In September 2012, Brazil’s most influential news magazine published a letter from a reader criticizing the expansion of affirmative action for college admission under the administrations of President Lula da Silva (2003–2010) and President Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), both from the Workers’ Party (PT, by its Brazilian initials). The letter to the Veja magazine stated: “I studied in public schools and came unprepared to higher education. I had to content myself with a private university. To ensure that my son would have a different history, with a lot of effort, I was able to keep him in the private [school] network, from the start of elementary school to the end of high school. Now he runs the risk of losing a vacancy in a public university for a candidate that is less prepared than him. Is this social justice, President Dilma?” (in Porto Reference Porto2023, 140).
We don’t know the full identity of the letter’s author, but it clearly indicates the social position of a white, middle-class parent. The letter refers to the stratified nature of Brazil’s educational system. Historically, the children of (mostly white) families who can afford private and expensive middle and high schools had much greater chances of entering public universities, which are free of charge and generally of much better quality (see Bernardino-Costa and Blackman Reference Bernardino-Costa and Elisa Blackman2017, 375–376). The letter reflects a sense of entitlement that results from that stratified system. It defines the provision of private education as the natural path to guarantee access to public universities. It also illustrates an attitude of resentment that frames changes in college admission as unjust and unfair, which are then the subject of indignation. The author of the letter predicts that her son, who goes to a private school, might lose out on a vacancy at a public university to a candidate who is “less prepared” than him. The statement is a clear reference to low-income and mostly Black and brown students who gained unprecedented access to higher education through the expansion of affirmative action during PT administrations. The letter suggests that students accessing universities through the so-called quota system were less prepared than her son, even though research has demonstrated that such students do not have significantly lower scores in the entry exam for public universities when compared to those who access them via general admission (see Vilela et al. Reference Vilela, Tachibana, Filho and Komatsu2017). As resentment often does, the letter transforms the bearers of privileges (in this case, members of the white middle class who have preferential access to higher education) into victims of major injustices.
The Veja reader illustrates the resentment that gradually spread among white middle-class Brazilians in relation to significant socioeconomic changes that took place during the PT era (2003–2016). Between 2013 and 2018, Brazil’s white middle class established a new conservative and reactionary movement that included massive street demonstrations. The movement led to the 2016 unconstitutional impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and culminated in the 2018 rise of far-right politician Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency. Such a rise of the far right in Brazil was intrinsically connected to the spread of white resentment (Porto Reference Porto2023).
This article seeks to develop a critical theory of political resentment that can account for the role of toxic sentiments of hatred and spite in contemporary processes of democratic backsliding. Such an analytical goal requires us to broaden the traditional disciplinary bases for thinking about politics. By engaging with perspectives from philosophy, sociology, political science, communication, and other disciplines, I argue that a transdisciplinary approach is required for a proper analysis of the complex configurations of toxic resentment in contemporary manifestations of far-right leaders and movements.
I start with an analysis of Brazil’s conservative rebellion, highlighting the linkages between white resentment and the rise of the far right. The second section reviews debates about the concept of political resentment in modern and contemporary social theory. The third section presents a definition of the concept of toxic resentment and outlines its three main constitutive elements. The fourth section outlines the principles for a critical theory of toxic resentment that focuses on two contextual factors: economic transformation or decline and actual or perceived status losses. The article ends by highlighting the ways such a theory can advance our understanding of the recent rise of conservative movements and the resulting crises of democratic politics.
Before advancing the argument, some caveats are in order. While the analytical framework outlined in this article emphasizes the role of toxic resentment in the rise of far-right leaders and movements, it is not my intention to suggest that such complex phenomena can be explained solely in terms of sentiments of hatred and spite. Several other factors contribute to the formation and dissemination of conservative rebellions. For example, this article does not consider in more detail the impact of Christian nationalism or evangelical churches in driving the backlash about women and LGBTQ+ rights (see Biroli Reference Biroli2020; Biroli et al. Reference Biroli, Machado and Vaggione2020; Gracino Júnior, Goulart, and Frias Reference Gracino, Paulo and Frias2021; Saidel Reference Saidel2024). It also does not discuss the public security crises that tend to increase support for far-right politicians who promote tough-on-crime policies (see Lero Reference Lero and Pereira2023; Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco Reference Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco2020). While toxic resentment is not sufficient to explain all the complexities of far-right politics, I argue that a critical and comprehensive perspective on resentment can shed new light on its contemporary manifestations.
White resentment and the far right in Brazil
Between 2013 and 2018, Brazil’s white middle class intensified its political mobilization and established a massive conservative rebellion. In 2013, the rise of public transportation fares and discontent about human rights violations and wasteful spending in relation to the decision to host the 2014 World Cup sparked the largest protest movement in more than two decades. At its peak, on June 20, 2013, more than 1.4 million people in at least 140 cities took to the streets to protest (Porto and Brant Reference Porto, Brant, Dencik and Leistert2015, 62). The more the movement grew, the more diversified its agenda became. The initial emphasis on the quality and cost of public transportation and on the negative effects of the World Cup was later replaced by a broader set of grievances that reflected the predominance of middle-class participants in online and street mobilizations (Porto and Brant Reference Porto, Brant, Dencik and Leistert2015, 62).
The massive street mobilizations of 2013 had significant political consequences, which resulted from the movement’s complex and often conflicting dimensions. The protests mark a critical point in the fragile democratic equilibrium established by the 1988 Constitution, exposing the deep structural limitations of Brazil’s political system (Nobre Reference Nobre2022). At this critical conjuncture, the activists who took to the streets shared contradictory characteristics, including a demobilizing morality that focused on sacrifice and victimization (see Tavares and Perimer Reference Tavares and Perimer2020) and a narrow conception of democracy that expressed little or no concern for the institutions and rules that are essential for democratic accountability and governance (see Mendonça Reference Mendonça2018). Embedded in these contradictions, the 2013 protests had significant unintended consequences. As Cavalcante and Arias (Reference Cavalcante, Arias, Bouffartigue, Boito, Béroud and Galvão2019) noted, they mark the start of the decline of the PT era, when the middle class realized its mobilizing power and its ability to exert political pressure outside electoral cycles.
The start of the anticorruption Operation Car Wash in 2014, which brought criminal charges against several high-ranking politicians, including former president Lula da Silva, further contributed to the political mobilization of the middle class. In 2015 and 2016, a new wave of street protests emerged demanding the imprisonment of Lula and the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. Surveys with participants of the pro-impeachment rallies reveal the predominance of middle-class subjects (Cavalcante and Arias Reference Cavalcante, Arias, Bouffartigue, Boito, Béroud and Galvão2019). Several studies corroborate these findings, indicating that the middle class was the key protagonist of the 2015–2016 mass demonstrations of the pro-impeachment movement (Firmino Reference Firmino2018; Ridenti Reference Ridenti2018).
The conservative rebellion of the middle class had immense political consequences. Emboldened by the street demonstrations, the opposition accused President Dilma Rousseff of manipulating the federal budget by hiding loans made from state-owned banks without congressional approval. Even though the alleged offenses did not qualify as the kind of high crimes and misdemeanors required by the Brazilian Constitution for impeachment, Rousseff was overthrown from the presidency by a trial in April 2016. Vice President Michel Temer, himself facing charges for accepting bribes, took office and brought a conservative coalition to power, effectively ending the thirteen-year-long dominance of the PT in the presidency. Former president Lula was detained in April 2018, which prevented him from participating in the 2018 presidential elections, and he spent the following 580 days in prison.
Widespread resentment over the policies and socioeconomic changes promoted by PT administrations after 2003 is central to understanding the political mobilization of the white middle class. André Singer (Reference Singer2012) famously coined the term lulismo to designate a style of political leadership marked by a strong identification between Lula and the popular classes or subproletariat. Singer highlights how the reformist policies implemented during Lula’s first term in office (2003–2006) led to a profound political realignment during his reelection to the presidency in 2006. The electoral support for PT candidates in presidential elections shifted from the regions and voters with higher levels of income to the Northeast and to the bottom of Brazil’s socioeconomic pyramid. Even though lulismo was characterized by a weak type of reformism (see Singer Reference Singer2012, 45–46), several policies implemented during the PT era (2003–2016) gradually built a sense of existential threat among middle-class publics (see Porto Reference Porto2023). The relative erosion of the historical bases of status and prestige, which had been central for whiteness and middle-class formation, caused a significant “status panic” (Mills Reference Mills1956, 254–258) in the middle class. As already noted, the expansion of affirmative action for college admission was one of such policies. Other changes included a major increase in the real value of the minimum wage and innovative social policies such as Bolsa Família, which led to unprecedented reductions in poverty and inequality levels, with more than thirty million Brazilians lifted out of monetary poverty between 2003 and 2011 (Kerstenetzky et al. Reference Kerstenetzky, Uchôa and Silva2015, 23). Such improvements in the living conditions of lower-status groups allowed them to engage with leisure and consumption spaces and practices that used to be monopolized by the white middle class, spreading anxiety and resentment (Cavalcante and Arias Reference Cavalcante, Arias, Bouffartigue, Boito, Béroud and Galvão2019, 56–57; Costa Reference Costa2018; Pinho Reference Pinho2021; Porto Reference Porto2023, 87–93; Roth-Gordon Reference Roth-Gordon2017, 72; Saraiva et al. Reference Saraiva, Rezende, Reis, Inácio and Schucman2015). Another significant policy change was the expansion of labor rights to more than six million domestic workers through the adoption of a constitutional amendment in 2013 and a new law in 2015. Several scholars have suggested that the need to comply with labor rights and pay more for their domestic workers generated widespread dissatisfaction and resentment in the white middle class about the social policies of the PT era (Acciari Reference Acciari2021, 6–7; Cal et al. Reference Cal, Lopes, Rezende, Cal and Brito2020, 200; Cavalcante Reference Cavalcante2015, 12–13; Costa Reference Costa2018, 514–515; Maia Reference Maia2021; Pinho Reference Pinho2021; Porto Reference Porto2023, 72–80; Ramos-Zayas Reference Ramos-Zayas2020, 187–193; Singer Reference Singer2012, 205–206). Interestingly, despite all the backlash, the Bolsonaro administration was not able to abolish the quotas for access to public universities or the legal guarantees for domestic workers that had been established during previous PT administrations.
Recent studies have provided significant empirical evidence about the links between perceptions of status loss, social class resentment, and the rise of the far right in Brazil. Drawing on survey data, Ricardo Valente and Julian Borba (Reference Valente and Borba2023) identified a growing social resentment among elites, especially middle-class men, which in turn played a major role in the election of Bolsonaro in 2018. Also on the basis of survey analysis, David Samuels et al. (Reference Samuels, Mello and Zucco2024) showed that respondents who believed that they had lost status under PT administrations exhibited significantly higher levels of resentment against welfare recipients, nonwhites, and women, reinforcing political polarization. These and other studies provide robust evidence about the significant role of resentment in Brazil’s recent turn to the far right.
Early explorations of political resentment
The link between resentment and the rise of the far right is not restricted to the Brazilian case but is, in fact, a central feature of the recent global wave of conservative rebellions. As Wendy Brown (Reference Brown2018) has noted, authoritarian-based resentment is one of the most disturbing elements of our times. However, we are still a long way from a comprehensive and critical theory of resentment. Such theorization is essential for a proper analysis of contemporary manifestations of right-wing backlash. Well before the more recent rise of far-right leaders and movements, Vron Ware (Reference Ware2008) had warned us that understanding resentment as a psychosocial dynamic was an urgent task, especially in contexts where whiteness provides a strong basis of identification. Her warning remains relevant, and this article seeks to contribute to advancing such an understanding.
To say that we lack a comprehensive theory of resentment does not mean that the phenomenon has been ignored by social theorists. In fact, there is a substantial line of inquiry about the significance and role of this emotion in modern political philosophy. Adam Smith (Reference Smith2005) introduced resentment as one of the most fundamental moral sentiments that, like anger, has the potential of advancing justice, as long as it remains checked. As he wrote in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, originally published in 1759, “when resentment is guarded and qualified in this manner, it may be admitted to be even generous and noble” (33). According to Smith, attempts to extirpate resentment are misguided, and we should focus instead on restraining it (see Schwarze and Scott Reference Schwarze and Scott2015, 466). For Smith (Reference Smith2005), the perturbing passion of resentment is necessary because it is required to motivate our concern for injustice.
While Smith’s treatment of resentment remains foundational, it was Friedrich Nietzsche’s (Reference Nietzsche2013) analysis of human morality, originally published in 1887, that has been credited as the first comprehensive treatment of the significance of resentment in modern societies (see Kehl Reference Kehl2020; Kelly Reference Kelly2020; Tomšič Reference Tomšič, Stagnell, Payne and Strandberg2023; Ure Reference Ure2015). Contrary to Smith, Nietzsche advances a harshly negative evaluation of the impact of resentful feelings. He adopted the French term ressentiment to designate a form of psychological disease that characterizes the weak and the mediocre and that results in an evolutionary degeneration. Nietzsche associates ressentiment with a “slave morality,” a degenerate form of envy that is common among the weak and that results in a constant depreciation of the virtues of the more advanced and noble values and individuals.
Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment has been criticized for relying on outdated, often poorly digested evolutionary theories from social Darwinism that reveal an aristocratic contempt for equality (see Ure Reference Ure2015, 606). But despite the highly problematic assumptions of his philosophical framework, Nietzsche offered fruitful insights for the analysis of resentment. These insights were taken up by the German sociologist Max Scheler ([Reference Scheler1915] 1994) to develop a comprehensive analysis of ressentiment as a feature of modern societies. He argued: “Ressentiment is a self-poisoning of the mind which has quite definite causes and consequences. It is a lasting mental attitude, caused by the systematic repression of certain emotions and affects which, as such, are normal components of human nature. Their repression leads to the constant tendency to indulge in certain kinds of value delusions and corresponding value judgments. The emotions and affects primarily concerned are revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to detract, and spite” (Scheler [Reference Scheler1915] 1994, 29).
Scheler goes beyond Nietzsche’s evolutionary and aristocratic concept of ressentiment to link sentiments of hatred and spite to the broader social, economic, and political foundations of modernity. He identifies an “important sociological law,” according to which the “psychological dynamite” of ressentiment will spread in modern, liberal societies where “approximately equal rights (political and otherwise) or formal social equality, publicly recognized, go hand in hand with the factual difference in power, property, and education” (33). Scheler therefore links resentment to the very structure of modern society, in which the promise of equality is always paired with the reality of inequality. Thus, according to him, what drives ressentiment is not inequality per se, but the combination of inequality with the modern ideology of equality (see Kehl Reference Kehl2020, 162–163).
Scholars have built on these foundational texts to advance a more systematic definition of resentment. Michael Ure (Reference Ure2015), for example, distinguished between three different concepts in contemporary uses of the term resentment: moral resentment, sociopolitical resentment, and ontological ressentiment. While the first two concepts draw on Scottish Enlightenment philosophers such as David Hume and Adam Smith to affirm resentment as a necessary condition for the formation and preservation of a sense of justice, the concept of ontological ressentiment relies on Nietzsche’s formulation to identify the ways envious hatred has become a politically toxic phenomenon in contemporary democracies.
Defining toxic resentment
I draw on these early explorations to propose a more specific definition of resentment to analyze modern and contemporary manifestations of far-right politics. While the perspective advanced in this article is closer to meanings associated to the French term ressentiment, I propose the term toxic resentment for the sake of clarity and to distinguish my approach from Nietzsche’s evolutionary and elitist perspective. Michael Ure’s (Reference Ure2015) insightful framework offers a good foundation to advance in this direction. While stressing that Nietzsche opens up a fruitful line of inquiry about the dangers of the pathologies triggered by ressentiment, Ure (Reference Ure2015, 606–610) also argued that Nietzsche’s aristocratic prejudices and biological fantasies transform every legitimate claim to justice as a reflection of self-defeating victimization and envy. In other words, Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment does not allow for a distinction between legitimate anger and grievances against elites from what I call toxic resentment.
To advance a definition of toxic resentment, this article identifies its three constitutive elements: a passive type of anger and envy, the disparagement of “others” and the values they represent, and the transformation of victimization into virtue. I first discuss each element separately before advancing a definition of toxic resentment.
Toxic resentment is a passive type of anger and envy characterized by a sense of impotence
Toxic resentment is an emotional state of hatred that often fails to directly confront the causes of the grievances or those who are the subject of indignation. It often builds over time and in silence. Resentment is born out of (perceived) powerlessness and remains marked by it (Jaeggi Reference Jaeggi2022, 504). The link between powerlessness and resentment was suggested early on by Scheler ([Reference Scheler1915] 1994), who argued that ressentiment is a strong emotion that must be suppressed because it is coupled with the feeling that one is unable to act them out. Because the resentful feel impotent to act on their grievances, Maria Rita Kehl (Reference Kehl2020, 199) defined resentment as a “passive rebellion.”
The “passive” nature of resentment refers to how aggrieved individuals quietly develop ill feelings over time that are accompanied by a sense of impotence in relation to the political, economic, social, and cultural changes that surround them. However, as discussed in more detail in the following sections, when sufficiently disseminated and vibrant, toxic resentment can be mobilized by political leaders and movements to establish interventions and rebellions that propel the disgruntled into action. In such circumstances, resentment becomes an “active” and important historical force. A key feature of contemporary manifestations of toxic resentment has been the electoral and political mobilization of latent and often ignored grievances by right-wing forces that succeed in recognizing and appealing to them, which in turn have led to authoritarian and regressive processes of political change.
Toxic resentment disparages the “others” and the values they represent
When confronted with a real or perceived inability to reach a certain social goal, achieve a certain recognition, or maintain a status position, the resentful will often find solace in denying value to those very objectives, values, and positions. In this process, the aggrieved will adopt a negative moral judgment about what they once aspired to. Scheler ([Reference Scheler1915] 1994, 53) deploys the old fable “The Fox and the Grapes” to illustrate the “psychological law” according to which the resentful will deny positive value to previously desired objects. In this fable from Aesop, after the fox fails to leap high enough to reach some sweet grapes, he deceives himself by asserting that the grapes were in fact sour. As Ure (Reference Ure2015, 605) noted, the parable illustrates how those who suffer ressentiment relieve the tension between impotence and the desire to realize the noble ideal by declaring that the nobles they previously wanted to emulate do not in fact embody the cherished ideals of “power, domination, success, beauty, glory.” This element helps explain how resentment often results in an antagonistic attitude to those seen as representatives of such ideals. As Jaeggi (Reference Jaeggi2022, 504) argued, ressentiment is “a specific kind of envy, a negative, hostile attitude and ‘ill will’ that aims at the disparagement of others and their way of life as well as at a devaluation of what they cherish and represent.” Drawing on this element of resentment, far-right movements have developed a renewed attack on values that used to be appreciated, as well as on the actors and institutions that represent them. What used to enjoy high social esteem or be broadly recognized as part of democratic politics becomes the subject of rage and spite. The targets of the new forms of animosity are extremely diverse, but can include science; diversity, equity, and inclusion policies; the principle of human rights; and social movements advocating for gender, racial, and social justice.
Toxic resentment turns victimization into virtue
Resentful subjects insist on blaming others for their problems, on creating scapegoats, and on presenting themselves as the victims of injustices, even when enjoying relatively privileged social positions. In this perspective, “past injuries become central to the subject’s identity in the present,” establishing a sense of melancholy that continually revisits previous wounds, as illustrated by Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan (Kelly Reference Kelly2020, 7). Resentment is, therefore, an emotional state that enables an inversion of previous notions of oppression and subjugation by framing privileged or relatively privileged groups as victims of systematic injustice. For example, it resonates with the long-standing effort to paint white men as victims, which “erases the material distinction between real structural inequality and indignation that arises from felt intensities” (Kelly Reference Kelly2020, 8).
A definition of toxic resentment
With these three key constitutive elements of toxic resentment, it is now possible to offer a definition. Toxic resentment refers to a diversity of processes in which aggrieved individuals who feel ignored, wronged, or treated unfairly gradually develop bitter and antagonistic attitudes toward the real or perceived ascension of social groups that are framed as undeserving. The toxicity of this sentiment refers to its core hostility to basic norms of democratic coexistence and governance, which are understood by the aggrieved to be the cause of such felt injustices. In contexts marked by economic decline, increases in the concentration of income, or changes in the hierarchy of status groups, toxic resentment disseminates victimization among the aggrieved, even when the aggrieved occupy privileged or relatively privileged social positions. It also directs blame away from the actual forces that cause societal changes and individual hardships, targeting instead forms of political, socioeconomic, and cultural inclusion that are associated with representative democracy. The toxicity of this type of resentment therefore refers to its regressive and totalitarian tendencies.
Toward a critical theory of toxic resentment
While the definition of toxic resentment advanced in this article opens new analytical perspectives, a proper theorization about its role in the rise of far-right movements and rebellions requires a broader framework. As Ware (Reference Ware2008, 6) noted, resentment has often been analyzed as a purely psychological rather than an eminently social condition. Jaeggi (Reference Jaeggi2022, 506) concurs, stating that we must avoid the tendency to “psychologize ressentiment.” A critical theory of resentment, therefore, requires analyzing in more detail its historical articulations with broader social, economic, and political contexts. The next sections of this article seek to contribute to the development of such a theoretical perspective.
Based on lessons drawn from the rise of the far right in Brazil, this section seeks to outline the main requirements for a critical theory of political resentment. The goal is to highlight the social basis of toxic resentment and emphasize its forms of articulation to social forces and structures in historically specific contexts. As Jaeggi (Reference Jaeggi2022, 502) has observed, ressentiment alone is not sufficient for a critical analysis of authoritarian-populist mobilizations, and we have just begun to grasp the structural dimensions underlying them. A first step in the development of a critical theory of toxic resentment is, therefore, the identification of the historical processes that lead to its intensification and political mobilization. Such a theoretical perspective requires paying proper attention to the structural and social causes of the spread of resentment. For the purposes of this article, I highlight two contextual factors that are particularly important: economic decline or inequality and perceived threats to status positions.
Toxic resentment is more likely to spread with economic decline or income concentration
While many factors explain the rise of the far right in Brazil, the economic slowdown that took place during President Dilma Rousseff’s administration and the recession that followed are central to understanding the conditions that potentialize the spread of toxic resentment. Contrary to her predecessor, President Lula da Silva, Rousseff faced a more difficult international context, characterized by the depression of international commodity prices. She tried to implement a neo-developmentalist agenda but failed to maintain economic growth. From a record annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 7.5 percent in 2010, the last year of Lula’s second term in office, economic growth slowed to 4.0 percent in 2011 and to 1.9 percent in 2012. Rousseff tried to reverse the economic downturn by adopting a neoliberal recipe of fiscal austerity and higher interest rates, but inflation rose, private investment fell, and GDP growth tumbled, hindering her ability to continue income distribution policies (Loureiro and Saad-Filho Reference Loureiro and Saad-Filho2019, 76). As a result, from 2012 to 2013, the middle class shrank, while the number of Brazilians living in poverty increased, effectively ending the expansion cycle of the Lula era (Quadros Reference Quadros2015, 1–2). In 2015, the first year of her second term, Brazil fell into a full-fledged economic recession with a negative GDP growth of –3.3 percent. Economic decline and corruption scandals propelled the white middle class to take to the streets through massive demonstrations in 2015 and 2016; they demanded Rousseff’s impeachment, which would eventually take place in 2016 through a parliamentary coup.
The politics of resentment that mobilized the Brazilian middle class and that contributed to establishing a conservative rebellion between 2013 and 2018 cannot be understood without reference to this economic context. It is therefore important to analyze how far-right movements are articulated with socioeconomic conditions that lead to sentiments of material and income losses. This point was reiterated by Rory McVeigh and Kevin Estep (Reference McVeigh and Estep2019) in their comparative analysis of the wave of mobilization of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s and of the rise of Donald Trump to the presidency in 2016. According to them, “political power loss is more likely to produce white nationalist policies when it is lost alongside economic power, since these political losses diminish the likelihood of redressing economic grievances through normal political processes” (McVeigh and Estep Reference McVeigh and Estep2019, 127).
Far-right movements are more likely to emerge and thrive not only in periods of recession but also during processes of reorganization of the economic system. Well before the rise of Trumpism in US politics, Marlia Banning (Reference Banning2006) identified changes in material conditions that created a fertile ground for the spread of resentment. These shifts included a restructuring of the economic base from manufacturing to service, wage stagnation, and more contingent and lower-paying jobs. These trends continued in the United States even during periods of economic boom, such as the late 1990s (Banning Reference Banning2006, 75). This reorganization of the economy was a direct result of the neoliberal turn of the 1980s and 1990s, when free market policies and trade agreements undermined the influence of trade unions, promoted further deindustrialization, and led to the financialization of the economy. Living conditions deteriorated with the increase in income inequality and the precarity of the job market, with devastating consequences for entire regions, such as the Rust Belt in the upper Midwest. As we have seen, Max Scheler was one of the first scholars to emphasize the connection between social structure and psychological mechanisms. He identified a foundational discrepancy found in modern societies between normative self-understanding and actual living conditions. Rahel Jaeggi (Reference Jaeggi2022, 511) builds on his insights to identify a strong connection between resentment and neoliberalism: “Certainly, the alleged discrepancy has taken out on a new form and new dimensions within contemporary neoliberalism and financialized capitalism: the ressentiment-triggering tension that confronts us today in a specific neoliberal form or precarity along with the ideological imperative imposed on the individual to independently (and creatively) solve her own problems, the assumption of responsibility that the spirit of neoliberal capitalism has been obsessed with.” Neoliberalism’s ideology of meritocracy propagates while its policies undermine the actual opportunities that allow most citizens to realize the resulting expectations, preventing them from understanding the root causes of societal changes and creating favorable conditions for the spread of toxic resentment. Such reactions based on resentment are inadequate and profoundly regressive since they disempower individuals to identify and confront problems and crises (Jaeggi Reference Jaeggi2022, 521).
Thus, one of the contextual dimensions that is essential to understanding contemporary manifestations of far-right movements is the dramatic increase in income inequality, which in turn is the direct outcome of the neoliberal transformation (see Harvey Reference Harvey2005). The deepening of economic inequality creates a fertile ground for the spread of hatred and spite. As Adam Smith argued more than two centuries ago, “the affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor,” who can be driven to commit injustice if they do not see real efforts being made to curb considerable inequality (qtd. in Schwarze and Scott Reference Schwarze and Scott2015, 475).
When mainstream political parties on the right and on the left embraced neoliberal policies and showed little or no concern for the vast segments being left behind, they seeded the conditions for the rise of outsiders and for their own demise. Such contextual factors are essential to interpret the 2016 election of Donald Trump and his return to power in 2024. Local political bosses in Youngstown, a small city in the Midwestern state of Ohio that was devastated by deindustrialization and neoliberal policies, illustrate the issue. Trump extended his victory margin in the town in 2024 despite failing to deliver any of his promises to the local community during his first presidency. A former Democratic Party county chair recognized his own party’s share of responsibility for such an outcome. He stated that Trump’s success was a symptom of the failure of Democratic leaders such as Bill Clinton and Barack Obama to address the catastrophic impact of free trade agreements on manufacturing jobs and the absence of any meaningful action against Wall Street or the big banks after the housing collapse of 2007–2008.Footnote 1 McVeigh and Estep (Reference McVeigh and Estep2019) made a similar observation about coal-mining areas of the United States. They noted that even after Trump failed to resurrect local economies, voters remained attracted to him because they appreciated the attention (McVeigh and Estep Reference McVeigh and Estep2019, 80). Resentment can therefore become a resilient passion among individuals facing economic decline or witnessing wealth concentration at the top who also feel abandoned by the mainstream political institutions. In such contexts, toxic resentment will push such individuals to support far-right leaders, even when they fail to deliver on their promises.
Toxic resentment is more likely to spread when status groups feel threatened
In my analysis of the Brazilian case (Porto Reference Porto2023), I deploy Weberian categories to highlight the ways the middle class evolved as a status group (see also Costa, Reference Costa2018). The subjectivities of white-collar people in Brazil are rooted in historical processes that have established specific definitions of honor and status, which in turn formed a specific lifestyle. Some markers of social status have been particularly important in the case of Brazil’s white middle class, including privileged access to college diplomas and the ability to hire at low cost mostly Black and brown women as domestic servants. When policy changes implemented by PT administration threatened to weaken or eliminate such status-building mechanisms, resentment was disseminated among middle-class publics, gradually leading to a significant panic. In his analysis of the US context, C. Wright Mills (Reference Mills1956) coined “status panic” to designate a type of anxiety that emerges when the historical bases of prestige become infirm, making it more difficult for middle-class individuals to honor their claims. In such historical moments, new struggles around definitions of status and prestige emerge (Mills Reference Mills1956, 254–258).
The Brazilian case demonstrates that forms of resentment can spread not only during periods of economic transformation or decline but also when new threats to status hierarchies emerge. In their analysis of the US context, McVeigh and Estep (Reference McVeigh and Estep2019) adopted a similar approach, highlighting the role of status preservation in the emergence of far-right movements. It is therefore important to stress that, in some historical conjunctures, toxic resentment emerges not because of material or income losses but because of real or perceived changes in the position of status groups. As Ure (Reference Ure2015, 599) noted, the restoration of wounded honor and respect is a key motive for the spread of resentment.
Perceived threats to status positions help explain how and why privileged or relatively privileged groups feel deeply hurt by societal changes and become resentful. The spread of envy, self-victimization, and hostile attitudes often emerges when groups feel a loss of status and prestige when comparing themselves to other groups whose social position has changed or has been perceived to change. Scheler ([Reference Scheler1915] 1994, 36) had already noted that the origin of resentment is always connected with a tendency to make comparisons between others and oneself. Resentment is therefore always relational and comparative. Such comparisons are often grounded on normative assumptions about honor and respect that lead to certain normative judgments about meritorious or undeserved status positions. When experiencing a sense of decline or stagnation, the resentful will often feel impotent and turn their rage against “the others” whose status change is perceived as unmerited and unfair.
There is therefore a significant relationship between toxic resentment and the goal of preserving existing or perceived privileges. The social groups who lost or feel the loss of historically advantageous positions tend to judge the groups considered to be ascending as usurpers of their natural rights (Kehl Reference Kehl2020, 174). In such circumstances, their resentment often moves them in the direction of right-wing extremism. As McVeigh (Reference McVeigh2024, 511) has observed, when social changes disrupt privileged people’s capacity to maintain societal benefits that had been historically denied to other groups, they are more likely to abandon mainstream institutions that, in normal times, are sufficient to protect their interests, joining far-right movements instead.
The comparative nature of toxic resentment and its obsession with the preservation of status are key reasons for its systematic targeting of historically oppressed groups, including the poor, immigrants, Black and brown communities, women, and LGBTQ+ people. Far-right politics is marked by a strong sense of indignation about the real or perceived ascension of these groups by aggrieved white men, who often form the core political and electoral support for the far right. As Bernd Reiter (Reference Reiter2025, 2) noted, the authoritarian appeal of conservative rebellions lies in their promise to restore a social order steeped in white male dominance, since “it is particularly white men in societies constructed upon male dominance and white supremacy who are driving this movement, based on their perceived loss of relative pride and dignity vis à vis other groups who they have historically dominated.”
The inclusion of status hierarchies in a comprehensive theory of toxic resentment advances the inquiry of far-right politics in significant ways. It broadens our understanding of the role of economic transformations and inequalities in the rise of ultraconservative movements. Economic inequality is usually defined in terms of the distribution of income and expenditure, and is often measured in terms of the Gini coefficient. The previous contextual factor discussed in this section, which deals with the impact of economic decline or income concentration, reflects this first definition. However, Paul Segal’s (Reference Segal2022) definition of inequality as entitlements over labor expands the concept by incorporating the ability of elite groups to command other people. It offers a definition of inequality that considers one’s power over other individuals, which in turn leads to significant disparities in social status. While income inequality is connected to the concept of exploitation, inequality as entitlements over labor emphasizes the concept of domination.
Segal’s (Reference Segal2022) concept of inequality as entitlements over labor estimates the power one person has to command the labor of another, highlighting the ability of top earners to “buy” the labor of other people to fulfill their personal needs. It captures an aspect of inequality that is not covered by other measures. He demonstrates, for example, that while the United States and Sweden have a similar real per capita GDP, the entitlements over labor for the top 1 percent were 3.7 in Sweden and 17 in the United States, meaning that “the average person in the top 1% in Sweden would have to spend 27% of their disposable income to employ a median worker full time, in contrast to just 6% in the USA” (Segal Reference Segal2022, 1525). In fact, the ability of the rich to command poorer people for their own enjoyment in the United States has grown much more rapidly than income inequality (Segal Reference Segal2022, 1527).
Such dimensions of inequality have immense political consequences. Changes in entitlements to “buy” other people have the potential to generate new forms of toxic resentment among the middle and upper classes. As Segal (Reference Segal2022, 1527) noted, people care about status as intensely as they do about money and power. He argued that Brazil is a good example of these processes, as the middle-class lost command over the labor of their poorer compatriots due to rising wages (Segal Reference Segal2022, 1517). In fact, entitlements over median-wage labor fell 14 percent in Brazil between 2001 and 2015, limiting the ability of middle-class individuals to hire domestic servants, which in turn generated major anxieties and backlash (Segal Reference Segal2022, 1530–1531).
Conclusions: Implications of a critical theory of toxic resentment
Based on lessons from the Brazilian case, this article advances a critical theory of toxic resentment that seeks to examine the relationship between social structure, historical context, and the dissemination of resentful sentiments. The theory highlights the linkages between economic transformation and decline, actual or perceived status losses, and the spread of resentment. The central goal is to enable the analysis of the processes by which far-right movements and leaders mobilize such sentiments to organize political rebellions and reconfigure, if not destroy, democratic politics and processes.
The critical and contextualized theory of toxic resentment outlined in this article has the potential to advance research on the far right on several fronts. One of them is the debate of whether economic or cultural factors are more significant in explaining the new conservative waves. According to Rovira Kaltwasser (Reference Kaltwasser2023, 5), analyses of the Latin American far right tend to focus on “cultural policies,” such as those related to abortion, gay marriage, and indigenous rights, rather than on economic or redistributive issues. But rather than consider whether redistributive or cultural conflicts are more important, the analytical perspective advanced in this article allows us to examine the articulations of both dimensions. One of the urgently needed tasks in the study of the far right is the development of theoretical models that specify how economic and cultural spheres intersect in specific historical, national, and local contexts. As Juliet Hooker (Reference Hooker2020) has argued in her discussion of white grievances in the Americas, the Latin American experience demonstrates that conflicts around gender and race cannot be separated from those related to class. According to her, Latin America’s recent history suggests that a proper and more effective response to far-right rebellions requires simultaneously addressing racial and gender equality head-on while also promoting redistributive policies, as neither strategy is sufficient on its own (Hooker Reference Hooker2020, 368–369).
A critical theory of toxic resentment enables the analysis of how economic and cultural factors interact and shape far-right politics. One example is the intersection of economic transformations, anxieties about status positions, and gender. The process by which advancements in the rights of women and of LGBTQ+ people generated major anxieties and mobilized far-right movements in Latin America has been well documented (see Biroli et al. Reference Biroli, Machado and Vaggione2020; de la Torre Reference de la Torre2025; Saidel Reference Saidel2024). The analysis of how such anxieties interact with transformations in material conditions and status positions has received less attention. McVeigh and Estep’s (Reference McVeigh and Estep2019) examination of the rise of Trump in 2016 offers some basis to advance this line of inquiry. They noted that Trump’s appeal was “rooted at the intersections of economics and what his supporters thought about gender, religion, and race. The more traditional gender arrangements in a county, the more support for Trump. For example, he tended to receive a smaller share of the vote in counties where higher percentages of women worked” (McVeigh and Estep Reference McVeigh and Estep2019, 107). Trump was particularly appealing to voters where the traditional “male as breadwinner” family prevailed, and women worked as homemakers or in low-paying supplemental occupations (McVeigh and Estep Reference McVeigh and Estep2019, 107–113).
Thus, the backlash on gender issues promoted by far-right leaders and movements interacts in important ways with local gender identities and hierarchies. As Banning (Reference Banning2006) argued in relation to the United States, economic transformations can have a major impact on the spread of resentment about gender and sexuality. Drawing on Susan Faludi’s (Reference Faludi1991) classic study, she highlighted how opinion polls demonstrate that being “a good provider for the family” is the leading definition of masculinity in the United States. Yet in the 1980s, real wages for men shrank dramatically, and the traditional male breadwinner himself became an endangered species (Faludi Reference Faludi1991, 83–84). Faludi argued that, in such a context, the backlash against women’s rights was particularly strong among two groups of men: “Blue-collar workers, devastated by the shift to a service economy, and younger baby boomers, denied the comparative riches their fathers and elder brothers enjoyed. The 80s was the decade in which plant closings put blue-collar men out of work by the millions, and only 60% found new jobs—about half at lower pay” (qtd. in Banning Reference Banning2006, 84).
Banning’s (Reference Banning2006) argument points to the ways that the neoliberal turn of the 1980s affected the rise of forms of toxic resentment about changes in gender roles. The related processes of deindustrialization, job insecurity, and lower-paying jobs made it more difficult, if not impossible, for men to continue performing their traditional masculinity, spreading anxieties about their status in the family and in society at large. Such anxieties have often been captured by far-right movements.
Similar intersections of gender, economic transformation, and support for the far right can be found in the 2018 election of Bolsonaro in Brazil. After an examination of data from local labor markets in Brazil’s microregions, Laura Barros and Manuel Santos Silva (Reference Barros and Santos Silva2019) concluded that the economic recession that started during Dilma’s second term in office (2015–2016) and continued throughout the presidency of Michel Temer (2016–2018) affected the votes of men and women differently. According to their analysis, when facing economic insecurity, men feel more compelled to vote for a figure like Bolsonaro who exacerbates masculine stereotypes, which allows them to compensate for the loss of economic status. The study’s findings suggest that “employment and relative earnings are so central for male identity that, once threatened, men often respond by exaggerating their masculinity” (Barros and Santos Silva Reference Barros and Santos Silva2019, 4).
The links between economic transformations, anxieties about status positions, and gender suggest that resentment often emerges as a type of social and political bond that agglutinates different types of anxieties and hostile responses. This important role of toxic resentment as a social glue that links disparate concerns has been highlighted by Gracino Júnior, Goulart, and Frias (Reference Gracino, Paulo and Frias2021) in their insightful analysis of the role of evangelical leaders and voters in the rise of Bolsonaro in the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections. The authors argued that resentment was the key affect that promoted the identification between Bolsonaro and a growing evangelical electorate, which had become anxious about the ways in which the mobilization of feminist and LGBTQ+ groups established core threats to the traditional nuclear family and to conservative religious values. More studies on the agglutination role of toxic resentment are required for a proper understanding of recent processes of democratic decay.
Future research can also explore in more detail the ways that digital platforms facilitate the spread of forms of hatred and spite that contribute to democratic decay. Some studies have already identified significant connections between the design and architecture of digital platforms and the dissemination of toxic communications and discourses (Munn Reference Munn2020; Recuero Reference Recuero2024). Similarly, Chagas and Miguel (Reference Chagas and Miguel2025) have emphasized the role of memes circulated by Bolsonaro supporters on the messaging platform WhatsApp in fostering a resentful community.
This article draws on the Brazilian case to develop an analytical perspective for the investigation of the links between resentment and the far right. Such a comprehensive and critical theory of political resentment is particularly needed when forms of emancipatory politics are under attack by regressive and authoritarian political movements. Such an approach is imperative not only to better understand these challenges but also to build collective and more effective responses to the manifestations of hatred and spite that characterize contemporary processes of democratic backsliding.
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this article was presented at the conference Democratic Backsliding & Resistance in Latin America & Beyond (University of Florida, Gainesville, February 29–March 1, 2024). I thank the participants for the feedback provided to the manuscript. I am also grateful to the anonymous LARR reviewers for their insightful remarks and suggestions.
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