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The Constitutional Fight over the NLRA and the NLRB: A 90 Year Reprise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2026

Kate Andrias*
Affiliation:
Columbia Law School, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
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Take Three
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For many decades now, worker advocates have bemoaned the inefficacy of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the statute that protects employees’ right to organize, bargain collectively, and strike.Footnote 1 Passed in 1935 after massive worker struggle, the NLRA initially helped spur nearly five million workers to engage in industrial action and almost three million to join a union.Footnote 2 Over time, however, the statute’s potency waned. Congressional amendments and Supreme Court interpretation narrowed the law, and employers exploited its weaknesses. As scholars have detailed, the NLRA today lacks sufficient remedies and enforcement mechanisms. It excludes millions of vulnerable workers, including domestic, agricultural, and gig workers. It fails to protect collective action, permitting permanent replacements during strikes and prohibiting secondary boycotts. Its focus on worksite bargaining with individual employers, to the exclusion of sectoral bargaining, is a poor match for the contemporary economy. The statute has “drifted” from its original purpose.Footnote 3

Yet, for all its failings, the NLRA still represents perhaps the most significant incursion into the employment relationship—indeed, into capitalism—of any modern U.S. statute. After all, the statute promises to protect the right of workers to act collectively and to withdraw their labor if their demands are not met. It enables workers to transform decision making within firms so that power is no longer held solely by managers and owners and instead is shared, democratically.Footnote 4

Perhaps for this reason, nearly a century after its birth, the NLRA remains a central target of big business and the Right. In the past year, corporations including Space X, Amazon, Starbucks, and Trader Joe’s have argued in legal proceedings that the agency tasked with enforcing the Act—the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)—is unconstitutional.Footnote 5 More recently, the Trump Administration has joined the corporate critics. Defying longstanding legal precedent and in violation of the statute, President Trump fired the chairperson of the NLRB, Gwynne Wilcox, without cause. He thereby teed up the question whether the NLRB’s structure, which provides a measure of independence from the president, is constitutional.Footnote 6 In so doing, the president also rendered the NLRB without a quorum to do its work.Footnote 7

This is not the first time that opponents of workers have attempted to dismantle labor law through constitutional challenge. When the NLRA, then known as the Wagner Act, was first enacted, the nation’s leading businesses opposed it staunchly and some declared they would ignore it.Footnote 8 On September 5, 1935, an organization of the biggest manufacturers in the country issued a lengthy memorandum concluding that the Act “constitutes a complete departure from our constitutional and traditional theories of government.”Footnote 9 The statement, over one hundred pages long, was signed by prominent lawyers representing all the major industries.Footnote 10 Numerous legal challenges ensued.

Most observers at the time assumed the Supreme Court would strike down the statute, given its then parsimonious approach to congressional power and its embrace of the “liberty of contract” theory.Footnote 11 However, against the backdrop of continuing labor turmoil and mounting pressure from President Franklin Roosevelt—who after securing an overwhelming election victory threatened to expand the number of justices—the Court switched course. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court, by a five to four vote, upheld the NLRA and declared that Congress did have authority to regulate labor under the commerce clause.Footnote 12 The justices’ momentous about-face allowed the New Deal to stand, while ushering in the modern era in constitutional law.Footnote 13

Even at the time, observers recognized the significance of Jones & Laughlin, with “the largest crowd in Supreme Court history pack[ing] the great white marble edifice” to hear the justices render their decision.Footnote 14 The eponymous Senator Robert Wagner called the Court’s decision the “most important interpretation of the commerce clause since John Marshall spoke in Gibbons v. Ogden.”Footnote 15 Constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin described a “radical” and “swift” transformation in American constitutional law.Footnote 16 With the Court no longer viewed as the enemy of the New Deal, Roosevelt’s court-packing plan lost support, and the case, along with another labor case decided just two weeks prior, came to be known as “the switch in time that saved nine.”Footnote 17

Yet, constitutional fights are rarely over—especially those that go to the heart of how power is distributed and who wields it. The Trump Administration and numerous corporations are now reviving the constitutional attack on the NLRA. This fight is as significant as the 1930s battle—both because of the implications for the shape of American government and because of the potential effect on workers, the economy, and the democracy.

First and foremost, the Trump Administration and corporate challengers contend that the Board’s structure violates Article II of the Constitution and the “unitary executive” theory. On this account, Board members, who form the highest body within the agency and who can be fired only “for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office,” are unconstitutionally shielded from the president’s supervision.Footnote 18 Yet, the Supreme Court upheld such protections in 1935, holding in Humphrey’s Executor that Congress has power to create multimember expert boards, with members removable only for cause.Footnote 19 The NLRA is just one of many agencies with this structure, which aims to insulate agencies from political pressure.Footnote 20 Consistent with its broader attack on rule of law and democratic institutions, the Trump administration thus seeks to upend much of the modern administrative state.

Corporate critics also challenge the constitutionality of the Board on numerous other bases: Again invoking the unitary executive theory, they object to the job protections for the NLRB’s administrative law judges, who hear, settle, and decide unfair labor practice cases nationwide.Footnote 21 They also assert that NLRB proceedings violate the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury and Article III of the Constitution by allowing the Board, rather than federal courts, to grant certain monetary remedies to workers.Footnote 22 And some contend that the statute violates general principles of separation of powers and due process.

Back in the 1930s, the Supreme Court rejected these argument as well. While the focus of the Jones & Laughlin opinion was on the commerce clause, the Jones & Laughlin steel company, like Space X and other corporate challengers today, also claimed that the NLRB’s structure violated Article III, the Fifth Amendment, and the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution.Footnote 23 The Court disposed of these arguments in a few lines.Footnote 24 For nearly 100 years, the constitutionality of the NLRA was considered settled.

Yet given today’s radically conservative Court, and a president who has styled himself a king, constitutional arguments that were long thought to be off-the-wall are now back “on-the-wall.”Footnote 25 Most lower courts that have considered the constitutional challenges to the NLRB’s structure have applied precedent and rejected them.Footnote 26 But in May of 2025, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority signaled its sympathy to the arguments against removal protections—and in favor of the unitary executive theory—by staying an injunction that had been entered in favor of Chair Wilcox.Footnote 27 Then, in December of 2025, during oral argument in a case involving the Federal Trade Commission, a majority of justices appeared poised to expand significantly the president’s removal authority.Footnote 28 Moreover, in a series of prior cases, the conservative majority on the Court has already significantly weakened administrative agencies, while strengthening courts’ power.Footnote 29 At the same time, the Court has signaled its support for robust presidential authority, even presidential impunity.Footnote 30

The companies’ arguments thus draw from conservative legal doctrine and theory that reach far beyond labor law.Footnote 31 Yet the NLRB is a particular focus for many of the most powerful corporations, trade associations, and right-wing think tanks, perhaps because the NLRA so squarely challenges corporate power. Indeed, the conservative constitutional assault on labor is not limited to separation of powers or administrative law arguments. The Chamber of Commerce and other trade associations, along with allied right-wing organizations, have mounted a broader constitutional challenge to labor law, with some notable recent successes at the Supreme Court.Footnote 32 For example, in Janus v. AFSCME, the Court held that fair share fees, which obligate all workers to contribute to the cost of administering a union contract and help ensure the financial viability of unions, violate the First Amendment when used in public sector employment.Footnote 33 More recently, the Court struck down a state law granting union organizers limited access to farms to talk to workers; it held that such access constituted a “taking” of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.Footnote 34 Meanwhile, the Trump administration has mounted a frontal assault on labor, firing hundreds of thousands of federal workers and challenging their right to engage in collective bargaining, while targeting immigrant workers for deportation without due process.Footnote 35

What will result from the pending challenges to the NLRB is uncertain. Even assuming the companies prevail on some claims and the Court reshapes, weakens, or strikes down the Board, the effect on labor organizing and unions is hard to predict. On the one hand, a win for the Trump administration and the corporate challengers could be devastating for workers. Despite its failings, the NLRB has played a critical role in enabling unionization and collective bargaining; its demise or diminishment could return the country to a regime far more hostile to workers, exacerbating a race to the bottom, with no federal floor.Footnote 36 A decision in favor of the Trump administration could also embolden the president to challenge other long-established principles of constitutional law, encouraging his assault on federal workers, immigrant workers, and the rule of law. On the other hand, some observers believe that the absence of a federal agency with significant preemptive reach might set free a labor movement hamstrung by legalism, and might allow progressive states to experiment.Footnote 37 The actions of the conservative Court could also spur backlash among working Americans who broadly support unions, further undermining workers’ confidence in the Court and leading them to engage in more protest and disruption to enforce their rights.Footnote 38 Indeed, that is what happened in the 1930s, when a Court deeply antagonistic to labor lost the support of the public until it eventually reversed course in Jones & Laughlin.

One thing is certain, however: Questions about labor rights are fundamentally questions about how we constitute ourselves as a nation, about who holds power and how they can wield it. These are inevitably questions of constitutional law. At the same time, the constitutional future of the NLRA and of labor law more generally is as much a political and economic fight as a legal one. With the country facing staggering levels of inequality, millions of working people struggling to make ends meet, and a president committed to aggrandizing his own power at the expense of democracy, the political fight is on. And the stakes are every bit as high as they were a century ago.

Footnotes

I am grateful to Melanie Mignucci, Juan Ramon Riojas, and Charlotte Waldman for excellent research assistance and to Joseph McCartin and Christian Paiz for their helpful feedback. Research for this essay was made possible in part by the Abraham M. Buchman Fellowship for Administrative Law at Columbia Law School.

References

1 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. secs. 151–169 (1935).

2 Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor (Princeton, 2013), 44, 51.

3 For excellent engagement with these problems, see Joseph McCartin, “Milestone, Millstone, …Tombstone? The 90-Year Life Cycle of the National Labor Relations Act,” Modern American History 8, no. 3 (2025) and Christian Paiz, “An Inheritance: the National Labor Relations Act in the Age of Trump,” Modern American History 8, no. 3 (2025). See also Kate Andrias, “The New Labor Law,” Yale Law Journal 126, no.1 (Oct. 2016): 5–6; Daniel J. Galvin & Jacob S. Hacker, “The Political Effects of Policy Drift: Policy Stalemate and American Political Development,” Studies in American Political Development 34, no. 2 (Oct. 2020): 224; Karl E. Klare, “Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941,” Minnesota Law Review 62, no. 3 (Mar. 1978): 286; and Paul Weiler, “Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA,” Harvard Law Review 96, no. 8 (June 1983): 1769.

4 See Klare, “Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941,” 287.

5 Appellant’s Opening Brief, Space Exploration Techs., Corp. v. NLRB, No. 24-40315 (5th Cir. filed July 17, 2024); Appellant’s Opening Brief, Amazon.com Servs. LLC v. NLRB, No. 24-50761 (5th Cir. filed Oct. 10, 2024); NLRB v. Starbucks Corp., 125 F.4th 78 (3d Cir. 2024); Transcript of Proceedings at 21, Trader Joe’s E., Inc., 01-CA-296847 (Jan. 16, 2024).

6 Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415 (2025).

7 Robert Iafolla, “Trump Stymies Labor Board by Firing Democrat Gwynne Wilcox (2),” Bloomberg Law, Jan. 28, 2025.

8 James A. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board: A Study in Economics, Politics, and the Law 1933–1937 (New York, 1974), 171; Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933–1941 (Boston, 1970), 349.

9 National Lawyers Committee, Report on the Constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act (1935), x.

10 Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board, 172.

11 Ibid., 195–204; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1932–1940 (New York, 1963), 231. For examples of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence at the time, see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 56–62 (1905).

12 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

13 Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board, 255; Bernstein, The Turbulent Years, 449–50.

14 Tyrrell Krum, “Bench Unanimous in One Ruling, Divides Five to Four in Four Other Cases,” San Francisco Examiner, Apr. 13, 1937, 1. See also Arthur Krock, “Five Cases Decided,” New York Times, Apr. 13, 1937, 1.

15 “Wagner Calls on Both Sides to Obey the Act,” San Francisco Examiner, Apr. 13, 1937, 2.

16 Edward S. Corwin, “The Court Sees a New Light,” New Republic, Aug. 4, 1937.

17 John Q. Barrett, “Attribution Time: Cal Tinney’s 1937 Quip, ‘A Switch in Time’ll Save Nine’,” Oklahoma Law Review 73, no. 2 (Winter 2021): 229–42.

18 29 U.S.C. sec. 153(a). See also VHS Acquisition Subsidiary No. 7 v. NLRB, No. 1:24-cv-02577, 2024 WL 5056358, at *10 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2024); Aditya Bamzai & Saikrishna Prakash, “The Executive Power of Removal,” Harvard Law Review 136, no. 7 (May 2023): 1758; Daniel D. Birk, “Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive,” Stanford Law Review 73, no. 1 (Jan. 2021): 179.

19 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The challengers attempt to distinguish Humphrey’s Executor by arguing that the NLRB members exercise functions more executive in nature and that their removal protections are stronger than those in Humphrey’s Executor. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 10–11, Space Exploration Techs., Corp. v. NLRB, No. 24-40315.

20 Other agencies similarly designed include the Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the Federal Maritime Commission. 15 U.S.C. sec. 41 (1914); 15 U.S.C. sec. 2053 (1972); 49 U.S.C. sec. 1111 (1974); 46 U.S.C. sec. 46101 (1961).

21 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. secs. 7521(a), 1202(d) (1946); Leachco, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 103 F.4th, 763 (10th Cir. 2024), VHS Acquisition Subsidiary No. 7 v. NLRB, 2024 WL 4817175, at *1–4 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2024); cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 492 (2010).

22 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5–8, 11, Waffle House, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 3:24-cv-06751-MGL (D.S.C. filed Nov. 21, 2024); Respondent’s Exception to the Decision of the ALJ, United States Postal Service, No. 06-CA-277831 (filed June 4, 2024).

23 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 25.

24 Ibid.; see also Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (rejecting First Amendment challenge).

25 Jack M. Balkin, “From Off the Wall to On the Wall,” The Atlantic, June 4, 2012.

26 For instance, see YAPP USA Automotive Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 24-12173, 2024 WL 4119058 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2024); Cortes v. NLRB, 2024 WL 1555877 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2024); Alivio Med. Ctr. v. Abruzzo, 24-cv-7217, 2024 WL 4188068 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2024); and Wilcox v. Trump, No. 25-334, 2025 WL 720914 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2025). Some Trump-appointed judges, however, sided with the challengers. See VHS Acquisition Subsidiary No. 7 v. NLRB, 2024 WL 5056358, at *10.

27 Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415.

28 Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332 (Dec. 8, 2025).

29 For instance, see Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2273 (2024); Ohio v. EPA, 144 S. Ct. 2040 (2024); SEC v Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2139 (2024); West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2614–16 (2022); and Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 492.

30 Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2340–41, 2347 (2024). See also Gillian E. Metzger, “The Roberts Court’s Dual Stance on Executive Power,” ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (forthcoming) (showing that the current Supreme Court seeks to narrow the authority of administrative agencies while taking an expansive view of presidential power).

31 For instance, see Neil Gorsuch and Jane Nitze, Over Ruled: The Human Toll of Too Much Law (New York, 2024); Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (Chicago, 2014); and Gary Lawson, “The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,” Harvard Law Review 107, no. 6 (Apr. 1994): 1231–54. See also Steven Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (Princeton, 2020).

32 Kate Andrias, “Constitutional Clash: Labor, Capital, and Democracy,” Northwestern University Law Review 118, no. 4 (Jan. 2024): 1042–64.

33 Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2459–60 (2018).

34 Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2080 (2021).

35 Elena Shao and Ashley Wu, “The Federal Work Force Cuts So Far, Agency by Agency,” New York Times, May 12, 2025; Myah Ward, “Behind Trump’s Push to Erode Immigrant Due Process Rights,” Politico, Apr. 28, 2025.

36 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a)(5); Williams T. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 37–58.

37 See Benjamin I. Sachs, “Going, Garmon, Gone: Why States May Now Be Free to Redesign Labor Law,” OnLabor, June 4, 2025; Joe Burns, “Labor Law Won’t Save Us,” Jacobin, Jan. 27, 2015; and Benjamin I. Sachs & John Fry, “Is Labor Preemption Good for Labor?” (unpublished manuscript, on file): 8–10.

38 Lydia Saad, “More in U.S. See Unions Strengthening and Want It That Way,” GALLUP, Aug. 30, 2023.