A. Introduction
The Article aims to thrust light on recent developments in the Russia and China sanctions policy. Typically, these two countries have been at the forefront of the efforts to de-legitimize sanctions other than those enacted by the multilateral architecture of the Security Council. Multiple instances of their opposition can be found in the General Assembly Resolutions concerning unilateral sanctions and coercive measures, as well as in the voting meetings of the Security Council when considering the possibility of adopting sanctions or right after their actual adoption.Footnote 1 However, in the ever evolving reality of international relations, these States have been gradually changing their approaches regarding the issue of sanctions so much so that they can be regarded as practitioners of such measures.Footnote 2
Strikingly, China has commenced adopting its own package of measures that, in international law, are commonly referred to as unilateral sanctions, though the Chinese authorities refrain from calling them so. For instance, in an attempt to respond to arms sales to Taiwan, China has repeatedly imposed sanctions on American defense companies, including Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies.Footnote 3 These sanctions often include bans on business activities within China and restrictions on cooperating with Chinese firms. China has also implemented a policy of sanctions against individuals via visa bans and asset freezes in response to actions it considers harmful. For example, in 2022, China sanctioned U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi after her visit to Taiwan, as well as European and Canadian officials in response to Western sanctions related to human rights violations in Xinjiang.Footnote 4
As for Russia, measures aimed at primarily responding to sanctions previously levied against it have been passed by leveraging its geopolitical role. In March 2022, the Russian government imposed a ban on the export of more than 200 goods, including technological and telecommunications equipment, agricultural machinery, and some medical equipment.Footnote 5 This was framed as a protective measure against the “unfriendly” actions of other countries that were implementing sanctions on Russia.Footnote 6 It also imposed travel bans and asset freezes on a number of Western officials, journalists, and business leaders, together with blacklisting U.S. President Joe Biden, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and several EU officials, barring them from entering Russia.Footnote 7 Such actions mirrored Western sanctions against Russian officials and oligarchs.Footnote 8 As a result, this Article suggests that the recent practice, combined with the stance still taken at the UN level, is opening up a considerable gap in terms of readily utilizing unilateral sanctions as a means of exerting international leverage. In this sense, municipal laws paving the way for the imposition of sanctions have been increasingly enacted.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section B and C situate the above contradictions in the broader international legal order, shedding light on the pillars China and Russia rely on to assert their opposition to unilateral sanctions and, recently, to justify the imposition of counter-sanctions. Section D and E dwell on the relevant practice in order to distinguish “tacit” or informal sanctions from formal unilateral sanctions. For instance, as a major development, Russia and China overtly announced the imposition of sanctions. The last section will zero in on the findings of this Article, pointing in particular to how the broader geopolitical setting is shaping the way Russia and China conceptualize and apply sanctions, and what the broader implications of this process may be for International law.
B. Antagonizing Unilateral Coercive Measures: The China and Russia’s Attitude in the UN fora
Notoriously, China and Russia are vocal opponents to sanctions other than those multilaterally imposed under UN auspices.Footnote 9 They repeatedly expressed the view that unilateral sanctions are to be regarded as an encroachment upon the UN Security Council’s prerogatives in the realm of international peace and security, and as an attempt to leverage political and economic coercion in order to chiefly interfere in the internal affairs of other states. This was already evident in the context of the draconian sanctions programs set up to face multifaceted crises during the so-called “sanctions decade.”Footnote 10 Following the coup d’état that occurred in Haiti in 1993, the Security Council decided on the imposition of sanctions.Footnote 11 China cautioned that it did not “approve of resorting lightly to such mandatory measures as sanctions by the Council,” especially when it comes to dealing with matters falling within the internal affairs of a member state.Footnote 12
Different reasons have prompted China and Russia to oppose this type of sanction. For instance, when the military junta cracked down on pacific protests in 2007, China affirmed that “sanctions will not help resolve the issue, but rather further complicate the situation’ in relation with unilateral measures against Burma.”Footnote 13 Echoing a similar sentiment, Russia pointed out that “threats, pressure and sanctions exerted from outside the country are counterproductive and will only hinder the effort to solve the problems facing the country today.”Footnote 14 In other words, they risked undoing the steps towards facilitating dialogue and diplomatic solutions.
Much more recently, during a session convened at the behest of the Russian Federation to discuss the humanitarian impact of sanctions, its representative explained that unilateral measures also erect barriers to the mandate of humanitarian organizations. For example, fearing that their actions would run afoul of “national and sometimes extraterritorial effects,” the private sector displays a wary posture towards entering into agreements for the delivery of humanitarian assistance authorized by the Security Council.Footnote 15 Moreover, citing the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as an example of such operational hurdles, the unilateral sanctions make it difficult for banks to carry out transactions and “resulted in widespread unwillingness to cooperate with it, even in those areas that are not subject to international restrictions.”Footnote 16 In keeping with these observations, China cautioned that the members of the Security Council “should be all the more cognizant of the harm of unilateral sanctions imposed by certain countries … in the glorified name of implementing Council sanctions,” to the detriment of the authority and effectiveness of the UN body’s sanctions themselves.Footnote 17 By putting interpretative emphasis on the illegality of unilateral sanctions in connection with the UN Charter, China added that the sanctions have “no basis in international law and are a concrete manifestation of hegemonism and power politics.”Footnote 18
During the adoption of Resolution 2761 in 2024, which has indefinitely extended the permanent humanitarian carve-out under Resolution 2664 to the 2253 ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaeda sanctions regime, the Russian statement went hand in hand with that delivered by the Chinese representative.Footnote 19 Expressing concern over the impact of unilateral sanctions on humanitarian efforts, the Chinese statement affirmed that, unlike UN sanctions, “illegal unilateral” measures are capable of creating a more severe and far-reaching disruption to humanitarian operations.Footnote 20 The sanctions also raised legal challenges for aid organizations, exacerbating the suffering in affected countries, and contributing to an increasingly untenable situation.Footnote 21
In spite of the political and legal support for UN sanctions, Russia and China have also leveraged their permanent seats to cast vetos with respect to either the adoption or renewal of sanctions packages. For example, their refusal to support UN action with respect to Syria shows their reluctance to endorse UN sanctions when it is perceived as a threat to their geopolitical interests.Footnote 22 This episode showcased the internal frictions of the Security Council, with Russia and China routinely vetoing draft resolutions envisaging inter alia the application of sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter. In particular, because the EU had already initiated a series of sanctions, Russia opposed UN enforcement action in order to “not get involved with legitimizing previously adopted unilateral sanctions.”Footnote 23
China and Russia also casted vetos with respect to actions that strike at the heart of what they consider to be a matter of domestic rather than international concern. The UN sanctions regime against the DPRK is particularly instructive in this regard.Footnote 24 From the debates on draft resolutions, it can be inferred that, from the Chinese perspective, levying sanctions for the purposes of upholding human rights is a legal pretext, allowing western states to infringe upon the national sovereignty of the concerned state.Footnote 25 Indeed, the very first few words pronounced by its Permanent Representative at the beginning of the meeting aptly capture this line of reasoning: “China is always opposed to intervention by the Council on issues concerning human rights situation in any country.”Footnote 26
As an example of the failure to renew UN sanctions, the 2023 Mali episode is a case in point, in that Russia vetoed the decision to extend the targeted measures, de-facto terminating the sanctions regime at hand.Footnote 27
Of relevance for the present inquiry is also the fact that opposition to unilateral sanctions is consistently maintained by Russia and China in other UN bodies, first and foremost in the UN General Assembly. During general debates, China firmly asserted that it “does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or impose its will on others, and does not allow outside forces to interfere in its internal affairs.”Footnote 28 When discussing the U.S. embargo on Cuba, it stressed again its opposition “to any unilateral sanctions against other countries by military, political, economic or other means.”Footnote 29
More importantly, since 1996, the question of unilateral sanctions commenced gaining increasing traction at the UN General Assembly. Under Resolution 51/22, the UN body urged states not to “recognize unilateral extraterritorial coercive economic measures or legislative acts,” while calling for the repeal of such extraterritorial law that affect legal entities and individuals of other states.Footnote 30
In addition, the General Assembly has routinely adopted resolutions on unilateral sanctions and human rights, which have China and Russia among the signatoriesits penholders.The most recent resolution has urged states to refrain from resorting to and implementing any “unilateral economic, financial or trade measures not in accordance with international law and the Charter that impede the full achievement of sustainable economic and social development, particularly in developing countries.”Footnote 31 On the very same day, and relatedly, the General Assembly also adopted Resolution 79/168 pertaining to the “Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order.” The General Assembly voiced concerns over the “continued abuse by Member States of the extraterritorial application of their national legislation,” as it affects “the sovereignty of other States, the legitimate interests of entities or persons under their jurisdiction and the full enjoyment of human rights.”Footnote 32
China and Russia have also joined the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations, which has been issuing political declarations on a series of issues, including unilateral coercive measures.Footnote 33 The group, which currently consists of eighteen members, expressed “categorical rejection of all unilateral coercive measures, including those applied as tools for political or economic and financial pressure against any country, in particular, but not exclusively, against developing countries.”Footnote 34
What it also of interest to observe is that their stances voices. African states have long voiced their intention to apply “African sanctions” while expressing criticism over extra-continental interference. By way of example, with regard to Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the African Union Peace and Security Council has “condemned the extra-continental interferences in AU [African Union] Member States affairs, in particular, the unilateral practice of targeted sanctions against Congolese personalities by non-African organisations and countries.”Footnote 35 The attempt to resist the imposition of unilateral sanctions is the result of the developed-developing country polarity. In 2014, under the Human Rights Council Resolution 27/21, developing states took the view that unilateral sanctions contravene international law on several grounds, in particular the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and “the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States.”Footnote 36 Consequently, they condemned the political and economic pressure resulting from such sanctions, which is meant to deprive developing states of “their right to decide, of their own free will, their own political, economic and social systems.”Footnote 37 In 2015, the Chinese Permanent Representative reiterated China’s stance, urging the international community to pay close attention to and firmly reject unilateral coercive measures.Footnote 38 China called on the relevant countries to put an end to such actions, which interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states, hinder their economic and social progress, and obstruct the realization of their right to development.Footnote 39
Moreover, the Non-Aligned-Movement succeeded in creating the role of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights under the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner.Footnote 40 The first Special Rapporteur, Idriss Jazairy, took a broad understanding, stating that he would “consider as unilateral coercive measures, measures other than those taken by the Security Council under article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.”Footnote 41
It follows that unilateral sanctions constitute fertile terrain where third world positions on international law have grown. As Professor Bâli compellingly argues, the economic dominance of the Global North states, rooted in “a legacy of colonial extraction,” has long allowed them to impose their preferences through coercive means.Footnote 42 In contrast, these same structural asymmetries have left Global South states especially vulnerable, as their comparatively weaker economies are more susceptible to punitive measures.Footnote 43 Importantly, China and Russia consider themselves to be among such developing countries.Footnote 44 As it will be noted, what sets these two states apart from the Global South is that they are becoming increasingly able to exert counter-pressure by imposing sanctions against the sanctions initiators.
With respect to the scope of sanctions, China and Russia display a remarkably different position from the EU, U.S. and other traditional sanctioning countries. China and Russia regard UN sanctions as a ceiling, whereas others treat them as a floor.Footnote 45
Outside the UN context, China and Russia’s position can be understood as part of a broader effort to deligitimize coercive measures, based on two cardinal principles of international law: state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.Footnote 46 In the next section, this Article will succinctly thrust light on the notion of international law as perceived by these two States and how it intertwines with sanctions theories.
C. The Interplay Between International Law and Sanctions in the Sino-Russian Narratives
In order to better grapple with opposition to unilateral sanctions, one has to look at how China and Russia have traditionally approached international law. From a legal perspective, the intense contestation of unilateral sanctions is rooted in the alleged breach of the principle of non-intervention.Footnote 47 Together with the respect for national sovereignty, this principle is usually referred to as a “generally recognized principle and rule of international law,” and it is invoked for refute unilateral sanctions, whose utilization exhibits a pattern “of double standards or imposition by some States of their will on other States.”Footnote 48
Such a stance is not without legal basis. Suffice it to recall that, according to the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, “no State may use or encourage the use of unilateral economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights unilateral economic sanctions violate the sovereignty of the target.”Footnote 49 The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States stipulated a similar principle.Footnote 50 After affirming that the relations among States are inter alia centered on sovereignty and non-intervention, it proclaimed that “[n]o State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.”Footnote 51
Both Russia and China have historically championed a state-centric vision of international law. For Russia, this has meant a focus on strict formalism: the primacy of state sovereignty, and the insistence that only the UN Security Council has the authority to impose sanctions.
History may help explain Russia’s consistent rejection of any forms of coercion and interferences in internal affairs.Footnote 52 Following the 1917 revolution, Soviet Russia initially retreated from Western relations, only to re-emerge after World War II as a leading voice of the anti-colonial and anti-Western bloc in international law.Footnote 53 Russia has since regarded liberal international order as a tool for Western dominance. For instance, Russia remains deeply critical of doctrines such as humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, arguing that they may serve as pretexts for external interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.Footnote 54
For these reasons, state sovereignty constitutes the backbone of international law in Russia. The bearer of sovereignty is the Russian federation—the state—not individuals. Reflecting this stance, Moscow has, in recent years, reaffirmed the amacy of domestic constitutional law over international obligations, as seen in the rulings by the Constitutional Court rejecting the binding force of certain decisions from the European Court of Human Rights.Footnote 55
Interestingly, within academic circles, this position is underpinned by a persistent distinction between “native” (otechestvennaya) and “foreign,” typically Western, doctrines of international law.Footnote 56 Nearly all contemporary Russian legal scholarship maintains this dichotomy, with international legal discourse framed primarily through the lens of “native doctrine.”Footnote 57 A particularly illustrative example is the widely used textbook published by the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Footnote 58 In this work, the authors argue that, while Western legal doctrine interprets the principle of non-intervention narrowly, Russia’s native doctrine adopts a far broader reading, one that reinforces the state’s right to shield its internal affairs from external scrutiny.Footnote 59 This insistence on a sovereign-centered legal order, supported by a domestic jurisprudential tradition, continues to inform and justify Russia’s posture in international legal debates.
China has expressed similar views, anchored in its long-held Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, equality, and peaceful coexistence.Footnote 60 These principles continue to inform Beijing’s legal posture on the international stage. Historically, China has preferred bilateral diplomacy and negotiation over legal confrontation, particularly in matters touching on its core interests, such as territorial sovereignty This approach is evident in its selective engagement with international legal mechanisms—while participating in institutions when strategically beneficial, China has often rejected binding adjudication, most notably refusing to recognize the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) framework concerning the South China Sea.Footnote 61
Chinese officials have criticized international law as a construct that historically served colonial and imperialist interests at the expense of developing nations.Footnote 62 This viewpoint stems from a strong anti-colonial stance and is anchored in a precise moment of Chinese history back in the middle of the nineteenth century which, according to the Chinese narrative, marked the beginning of the “hundred years of humiliation.”Footnote 63 Beijing now routinely expresses rhetorical support for international legal norms, including human rights, while simultaneously advancing the interpretations that align with its domestic political and ideological priorities.Footnote 64 This includes justifying internal policies in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong, as well as restrictions on expression, religion, labor rights, and civil society, under the broader banner of national stability and sovereignty.Footnote 65
Beijing’s engagement with human rights law is therefore particularly illustrative of this tension.Footnote 66 At the UN Human Rights Council and other fora, Chinese representatives have repeatedly emphasized the principle of non-interference, arguing that international concern over domestic human rights issues constitutes a violation of state sovereignty.Footnote 67 As one delegate declared, the international community must “firmly adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and refrain from interfering in other countries’ internal affairs under the pretext of human rights.”Footnote 68 President Xi Jinping has echoed this stance, calling for a “community of shared future for mankind” while warning against “double standards” and the selective application of international norms.Footnote 69
In this context, China is not rejecting international law, especially in the face of what scholars perceive as “declining state sovereignty” in an era of transnational challenges.Footnote 70 By doing so, China attempts to shape the evolution of international law in ways that reinforce regime stability and limit the scope of external scrutiny, particularly on sensitive issues like human rights and territorial integrity.
In both cases, international law has been treated less as a system of norms and more as a pragmatic instrument to shield domestic sovereignty. This is not to say that they did not contribute to the establishment of international law. Studies have proven above any doubt that not only the West but other communities have significantly contributed to the idea of an international legal order.Footnote 71
The adoption of these approaches into international law in the domain of sanctions reveals an interesting finding. General theories on sanctions postulate that one way to look at this instrument is through reactive lens: sanctions are resorted to as a way of reacting against a breach of international obligations, including erga omnes and erga omnes partes ones.Footnote 72 In this case, states applying sanctions see themselves as guardians of the international legal order.
At the other end of the spectrum, unilateral sanctions are aimed at preserving the international system, whose balance is undermined by certain actions and conducts. To restore such a balance, a variety of measures can be employed, including sanctions.Footnote 73
Applying such categorizations to China and Russia, it can be observed that they fit neither category. To the contrary, not only have they thus far refrained from imposing sanctions with a view to protecting communal interests, but they also oppose and contest the geopolitical and legal order as being Western-centered.Footnote 74 The overwhelming majority of Russian scholars are still convinced that international law is made of bilateral threads, which explains why countermeasures to uphold erga omnes values are entirely absent in Russian toolkit of foreign policy.Footnote 75 As noted in the academic literature, Russia considers non-UN sanctions as measures to underpin a world order which essentially revolves around Western values.Footnote 76
Relatedly, it can be observed that another reason as to why China and Russia emerged as vocal opponents to unilateral sanctions is that they themselves were targeted by unilateral sanctions much like other developing states.Footnote 77 When the U.S. and EU began imposing sanctions on Russia in 2014, President Vladimir Putin publicly denounced these measures as contrary to international law, asserting that sanctions are only legitimate when authorized by the UN Security Council.Footnote 78 It comes with no surprise that the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, approved by President Putin on February, 12 2013, emphasized the “primacy of international law, including, first of all, the UN Charter.”Footnote 79 Specifically, the Foreign Policy Concept postulated that “attempts to manage crises through unilateral sanctions and other coercive measures, including armed aggression, outside the framework of the UN Security Council” represented a threat to international peace and stability.Footnote 80
Given that China and Russia are not accustomed to imposing sanctions and have themselves been subject to such measures, it is unsurprising that they regard sanctions as incompatible with the UN Charter—in fact, sanctions unilaterally imposed de-facto bypass the UN Security Council, which is the international forum where both China and Russia hold permanent seats and veto power.
In light of the foregoing, one might have expected these States to keep unilateral sanctions at a safe distance and the story would end here. To the contrary, especially in light of recent practice, China and Russia are growing increasingly comfortable with sanctions, which form part and parcel of a more diversified foreign policy toolbox.
D. First Instances of Russia and China’s Sanctions in Contemporary Practice
The aim of this section is to take stock of how Russia and China quietly began issuing sanctions. It will be noted that, while China has initially resorted to informal or “tacit sanctions,” the events in Crimea prompted the Russian Federation to take a step towards enacting a food embargo in order to respond to EU sanctions in 2014.Footnote 81 This difference may help explain the different pace and modalities at which China and Russia will institutionalize the use of sanctions. Russia’s adoption of sanctions frameworks has been faster and more extensive, largely because it needed to face the immediate and overwhelming pressure of Western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine. For Moscow, sanctions are a matter of economic survival and geopolitical resistance, making their institutionalization urgent. China, by contrast, has proceeded more gradually, reflecting both its relative insulation from comparable sanctions pressure and its longstanding caution in presenting itself as a defender of sovereignty and non-interference. Beijing’s sanctioning toolkit has therefore expanded incrementally, often in direct response to U.S. actions on trade, Taiwan, and human rights, rather than through the wholesale escalation seen in the Russian case.
I. China’s Use of “Tacit” Sanctions
The first examples of tacit sanctions emerged as consequence of China exploitating its economic force to advance political agendas, pursue foreign policy objectives, and defend its own interests—such as countering the supply of arms to Taiwan or maritime disputes in the South China Sea.Footnote 82 Two features characterized them—they are “more bark than bite” and are relatively “short-lived,” functioning more as political signals than sustained trade restrictions.Footnote 83 Rather than openly announce economic retaliation, China often opted to imply future consequences, using limited restrictions to express dissatisfaction and warn of potentially more severe responses if the offending behavior continues. A couple of examples will help illustrate the matter at hand.
Following the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in 2010, an act sharply condemned by Beijing, Norway became the target of informal economic retaliation.Footnote 84 Chinese authorities did not announce formal sanctions but rather imposed stringent customs inspections and prolonged quarantine procedures on Norwegian salmon, citing vague health and safety concerns.Footnote 85 The targeting was highly selective—salmon is a luxury consumer good, non-essential to Chinese supply chains, and easily replaceable with domestic or non-Norwegian imports.Footnote 86 At no point did China extend restrictions to goods whose absence would materially impact its domestic production sectors.
In 2012, during heightened tensions with the Philippines over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, Chinese authorities abruptly tightened customs inspections and imposed new entry restrictions on Philippine bananas.Footnote 87 These measures, introduced in late March, were never officially labelled as sanctions, but their timing and selective application made the political message unmistakable. At the time, China was the Philippines’ third-largest export market and one of the most significant importers of Filipino bananas, accounting for approximately fourteen percent of total exports. Instead of expressly declaring the application of a trade embargo, Chinese authorities framed the import restrictions as sanitary threats—the agricultural products did not meet the Chinese sanitary regulations.Footnote 88
In more assertive cases, Chinese trade coercion has taken the form of export restrictions, cutting off targeted countries from access to Chinese goods. One notable instance is China’s temporary suspension of rare earth exports to Japan in 2010.Footnote 89 This rare use of export controls underscores Beijing’s typical reluctance to employ measures that might jeopardize its own economic interests unless the geopolitical stakes are deemed particularly high.Footnote 90
Admittedly, the strategy of silently applying economic coercion provided Chinese policy makers with wide leeway to deny the imposition of sanctions.Footnote 91 In fact, one of the contemporary features of sanctions is the insertion of the target in a publicly released blacklist.
Although contradictory prima facie, this approach in reality perfectly aligns with China’s stance taken within the UN—as antagonist to unilateral sanctions, China “rarely openly declares its economic sanctions.”Footnote 92 Moreover, China relied on these types of measures because it has never established a broad legal regime to implement sanctions and trade controls.Footnote 93 In this way, China’s approach can co-exist with its long-standing opposition to unilateral coercive measures in international fora. In terms of aims it sought to achieve, China intended to chiefly convey diplomatic signals, rather than apply prolonged or forceful economic coercion. This aligns with China’s traditional preference for diplomatic means over coercion to settle international disputes.Footnote 94
II. Countering Western Sanctions: Russian “Special Economic Measures”
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia, like China, began to utilize informal economic pressure to exert influence over its immediate neighbourhood.Footnote 95 These measures, while not always officially labelled as sanctions, functioned as instruments of political leverage, aimed at preserving regional influence, and asserting Moscow’s interests in the post-Soviet space. For example, Russia applied various forms of economic pressure on Kazakhstan, including the imposition of restrictive transit quotas and elevated pipeline fees for oil exports, curtailments in natural gas purchases, and delayed payments for key Kazakh exports such as coal.Footnote 96 Russia also withdrew military and technical personnel from strategically sensitive installations under negotiation, such as space and defense facilities, using their presence as a bargaining chip in broader bilateral discussions.Footnote 97
In the case of Turkmenistan, Moscow reduced or delayed deliveries of essential goods, such as foodstuffs and industrial equipment, particularly those needed for the energy sector, while also significantly cutting volumes in bilateral trade, thereby placing economic pressure on Ashgabat to align more closely with Russian expectations.Footnote 98
Perhaps most acutely, Ukraine experienced sustained and multifaceted pressure from Russia during the early years of its independence. With its economy heavily dependent on Russia, relying on it for approximately 89% of its crude oil and 56% of its natural gas imports, Ukraine was especially susceptible to economic coercion.Footnote 99 In this context, Russia implemented measures that severely disrupted Ukraine’s energy supplies and trade flows, taking advantage of Kyiv’s debt obligations and energy dependency.Footnote 100
Relevant research opined that, in this historical period, “Russia’s government still hesitate[d] to invoke its economic sanctions legislation to justify the trade restrictions it place[d] on Russia’s neighboring states,” aligning its stance with the Chinese tacit sanctions—certain products were banned as they are at odds with Russian sanitary or other technical regulations.Footnote 101 In 2006, in the aftermath of Georgia’s pro-Western political shift following the Rose Revolution, Russia imposed a sweeping ban on the import of key Georgian agricultural products, including wine, mineral water—notably Borjomi—and fresh fruits.Footnote 102 These goods represented a substantial portion of Georgia’s export portfolio, with Russia serving as the primary market for many of them at the time.Footnote 103 While Russian authorities cited health and safety concerns as the official justification for the ban, the timing and scope of the restrictions strongly suggested a politically motivated response to Georgia’s increasing orientation toward Euro-Atlantic institutions and its growing estrangement from Moscow’s sphere of influence.
In addition, the Anti-Magnitsky law provides a useful foil for illustrating the symmetrical nature of the Russian response.Footnote 104 In 2012, the U.S. Congress passed the Magnitsky Acts, named after Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who died in a Moscow prison after exposing government corruption.Footnote 105 The law allows the U.S. to impose visa bans and asset freezes on individuals involved in human rights abuses and significant corruption, initially targeting Russian officials.Footnote 106 In response, Russia enacted its own law in 2012, banning U.S. citizens from adopting Russian children and creating a blacklist to freeze the assets and deny entry in Russia of American officials.Footnote 107
A change of approach can be perceived in 2014.Footnote 108 The events that unfolded in Crimea have led to the imposition of smart sanctions, including travel ban and asset freezes, by the U.S. and EU.Footnote 109 Shortly thereafter, the EU implemented a broader package of trade restrictions. Under Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP, European companies were prohibited from exporting specific categories of goods to Russia and from investing in or purchasing certain Russian assets.Footnote 110 These measures targeted key sectors of the Russian economy, particularly finance, energy, and defense, and were designed to increase economic pressure on Moscow.Footnote 111
On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States introduced what it termed a “third wave” of sanctions on July 17, 2014.Footnote 112 The U.S. Treasury Department announced restrictions that barred American individuals and entities from providing new financing to two major Russian financial institutions and two prominent energy companies, thereby curtailing their access to U.S. capital markets.Footnote 113 The U.S. response did not go unnoticed by Russia. First, it adopted tit-for-tat measures, restricting access to the Russian territory to a series of blacklisted U.S. and EU individuals.Footnote 114 In addition, and more importantly, it blocked the import of certain products, imposing a trade embargo.Footnote 115 Before addressing its content, a preliminary point should be adequately stressed. To justify trade restrictions and the ensuing change of economic policy in response to the Western sanctions, Russian authorities portrayed them as necessary for the securitization of the economy, especially from 2014 onwards.Footnote 116 In this way, it was easier for the policy makers to invoke independence and national sovereignty vis-à-vis external coercive measures as grounds for adopting domestic measures—sanctions.Footnote 117 It is important to stress that national security is at the heart of one of the most relevant laws for the purposes of the present study—The Use of Certain Special Economic Measures for the Purposes of National Security Assurance of the Russian Federation.
Under the Russian legal order, Article 1194 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation provides the legal basis for applying retaliatory measures in response to similar measures from other states against Russian citizens and legal persons.Footnote 118 In 2006, on the basis of this provision, the Russian legislature enacted the Federal Law on Special Economic Measures (SEMs).Footnote 119 The legislature strategically labeled these measures as “special economic measures.”Footnote 120 Under Article 1(1), the imposition of SEMs are guided by the Russian Constitution, along with “generally-recognized principles and norms of international law” and UN resolutions.Footnote 121 Paragraph 2 thereof is clear what the purposes of such measures and the circumstances under which they will be applied are—the President is vested with the responsibility to impose them in order to address circumstances “requiring immediate reaction to international illegal act or unfriendly action.”Footnote 122 In other words, the responses sit in the legal categories of retorsions and countermeasures.Footnote 123
The power to introduce such measures rests with the President of the Russian Federation, acting upon the recommendation of the Security Council.Footnote 124 The law provides a detailed list of potential SEMs, which include: the suspension of economic, technical, and military-technical cooperation programs; the prohibition or restriction of financial transactions and foreign economic operations; the termination or suspension of trade and other international agreements in the economic sphere; the modification of customs duties; and bans or restrictions on port access for foreign vessels and limitations.Footnote 125
The law remained dormant until 2014, when, by Executive Order No. 560 of August, 6 2014, President Putin sanctioned the EU and U.S. by imposing an import embargo on certain agricultural products and food.Footnote 126 The embargo specifically targeted various raw and processed agricultural goods, including meat and meat products, certain types of fish and seafood, milk and dairy products, a range of vegetables, fruits, and nuts.Footnote 127 It also extended to a selection of other prepared and packaged food products.Footnote 128
The Russian retaliation had a significant economic impact, especially on European exporters. Western countries experienced a sharp decline in the goods affected by the Russian sanctions, nearly a 90% drop, highlighting effectiveness of Moscow’s retaliatory measures.Footnote 129 The stark contraction in import volumes clearly marks a break between the pre-sanctions and post-sanctions periods. The same goes with the US—this shift could be attributed to global market trends or parallel changes in U.S. import data, reinforcing the conclusion that the Russian embargo was the decisive factor.Footnote 130
What further sets the Russian counter-sanctions apart is the rigidity of their implementation. The sanctions regime allows for no exemptions. This approach was not only punitive but also strategic—at the time of the embargo’s introduction, Russia was the second-largest market for European agricultural exports.Footnote 131 By targeting this specific sector, Moscow aimed to increase the economic costs borne by EU Member States and, in turn, dissuade them from aligning with or expanding the Western sanctions architecture.Footnote 132
E. Institutionalizing Russian and Chinese Unilateral Sanctions
Despite the controversy they sparked and the call for their lifting on political, economic, and human rights grounds, unilateral sanctions are proliferating rather than diminishing. Interestingly, the current season of global affairs has made it possible for such measures to be resorted to by those very States that have put so much effort in attempts to de-legitimise them, particularly China and Russia. In the shifting terrain of global geopolitics, they are rectifying their approaches. Recent events, like Russia’s war in Ukraine, growing U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan, and the proliferation of Western economic sanctions, have prompted both States to adopt a more active and retaliatory legal posture.
What distinguished the previous practice from recent ones is the level of municipal institutionalization. Considering the continued efforts to delegitimize unilateral sanctions, it is not surprising that China and Russia have been lax in institutionalizing the application of their own measures. Moreover, recent practice evidences that they are utilizing a toolkit that is well entrenched within the international legal order, such as the targeted sanctions.
This emerging trend in sanctioning practices requires appropriate justifications from an international legal perspective. In fact, while symmetrical responses that do not breach international obligations are per se permissible as retorsions, asymmetrical counter-sanctions can be deemed to be lawful as long as the first package of sanctions are unlawful.Footnote 133 Moreover, in the case of trade restrictions, reference has to be made to the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework.
Be that as it may, this Article submits that the evolving posture of China and Russia’s positions towards sanctions are best understood as primarily driven by geopolitical and economic imperatives. Geopolitically, sanctions provide both states with an instrument to counter Western pressure and assert themselves as autonomous great powers. Economically, sanctions are deployed to mitigate the effects of external restrictions, protect strategic industries, and signal resilience to their international partners and rivals alike. By contrast, the domestic political dimension is largely derivative of these external pressures. For both Moscow and Beijing, external confrontation necessitates internal consolidation—sanctions must be embedded within a credible domestic framework in order to be sustainable. This explains why both states have moved toward institutionalizing sanctions regimes through the enactment of municipal laws. Such legislation prepares the ground domestically by ensuring that sanctions can be implemented consistently, legitimized internally, and integrated into broader strategies of economic statecraft. The following sections are aimed at substantiating this assertion.
I. China’s Unreliable Entity List and Anti-Sanctions Law
Whereas China once relied primarily on informal or tacit forms of economic pressure, it has progressively assumed the role of a formal unilateral sanctions user.Footnote 134 This Article submits that, instead of pointing to a re-calibration of the Chinese posture toward international law, particularly with respect to its interpretation of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, these new sanctioning efforts are precisely aimed at making China more resilient vis-à-vis external interferences.
While not directly involved in the Ukrainan conflict, China has faced mounting pressure from the West over its position on Taiwan, its trade practices, and its human rights record. In response, China has begun codifying its own legal frameworks for retaliatory sanctions, such as the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law in 2021, and has created “Unreliable Entity Lists” and export controls under the banner of defending national sovereignty and economic security.
China has in fact taken a considerable step towards equipping itself with the municipal laws necessary to impose sanctions. Specifically, the national legal toolkit currently consists of four main acts. First, in September 2020, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) introduced the “Unreliable Entity List” regime.Footnote 135 Under this framework, foreign entities may be designated based on two primary criteria: (1) actions deemed to endanger China’s national sovereignty, security, or interests, and (2) discriminatory or disruptive measures targeting Chinese enterprises, organizations, or individuals, including suspension of normal commercial transactions.Footnote 136 Once listed, entities may be subject to a range of restrictive measures, eitherseparately or cumulatively. These measures include prohibitions on trade and investment activities with China, restrictions on personnel and transport access to Chinese territory, revocation of work or residency permits, and financial penalties.Footnote 137 The regime also allows the imposition of “other necessary measures,” granting authorities broad discretion.Footnote 138
Second, in October 2020, the Export Control Law complemented this very first unilateral regime.Footnote 139 The law provides for the possibility of exercising “export control” through restrictive measures aimed at blocking either the transfer from the Chinese territory or the provision of “controlled items” by a Chinese citizen, legal person, or unincorporated organization to foreign organizations or individuals.Footnote 140 What falls under the category of “controlled items” includes dual-use goods, military technologies, nuclear materials, and other sensitive products, whose export and provision can be restricted on the following grounds: safeguarding national security, fulfilling non-proliferation obligations, and upholding China’s international commitments.Footnote 141
Third, on January 9, 2021, the Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-Territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures came into effect.Footnote 142 The stated purpose of the regulation, outlined in Article 2, is to resist the extraterritorial enforcement of foreign laws and measures that contravene international law and the basic principles of international relations.Footnote 143 The rules specifically aim to address situations where such foreign laws unjustifiably prohibit or restrict Chinese citizens, legal persons, or organizations from conducting normal commercial activities with third-party countries, regions, or entities.Footnote 144
A central enforcement mechanism under the regulation is the establishment of a dedicated inter-agency coordination body—the “working mechanism”—as provided in Article 4.Footnote 145 This body is responsible for evaluating instances of extraterritorial interference. Upon confirmation that a particular foreign measure meets the threshold of unjustified extraterritorial application, Article 7 empowers the working mechanism to authorize the Ministry of Commerce to issue a “prohibition order.”Footnote 146 This order instructs Chinese entities not to recognize, enforce, or comply with the foreign legislation or measures in question.Footnote 147 In effect, the regulation operates as a legal shield, enabling China to neutralize the domestic legal impact of foreign sanctions regimes targeting its nationals and economic interests.Footnote 148
Lastly, in June 2021, the National People’s Congress passed the Countering Foreign Sanctions (Anti-Sanctions Law).Footnote 149 It stipulates that “countermeasures” may be resorted to in order to respond to “discriminatory restrictive measures” imposed by foreign states, targeting Chinese individuals, organizations, or national interests.Footnote 150
Notably, the scope of “countermeasures” is expansive, extending not only to individuals and organizations directly involved in the sanctions but also associated parties.Footnote 151 According to Articles 3 and 5, associated parties include spouses of sanctioned individuals, organizations where these individuals serve as senior managers, and entities in which sanctioned individuals are actual controllers or otherwise participate in their establishment and operations.Footnote 152
Under Article 6, the law prescribes a broad set of retaliatory tools that Chinese authorities may deploy: refusing to issue visas; denying entry into China; revoking existing visas; ordering deportation; freezing, seizing, or sealing off both movable and immovable assets located within China; banning or restricting economic transactions, cooperation, or other dealings between targeted foreign individuals or entities and Chinese counterparts; and implementing any “other necessary measures” as deemed appropriate.Footnote 153
To coordinate the implementation of counter-sanctions, Article 10 mandates the establishment of a dedicated inter-agency mechanism.Footnote 154 This mechanism is responsible for evaluating foreign measures, recommending responses, and supervising enforcement.Footnote 155
On the basis of this legal framework, China has expanded its use of sanctions against natural and legal persons, freezing assets and denying visa and entry into China.Footnote 156 Notably, the expansion of the ratione materiae scope occurred with respect to arms sale to Taiwan, a realm where China previously confined itself to threats of imposing sanctions.Footnote 157 The first instance of formal sanctions occurred in 2019 and 2020, when such threats turned into actual sanctions. Beijing officially blacklisted U.S. major defense firms, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing Defense, and Raytheon, after a weapons sale to Taiwan.Footnote 158 The decision to impose trade and investment sanctions marked a significant escalation from previous symbolic, “more bark than bite” reactions.Footnote 159
More recently, in April 2024, China froze the assets of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems, and denied visas and entry into China to their senior management.Footnote 160
The government imposed sanctions on Skydio, a U.S. drone maker supplying Ukraine, on October 31, 2024.Footnote 161 Subsequently, in December 2024, China announced further sanctions targeting U.S. defense contractors involved in arms sales to Taiwan, citing violations of the “One-China” principle.Footnote 162 The measures included freezing assets and prohibiting transactions between Chinese entities and the designated U.S. companies and individuals.Footnote 163 A total of thirteen companies and six senior officials were subjected to these restrictions.Footnote 164
The trend culminated in early 2025 when China designated ten U.S. defense companies as “unreliable entities” and imposed export restrictions and sanctions on twenty-eight additional firms over ongoing arms support to Taiwan.Footnote 165
Beijing also retaliated against human rights sanctions imposed by the EU, U.K. and U.S. by symmetrically applying targeted sanctions.Footnote 166 In this sense, in January 2021, China sanctioned U.S. individuals from the Trump administration, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in response to their sanctions rooted in the human rights situation in China, particularly with respect to Xinjiang.Footnote 167 In March 2021, and on the same grounds, it imposed travel bans and asset freezes on UK individuals and their immediate family members and prohibited Chinese citizens and institutions from doing business with them.Footnote 168 Similar sanctions have been imposed on EU individuals and entities.Footnote 169
For the purposes of this Article, the U.S.-China tariff war will not be taken into account. Suffice it to say that tariff-based economic confrontation between the two countries significantly escalated during the first Trump administration, from 2018 to 2020, with the U.S. imposing tariffs on over $350 billion worth of Chinese goods and China responding in kind.Footnote 170 Though tensions briefly eased following the 2020 “Phase One” deal, tariff disputes have resurfaced under the second Trump administration, from 2025 to today, with the U.S. imposing sweeping new tariffs—some as high as 100%—on strategic Chinese sectors such as electric vehicles, batteries, and semiconductors.Footnote 171 China, in turn, has demonstrated a markedly enhanced capacity to resist and retaliate, matching or exceeding U.S. tariffs in several categories and leveraging its dominance in key supply chains, including rare earth elements and green technologies.Footnote 172
Though traditionally reluctant to invoke international legal doctrines, China now frames its retaliatory actions as lawful responses to external coercion, invoking the principle that unlawful acts—such as unilateral sanctions—permit resorting to “countermeasures.”Footnote 173 They are now firmly embedded in the China’s approach to foreign policy. In June 2023, the National People’s Congress passed the Foreign Relations Law, which, under Article 33, proclaimed the “right” to adopt “corresponding countermeasures and restrictive measures” in response to acts that breach “international law and basic norms governing international relations and endanger the [Chinese] sovereignty, security, and development interests.”Footnote 174 Ironically, at the G7 summit in May 2023, Western States issued a unified warning to China, highlighting concerns over so-called “economic coercion.”Footnote 175 To put it differently, it was Western powers, which typically have resorted to such mechanisms, which voiced grievances that have long been echoed by countries in the Global South.
II. Russian Federal Laws Complementing the SEMs
Much of the academic attention has been devoted to assessing the number of sanctions packages agreed upon at EU level.Footnote 176 Commenting on them, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov repeatedly affirmed that such measures are unilateral and illegitimate as they encroach upon Security Council prerogatives.Footnote 177 Interestingly, echoing similar concerns, the Chinese spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs voiced critical remarks over sanctions directed at Russia for lacking a “mandate from the Security Council.”Footnote 178 Even before the multitude of sanctions packages, a Sino-Russian Joint Statement denounced the Western attempt to recalibrate certain mechanisms and rules by exerting “power politics, bullying, unilateral sanctions, and extraterritorial application of jurisdiction.”Footnote 179
Less explored is therefore the extent of the Russian reaction. From 2018 onwards, and pursuant to newly enacted municipal laws, sanctions are portrayed as “measures of impact” or “counteractions,” signifying that Russia still believes that only the measures agreed upon by the Security Council can be labeled as “sanctions.”
Much like China did, Russia has gone through a process of institutionalizing the imposition of counter-sanctions, which essentially revolves around two pillars: Federal Laws and Presidential Decrees, which are meant to complement the SEMs Law.
First, in 2018, the Russian Federation passed the Federal Law No. 127-FZ, On Measures of Impact (Countermeasures) in Response to Unfriendly Actions of the United States of America and Other Foreign States, which laid the legal groundwork for the imposition of retaliatory sanctions.Footnote 180 The law provides the Russian President and Government with broad discretionary powers to enact “countermeasures” against states, organizations, and individuals involved in activities deemed hostile to Russia.Footnote 181 These measures may include import and export restrictions, limitations on cooperation in specific sectors, exclusion from public procurement, and bans on participation in the privatization of state property.Footnote 182 While the law does not mandate automatic sanctions, it establishes a legal framework enabling rapid and targeted responses to foreign pressure, notably that emanating from U.S. and EU sanctions regimes.Footnote 183
Second on June 28 2022, the Russian legislature adopted Federal Law No. 212-FZ, introducing significant amendments to the 2018 Federal Law No. 127-FZ on Countermeasures to Unfriendly Foreign Actions.Footnote 184 These revisions expanded the scope and operational flexibility of Russia’s retaliatory sanctions regime. Notably, the amendment enumerates a set of regulatory measures that may be adopted in furtherance of financial stability.Footnote 185 These include the power to impose prohibitions or limitations on specific transactions—particularly currency operations—and the ability to alter the manner in which certain obligations are to be fulfilled.Footnote 186 This could encompass changes to the currency of settlement or the offsetting of claims between residents and non-residents.Footnote 187
Moreover, entities may be required to obtain special permits before conducting designated transactions or use special accounts for such transactions.Footnote 188 Additional measures may encompass compulsory conversion—sale—of foreign currency into rubles on the domestic foreign exchange market, freezing or blocking of funds and property, and the establishment of quantitative limits on foreign exchange transactions.Footnote 189
Third, the SEMs law was amended by the Federal Law No. 422‑FZ, “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation,” empowering the government to impose personal restrictions on individuals tied to “unfriendly states.”Footnote 190 This parallels EU or U.S.-style personal sanctions, including visa bans and asset freezes, and introduced the notion of “blocked persons.”Footnote 191 In terms of ratione personae scope, targets within the meaning of “blocked persons” include foreign states, foreign organizations, foreign nationals, stateless persons, and legal entities under their control—where “control” is defined as the direct or indirect right, whether individually or jointly, to dispose of more than 50% of the votes in the highest governing body of such legal entity.Footnote 192 The importance of such an amendment is that it explicitly authorizes freezing of assets—cash, securities, and other property—belonging to blocked persons, and prohibition or limitation of financial transactions in their favor. The enforcement falls under the remit of the Central Bank of Russia and other authorized financial operators, who are responsible for enforcing and reporting compliance.Footnote 193
Fourth, in December 2023, an amendment of FL 127, passed in 2018, was signed into law under Federal Law No 600‑FZ, effective the end of 2023.Footnote 194 It considerably enhances the presidential authority to impose a wide range of regulatory measures with the aim of preserving “economic sovereignty and security.”Footnote 195 These include the establishment of special regimes governing transactions between Russian entities and individuals or organizations from so-called “unfriendly” states, new requirements for corporate governance, including disclosure obligations, restrictions on dividend payments to foreign shareholders, and procedures for the formation or dissolution of legal entities, and stricter control over cross-border currency operations, foreign exchange trading, and the use of foreign accounts.Footnote 196 Furthermore, one key aspect involves the introduction of temporary administration over property owned by such persons within Russia, including both movable and immovable assets, securities, shares in Russian companies, and other property rights.Footnote 197 The amendment also provides for a special legal procedure governing the enforcement of claims related to monetary funds, securities, and other assets connected to unfriendly foreign entities.Footnote 198 Specifically, it prescribes the mandatory transfer of such assets to designated special accounts, along with the possibility of seizure and other interim actions designed to secure or restrict their use.Footnote 199 Importantly, the law applies retroactively to legal relations dating back to February 24, 2022, thereby legitimizing a wide range of measures already implemented in response to Western sanctions imposed after the escalation of the war in Ukraine.Footnote 200
The second pillar of Russian counter-sanctions is represented by Presidential decrees. In response to what it defines as “unfriendly actions” by the U.S. and allied foreign states and international organizations, the President enacted Presidential Decree No. 79 on February 28, 2022.Footnote 201 The decree, which forms a key part of Russia’s broader counter-sanctions regime, introduced mandatory financial restrictions on Russian residents engaged in foreign economic activities.Footnote 202 One of its central provisions obliges all resident participants of foreign trade to sell any income received in foreign currency, that is, foreign currency credited to their accounts in Russian banks as a result of contracts involving exports of goods, services, labor, or intellectual property to non-residents—commonly referred to as foreign exchange proceeds, or FX proceeds.Footnote 203 The provision required the sale of 80% of such proceeds within three business days of receipt.Footnote 204
However, this requirement was significantly revised by Presidential Edict No. 360 of June 9, 2022, which amended the original decree.Footnote 205 Under the amended framework, the percentage of foreign currency proceeds to be sold is now determined by the Government Commission for Control over Foreign Investments, while the timeline for sale is established by the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Russia.Footnote 206
Furthermore, beginning March 18, 2022, Russia prohibited residents from extending foreign currency loans to non-residents, transferring currency to their accounts abroad, or using foreign electronic payment systems without opening an account.Footnote 207 The decree further delegates to the Central Bank the authority to determine the procedural framework for implementing these requirements, thereby centralizing enforcement and compliance monitoring within Russia’s financial regulatory apparatus.Footnote 208 In practical terms, the Presidential Decree constitutes a defensive economic measure designed to preserve domestic liquidity in rubles while also restricting capital outflows.
Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 81 of March 1, 2022 introduced a special authorization regime for transactions involving Russian residents and persons from such states, including operations with securities, real estate, and the provision of loans in rubles.Footnote 209 It also imposes a restriction on the export of foreign currency and monetary instruments exceeding the equivalent of $10,000 USD, and establishes special rules for conducting foreign exchange transactions.Footnote 210 The Government and the Central Bank of Russia are assigned regulatory responsibilities to implement and supervise these measures.Footnote 211
In addition, and pursuant to Decree No. 100 passed in 2022, trade restrictions have been imposed on certain goods and raw materials with so-called unfriendly countries.Footnote 212 The decree establishes a ban on the export from and import into the territory of the Russian Federation of certain products and raw materials, as specified by lists determined by the Government of the Russian Federation.Footnote 213 Additionally, it introduces restrictions on the export and import of products and raw materials outside and into the Russian Federation, respectively, in accordance with the government-approved lists.Footnote 214
Moreover, under Decree No. 520 passed in 2022, President Putin imposed a ban on transactions that establish, alter, terminate, or encumber rights of ownership, use, or disposal of securities, equity interests, and investment-related rights in Russian legal entities, where such assets are held by persons affiliated with states deemed unfriendly.Footnote 215 The restriction applies to a wide range of strategic sectors, including energy production and supply, oil refining, mineral resource extraction, and the manufacturing and servicing of equipment for the fuel and energy complex.Footnote 216 It also extends to subsoil users operating in the Russian Federation with access to significant deposits of hydrocarbons, uranium, rare earth elements, and other critical minerals.Footnote 217
Considering the enactment of such Laws and Decrees, it comes with no surprise that Russia has been able to counter the effects of Western sanctions, at least to some degree.Footnote 218
In light of the foregoing, the counter-sanctions Russia has been implementing from the beginning of the war are of three main types: financial and energy restrictions, requiring payments to be made in rubles and cutting natural gas supplies to countries that refused to pay in rubles; trade sanctions affecting the export of raw materials; and other financial and investment restrictions, designed to de-dollarize the economy.
Moreover, Russia has escalated the number of targeted sanctions imposed on citizens of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, and the U.S. in retaliation for Western sanctions.Footnote 219 CEOs, scholars, researchers, journalists, members of academia, senior officials, and directors have been included in a “stop list” and are currently denied entry into Russian territory.Footnote 220 With respect to the U.S., Russia has also issued a travel ban against the former U.S. President BidenFootnote 221 and members of the Congress. The number of people named in the Stop list is fairly extensive. Suffice it to note that the last round of retaliatory measures has resulted in 227 U.S. citizens being sanctioned.Footnote 222 These counter-sanctions are directed at those who have actively conceived, implemented, or publicly justified an “anti-Russian policy” pursued by the current U.S. administration.Footnote 223 As one can aptly note, the rhetoric has changed, as Russia is now perfectly aware that the denial of entry fits the category of “sanctions”—smart sanctions to be precise.
Consistent with such measures, Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept has overtly espoused the notion of sanctions.Footnote 224 On the one hand, under the chapeau “Rule of law in international relations,” the Concept emphasizes the importance of doing away with “the practice of taking illegal unilateral coercive measures in violation of the UN Charter.”Footnote 225 On the other hand, it outlines Russia’s right to respond to what it characterizes as “unfriendly acts” by foreign states or alliances, particularly those that threaten its sovereignty or territorial integrity.Footnote 226
In such cases, the Concept asserts that the Russian Federation “considers it lawful to take the symmetrical and asymmetrical measures” with the aim of “suppress[ing] such unfriendly acts and also to prevent[ing] them from recurring in future.”Footnote 227
The Concept provides additional insights into the aims that the sanctions are intended to bring about. One of its central aims is to shield the Russian economy and its international trade and financial relationships from “unfriendly actions” by foreign states by applying SEMs.Footnote 228
Additionally, the Concept justifies the adoption of economic measures against states and against foreign officials, organizations, and private individuals—smart sanctions. These measures are directed at those who, in the view of the Russian government, are responsible for committing unfriendly acts against Russian citizens or entities, or who are involved in violating “the fundamental rights and freedoms of Russian compatriots residing abroad.”Footnote 229
As stated at the beginning of this section, such measures, which can be portrayed as “counter-sanctions,” are admissible under the law of international responsibility as long as the countermeasures applied in the first place are unlawful. The core interpretative issue is whether a countermeasure remains lawful when directed at a state that itself fails to comply with international law. Should the answer be in the negative, meaning that the initial breach justifies a response, then the responding state’s actions could be considered lawful countermeasures taken in response to wrongful conduct.Footnote 230
From this viewpoint, the academic literature has offered some compelling arguments as to the illegal and illegitimate nature of the EU’s and U.S.’s “autonomous” sanctions against Russia.Footnote 231 Espousing this line of reasoning, unlawful Russian measures would be in accordance with the law of states responsibility, at least as far as the trigger is concerned.Footnote 232
At the same time, and because of the issue of autonomous measures, especially when taken by non-directly injured party, remains contentious, there would be room to argue that of EU and U.S. sanctions further enriches the practice of third-party countermeasures.Footnote 233 They have been taken in response to one of most flagrant violation of international law, that is an act of aggression, in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.Footnote 234 Such a scenario would render the Russian countermeasures unlawful.
Other measures, like trade restrictions with regard to “unfriendly states,” would contradict the most-favoured-nation clause under Article 1 of the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]. However, security exceptions may be invoked. In particular, Article XXI(b) GATT permits exceptions where a WTO member considers action necessary for the protection of its “essential security interests,” in particular, during war or other emergency in international relations.Footnote 235
It bears recalling that the WTO panel report in Russia—Traffic in Transit confirmed that: Article XXI(b) is not entirely self-judging. Panels can review whether the circumstances qualify as a war or international emergency. Thus, the WTO can assess whether Russia’s justification meets the threshold of emergency and whether the measures are taken in good faith and “meet a minimum requirement of plausibility.”Footnote 236
F. Conclusion
This Article has shown that a behavioural change has occurred in both states. In addition, it has forged a better understanding of how global challenges have influenced the recent practice of both China and Russia in terms of unilateral sanctions. New circumstances have in fact enabled Russia and China to engage in a unilateral sanctions practice. Realpolitik’s reasons have weighed in favor of (1) counter-sanctions to respond to the imposition of sanctions and, consequently, (2) domestic legislation designed to readily impose unilateral sanctions and make the economy more resilient.Footnote 237 The enactment of fine-tuned municipal laws on sanctions demonstrates that these two states have grown comfortable with such an instrument, which is now part of the foreign policy repertoires.
Following this trajectory, China and Russia are likely to exhibit an even more assertive posture towards unilateral sanctions, probably for different rationales: on the one hand, China is believed to increase its leverage as a result of stance taken by President Xi, confirming that China has also undergone a major shift from developing country to “a special rising power.”Footnote 238 In this respect, the findings of the present study about a changed, and changing, posture towards sanctions resonate with other arguments. In particular, scholars have provided evidence that China is taking a “relative” approach toward the principle of non-intervention, which changes in accordance with “who is interfering with whom.”Footnote 239 What is of interest is that this new way of interpreting and applying such principle is aimed at changing international law and global governance, a goal that can be pursued by inter alia considering the application of sanctions.
On the other hand, Russia is confronted with the need to respond to the sanctions packages. Pro futuro, one possible evolution of sanctions policy in China and Russia lies in the development of thematic or “standing” unilateral sanctions. These would consist of pre-defined measures automatically triggered by specific behaviors or affiliations deemed contrary to national interests. Such mechanisms would represent a shift toward more institutionalized and assertive sanctions framework, signaling a broader willingness to employ economic coercion as a tool of foreign policy.
Widening the gaze, the fact the two vocal, “non-western” opponents have started resorting to unilateral sanctions has several implications for the international legal order. The risk of taking an increasingly assertive posture should not be overlooked. First, and in the short term, it may deprive the legal argument of coherence. Thus far, such sanctions have been criticised for being a toolbox of the West dominance. Second, and paradoxically, it may contribute to the establishment of a legal regime, thereby reinforcing the use of sanctions by the senders. In fact, commentators remain divided as to the possibility of resorting to this type of sanctions, due to the presence of persistent objectors.
Therefore, it is submitted that the Sino-China stance is likely to reshape international rules on unilateral sanctions over time. By institutionalizing their sanctions domestically, they expand the range of accepted practices, contributing to an emerging “multipolar” sanctions landscape. Looking ahead, this trajectory may carry a diffusion effect. If more actors internalize the view that unilateral sanctions are permissible responses, the practice may shift from being a contested exception to a normalized feature of international relations. Global South States could invoke the Janus-faced approach explained by the present inquiry, pointing to Russia/China adopting what they long condemned. Furthermore, regional organizations may draw inspiration from their approaches. For instance, reference can be made to the ASEAN. Traditionally reluctant to impose sanctions on the account of the alleged breach of the principle of non-intervention—as China and Russia—ASEAN could gradually embrace such instruments.Footnote 240
In addition, one must also take into account the prospect of China and Russia jointly imposing sanctions. Joint statements condemning sanctions against Russia outside of the UN architecture; high-profile gestures of political solidarity, such as joint military parades and frequent bilateral summits. These are but few examples of recent developments creating fertile ground for greater coordination, even in sanctions domain. In particular, the sanctions evasion has already intensified the relations between the two states. Facing unprecedented EU and U.S. sanctions, Russia has heincreasingly relied on China as a crucial outlet for trade, technology, and finance. China’s financial infrastructure, particularly the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), has emerged as a partial substitute for SWIFT, while Chinese exports have filled gaps left by departing Western firms.Footnote 241 Therefore, by taking advantage of multilateral platform, such as the expansion of BRICS championed by both Russia and China, the latter may articulate common positions on sanctions and promote alternatives to Western-led economic governance.
For now, what may remain unchallenged is that China and Russia will not use “unilateral coercive economic measures to defend global norms” and that the imposition will still be driven by a responsive logic:Footnote 242 sanctions are levied only as a form of response and in so far as China and Russia have been previously targeted. Without claiming there is uniformity in Non-Aligned Movement, non-aligned and developing States are skeptical of Western-led sanctions, creating a permissive environment in which retaliatory measures can be justified without framing them as instruments for upholding global norms or communal values. Consequently, the lack of normative motivation in China and Russia’s sanctions policy is both a product of domestic strategy and a reflection of the wider context of non-alignment. This is especially evident in the fact that what triggers the imposition of counter-sanctions is the alleged breach of the principle of non-intervention.
In terms of trends that characterize their sanctions policy, practice evidences that they are favoring measures that fall within the category of unilateral sanctions. By mapping the evolution that has occurred in utilization of such sanctions, this Article has provided insights which can be instrumental in further investigating their impact. Indeed, the UN General Assembly has tasked the Secretary General with monitoring the presence of unilateral sanctions and studying “the impact of such measures on the affected countries, including the impact on trade and development.”Footnote 243 Moreover, taking a human rights angle, it can be noted that studying “trends, developments and challenges in relation to the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights” represents one of core tasks of the UN Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures.Footnote 244
Ultimately, the utilization of such measures may accelerate the fracturing of the geopolitical order, with more competition and less integration producing a fraught new landscape in which a multiplicity of actors may wield the tools of economic coercion.Footnote 245
Based on the foregoing, it seems appropriate to conclude this Article by putting forward at least four policy recommendations.
First, UN monitoring mechanisms could be enhanced to capture not only Western unilateral sanctions but also the counter-sanctions of non-Western powers. Strengthening the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures would ensure balanced scrutiny. However, prospects for altering the mandate appear minimal, given that the Special Rapporteur’s work is highly politicized and influenced by the positions of States under Western sanctions.
Second, it is worth monitoring the regional developments, especially in ASEAN, to see whether the Chinese use of sanctions my alter the posture of a typically “dormant” international organization from a sanctions perspective.
Third, as sanctions senders, Western states should recalibrate their sanctions strategies in recognition of Russia and China’s growing retaliatory capacities, including by taking into account possible instances of convergence between these two States. The U.S. could consider being more cautious in applying extraterritorial sanctions, considering that China is now equipped with municipal laws devoted to respond to the so-called secondary effects. Moreover, western senders should incorporate humanitarian exemptions for at least two reasons. First, they serve as an important bargaining tool. By allowing limited channels of trade, particularly in essential goods such as food and medicine, senders can signal that sanctions are intended to constrain specific behaviors rather than indiscriminately punish populations. This calibrated approach preserves space for negotiations while maintaining pressure. Conversely, withholding exemptions risks conveying a rigid stance that may foreclose diplomatic engagement. Second, because Russia and China proved to display a reactive posture, they may consider approving humanitarian carve-out as long as the western packages do so. Therefore, it is important to maintain and strengthen humanitarian exemptions.Footnote 246
Fourth, and relatedly, if the China and Russia keep engaging in international sanctions practice, the international community should seize this shift as an opening to press for clearer and consolidated global standards on sanctions, such as humanitarian exemptions.
Acknowledgements
The author declares none.
Competing Interests
The author declares none.
Funding Statement
No specific funding has been declared in relation to this Article.
Open access
