1. Introduction
“Warraq Island is not for sale” and “Our lands and houses are not for sale” were two of the slogans raised during the demonstrations by the residents, in opposition to the Egyptian government’s initiative to evict them for “illegally” occupying the island.Footnote 1 Although such statements appear to be typical of those confronted by authorities when attempting to evict or relocate them, this case presents a point of contention regarding the legal status of land, such as riverbanks or desert land, whose ownership is not clearly defined by Egyptian law. According to the Egyptian Civil Code (Art. 874), land that belongs to no one becomes the property of the state. However, since the same legislation also provides a process in which individuals can acquire such land through occupation (waḍ‘ al-yad), the state has attempted to end such acts and reclaim its land by amending its laws. Thus, the present study examines the nature and extent of the acquisition and expropriation of land in the Nile River, with specific focus on Warraq Island in Greater Cairo, Egypt. It is important to note that Egypt has adopted the Western legal system, while also retaining elements of Islamic law and customs (cf. Debs, Reference Debs2010). In this regard, this study also examines how the Egyptian government and the people use such laws and what this reveals about their sense of justice.
The setting of this study is Warraq Island, which includes an area of approximately 6 square kilometres.Footnote 2 This is roughly twice the size of neighbouring Zamalek Island, which is approximately 2.7 square kilometres.Footnote 3 While Zamalek is known as an affluent residential area that has been urbanized since the 19th century (Raymond, Reference Raymond2001), Warraq Island, known in Arabic as al-Warrāq al-Khaḍar (the “Green Warraq”), is an undeveloped island under the jurisdiction of the Giza Governorate, with close ties to Imbaba County.
As for its infrastructure, the Ring Road passes through the northern tip of Warraq Island, while on the southern/central part of the island, there is the Tahya Masr (the “Long Live Egypt”) Bridge. The residents mainly rely on two privately operated ferries for their daily transportation needs: one on the western (Imbaba) side and the other on the eastern (Shubra El-Khima) side. Although the island includes schools, hospitals, electricity, and a water supply, it lacks paved roads and comprehensive housing plans, since the majority of the housing has been informally built on the island’s agricultural land.
In recent decades, the expansion of such unplanned informal settlements, or ‘ashwā’iyyāt,Footnote 4 has occurred across the country, due to the rapid population growth and the inadequate supply of formal housing. This phenomenon has become a major social issue as agricultural production has declined, resulting in an increase in food imports and external deficits, and deteriorating living conditions (Cole and Altorki, Reference Cole and Altorki1998; Shawkat, Reference Shawkat2020; Sims, Reference Sims2011). Hence, the government has identified such informal settlements as a threat to the people’s lives and the country’s natural resources and has initiated concerted efforts to eradicate them. Such efforts include reclaiming the state land from unauthorized occupants and developing riverbanks or desert land for residential use. The overall objective is to facilitate the expansion of new cities where people are encouraged to settle, rather than remain in ashwā’iyyāt (Sims, Reference Sims2014; Wahdan, Reference Wahdan2012).
In this context, on 16 July 2017, government forces arrived on Warraq Island to remove the illegal houses and buildings on the island’s riverbanks and state-owned lands. All of these structures were considered as encroachment on state property (al-ta‘addī ‘alā amlāk al-dawla) (see also Dorman, Reference Dorman, Springborg, Adly, Gorman, Moustafa, Saad, Sakr and Smierciak2021). Meanwhile, the residents, who considered themselves to be legitimate citizens living on their land, opposed such actions and gathered in the streets and open spaces. Several clashes occurred, with security forces using tear gas and other crowd-control weapons. This resulted in numerous injuries and arrests, with one death among the residents and several injuries among the security forces.Footnote 5
The government’s rationale was that since the Nile islands were officially state property and designated nature reserves (maḥmiyya ṭabī ‘iyya), all individuals residing there were inherently violating the law. It also claimed that they built residential structures on land supposedly designated for agricultural use and discharged sewage directly into the Nile. In response, the residents claimed their legitimacy as legal owners of the land and buildings by presenting official registries and purchase contracts. The residents even established a popularly elected body, known as the Warraq Island Families Council (majlis ‘ā’ilāt jazīrat al-warrāq), to represent their interests and affairs. In this case, they filed administrative lawsuits to stop the eviction and development project, petitioned the court for the immediate release of those arrested, organized opposition rallies and street protests, and disseminated information on the Internet, especially on social networking platforms.Footnote 6 Partly due to these actions, the government altered its stance toward the residents, recognizing their rights and initiating a formal expropriation process for public benefit (naz‘ milkiyya li-l-manfa‘a al-‘āmma) in accordance with the law.Footnote 7 This also included negotiations regarding fair compensation and alternative housing arrangements, both on and off the island.
Such activism of the residents of Warraq Island is clearly a representation of their resilience through formal and proactive approaches. However, the purpose of this study is not to simply repeat the story, but rather to re-examine it from a different perspective, namely that of the law. Specifically, this requires an investigation of the Egyptian law that allowed the residents to acquire the land on the island. At this point, the following question is raised: Is the government’s claim that all land (including the islands and riverbanks) along the Nile is state property correct? To answer this question, this study focuses on the government’s efforts to restrict the informal occupation and reclaim state-owned land as well as the responses of the residents and their means of resistance through formal actions.
Before beginning this discussion, it is important to emphasize the methodological stance of this author. Egypt is a country with a predominantly Muslim population that is situated within the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In comparative law, MENA countries are typically treated as a consolidated entity and referred to as “Muslim societies” or the “Islamic world” (e.g., Chiba, Reference Chiba1986; Sait and Lim, Reference Sait and Lim2006). However, the Egyptian legal system has been modernized since the 19th century and its laws have been revised depending on the country’s situation.Footnote 8 In this regard, the Egyptian experience is different from those of other MENA countries with Muslim majorities, although there are some shared elements inspired by Islamic law or al-sharī‘a (e.g., Otto, Reference Otto2010). As a sociocultural anthropologist with an interest in the Middle East, this author’s goal is not to identify the essence of Islamic culture through a re-examination of Egyptian law, but to elucidate the ways in which legal practice occurs within a context that is deeply (but not solely) shaped by Islamic traditions (cf. Hounet and Dupret, Reference Hounet, Dupret and Hounet2018, p. 5). Accordingly, the present study presents a contextual analysis of the events and actions on Warraq Island, based on the context of Egyptian law and society as well as the normative values and attitudes in the country.
2. Property laws in Egypt
Egypt’s modern history begins with the rise of the Muhammad Ali dynasty in the 19th century, which secured a quasi-independent status from the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, Egyptian land law began to diverge from Ottoman law around the middle of the century (e.g., Jorgens, Reference Jorgens and Owen2000). In the 1870s, during the reign of Khedive Ismail, the dynasty experienced a notable decline in financial stability, which was mainly due to the significant expenditures on public works such as excavation of the Suez Canal and the construction of new districts in Cairo. This resulted in political intervention by the British and French governments, culminating in the British occupation in 1883. Meanwhile, Muhammad Ali attached considerable importance to agriculture, especially the cultivation of cotton (Rivlin, Reference Rivlin1961). He abolished the Ottoman tax collection method and adopted a new system for the state monopoly of agricultural land and the control of peasants (Chalwash, Reference Chalwash2023; Cuno, Reference Cuno1992). In response to the abovementioned economic crisis, the Khedival government allowed private ownership of agricultural land based on the condition that each potential landowner pays land taxes for seven years in advance (Baer, Reference Baer1962). This led to the establishment of extensive land estates by members of the royal family, prominent individuals, and foreign nationals (Abbas and El-Dessouky, Reference Abbas and El-Dessouky2011).
In 1922, Egypt gained nominal independence from the British protectorate. Subsequently, the Kingdom of Egypt was established, with the heir to the Muhammad Ali dynasty as the king. Meanwhile, the newly elected parliament adopted a constitution (dustūr) based on Belgium’s constitution, which was also a monarchy. Article 9 of the Egyptian 1923 constitution states that property rights (al-milkiyya) are “inviolable” (ḥurma) and that “no person shall be deprived of his property (lā yunza‘u ‘an aḥd milk-hu), except for reasons of public benefit and in the case specified by law (qānūn), and only on the condition that just compensation is provided.”Footnote 9
The 1923 constitution was subsequently halted by the July Revolution of 1952, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser (Gordon, Reference Gordon1992). The revolutionary regime initiated agrarian reforms that limited the size of agricultural land holdings, for the purpose of weakening the landholding class. In 1953, the Republic of Egypt was established, after which a new constitution was adopted in 1956. The constitutional protection of property rights gradually eroded in the following years, which saw the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the country’s rapprochement with the Soviet socialist bloc. For example, Article 11 of the 1956 constitution represented a moderation in the level of protection of property rights. Specifically, it was reformulated as a simple affirmation that the right to property “shall be protected (maṣūna).”
The 1964 constitution, which advocated Egyptian socialism, defined three categories of ownership: state ownership, cooperative ownership, and private ownership (Article 13). Among these, state ownership was described as “inviolable” and that “its protection is the duty of the citizen” (Article 15). Meanwhile, private ownership, as in the 1956 constitution, “shall be protected.” The 1971 constitution and its amendments changed some of the terminology, with state ownership renamed as public ownership. Finally, the current 2014 constitution maintains the basic tenet that the right to public ownership is “inviolable” and that the right to private ownership “shall be protected” (Articles 33–35).Footnote 10
It is noteworthy that the 2014 constitution includes not only the protection of the property rights of individuals, cooperatives, and the state, but also protection for agricultural and fishery resources as well as their workers (Articles 29–30), natural resources, public lands, mines, and the state’s private property (Article 32). Moreover, the constitution requires the government to protect the Suez Canal (Article 43), the Nile (Article 44) and its waterways, groundwater resources, coastal areas, lakes, nature reserves (Article 45), and the natural environment (Article 46). The constitution also requires the provision of just compensation for the expropriation of private property for public benefit (Article 35) and the prohibition of forced displacement for any purpose (Article 63).
In 1949, the new Civil Code came into force in Egypt (Law No. 143 of 1948).Footnote 11 Although it was based on the previous French-style codes (the Civil Code of the Mixed Courts of 1875 and the Civil Code of the National Courts of 1883), it sought to create a harmonious civil law that would bring social justice to citizens, the majority of whom were Muslim.Footnote 12 In the Code, the right of ownership (al-milkiyya) is defined “to constitute the right to use, to derive income from, and to dispose of a thing” (Article 802), in accordance with the provisions of Western law (Debs, Reference Debs2010, p. 85). Meanwhile, Article 805 states that “no person shall be deprived (lā yuḥramu) of his property,” except in the case specified by law (qānūn) and in exchange for just compensation. The language here is quite analogous to that used in Article 9 of the 1923 constitution. This raises the question of ownership of an “ownerless (lā mālik la-hā) thing” when it is occupied (al-istīlā’). The Civil Code provides separate legal frameworks for movable and immovable property. If an individual occupies an ownerless movable property with the intention of claiming its ownership, then he/she acquires ownership of it (Article 870). This provision also applies to wild animals (Article 871), although catches, game, and lost property are subject to the provisions of individual laws (Article 873).
As for the occupation of ownerless land, Article 874 states a different regulation. Although the third paragraph was later repealed by Law No. 100 of 1964, the original version of Article 874 is as follows:
Article 874
(1) Uncultivated land that has no owner belongs to the state.
(2) It is not permissible for anyone to own or occupy such land without permission from the state and in accordance with regulations.
(3) However, if an Egyptian cultivates, plants, or builds on uncultivated land, he shall possess the portion of land that he has cultivated, planted, or built on, even if he has not obtained permission from the state. Nevertheless, if the land remains unused for five consecutive years within fifteen years of the acquisition of ownership, it shall be considered forfeited.
In the Egyptian context, the statement “uncultivated land that has no owner” refers to the country’s vast desert area that remains unexploited due to the lack of water and soil nutrients. Egypt’s climate is primarily arid, receiving sporadic rainfall only in the northern region along the Mediterranean Sea during the winter months. Thus, agricultural production is largely dependent on the Nile. In the original stipulation of Article 874 (3), the Civil Code granted ownership to anyone who has cultivated such land or built a structure on it, thereby generating use and benefit (manfa‘a). This was based on the principle of the resurrection of dead lands (iḥyā’ al-mawāt) in Islamic law (al-Ḥukūma al-Miṣriyya, n.d., pp. 195–9; al-Sanhūrī, Reference al-Sanhūrī1986, p. 54). However, due to the increased military attention to desert areas during World War II, a number of laws have been enacted since the 1940s in order to restrict the previously unrestricted use and acquisition of desert lands.
In 1964, Law No. 100 was enacted to regulate the leasing and disposal of “state-owned land as private property”Footnote 13 (al-arāḍī al-mamlūka li-l-dawla milkiyya khāṣṣa).Footnote 14 The law repealed paragraph three of Article 874 of the Civil Code and reorganized its associated rights. Article 2 of the law states that state-owned land is private property, comprising three distinct categories: (1) agricultural land or cultivated land within the area bounded by the village land boundary (al-zimām) and areas up to two kilometres beyond it; (2) barren or uncultivated land located within the area; and (3) desert land or all land outside the area. In the case of the confiscation of agricultural land by state authorities, the land is to be sold by public auction or tender (Article 8). Meanwhile, barren land is to be cultivated by public or private enterprises or by small farmers (Article 9). Article 11 stipulates that land that has been elevated by rivers (ṭarḥ al-nahr) is to be classified as state property. Part III of the law presents the method for selling and distributing barren and desert land to small farmers and peasants. However, this section was later repealed by Law No. 143 of 1981, which renewed the relevant methods for dealing with desert land.Footnote 15
In order to reinforce the prohibition set forth in Article 874 (2) of the Civil Code regarding the unauthorized use of uncultivated land with no owner, Law 100/1964 stipulates that neither the long-term acquisition (ḥiyāza) nor the occupation (waḍ‘ al-yad) of such land is permitted. However, Article 75 of Law 100/1964 states that any individual who cultivates land or constructs a building on land outside the al-zimām boundary and areas up to 2 kilometres beyond it prior to 24 August 1958 (the effective date of Law No. 124 of 1958 that preceded Law 100/1964) shall be considered to have acquired ownership of that portion of the land, provided that it does not exceed the maximum limit of land ownership under the Agrarian Reform Law. Accordingly, individuals who occupy, cultivate, or build on the land after the enactment date of Law 124/1958 are not considered to be the owners of their lands (Article 80). The exception is if they submit an application to the competent authority (by the end of 1969) in which they request the purchase of their land or complete a lease agreement with the authority for a period of up to nine years. If no application is completed, or if an application is rejected by the authority, then the authority may remove any buildings or trees on the land and declare it as state property. In essence, the state’s stance on the unauthorized occupation of state land is prohibition. However, existing occupations are not immediately subject to eviction.
There is a similar structure in Law No. 143 of 1981. Specifically, this law stipulates that desert land, which in principle belongs to the state but is in reality put under the jurisdiction of state authorities or informally occupied by citizens, cannot be used or occupied, legally speaking, without prior permission from the state. In this regard, those who violate the regulations are subject to penalties, including forced eviction through administrative measures. However, as in the previous legislation, lands occupied prior to the enactment of this law, especially those registered with state authorities, are considered valid. In such cases, the occupants can pursue a process called the “legalization of occupation” (taqnīn waḍ‘ al-yad) with payment of a fee. Here, Egyptian land law employs a dual structure of formal prohibition and the conditional ratification of informal occupation.
This dual structure has served as the main framework for the government’s renewed campaigns to restore or reclaim state-owned land since 2016 (SIS, 2016). Overall, these campaigns have identified numerous cases of illegal occupation of state land across the country and called on the authorities to either provide occupants with a process to formalize their situations within a specified time period upon payment of a fee or remove them. This also affected Warraq Island.
3. Development plans for Warraq Island
Warraq Island first came to public attention in the 1990s, when then-Prime Minister Kamal El-Ganzouri declared that all of the 188 islands in the Nile, including Warraq Island, were to be designated as “nature reserves”Footnote 16 (Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1969 of 1998). Accordingly, all activities that could potentially degrade the environment, such as fishing, agriculture, or dumping garbage and sewage were prohibited as prescribed in Article 3, although some people had already settled on those islands. At that time, the Environmental Law (Law No. 4 of 1994) was finally enacted as a result of the increased effort to raise environmental awareness in the country (Gomaa, Reference Gomaa1997). However, these regulations had limited power or were usurped by other traditional ministries with authority over the Nile (Bell, Reference Bell and Singerman2009).
In 2001, Prime Minister Atef Ebeid, who succeeded El-Ganzouri, designated the entire Warraq Island as a public benefit zone, through which the government could expropriate land on it (Prime Ministerial Decree No. 542 of 2001). In this case, the Minister of Housing, Ibrahim Suleiman, explained that the island was a newly formed riverbed created by the Aswan High Dam, which indicated that it constituted state property, and that individuals from surrounding areas had illegally occupied the island, creating poor living conditions that were detrimental to both the environment and their well-being (Bell, Reference Bell and Singerman2009, p. 360). Here, the minister’s statement as well as the memorandum from the Ministry of Housing indicated that the purpose of the decree is to facilitate urban development—rather than to protect natural environment—on the island.Footnote 17 Unsurprisingly, the residents of Warraq Island objected to the move and even filed an administrative lawsuit,Footnote 18 challenging the legality of the decree and claiming their rights.Footnote 19 Consequently, Ebeid had to issue a second decree (Prime Ministerial Decree No. 848 of 2001), which recognized the rights of the landholders and prohibited the removal of the existing structures on the island (Article 1). The decree also stated that the landholders in question had the right to officially register their property with notary offices, upon payment of a fee (Article 2). This situation reminds us of a dual process consisting of the formal denial of informal occupation and the subsequent possibility of formalization.
In the late 2000s, urban development plans brought Warraq Island back into the public eye. For example, in 2009, the Cairo 2050 plan was introduced as a comprehensive blueprint for the future urban development of the capital city (Cube Consultants, Reference Consultants2010a). This plan encompassed the Maspero Triangle (one of the most well-known informal settlements in the heart of downtown), the Rawd El-Farag neighbourhood in North Cairo, the Nile banks, and Warraq Island. As for Warraq Island, the area was to be transformed into a tourist, entertainment, and commercial centre, with construction limited to less than 20% and an increase in the number of parks and green spaces. This plan also included the construction of a bridge to connect Warraq Island to the east and west, a metro line, and a monorail. It also proposed the construction of a tall tower called the Nile Guard at the southern tip of the island. A similar approach can be found in the Giza 2030 plan, introduced in 2010 (Cube Consultants, Reference Consultants2010b).Footnote 20
Perhaps the most comprehensive account of the transformation of Warraq Island was the Horus Island Plan, introduced in 2010 by a private consultant at the request of the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) under the Ministry of Housing (Cube Consultants, Reference Consultants2010c).Footnote 21 This plan indicated that the land on Warraq Island covered 1,285 feddans.Footnote 22 As of 2009, the southeastern part of the island included a population of approximately 30,000 concentrated in a small area known as Warraq Village. In regard to the living conditions on the island, this plan stated that the water supply is frequently interrupted due to insufficient capacity, with some residents resorting to washing dishes in the Nile River. Meanwhile, due to the lack of a sewage treatment system, the sewage is stored in trenches until trucks collect it and dispose of it into the Nile. Meanwhile, the island’s only bakery has been unable to meet the demands of the growing population. Although the Ring Road bridge spans the northern tip of the island, there is no connecting road. In order to improve their poor living conditions, this plan proposed to limit the island’s residential zone to 10% of the land, with 50% designated for green spaces and gardens, and 30–40% reserved for hotels and commercial facilities. This plan advocated the renaming of Warraq Island to Horus Island, since the configuration of the island resembles the shape of an eye, symbolizing the ancient Egyptian god Horus. In this case, the central eye was conceived as a space surrounded by water, with an excavated water channel and high-rise buildings facing the marina.
However, these plans were abandoned due to the major political upheavals that occurred in Egypt in 2011 and 2013. In the aftermath of these events, the individuals and politicians who had initially championed these plans stepped down. In 2014, a new direction was introduced by Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab. First, in May 2014 (under the interim presidency of Adly Mansour), Mahlab issued Prime Ministerial Decree No. 510, authorizing the construction of the Rawd El-Farag (later Tahya Masr) Bridge, connecting both banks of the Nile through Warraq Island. This created a new opportunity for the residents of Warraq Island to access the city of Cairo via a bridge. It is important to note, however, that the land on which the bridge was to be built was anticipated to be expropriated at a later date.
Second, in June of the same year, Mahlab appointed Laila Iskandar,Footnote 23 a prominent social entrepreneur, as the Minister of State for Urban Development and Informal Settlements (‘ashwā’iyyāt). Through Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1252 of that year, Minister Iskandar was empowered to eliminate the ‘ashwā’iyyāt issue, ensuring the safety and hygiene of the citizens’ living conditions, and promoting urban development aimed at improving basic infrastructure.Footnote 24 In collaboration with Iskandar, Mostafa Madbouly, the Minister of Housing in Mahlab’s cabinet, reintroduced the Warraq Island development plan into the policy debate. In this case, Madbouly considered Warraq Island a major component of the broader urban plan for Greater Cairo. For instance, he proposed consolidating the island’s dispersed population into a 50-feddan zone, while transforming the remaining area into a hub for tourism, entertainment, and commerce (Ḥamza, Reference Ḥamza2014). Madbouly retained the post of Minister of Housing in Sherif Ismail’s cabinet, from September 2015 until his own ascension to prime minister in June 2018. Meanwhile, Egypt Vision 2030,Footnote 25 a prospective plan for achieving sustainable development goals, was unveiled by President El-Sisi in February 2016. This plan included eliminating informal settlements, providing basic infrastructure, and creating better living environments as some of its main goals. Since then, the El-Sisi/Madbouly administration has been working diligently to improve the general standard of living of the Egyptian people.Footnote 26
Under El-Sisi’s presidency (i.e., since June 2014), the removal of encroachments on state lands gained momentum, resulting in a nationwide campaign. This had a significant impact on Warraq Island. The main actor in this effort was the Committee for Reclaiming State Lands (lajnat istirdād arāḍī al-dawla), which was established in November 2012 by the Kandil cabinet under President Muhammad Morsi (Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1205 of 2012). Its main purpose was to list the state lands that are under informal occupation, take legal actions for their reclamation by the authorities, and make recommendations on future preventive measures (Article 2). This committee consisted of representatives from several ministries, with a judge leading the investigations (Article 1).
In December 2012, Ahmad Idris, a specially appointed judge in charge of agricultural land corruption issues, was appointed as the chairman of the Committee and began investigating the cases in question. Meanwhile, newspaper articles reported the locations and number of encroachments that had been removed. Idris retained his position after the political change in June 2013, and in November 2014, he was reported to have reclaimed 4,000 feddans along the Cairo-Ismailiyya desert road (Shalabī, Reference Shalabī2014). In December of that year, Prime Minister Mahlab met with Idris and received a report on the results of the campaign for reclaiming state lands in Giza. Mahlab also stated that the government attached great importance to this issue, that the state did not intend to overlook the land grabbers, and that it would direct the surplus paid for the formalization of occupation to various projects that help improve the lives of the Egyptian people (Kāmil, Reference Kāmil2014).
In 2016, ex-PM Mahlab,Footnote 27 who assumed the chairmanship of the Committee in February 2016 by Presidential Decree No. 75 of 2016,Footnote 28 initiated another national campaign to identify and remove illegal occupations. Mahlab referred to the reclaimed lands as the “people’s right” (ḥaqq al-sha‘b) and argued that the state’s goal was to take state property back from those who were occupying it for personal gain. He also planned to allocate it to serious investors, with the goal of generating profits for the public (Sālim, al-Baḥrāwī, and Abū Sadīra, Reference Sālim, al-Baḥrāwī and Abū Sadīra2016). In August of that year, another presidential decree was issued (Presidential Decree No. 378 of 2016), which stipulated that the recommendations of the central committee of the campaign were to be binding in regard to the formalization of occupation (Article 1). According to Article 3, the competent authority shall determine the amount of payment for the legalization based on prescribed criteria, receive at least a quarter of the total amount as an advance, while the remainder is due within a certain time period. The payment will be deposited into the “people’s rights account” (Article 3). Here, the same dual structure of the prohibition of occupation and its subsequent formalization by payment of a fee is observed.
It was not until the end of 2016 that Mahlab disclosed his intention to permit a formalization process. With significant achievements under his belt, Mahlab claimed that the era of gangs and rule by force had ended (Sālim and Sumayka, Reference Sālim and Sumayka2016a) and began approving formalization contracts for those who had settled with the government (‘Abd al-‘Āṭī, Reference ‘Abd al-‘Āṭī2016). This was expected to result in a significant influx of revenue into the state treasury (Sālim and Sumayka, Reference Sālim and Sumayka2016b). In February 2017, a number of governorates began accepting formalization applications (al-Maṣrī al-Yawm, 2017). By April of that year, approximately 2,600 applications had been submitted in just two weeks, representing more than one million feddans (Sumayka and Sālim, Reference Sumayka and Sālim2017). In the same month, the Committee issued the first formalization contracts (Sālim and Sumayka, Reference Sālim and Sumayka2017). Then, Mahlab informed the governors that the end of May would be the final date for this process, since he planned to hold a national conference on 7 June in which governors and ministry representatives would report their progress on the removal of encroachments of state land to President El-Sisi. This became the context for the 16 July incident.
4. Governmental action on Warraq Island and resistance by the residents
4.1. The 16 July incident
On 7 June 2017, President El-Sisi attended a national conference on state land, in which ministers, governors, and other officials presented reports on their respective situations and activities in different parts of the country. Sitting in the front row, the president responded to each report, with Mahlab and Prime Minister Ismail at his side (YouTube.com, 2017). In the middle of the conference, El-Sisi responded to a report from the governor of Qalyubiyya (located north of Cairo) stating, “As I said before, encroachments of the areas along irrigation and drainage canals are unacceptable… If such acts exist, we will definitely remove them after evicting the residents.” As such, the president unequivocally rejected the formalization of the occupation of such land. However, he showed acceptance of the formalization of other areas if the applicants were serious, indicating that the government has received as many as 100,000 applications thus far.Footnote 29 El-Sisi continued by stating that the Nile islands are where, according to law, “no one should enter,” either due to its designation as a nature reserve or due to the lack of permits. Moreover, he stated:
There is an island in the Nile with an area of more than 1,250 feddans. I will not tell you its name, but as a result of the occupation, people built houses there and informal settlements were established. If there are 50,000 people there, where does the sewage go? It ends up in the Nile, from which we all drink. Later, they will ask us to build sewage systems and treatment plants, and they will say that the sewage they dumped in the Nile was harmful to their health. No, that is not quite right. We must be careful with these words. We all have to work as citizens before the state. That is why, I ask you, these islands should be given priority.
The Ministry of Housing and the GOPP promptly responded to the president’s remarks and reactivated the Nile Islands Development Plan, which was originally introduced in 2010 (Sālim and ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm, Reference Sālim and ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm2017). Again, one of the targeted areas was Warraq Island. In the following days, a reporter from the al-Masry al-Youm (The Egyptian Today) newspaper provided an account of the situation and the voices of the island’s residents. According to the report, the primary means of transportation on the island was tuktuks, i.e., three-wheeled motorized vehicles used as taxis. Sewage was observed overflowing from underground trenches, and garbage piles had formed along the riverbanks, due to the lack of an incinerator on the island (al-Sayyid, Reference al-Sayyid2017a). The reporter also presented the perspectives of three residents, beginning with an elderly man who offered his candid observation:
I have lived on this island for over 70 years. How could I leave the island and leave the land and home that have become a part of me? The government does not recognize us as human beings and does not give us any rights. We do not have education, sanitation, sewage, or drinking water. I am a farmer, so I cultivate the land and live off its bounty. I cannot leave this land and move to one of the new cities. Even if I go there, I do not know what I would do to make a living there.
The second interviewee characterized the relationship between the island and its inhabitants as analogous to that between water and fish:
We live like fish, and if we leave the island, we will die. Maybe the government wants to take the land because we are poor and have no one to help us. I was born on this island and I have a home here. I cannot just leave.
The third person introduced himself as the former head of the island’s village office. He recalled the attempt by Prime Minister Ebeid in 2002 to transform the island into a tourism project, which prompted the residents to file an administrative lawsuit. A survey conducted at the time showed that the island’s state-owned land was only 60 feddans, 30 of which were owned by the Ministry of WaqfFootnote 30 and leased to the residents. He stated that certain officials had provided the president with false information about the island, and that two members of parliament (MPs) representing Warraq Island were responsible for this action and were urging the residents to leave. However, he told them, “You cannot make us leave unless you do it according to the law.”Footnote 31
On 15 June, Prime Minister Ismail issued a decree exempting 17 Nile islands, including Warraq Island, from the nature reserve designation (Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1310 of 2017). This indicated that it was possible to build houses and develop new residential areas on these islands, which had been prohibited by environmental laws.
After a month, on 16 July, a large security contingent, accompanied by government officials, arrived on Warraq Island to execute the order to remove illegal structures on the island (‘Abd al-‘Āṭī, Reference ‘Abd al-‘Āṭī2017). According to the police report released to the media, when the forces arrived in the morning, the residents gathered in large numbers to prevent their actions (Abū Sadīra, Reference Abū Sadīra2017). The crowd even resorted to throwing stones and using live ammunition. In response, the security forces used tear gas in attempt to control the crowd. The security forces withdrew from the island that afternoon. Overall, 33 security personnel, including officers, were injured, while one resident was killed and 19 others were injured. A total of 35 residents were arrestedFootnote 32 (Dabash, Reference Dabash2017; Ramaḍān, Reference Ramaḍān2017; al-Sayyid, Reference al-Sayyid2017c). Given the significant number of casualties on both sides, Warraq Island quickly attracted public attention. This was accompanied by an increase in the number of people accessing videos and comments posted on social networking platforms, which helped raise awareness of the situation on the island and the return of the Horus Island Plan. Meanwhile, the residents made a number of demands, including the cancellation of the development plan, the immediate release of those arrested,Footnote 33 and an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of the young man.
In August 2024, seven years after the incident, this author had the opportunity to visit Warraq Island. The landscape there was not significantly different from that described in the newspaper articles. Despite the presence of some empty dwellings and collapsed structures, there was obvious evidence of human habitation. In several locations, construction work was underway on high-rise apartment buildings that were remarkably different from the other houses on the island. We observed that some of the local people were working at the construction sites. As reported, roads within the island were mostly unpaved, narrow, and circuitous, with a width that only allowed for the passage of a single vehicle. On the northern part of the island, which mainly consisted of farmland, farmers were using pumps to irrigate their fields with Nile water. Although the Tahya Masr Bridge was completed on the southern part of the island, there was no connecting road down to the island. Accordingly, the residents continued to rely on ferries for transportation. This raises the following questions: What changes have occurred on Warraq Island over the past seven years since the incident? What measures (formal or informal) have residents taken to halt the government’s development initiatives? The following section explores these questions in more detail.
4.2. Battles in legal fields
After the 16 July incident, negotiations between the government, the military, and local officials, on the one hand, and the residents of Warraq Island, on the other, began in early August. The main figure was General Kamil El-Wazir,Footnote 34 the head of the Armed Forces Engineering Department, which was responsible for the construction of the Rawd El-Farag (Tahya Masr) Bridge. On 8 August, during his visit to Warraq Island, El-Wazir had a telephone conversation with President El-Sisi, which the assembled residents heard over a loudspeaker. El-Sisi assured the residents that the government had no intention of confiscating their land or forcibly relocating them. He even stated that the government was interested in developing the island and would work to provide the residents with adequate housing (Bawwābat al-Maṣrī al-Yawm, 2017). The government’s stance on the issue showed a clear shift that day, perhaps driven by the president’s words. Subsequently, the government began offering financial compensation to those whose properties were affected by the construction of the Rawd El-Farag Bridge, although the price offered was considered inadequate or undervalued by many residents (al-Sayyid, Reference al-Sayyid2017e).
During another visit to Warraq Island, El-Wazir asserted that “no citizen of Egypt or Warraq Island will be harmed or suffer injustice under the rule of President El-Sisi.” He further emphasized that “no citizen’s rights will be lost” and that “those who have rights will receive what is due to them through agreements, provided that such actions do not contradict the public interest of the state.” As such, El-Wazir promised to pursue expropriation through legal means (al-Sayyid, Reference al-Sayyid2017f). Meanwhile, he also expressed his intention to address the challenges associated with the informal settlements, narrow roads, and illegal structures along the Nile, and to implement equitable development plans. Although he did not explicitly state the underlying rationale, the transformation of the island into a luxurious urban centre remained viable. Since the residents feared that they would eventually be evicted, they decided to collectively negotiate with the government to secure fairer compensation and alternative housing, including the possibility of living on the island. Some of the residents even petitioned the Administrative Court to suspend the Warraq Island development plan altogether.
For that purpose, the residents began collecting signatures from across the island to elect a ten-member front (jabha) from among themselves (al-Sayyid, Reference al-Sayyid2017g). At its core was their distrust of their official representatives and their rejection of the government’s decision to expropriate 100 metres of land on either side of the bridge construction site as reserve land.Footnote 35 The front, also called a committee (lajna), subsequently formed the basis of a council (majlis) called the “Warraq Island Families Council,” which aimed to represent the residents of the island in a different way from the formal representatives of local or national parliaments.Footnote 36 Specifically, the Council was deeply rooted in the concept of family (‘ā’la). Unlike the Arabic term usra that denotes a household or nuclear family, the term ‘ā’la denotes an extended family or larger kinship group based on (mainly patrilineal) blood relations. In this case, each of the 63 ‘ā’ilas on the island selected 5 candidates, after which a total of 315 individuals cast their votes to elect 10 members (al-Sayyid, Reference al-Sayyid2017i). Following the election, the Council was established in October 2017.Footnote 37
The Council’s founding charter outlines eight principles (Afifi, Reference Afifi2017; al-Nāṣir, Reference al-Nāṣir2017): (1) to investigate the circumstances regarding the death of the young man who died during the 16 July incident; (2) to maintain the inviolability of the island’s territory; (3) to refrain from negotiating with the government until it presents the Council with a full proposal of its development plan; (4) to formalize the occupation of state-owned land and buildings on the island; (5) the central committee of the Council is empowered to make decisions on behalf of the Council; (6) no negotiations with outside parties are permitted, except for those authorized by the Council; (7) any government official wishing to engage in dialogues with the Council must do so at the headquarters in Warraq Village; and (8) the Council shall meet regularly on the last Friday of each month, or meet in an extraordinary session in case of emergency. Some have argued that this was the creation of a genuine popular grass-root democracy, characterized by the direct election of representatives by the residents themselves and the concentration of authority in their hands (Afifi, Reference Afifi2017). Following the establishment of the Council, the residents held a large gathering in November 2017 in which they invited journalists and reflected on the history of unrest on the island ranging from the time of Ebeid to the 16 July incident. These protesters showed their opposition to the sale of their land and buildings with the slogans quoted at the beginning of this study (al-Sayyid, Reference al-Sayyid2017j).
At this point, the following questions are raised: To what extent was the opposition movement successful? and What was the government’s response? In April 2018, Ismail’s cabinet transferred Warraq Island from the local administration to the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) (hay’at al-mujtama‘āt al-‘umrāniyya al-jadīda), as part of its development plan (Egypt Today, 2018). The decision was issued on 2 June (Prime Ministerial Decree No. 20 of 2018), after which a branch of the NUCA was established on Warraq Island. It was a strange move. According to Article 1 of the founding Law No. 59 of 1979, the NUCA aims to establish new residential zones outside the existing urban and village areas, for the purpose of enhancing social stability and economic prosperity. In this regard, the law facilitates the construction of new cities in desert areas such as Sadat City or Sixth of October City. In theory, it is impossible to establish a NUCA branch in a place consisting of agricultural lands such as Warraq Island. However, in order to achieve its goal, the government amended the law in January 2018, just before transferring Warraq Island to the NUCA. Specifically, the amendment (Law No. 1 of 2018) added a clause to Article 1 of Law 59/1979 that allows the cabinet to establish NUCA branches within existing urban and village areas. This was equal to changing the rule in the middle of the game.
Naturally, the decision was met with considerable opposition by the local community. On 24 June, a group of 21 individuals from the island (later joined by 61 additional residents), including lawyers, filed an administrative lawsuit against the Prime Minister, the Minister of Housing, and the President of the NUCA (Action No. 46990 of Judicial Year 72).Footnote 38 Their main objective was to revoke the establishment of the NUCA branch on Warraq Island and consequently halt the progress of any development plan on the island. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that Law 59/1979 was not applicable to Warraq Island, which mainly consists of privately owned agricultural land. The plaintiffs also argued that the purpose of the law was to establish new urban communities in desert areas, which would remain unchanged after the amendment introduced by Law 1/2018. The plaintiffs also claimed that the amendment was inconsistent with Article 29 of the Egyptian constitution, which requires that the state protect agricultural land. The plaintiffs emphasized that the residents possess title deeds and showed them as proof of their legitimate ownership.
The Administrative Court accepted the case and, after reviewing the evidence submitted by the residents, it issued an interim order on 23 March 2019.Footnote 39 The court ordered the assignment of three experts to determine the residents’ land ownership as well as evaluate the use of the land on Warraq Island. For this purpose, the court imposed costs of 10,000 Egyptian pounds on the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs were unable to meet this obligation, then the hearing would end in April. If they paid the fee, then the trial would continue in June (or beyond). In this case, the plaintiffs duly paid the required fee and the trial continued. However, in May 2021, the plaintiffs withdrew their complaint (‘Abd al-Qādir, Reference ‘Abd al-Qādir2021) and in April 2022, the case was officially declared moot (Nābilyūn, Reference Nābilyūn2022). The reasons for dropping the case are unknown, but there were political changes that seemed to support the development plan for Warraq Island. Madbouly, who served as Minister of Housing in Ismail’s cabinet and was heavily involved in the initiative to eradicate ‘ashwā’iyyāt, became Prime Minister in June 2018 (France 24, 2018). Hence, it is not difficult to imagine the obstacles that the legal action faced under the political power that prevailed at that time.
In November 2018, a Cabinet Order (No. 49 of 2018) was issued designating that 100 metres of land on both sides of the long-pending Rawd El-Farag Bridge construction site and the coastal area of the island up to 30 metres from the Nile’s waterfront as public benefit zones, allowing for the expropriation of land. The bridge construction site was originally designated as a public benefit zone by Prime Ministerial Decree No. 510 of 2014,Footnote 40 which was reaffirmed by Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1139 of 2019. The designation of the 100-metre zones on both sides of the site as public benefit was also reaffirmed by Cabinet Order No. 37 of 2021.Footnote 41
Following these orders, the 100-metre zones around the bridge and the 30-metre zone from the island’s waterfront were finally expropriated. The government then proceeded to acquire the rest of the land on the island through agreements between the residents and the NUCA. In September 2019, a new development plan for Warraq Island formulated by the Ministry of Housing was approved (Ministry of Housing, Infrastructure and New Communities Order No. 775 of 2019). In January 2021, the construction of 68 high-rise residential towers on 60 feddans of the island was designated as a public benefit project for urban planning. In September 2022, the Egyptian television station Ṣadā El-Balad documented the residents willingly receiving compensation and alternative housing off the island (YouTube.com, 2022). In the video, the woman told the reporter, “No one drove us away, and we were not compelled to move out” (Ṭāhā, Reference Ṭāhā2022). In July 2024, Madbouly stated that the government had purchased 993 feddans, or 76% of the island’s total area of 1,290 feddans, and stressed the need to complete the purchase quickly (al-Ṭayyib, Reference al-Ṭayyib2024).
Overall, it appears that the residents’ resistance yielded to the government’s action and legal manoeuvres. However, in a BBC Arabic interview aired in August 2024 (YouTube.com, 2024), Muhammad Khaled, a lawyer and one of the residents, shared a different view. Referring to the 16 July incident, he claimed that “the state acted based on false information, which led it to perceive the residents of Warraq Island as squatters, gangsters, and illegal occupiers.” As the residents continued their demands, the government was forced to acknowledge that they were the legitimate owners of the land on the island. As a result, the government changed its strategy from forced eviction to just compensation and alternative housing. Khaled also stated that the government will not pursue the forced option and that the residents do not want such actions to occur. He concluded by saying, “We are in our homes. We will remain in our homes until we draw our last breath. This is our land to protect. This is what the state is supposed to give us.” His remarks suggest that the residents have won the battle of discourse, if only partially. It may be a small victory, but it reveals the many challenges they faced and their surprising resilience on the battlefield of law.
5. Conclusion
This study examined the question of how land that belongs to the state is recognized in Egypt, where land laws have evolved through a specific course of events. A case in point is Warraq Island in Greater Cairo. In July 2017, government forces arrived on the island to remove “illegal” occupations on state-owned land. However, they faced opposition from the residents and were forced to withdraw. Since then, the government and residents have been engaged in discussions about the ownership of the island, its legitimacy, and possible solutions. This case touches on a wide array of issues, including administrative measures, judicial actions, and discursive battles over state property vs. private property.
As noted in Section 2 of this study, the Egyptian Civil Code designated “uncultivated land that has no owners” as “state property.” In the same law, the dual structure of denying the unauthorized occupation of such land and granting rights to actual land users exists. Desert lands, the banks of the Nile, and islands are legally considered as “state-owned lands,” but in some cases are informally occupied and used by citizens without permission from the state, which has been attempting to reclaim them in recent years. Warraq Island is one of them. As discussed in Section 3, there have been various efforts to transform and develop Warraq Island since the 1990s. The intention to develop the Nile islands has been prominent in President El-Sisi’s administration. In 2016, a national committee to reclaim state land from illegal occupiers gained momentum, which provided the context for the government to take aggressive action on Warraq Island in July 2017. Fearing eviction, the residents obstructed the government forces, after which they organized themselves for collective action and negotiation. The subsequent government’s acknowledgement of their rights and promise to provide just compensation and alternative housing was a triumph for their resistance. Nevertheless, the transformation of Warraq Island into new residential and commercial quarters is moving in accordance with the government’s plans, if not at the speed it desired.
Overall, the disputes over Warraq Island highlight the power asymmetry in the legal struggle between the government and the residents. The government mobilized the legal system to its advantage (even changing the law), whereas the local population appealed to the law and the courts to the best of their ability. As discussed in Section 4, lawyer Muhammad Khaled claimed that the residents turned to the constitution and the law as a source of protection for their rights. The law was the residents’ shield, but it was not hard enough. In this regard, the residents relied on themselves. In protest, they gathered in the streets in large numbers, raising their voices and forming a solid mass, as the Egyptians did during previous revolutions. It was a strange coincidence that the charge against the 35 people arrested in the incident was “gathering in large numbers” (tajamhur).Footnote 42 Since it was a felony, the majority of them were sentenced to at least 15 years in prison. It took six years for the 19 of them to get acquittal. In this case, the law helps the people, but not as quickly as one might expect; rather, the law helps the state much faster and more powerfully. Accordingly, the people need other means of support, such as their own presence in large numbers in public spaces. It is in this dimension of “customary law” that the sociocultural characteristics of a society come to the fore.
Open access
