At the beginning of this study, we set out with three broad questions in mind. How did Americans interpret de Gaulle's policy of “independence” within the larger framework of their ideas about the transatlantic relationship? How did consecutive administrations actually deal with the challenges posed by de Gaulle's “independent” foreign policy from 1958 to 1969? And did de Gaulle's policy of “independence” modify American policies towards Europe and the Atlantic alliance? We will now attempt to answer these three questions on the basis of the foregoing.

De Gaulle – Hero of the Past

The Diversity of American Opinion

In respect of the first question, we should first of all observe that there was not one American evaluation of de Gaulle. Dean Acheson's and George Ball's condemnation of the General, for instance, differed greatly from the veneration exhibited by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger. President Eisenhower and his successor John F. Kennedy were – in different ways – tempted by de Gaulle's powerful vision and personality, and groped for common ground, but there was very little that connected President Johnson to his French counterpart (despite the Texan's unfailing restraint). Someone like McGeorge Bundy showed an understanding of de Gaulle that caused Ball to accuse him of being a “Gaullist”; while this charge was overdrawn, Bundy certainly tended to be less condemnatory and more pragmatic in his views of de Gaulle than most officials (including his successor Walt Rostow). Secretary of State Rusk meanwhile appears to have lost his legendary patience and equanimity only when it came to de Gaulle, whereas the factual mind of Secretary of Defense McNamara remained largely undisturbed by the Gaullist challenge (even as he strongly opposed the French nuclear program). Ambassador Charles Bohlen's influential advice that no American concession could alter de Gaulle's course contrasted sharply with that of his predecessor James Gavin, who pressed Washington – in vain – to be more forthcoming (in particular in the nuclear realm). In short, there were many interpretations of de Gaulle and his policies.

One might say that the American public, to begin with, generally entertained a favorable opinion of de Gaulle from his return to power in 1958 to his press conference of January 14, 1963, in which he torpedoed Kennedy's Grand Design by vetoing Great Britain's entry into the Common Market and rejecting the multilateral nuclear force.