; Lo, Proksch, and Slapin Reference Lo, Proksch and Slapin2016). This is because voters often project their own views onto politicians who take ambiguous positions, interpreting the lack of clarity as alignment with their own preferences. This dynamic, sometimes referred to as “preference projection,” allows parties to sidestep polarizing issues that might drive voters away if addressed explicitly. As a result, parties can use ambiguity to maximize voter support without committing to positions that could hurt them later in the election process.

Moreover, as Meirowitz (Reference Meirowitz2005) points out, ambiguity can serve as a defensive mechanism, particularly in the early stages of a campaign when parties may still be gauging voter sentiment. In these moments of uncertainty, ambiguous language allows parties to avoid premature commitments that might provoke a backlash. By delaying firm positions, parties can adjust their electoral appeals as they gather more information about voters’ preferences and the political landscape. Similarly, Page (Reference Page1976) suggests that ambiguity can shift the focus away from divisive issues, steering the campaign discussion toward areas where conflict is minimal, including broad, universally appealing themes such as economic growth and national security.

Political ambiguity also plays a crucial role in managing the internal dynamics of parties. Ambiguous language helps reduce internal conflicts between different factions within a party, including activists and donors (Bräuninger and Giger Reference Bräuninger and Giger2018; Dahlberg Reference Dahlberg2009; Elkjær and Iversen Reference Elkjær and Iversen2020). By keeping policy statements vague, party leaders can maintain the appearance of unity, which is essential for building a strong public image. A divided party is often perceived as weak, which can hurt its chances of winning elections. Ambiguity allows parties to minimize the visibility of internal disagreements, offering a facade of consensus that can attract more broad-based support.

Additionally, ambiguity can be particularly advantageous in highly polarized or closely contested elections, although researchers disagree on whether the effect of polarization on ambiguity is positive or negative. Some argue that in situations where voters are deeply divided along ideological lines, ambiguity helps parties attract “swing voters,” who may lean one way but are not firmly committed to a specific party (Tomz and Van Houweling Reference Tomz and Van Houweling2009; Tromborg Reference Tromborg2021). By avoiding clear stances on contentious issues, parties can prevent swing voters from being repelled by positions that they might oppose. Similarly, Spoon and Klüver (Reference Spoon and Klüver2015) find that in highly polarized environments, political parties – especially smaller or newer ones – might have incentives to use ambiguity. They suggest that polarization can make it difficult for smaller parties to compete on a clear ideological basis, as the larger, established parties often dominate distinct ideological spaces. To survive, smaller parties may resort to ambiguity as a way of appealing to a broader base without directly challenging more powerful political actors. By contrast, Han (Reference Han2020) argues that increased polarization may reduce the use of ambiguity, as parties feel pressure to differentiate themselves more clearly from their opponents in a polarized system. In such contexts, ambiguous stances could be detrimental, as voters demand stronger ideological clarity to distinguish between parties. Tolvanen, Tremewan, and Wagner (Reference Tolvanen, Tremewan and Wagner2022) take a distinct position in this debate, contending that the effect of polarization depends on party size and electoral strategy. Their research demonstrates that while major parties in polarized systems might avoid ambiguity to secure their established voter base, minor parties often find it strategically useful to remain ambiguous to avoid alienating potential supporters and to prevent locking themselves into niche positions.

Another key factor in parties’ use of ambiguity is the issue-specific competitive context. Rovny (Reference Rovny2012, Reference Rovny2013) argues that parties are more likely to remain silent or use ambiguous language on issues where they do not have a clear advantage or distinct stance, particularly in competitive party systems. If a party does not “own” a particular issue – meaning they are not seen as the most competent or credible on it – they are likely to avoid discussing it in clear terms. This allows the party to evade potential criticism or backlash in weak areas, while focusing their program on issues on which they are stronger. This strategy is particularly effective when facing strong competition, as ambiguous language prevents opponents from easily attacking the substance of their policies. Rovny and Polk (Reference Rovny and Polk2020) further expand on this by showing that parties often use vague language in policy areas where there is no clear electoral benefit to clarifying their stance. Instead, parties strategically emphasize issues on which they have stronger reputations, while remaining ambiguous on other issues to avoid alienating voters or making unnecessary commitments. Their research also finds that this is more common in multiparty systems, where competition is more intense, and parties must balance a wide array of policy positions to appeal to diverse constituencies.

In sum, while ambiguity carries the risk of reducing electoral support and trust, if used carefully, its benefits can outweigh these risks. Parties use ambiguity to appeal to broader sections of the electorate, delay backlash, manage internal conflicts, and create a flexible program that can adapt to changing political circumstances. These mechanisms have provided remarkable insights into parties’ use of ambiguity from different perspectives, and they provide a powerful rebuttal to earlier arguments that ambiguity is inherently costly and that rational political actors would avoid ambiguity at all times.

Ambiguity as Blame Avoidance Strategy

We argue that ambiguity can serve as a strategy of blame avoidance for political parties that fear both retrospective and prospective sanctioning in the context of economic globalization.

First, ambiguity can be a useful strategy for rightist political parties that must balance the competing interests of distinct constituencies. Voters who expect governments to protect them from the economic risks associated with globalization are one broad constituency. Some of these protections may take the form of generous public social security and vocational education programs, which function as safety nets and retraining opportunities for employees who lose their jobs due to global competitions and capital movements. Other protections may include regulations of industries that guarantee strong labor rights. Within this broad constituency, some citizens will be drawn to the allure of populist policies that target immigrants, economic elites, and the openness of the international economy itself. Another distinct constituency that center-right parties are typically aligned with consists of the winners of globalization. These include highly educated, wealthy citizens who often favor market-friendly, economically liberal policies. Center-right party donors often include business interests that lobby for such policies too. By employing ambiguity, center-right parties can craft messages that appeal to these distinct broad constituency groups without committing fully to one side or the other, allowing each constituency to interpret the parties’ programs in ways that align with their own preferences.

The use of ambiguity to appeal to a broad range of voters is well documented in the political science literature. Somer-Topcu (Reference Somer-Topcu2015), for instance, highlights how ambiguity enables parties to attract a larger electorate by allowing different voter groups to see their own views reflected in vague or flexible policy statements. This flexibility is crucial to maintaining a diverse coalition, as voters are more likely to support parties that they perceive as being closer to their own positions, and ambiguity allows parties to project such proximity without making firm commitments. If rightist parties were to take clearer stances on socioeconomic issues, they would risk alienating at least one of their target constituencies. If they were to clearly endorse protectionist measures, they would face the wrath of wealthy voters and business elites, who benefit from market openness and international trade. Conversely, a strong endorsement of neoliberal economic policies would alienate many working and middle-class voters, who feel threatened by the forces of globalization. Ambiguity, therefore, allows these parties to keep both constituencies engaged.

Second, ambiguity helps leftist parties avoid retrospective sanctioning. These parties’ capacity to deliver on their campaign promises is severely undermined by the constraints of globalization. When voters expect parties to make ambitious promises during campaigns, but political parties are uncertain about their ability to fulfill those promises once they hold executive power, they worry about voters sanctioning them at the next election for not fulfilling their promises. In response, parties have strong incentives to use strategic ambiguity to avoid retrospective sanctioning by voters in future elections. Since ambiguous campaign statements are reconcilable with a broad range of subsequent government policies, they are unlikely to be perceived as broken promises by voters. In a different context, Aragonès and Neeman (Reference Aragonès and Neeman2000) show how the need for “wiggle room” after elections, which is certainly the case in the context of globalization constraints, increases parties’ use of strategic ambiguity.

The findings in Chapters 4 to 6 form the basis of our argument on the impact of globalization on ambiguous communication during electoral campaigns. In Chapters 4 and 5 we show that although parties often successfully fulfill their campaign promises if they gain sufficient governing power after elections, globalization severely constrains their ability to do so. Economic globalization not only prevents parties from keeping their campaign promises, but it also limits their ability (or willingness) to pursue policies that are responsive to public opinion if they hold executive power after elections (Ezrow and Hellwig Reference Ezrow and Hellwig2014; Hellwig Reference Hellwig2015). Chapter 6 shows that voters punish parties for failing to keep their promises and reward those that do, a finding that is well-established in the existing literature (Matthieß Reference Matthieß2020; Naurin and Oscarsson Reference Naurin and Oscarsson2017; Stokes Reference Stokes2001). Our analyses add that the electoral punishment for breaking promises is particularly harsh in countries that are deeply integrated into the global economy.

In sum, there are strong theoretical arguments to expect that political parties are more likely to use ambiguity during election campaigns when they operate in countries that are more deeply integrated into the international economy.

Creating ambiguity through vagueness is a superior strategy for preempting political sanctioning by voters compared with reducing the quantity of campaign promises they make. Modern political parties are compelled to have comprehensive blueprints for governing, and failure to do so exposes them to the criticism that they lack governing competence. This means that parties must make comprehensible statements, even if nuanced and sometimes vague, on all electorally salient areas of policy. In line with this argument, comparative research shows that parties make many specific campaign promises in a broad range of institutional, political, and economic contexts (Naurin, Royed, and Thomson Reference Naurin, Royed and Thomson2019). Parties make a comparable number of promises whether they be left-wing or right-wing parties, incumbents or challengers, or in systems where single-party governments or coalitions are the norm. In Chapter 4 we find no significant effect of globalization on the number of election pledges. There is, however, a weak tendency for parties to make more pledges to expand programs in contexts where governments are more exposed to economic globalization. This suggests that parties may indeed adapt the contents of their electoral appeals rather than the quantity of promises they make.

Not all types of ambiguity may be effective in protecting parties from retrospective sanctioning by voters for broken promises; the use of some types might even backfire. There are strong reasons to suppose that ambivalence is a less effective type of ambiguity than vagueness, as it exposes the party to criticism for being inconsistent, which voters generally dislike. Furthermore, ambivalence does not protect a party from future retrospective sanctioning, since governments’ actions are likely to be congruent with some statements and incongruent with other statements. Vagueness, by contrast, does shield the party from future accusations of promise breaking and does not expose the party to accusations of internal inconsistency in relation to their campaign appeals. Another type of ambivalence is at the ideological level, where a party may take left-leaning positions on some issues and right-leaning positions on other issues. This creates ambiguity about where a party stands ideologically, but it does not preempt retrospective sanctioning for promise breaking, as parties’ record of promise keeping is distinct from the ideological consistency of those promises.

Before presenting the evidence for our theoretical argument, we reiterate a point we made earlier in the chapter about the limited use of ambiguity as a political strategy, even in its “vague” form. Voters fundamentally dislike ambiguity, such that parties should use it only if the political benefits (i.e., minimizing retrospective sanctioning for promise breaking or obfuscating unpopular positions) exceed the political costs (i.e., sanctioning for using ambiguous language). If ambiguity did not incur political costs, all political parties would have incentives to use ambiguous language most of the time. But ambiguity is costly, such that parties use it only when it is politically expedient.

Beyond voters’ fundamental dislike of ambiguity, there are other reasons why parties limit the use of vague language in their campaign appeals. First, concrete language may in fact serve to temper voters’ expectations of what to expect from parties when in office, while vaguer language might raise expectations. In this sense, while vagueness may reduce the likelihood of future retrospective sanctioning for promise breaking, it may exacerbate retrospective sanctioning for failing to meet the high expectations that were fed by candidates’ espousal of lofty but vague ideals. Second, parties are policy seekers as well as office seekers, which means that party members and factions need assurance that the party will promote certain policies when in office. Excessive use of vague language on issues of core concern to the party faithful will not go down well. Finally, parties need a blueprint for government when they enter coalition negotiations or executive office as a single party. Election programs that are too vague provide little in the way of guidance to party leaders, ministers, and senior officials when the parties that authored them enter office. These costs limit parties’ use of ambiguity across a broad range of contexts and ensure that they continue to issue at least a mixture of clear and vague statements. What is at stake here is the relative proportion of concrete and vague statements. The theory suggests that globalization is associated with a greater proportion of vague campaign statements, at least for parties that are determined to attain and remain in power.

Dependent Variable: Ambiguity as Vagueness

The main dependent variable is the level of vagueness in the texts of parties’ election programs. As discussed previously, the most effective form of ambiguous political communication is the use of vague (as opposed to ambivalent language). To measure Political Ambiguity as vagueness, we follow Eichorst and Lin (Reference Eichorst and Lin2019) and apply an English-word dictionary of concrete and vague words from the 2015 Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) database. The LIWC database contains a set of word dictionaries that intend to capture different psychometric concepts in text or transcribed dialogue, such as positive/negative emotions, causal statements, concern, inhibition, assent, and many others (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010). The dictionaries were created through an iterative expert coding approach. For the 2015 LIWC database, coders were asked to use their experience and previous versions of the LIWC to create an initial word list for each psychometric concept. Then, using a large corpus of documents, other candidate words were identified through their repeated association with the seed words in different documents. They were then passed back to the experts, who separately assessed the suitability of candidate words for the final dictionary.

We use the LIWC dictionary that was created to measure certainty and tentativeness. The fact that this is an established measure used in a wide range of fields, rather than one specifically designed for our study, preempts the concern that the measure was specifically designed to obtain the results that our theory expects. To cite a few examples of the previous applications of this measure in the psychology and psychometrics literature, it was used to assess the effects of emotionally charged written text on survivors of sexual abuse, cancer, and ankylosing spondylitis (Batten et al. Reference Batten, Follette, Rasmussen Hall and Palm2002; Creswell et al. Reference Creswell, Lam, Stanton, Taylor, Bower and Sherman2007; Hamilton-West and Quine Reference Hamilton-West and Quine2007), to examine the impact of testosterone supplements on language (Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis Reference Pennebaker, Booth and Francis2007), to show the effects of language specificity on reactions to affective claims and emotional expression (Centerbar et al. Reference Centerbar, Schnall, Clore and Garvin2008; Kahn et al. Reference Kahn, Tobin, Massey and Anderson2007), to map out the social spheres of students’ university community experience (Mehl and Pennebaker Reference Mehl and Pennebaker2003), and to detect the effects of different types of deception and lying on participants (Hancock et al. Reference Hancock, Curry, Goorha and Woodworth2007). More relevant to political science, the dictionary was leveraged to analyze socialization and discourse within the Chinese-American community (Tsai, Simeonova, and Watanabe Reference Tsai, Simeonova and Watanabe2004), and to deconstruct the effects of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on public speeches of elected officials (Pennebaker and Lay Reference Pennebaker and Lay2002).

We generate a count of concrete and vague words in each election program using the dictionary of concrete and vague words. The dictionary contains thirty-eight words coded as imparting tentativeness (e.g., seem, probably, hoping, hesitant) and twenty-eight words coded as imparting certainty (e.g., never, confident, clearly, exact, guarantee). Several of these terms are coded as root words; for instance the words “certain,” “certainty,” and “certainly” are all coded as imparting certainty but are counted as a single instance in the dictionary. We processed the documents by removing all stop words (e.g., the, a, is, and in) and then identifying the proportions of ambiguous and certain words over the total remaining words in the text. We generate a measure of the ambiguity of each election platform by (1) subtracting the proportion of vague words from the proportion of certain words, and then (2) taking the inverse of this measure.Footnote ² For ease of interpretation, we standardize our measure to a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. A larger value indicates a more ambiguous (vague) election program, while a lower value indicates a more concrete one.

Figure 9.1 illustrates variation in Political Ambiguity as vagueness across the six countries using violin plots. While the average ambiguity is relatively consistent across countries, it varies significantly across political parties and over time.

Figure 9.1

Comparing ambiguity across countries, 1960–2019

Note: The figure presents a violin plot of the average ambiguity (vagueness) in mainstream parties’ election programs by country where the width of the shape reflects the data density, the dot inside indicates the median, and the box elements show the interquartile range.

Figure 9.2 illustrates variation in ambiguity over time by taking the average of ambiguity across all election programs in each year. The graph illustrates significant variation in ambiguity over time, but no clear trend. One might wonder why we would not experience a general trend toward political ambiguity given our argument that globalization, which has generally increased over time, should affect the vagueness of language that parties use. One reason is that while most countries in our sample have become more integrated into the global economy over time, there is significant variation across countries. In addition, globalization has leveled off in the last decade. The lack of a clear trend also reduces our concerns that any effect of economic integration on ambiguity might be driven by a positive trend in both variables over time.Footnote ³

Figure 9.2

Political ambiguity over time

Note: The figure graphs the average ambiguity (vagueness) of mainstream parties’ election programs over time.

Figure 9.3 shows that the extent to which parties use vague language also varies significantly across the six countries. Although there is significant variation within each of the countries over time, Canadian parties have on average tended to use less vague language, while parties in New Zealand generally use relatively more vague language. Mainstream Australian parties sharply increased the level of ambiguity in their election appeals in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is noteworthy that this followed a sharp increase in Australia’s exposure to the international economic system, following the economic reforms implemented by the Hawke and Keating governments, which reduced tariffs and exposed many industries to disruptive international competition.

Figure 9.3

Political ambiguity by country

Note: The figure graphs the average ambiguity (vagueness) of mainstream parties’ election programs by country over time.

Finally, Figure 9.4 graphs political ambiguity for the two main parties in the United States. The graph demonstrates that average ambiguity varies across parties and over time. While the Democratic Party has remained relatively stable in the level of ambiguity since the 1990s, the Republican Party has exhibited a steady increase in its use of ambiguous language since the late 1980s. This coincides with a sharp rightward shift of the Republican Party. This combination of ideological radicalism and ambiguous language provides some tentative support for the idea that parties on the right have incentives to obscure their positions from voters, not because they fail to keep their promises, but because their policies are at odds with many voters’ expectations that governments protect them from economic risks.

Figure 9.4

Political ambiguity in the United States by political party

Note: The figure graphs the ambiguity (vagueness) of the election platforms of the Republican Party and the Democratic Party in the United States over time.

Principal Explanatory Variable

As in previous chapters, our principal explanatory variable is the extent to which individual countries are integrated into the global economy. Again, we use the KOF Globalization Index (Dreher Reference Dreher2006).

• Globalization is the extent to which a country is integrated into the international economy, including information on trade in goods and services, trade regulations, tariffs and agreements, foreign direct investment, investment restrictions, and capital account openness. Data are from Dreher (Reference Dreher2006). We transform the measure into z-scores to simplify the interpretation of the coefficients.

The six countries examined here are all highly developed economies and are therefore exposed to the international economy to a considerable extent. Nonetheless, there are marked differences in the relative levels of exposure to globalization. The observed values of Globalization range from 39 to 90 (on the 0 to 100 scale), with a mean of 67 and standard deviation of 13. The sample includes countries with medium, relatively constant levels of globalization (New Zealand, United Kingdom), countries that experienced very low integration in the 1970s and 1980s and a sharp increase in the 1990s (United States, Canada), and one deeply integrated country that also experienced a substantial increase (Ireland). The following analyses distinguish between trade and financial globalization.

Control Variables

To address omitted variable bias, we include control variables at the levels of countries, election years, and election programs that have been used in previous research. At the level of election years, we control for:

• Economic Growth measures a country’s gross domestic product growth. Data are from the World Development Indicators.

• Polarization accounts for party system polarization for each country election and is calculated using the following formula: $\sqrt{{\sum }_{j=1}^n{\mathit{VS}}_j{\left(P_{\mathit{jk}}-P_k\right)}^2}$, where ${\mathit{VS}}_j$ is the vote share (as a proportion) for party $j$ (from the set of parties n in country k), $P_{\mathit{jk}}$ is the ideological position of party $j$ in country $k$, and $P_k$ is the weighted mean of all parties’ left–right position in country $k$. Following Eichorst and Lin (Reference Eichorst and Lin2019), we rescale the Manifesto Project measures of parties’ left–right positions from a −100 to 100 scale to a 1–10 scale. Data are from the Manifesto Project data (Lehmann et al. Reference Lehmann, Franzmann, Al-Gaddooa, Burst, Ivanusch and Regel2024).Footnote ⁴

• Effective Number of Parties is measured as the inverse of the sum of squares of the proportion of seats that each party holds after election on a scale of 0–1.Footnote ⁵ Data are from Laakso and Taagepera (Reference Laakso and Taagepera1979b).

At the level of election programs, we control for several characteristics of the authoring parties:

• Incumbent is a binary variable that is measured as 1 if the political party holds executive office at the time of the election campaign and 0 otherwise. Data are from Seki and Williams (Reference Seki and Williams2014).

• Coalition is a binary variable that is measured as 1 if the political party is a partner in a government coalition. Data are from Seki and Williams (Reference Seki and Williams2014).

• Vote Share accounts for the vote share of the political party in the previous election. Data are from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow Reference Döring and Manow2015).

• Niche Party,Footnote ⁶ following Bischof (Reference Bischof2017), is an additive index of the extent to which parties predominantly compete on niche market segments neglected by their competitors, rather than addressing a broad range of segments. Data are from the Manifesto Project dataset.

• Party Age measures the log of the number of years since the political party was established. Data are from Eichorst and Lin (Reference Eichorst and Lin2019).

• Left–Right Position is a variable identifying partisan ideology on the left–right axis from the Comparative Manifesto Project. It is measured using the left–right (RILE) scores, which are also derived from parties’ election programs. Data are from the Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. Reference Lehmann, Franzmann, Al-Gaddooa, Burst, Ivanusch and Regel2024; Volkens et al. Reference Volkens, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, Merz, Tegel and Wessels2019).

We present descriptive statistics of all variables in the online Supplementary Material. To facilitate interpretation, all nonbinary variables are standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

De Jure Globalization Drives Strategic Ambiguity

The distinction between de jure and de facto measures of globalization is that the former refers to the openness of the country on paper in terms of its rules and regulations, while the latter refers to actual flows of goods and services:

• De Jure Globalization measures the extent of a country’s trade globalization using information including trade regulations, trade taxes, tariffs, and trade agreements. Data are from Dreher (Reference Dreher2006).

• De Facto Globalization measures the extent of a country’s trade globalization, using information including actual trade in goods, services, and the diversity of trading partners. Data are from Dreher (Reference Dreher2006).

Are parties more likely to respond to de jure or de facto globalization when they gauge the level of vagueness in their electoral appeals? In terms of the constraints of globalization that we discuss in Chapter 2, de jure globalization refers mainly to the constraints of international law. De facto globalization, by contrast, refers more directly to the influence of market actors, since these are empowered as actual flows of goods and services across borders become more important. To the extent that party officials who draft election programs perceive international law to be a heavier constraint on their room to maneuver than market actors, the de jure measure may exhibit a stronger effect than the de facto measure. Rules and regulations may also be perceived by party officials as more stable and predictable than the influence of market actors. Consequently, rules and regulations may be a more certain guide to the future constraints that parties face in government after the elections.

Figure 9.7 (left-hand graph) presents the results of a model in which we include de jure and de facto trade globalization instead of the overall trade globalization index. Full tabular results of the model are presented in the online Supplementary Material. It appears that while both measures are positively associated with higher levels of vagueness, it is only the de jure measure that is significant. This suggests that it is primarily the openness of countries in terms of their rules and regulations that drives mainstream parties to use vaguer language.

Figure 9.7

Exploring types of trade globalization and ambivalence

Note: The graphs present coefficients (round circles) with 95 percent confidence intervals (bars) from a beta regression model with a logit link function. Control variables and country fixed effects are omitted from the presentation. The left-hand graph depicts key findings from a model in which vagueness is the dependent variable, while a distinction is made between de jure and de facto trade globalization. The right-hand graph depicts key findings from a model in which ambivalence (not vagueness) is the dependent variable, while overall trade globalization is the main independent variable. Full numerical results in tabular form are presented in the online Supplementary Material.

Globalization Reduces Parties’ Use of Ambivalent Language

We now explore parties’ use of ambivalent language, meaning statements that may represent different sides of the same issue and could potentially be construed as inconsistent. Unlike vagueness, where the language is unclear or open to broad interpretation, ambivalence arises when a party makes multiple statements that reflect different or contradictory perspectives, creating uncertainty about where the party truly stands. As argued previously, in contrast to vagueness, we do not expect ambivalence to be an effective strategy for avoiding retrospective sanctioning by voters for promise breaking. Therefore, we do not expect globalization to be positively associated with ambivalence.

To measure Ambivalence, we apply the measurement approach developed by Lo et al. (Reference Lo, Proksch and Slapin2016), who use scaling techniques that consider the diversity and distribution of a party’s positions across the ideological spectrum. The key is to quantify how often parties express conflicting stances on the same issue or related issues, creating a “spread” or “distribution” over possible policy positions, which they interpret as ambivalence. Their method uses text analysis tools to detect and quantify the extent of mixed or opposing signals within political communication, thus offering an empirical measure of ambivalence in election programs.

Figure 9.7 (right-hand graph) presents the results where we replace the vagueness measure with the measure of Ambivalence as the dependent variable. We omit all other variables for ease of presentation, but they are included in the model. The full tabular results are presented in the online Supplementary Material. As we expected, the effect of globalization on Ambivalence is indeed not positive. It is, however, negative and significant, which may suggest that parties are less likely to use ambivalent language if their country is more integrated in the global economy. As we had no theoretical prior to expect this finding, we view this finding as highly tentative.

Ambiguity as Vagueness Is Focused on Economic Policies

Returning to the measure of Ambiguity as vagueness, we find that while globalization affects governments’ room to maneuver across a range of issues, its effects are particularly pronounced in relation to economic policies. These policies – such as taxation, market regulation, employment policy, infrastructure, monetary policy, and fiscal policy – are most directly impacted by global market forces, international competition, and transnational economic agreements. The integration of global financial markets and the influence of multinational corporations can severely constrain a government’s ability to impose high corporate taxes or implement strong market regulations without risking capital flight or trade retaliation. A case in point is the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact, which limits the fiscal deficits and public debt levels of its member states, effectively restricting their domestic economic policies. Similarly, the pressures of global competition and adherence to international trade agreements often limit a government’s ability to provide subsidies to struggling domestic industries.

While economic policies are most obviously constrained, some noneconomic policies may also be affected by globalization. Social policies like education and healthcare expansion may be compromised by the economic impacts of globalization. A government that promises to expand access to preschool education or improve healthcare services might find itself unable to fulfill these promises if globalization-induced budget shortfalls – such as reduced tax revenues from declining industries – limit available public funds. In this sense, the fiscal impacts of globalization can ripple out into other policy areas. Nonetheless, governments still retain a relatively higher degree of autonomy over noneconomic domestic policies such as education, welfare, and public health. Many countries, particularly in Northern Europe, have maintained robust welfare states despite operating in highly globalized economies. Moreover, some social policies appear further removed from the constraints of globalization, for instance social policies that involve citizens’ individual and collective rights, such as gender equality and reproductive rights.

National governments’ foreign policies may also be less visibly affected by economic globalization than domestic economic policies. However, national economic interests, which in a globalized world are defined by international considerations, also significantly affect states’ foreign policies. Defense and military policies, for instance, may be defined by geopolitical strategy rather than global market dynamics. At the same time, governments formulate defense policies in the context of military alliances, which involve economic interdependencies. NATO member states, for example, are economically dependent on each other for defense spending and procurement agreements. This economic interdependence can shape how members approach foreign interventions or respond to geopolitical threats. Likewise, national governments’ external policies on foreign aid and humanitarian assistance may be partly driven by noneconomic considerations. At the same time, national governments’ foreign aid and humanitarian assistance programs are affected by their trade relations, as the provision of aid often follows established trade relations between developed and developing countries. Some foreign policies specifically refer to national governments’ decisions on whether to bind themselves to the constraints of globalization, such as whether to enter into free trade agreements or other forms of cooperation with other countries.

The Manifesto Project provides a way of exploring the possible differences between the effects of globalization on ambiguity across different policy areas (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge Reference Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge1994; Lehmann et al. Reference Lehmann, Franzmann, Al-Gaddooa, Burst, Ivanusch and Regel2024). Manifesto Project researchers coded every sentence or quasi-sentence of each manifesto into one of fifty-six thematic categories. Chapter 7 uses these data on thematic emphases to examine ideological shifts by parties. Each of these thematic categories refers to different policy domains, which enables us to distinguish between text that refers to three broad policy areas: economic, social, and foreign policies:

• Economic Policies refer to the Manifesto Project’s economic policy domain. This contains policies related to economic management, fiscal policy, taxation, employment, trade, state intervention in the economy, and economic growth and infrastructure policies.

• Social Policies refer to three of the Manifesto Project’s policy domains. The freedom and democracy domain includes text on political rights, civil liberties, democratic governance, and rule of law. Positions on transparency, anticorruption measures, and democratic reform also fall into this category. The welfare and quality of life domain covers social services, health, education, and welfare programs. The fabric of society domain focuses on cultural, religious, and social norms. This domain also covers moral issues such as family values, same-sex marriage, gender equality, and reproductive rights, as well as immigration and, law and order policies, including crime prevention and policing.

• Foreign Policies correspond to the Manifesto Project’s external relations domain. This includes text on international cooperation and multilateralism, foreign aid and humanitarian assistance, defense and military spending, trade agreements, and globalization.

While the distinction between economic, social, and foreign policies is useful for analytical purposes, in practice, these boundaries can be difficult to maintain because one policy area often incorporates elements from another. For example, economic policies frequently include aspects of foreign policy, particularly in the context of trade agreements, international economic cooperation, or sanctions. A party’s program on economic growth or job creation may explicitly reference international trade agreements or foreign investments, blurring the lines between what might be classified as purely economic versus foreign policy. Similarly, social policies can also incorporate economic and foreign policy elements. For example, a party’s program on education or health care might include proposals related to the economic cost of these programs or even reference international partnerships that influence domestic policymaking. Immigration policy is another area where social, economic, and foreign policies converge. It may be listed under social policy in a party’s election program but typically involves foreign policy (international agreements and relations) and economic considerations (labor markets and public spending).

With these caveats in mind, we apply the measure of ambiguity as vagueness to each of these broad policy areas in each election program, thus generating a set of three separate vagueness measures for each document, for economic, social, and foreign policies separately. We use these to build three separate datasets of party programs split by issue areas, on which we run the same regressions as applied previously. The level of analysis is the political ambiguity at the level of party election program policy area. Figure 9.8 presents the results for our analysis of ambiguity in each of these policy areas. Each coefficient presents the effect of Globalization on Ambiguity. For parsimony, we omit the other control variables in the graph, but we present full tabular results in the online Supplementary Material.

Figure 9.8

Main results by policy area

Note: The graphs present the coefficients of Globalization (round circles) with 95 percent confidence intervals (bars) from a beta regression model with a logit link function. Control variables are omitted. The dependent variable is the vagueness in political parties’ election manifestos. The dashed line represents a coefficient of 0, corresponding to no effect. Full numerical results in tabular form are presented in the online Supplementary Material.

In line with our tentative expectation, we find that the positive and significant effect of Globalization on Ambiguity is driven primarily by parties using vague language when writing about economic policies. The coefficients on social and foreign policies are both indistinguishable from zero. Keeping in mind the caveats that we discussed, this lends further support to our argument that it is globalization constraints that lead parties to use more ambiguous language in their campaign appeals as a strategy to avoid prospective and retrospective sanctioning.

Parties of All Ideological Positions Respond to Globalization with Ambiguity

Exposure to economic globalization leads mainstream parties across the ideological spectrum to use vaguer language, although they do so for different reasons. Leftist parties use ambiguity as a way of avoiding future retrospective sanctioning for promise breaking. These parties often find it particularly hard to keep their campaign promises due to the constraints of globalization. Since breaking promises carries electoral costs (i.e., political candidates who break promises become less likable and their vote shares decline), parties have incentives to minimize those costs when they know that promise breaking may occur. Being vague is a way of avoiding future blame for breaking promises. Rightist parties face a different kind of pressure. They are typically less constrained by globalization when they attempt to fulfil their traditional commitments to neoliberal policies. But these parties have faced pressures to appeal to different constituencies. On the one hand, they must appeal to working and middle-class voters who are demanding more protection from the economic risks of globalization, some of whom are also succumbing to the allure of populist movements. On the other hand, they must appeal to their traditional constituencies who continue to favor free markets. For the right, vagueness is a way of reconciling these competing pressures.

To test the effect of economic globalization on parties with different ideological positions, we add an interaction term between the variables Globalization and Party Ideology. This enables us to examine whether the effect of Globalization on Ambiguity differs depending on parties’ ideological positions. Since we expect that it does not, this interaction should be insignificant. Parties’ ideological positions are measured using data from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. Reference Volkens, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, Merz, Tegel and Wessels2019), which are discussed extensively in Chapters 4 and 7. We present the results graphically in Figure 9.9, while the full tabular results are in the online Supplementary Material.

Figure 9.9

Effect of globalization on ambiguity for different party ideologies

Note: The figure plots the marginal effect and 95 percent confidence intervals of the effect of Globalization on the ambiguity (vagueness) of mainstream parties, conditional on the government party’s left–right political ideology, where higher values indicate increasingly right-wing political ideologies. Party Left–Right Ideology is standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The dashed horizontal line represents a coefficient of 0, corresponding to no effect. Full numerical results in tabular form are presented in the online Supplementary Material.

Figure 9.9 shows that the effect of Globalization on Ambiguity is not conditional on political ideology. Parties of the left and right are equally affected by globalization in this respect; the coefficient associated with Globalization is significant for parties along the entire left–right spectrum. The interaction term between Globalization and Party Ideology is insignificant. The findings provide additional evidence for our theoretical argument that parties assess the potential electoral costs associated with the clarity of language they use in their campaign statements. While left-wing parties use ambiguity to avoid future retrospective sanctioning for breaking promises, right-wing parties use ambiguity to appeal to broader voter bases that have different views on the desirability of government intervention.