Shrinking Aid and Resources

Resource development constraints and dependence are enduring conversations among TSOs and the researchers who study them. These concepts are highlighted in analyses that assess donor-TSO relationships and the accountability implications that result. Across diverse contexts, studies illustrate how TSOs increasingly focus their accountability upward toward donors, thus creating accountability gaps with the constituents or communities they serve. Traditional development funding via bilateral aid institutions has been a target of this criticism, with perverse incentives that hinder the community-led development they aspire to support. A post-aid world, as some predict (Appe, Reference Appe2018), creates a space to assess these historical relationships and offers opportunities for TSOs to operate with increased autonomy.

As Krawczyk (Reference Krawczyk2018) and Atia and Herrold (Reference Atia and Herrold2018) observe, TSOs in low-income environments have traditionally grappled with resource-constraints and in some cases have become reliant on international or domestic aid. In cases across Liberia (Krawczyk, Reference Krawczyk2018), Morrocco, and Palestine (Atia & Herrold, Reference Atia and Herrold2018), this reliance comes at an expense. Community priorities are traded for upward accountability. TSOs adapt their behaviors to accommodate shifting donor priorities (Krawczyk, Reference Krawczyk2018), and a system of patronage becomes the norm—where TSOs are no longer accountable to communities being served (Atia & Herrold, Reference Atia and Herrold2018). With development aid shrinking across donor nations, these seismic changes will have a ripple effect on domestic TSOs in traditionally aid-reliant environments. Although withdrawal of aid negatively impacts TSOs and the communities they serve, these changes may encourage humanitarian and development TSOs to meaningfully engage with actors other than hitherto funders. Studies published in VOLUNTAS document cases across contexts and regions where this development occurs.

Appe (Reference Appe2018) and Rejón et al. (Reference Rejón, Fernandez, Olliff and Varghese2025) provide meaningful insight into how South-South development and diaspora actors have begun to renegotiate traditional foreign aid-TSO relationships. Appe’s (Reference Appe2018) publication on TSOs in South-South development cooperation exemplifies the type of constructive responses that have arisen in Latin America to enable organizations to enjoy some of the benefits that come from development cooperation—that is, networking, capacity building, collective action—without the power imbalances inherent in traditional aid. With the advantage of hindsight, we can observe now, what Appe (Reference Appe2018) described as an “emerging post-aid world” (p. 271). Likewise, Rejón et al.’s (Reference Rejón, Fernandez, Olliff and Varghese2025) study of diaspora communities across Australia, highlight how decentralized aid, in the form of household level remittances and emotional support, provide necessary assistance in humanitarian crises spanning Syria to China. Diaspora communities as distinct and recognized actors, as well as South–South development cooperation, shift important focus away from conventional conversations on donor-focused resource dependence to represent networks of peer support and horizontal exchange. These approaches are significant in that they contest the dependency dynamics and unequal power relations characteristic of traditional aid.

Closing Civic Spaces

Accounting for the limitations of donor development cooperation and ongoing declines in aid, the contraction of civic space can be attributed primarily with governments in both the Global North and the Global South. In recent years, states from the Global North and the Global South alike have increasingly relied on legal, regulatory, and discursive tools to constrain civil society actors, often justifying these measures through appeals to national security, efficiency, or accountability. These dynamics position TSOs not only as service providers but also as political actors whose legitimacy and operational space are shaped by shifting state strategies.

Against this backdrop, Toepler et al. (Reference Toepler, Zimmer, Fröhlich and Obuch2020) demonstrate that the effects of civic space closure are intentionally uneven across the sector. Their review shows that service-providing TSOs tend to retain operational space across regime types, whereas claims-making, advocacy-oriented organizations face intensified scrutiny and repression. At the same time, regime-aligned or loyal TSOs may be rewarded with funding and collaborative opportunities in what the authors describe as the “duality of authoritarian postures” (p. 649). Such state strategies simultaneously instrumentalize and marginalize parts of civil society, undermining the capacity of independent TSOs to function as agents of democratization and defenders of human rights, thus calling into question the democratic promise often attributed to civil society.

While few of the articles in this virtual issue explicitly measure civic space closure (see VOLUNTAS Virtual Issue March 2024 for more on this theme), this body of work nonetheless points to a common challenge: TSOs are increasingly compelled to adapt their strategies in response to political constraint, legitimacy contests, and resource scarcity. This raises a critical question for the sector and for TSO researchers—how do TSOs operate differently under conditions of heightened regulation, reputational pressure, and shrinking aid?

New Opportunities

Considering these trends, it is worthwhile to examine approaches and groups that present opportunities for TSOs and researchers. Several contributions highlight internal and relational strategies that seek to protect organizational legitimacy and autonomy in the absence of reliable external support. Other publications present studies of new civil society actors engaged in development cooperation and/or humanitarian assistance.

Crack’s (Reference Crack2018) analysis of the INGO Accountability Charter illustrates peer regulation as a means of pre-empting and countering external critiques of transparency and accountability. Drawing on member perceptions of the Charter’s effectiveness, the study finds that while participating TSOs were motivated by self-interest, their behavior was also shaped by shared accountability norms. Interpreted through both club theory and constructivism, these findings suggest that professionalization and sectoral coherence can emerge endogenously within civil society rather than being imposed solely by donors or states. At the same time, Crack’s analysis raises questions about the sustainability of peer regulation as a defensive strategy in increasingly hostile political environments.

This emphasis on intra-sectoral collaboration resonates with Appe’s (Reference Appe2018) analysis of South–South peer-support networks, which similarly foregrounds horizontal forms of learning, solidarity, and capacity-building. Together, these studies point to a broader pattern where TSOs seek to mitigate external pressures not only through compliance, but by strengthening internal norms, collective identity, and mutual support structures that operate outside traditional top-down or North-South hierarchies.

Beyond peer regulation and professional networks, other contributions underscore the importance of trust-based relationships with communities as a complementary strategy. While authoritarian contexts can erode public trust in TSOs, Krogh and Lo (Reference Krogh and Lo2025) show how TSOs in high-capacity states such as Denmark and Norway, can play a critical role in building and sustaining trust during emergency response. Their study of emergency management co-production demonstrates how TSOs facilitate collaboration between citizens and public authorities, simultaneously enhancing operational effectiveness and social trust. Importantly, this research highlights how dynamics of legitimacy, trust, and civic engagement are equally salient in the Global North, where TSOs also navigate changing state–civil society relations under conditions of crisis.

Another area noted by the editors is the acknowledgment of novel methods and types of actors engaged in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. For example, in a cross-country study, Kinsbergen et al. (Reference Kinsbergen, Pijnenburg, Merlevede, Naus and Koch2022) depict the important role of private development initiatives (PDIs), also known as “citizen initiatives” (p. 498), in Northern-based organizations during COVID-19 humanitarian crisis. Rejón et al. (Reference Rejón, Fernandez, Olliff and Varghese2025) highlight the engagement of diaspora communities responding to a range of humanitarian crises (sociopolitical turbulences, military conflicts, disasters). Both studies explore how humanitarian TSOs coordinated activities with PDIs and diaspora communities, actors not traditionally recognized in humanitarian response. The authors identify novel avenues to integrate PDIs and diaspora actors into humanitarian systems. This approach also demonstrates the outdated and unhelpful siloing of organizational forms (non-profit versus non-governmental organization, Global North versus Global South) in third-sector studies, considering these modern-day approaches in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance.

Finally, García-Orosa & Pérez-Seijo (Reference García-Orosa and Pérez-Seijo2020) showcase how humanitarian-focused, European-based TSOs embrace novel story telling tools. Although used by a minority of humanitarian TSOs, 360° videos were found to successfully spread messaging, raise awareness and empathy, and a reconceptualize audience engagement. Furthermore, translation applications and remote communication platforms enhance connectivity between geographically distant actors. The 360° videos have the potential to facilitate new forms of solidarity and empathy with affected populations and open doors to alternative forms of advocacy, learning, and constituency engagement.