1. RELIANCE ON CROWDFUNDING FOR SOCIAL WELFARE

A fundamental question in every democratic society is who should be responsible for its citizens’ welfare, especially the weakest ones. Until the nineteenth century, with rare and partial exceptions, states took almost no responsibility for citizens, while philanthropists, churches, charities, and families provided welfare services. The first employment-based occupational insurance schemes mitigating the risk of ill health, work accidents, and old age occurred in the late nineteenth century (Esping-Andersen Reference Esping-Andersen1990). In the “welfare states” that subsequently emerged, governments assumed “responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for [their] citizens” to mitigate the effects of natural and social contingencies on individuals’ life chances (Esping-Andersen Reference Esping-Andersen1990, 18–19). Welfare state policies institutionalized norms, practices, and expectations regarding citizens’ entitlements, and criteria for support were independent of personal and family relationships (Björnberg and Latta Reference Björnberg and Latta2007). Unlike family support or occupational insurance, the states’ public support policies affected individuals through formal enforcement mechanisms designed to harmonize wealth production and distribution (Myles Reference Myles1988).

Throughout the twentieth century, welfare states continued to expand, and by the late 1980s had become a dominant fixture in “every modern industrial state” (Gutmann Reference Gutmann1988, 3). Given differing approaches to state involvement in welfare provision, the extent of and contingencies on access to benefits vary among countries (Blanc and Al-Amoudi Reference Blanc and Al-Amoudi2013). Nevertheless, all welfare state models have been in crisis since the late 1970s, with public spending cuts and extensive privatization of state-provided welfare services (De Blok and Kumlin Reference De Blok and Kumlin2022). In recent decades, governments worldwide have systematically reduced and limited eligibility for welfare benefits at the expense of the least well-off (Fotaki Reference Fotaki2022; Blanc and Al-Amoudi Reference Blanc and Al-Amoudi2013).

Ongoing erosion of the welfare state and developments in IT and internet technology have contributed to the proliferation of crowdfunding platforms designed to address unmet welfare needs. These “welfare crowdfunding platforms” rest on the egalitarian principle that productive assets should be distributed as widely as possible, rather than concentrated in only a few hands (Sajjad et al. Reference Sajjad, Zhang, Alarifi, Battisti and Arrigo2023). The idea is to facilitate a simple procedure for fund-seekers to post their welfare-funding requests and raise large sums of money by aggregating numerous small contributions from “crowds” of people via the internet (Mollick Reference Mollick2014). Unlike other crowdfunding platforms that reward contributors for their support, welfare crowdfunding platforms offer no tangible incentives. Instead, donors may receive symbolic rewards such as honorable mentions, but above all they value the feeling of contributing to others’ well-being (Moysidou Reference Moysidou2021). In some senses, welfare crowdfunding platforms resemble cooperatives, with people voluntarily joining them to address specific needs or pursue joint economic, social, or cultural goals. However, unlike cooperatives, these platforms are not democratically controlled or owned by the crowd, nor does each member have voting rights. Rather, these private, for-profit digital entities control fundraising activities without transparency about their profits, strategies to increase their donor base, and their power and other activities.

2. THE SCOPE OF OUR ETHICAL ANALYSIS

In this study, we focus on the US context, as both the largest welfare crowdfunding market and an example of a “reluctant” and “residual” or even “laggard” welfare state (Jansson Reference Jansson2014; Skocpol Reference Skocpol1995). The US devotes a smaller proportion of its gross national product (GNP) to social welfare than its European counterparts, and its welfare state is more fragmented and less inclusive or extensive (Hacker Reference Hacker2002). Historically, core social programs emerged later in the US than in Europe, and programs in some notable areas, like national health insurance, never fully materialized (Howard Reference Howard1999). Instead, the US has emphasized the role of voluntary associations, including markets, cooperatives, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), in providing welfare, healthcare, and income maintenance benefits. The US state offers welfare selectively, promoting individual rather than collective responsibility for individuals’ well-being. Even in generous social-democratic models, institutions struggle to protect their constituents (Cribb Reference Cribb2008); yet the US system of welfare provision experiences significantly more problems than welfare states in similarly affluent democracies (Gutin and Hummer Reference Gutin and Hummer2021). It is less equitable, with differential access for the wealthy and vast disparities in well-being, life expectancy, and infant mortality outcomes (Schneider et al. Reference Schneider, Shah, Doty, Tikkanen, Fields and Williams2021).

In the UK, provision of free and universal publicly funded healthcare through the National Health Service has long been widely perceived as an essential feature of national identity and collective consciousness (Fotaki Reference Fotaki2006). However, in the US, where private healthcare markets and health insurance play significant roles in providing such services, there has long been powerful opposition to universal public healthcare. Given these fundamental differences, our arguments and ethical critique are less relevant to countries with comprehensive social-democratic welfare states, although we may expect similar developments in the latter if their decline continues.

In the context of profound inadequacies in the US welfare system, GoFundMe was launched in 2010 as a private, for-profit organization to enable citizens to solicit funds for their welfare needs. At that time, the US economy was recovering from its worst recession in decades, suffering from growing wealth inequality, drastic austerity measures, and diminishing faith in political institutions (Wade Reference Wade2023). In this post-global financial crisis world, GoFundMe emerged as part of a movement prompting the public—“the crowd”—to participate in the value creation process (Bayus Reference Bayus2013), leveraging active participation and civic engagement (Haltofova Reference Haltofova2018). The platform quickly transformed the traditional fundraising landscape by allowing people to directly support those needing emergency financial assistance. Unlike 501(c)3 charities, donations to a personal GoFundMe fundraiser are considered personal gifts, are not tax-deductible, and go directly to a specific individual/family.Footnote ¹ Predictably, GoFundMe gained popularity in regions that provide limited publicly financed welfare services (Bassani, Marinelli, and Vismara Reference Bassani, Marinelli and Vismara2019), lack universal health coverage, encourage market solutions to social problems, and cover citizens’ needs through private welfare schemes (Lublóy Reference Lublóy2020).

Today, GoFundMe is synonymous with welfare-related fundraising in the US.Footnote ² As a private enterprise, it generates revenues through voluntary gratuities from donors (at a suggested 10–20 percent per donation). Whereas nonprofit organizations are obliged to share information about the grants they give and receive, GoFundMe has avoided public discussion of its annual revenues, probably to quell perceptions of proudly profiting from the suffering of others. Thus, we cannot estimate how much giving through GoFundMe has supplanted giving to nonprofit organizations (Beaty Reference Beaty2024). Recently, GoFundMe announced that since its launch it has generated $30 billion, with 150 million users to date (Beaty Reference Beaty2024). For comparison, in 2022 alone, charitable giving to nonprofit organizations reached $499.3 billion (Giving USA Reference Giving2023) and total annual healthcare spending was $4.5 trillion in the US (Hartman et al. Reference Hartman, Martin and Whittle2024). Although GoFundMe’s total giving is relatively small compared with charitable giving and healthcare spending, its exponential growth over the past ten years indicates its potential future impact. It took five years to raise the first $1 billion on its platform, nine months for the second billion, and only seven months for the third (Adams Reference Adams2016).

Although GoFundMe is not transparent about its total donations relating to welfare, this figure can be estimated from the number of health-related crowdfunding campaigns, representing a third of all donations on the platform (Cerullo Reference Cerullo2019). In 2010, GoFundMe hosted approximately 42 medical campaigns seeking a total of $717,125. By 2018, this had risen to 119,373 campaigns each year seeking more than $4.6 billion in the US (Angraal et al. Reference Angraal, Zachariah, Raaisa, Rao, Krumholz and Spertus2021). From 2016 to 2020, GoFundMe raised over $2 billion for healthcare-related needs (Kenworthy and Igra Reference Kenworthy and Igra2022). Since 2020, given the American welfare state’s poor response to the pandemic, the US public have relied more heavily on GoFundMe. In the first few months of the pandemic, GoFundMe launched over 175,000 COVID-19-related campaigns, and this unprecedented crowdfunding activity has persisted (Igra et al. Reference Igra, Kenworthy, Luchsinger and Jung2021). GoFundMe reports more than 250,000 campaigns financing medical needs each year, raising more than $650 million (Cadogan Reference Cadogan2022). Seventy-eight percent of these campaigns are for routine medical care, which in theory is less costly than specialist and invasive procedures (Saleh et al. Reference Saleh, Ajufo, Lehmann and Medford2020), highlighting the immense financial cost of accessing even essential medical care in the US healthcare system.

The shortcomings of the welfare system account for GoFundMe’s more pivotal role in the US than in any other country. In similarly wealthy countries such as the UK and Canada, the platform is less prominent and needed than in the US (Saleh et al. Reference Saleh, Ajufo, Lehmann and Medford2020). Moreover, in these and other countries with universal healthcare systems, campaigns are generally confined to treatments not covered by public healthcare systems, including financing “alternative” therapies (Lublóy Reference Lublóy2020). In contrast, such campaigns in the US are more likely to cover basic needs and routine medical procedures (Saleh et al. Reference Saleh, Ajufo, Lehmann and Medford2020). GoFundMe’s normalization and institutionalization for accessing welfare in the US accentuates the pressing need for a thorough ethical critique of the platform in this context.

We analyze GoFundMe’s ethical standing through the prism of Rawls’s theory because the latter is one of the most influential theories on what constitutes just and acceptable allocation of resources in the context of the liberal market economy. Rawls explored the importance of the welfare system for distributional equality and how to organize it inclusively without violating the free choice of others (Rawls Reference Rawls1982). Importantly, his work emphasizes the importance of protecting individual rights and liberties in ensuring fair distributions of resources. We accept that Rawls’s premises arose in a different world, where developing a fully-fledged welfare state to address inequalities was a viable policy objective. In other words, we generally agree with Blanc and Al-Amoudi’s (Reference Blanc and Al-Amoudi2013) argument that Rawls’s restrictive definition of the domain of the principles of justice is broadly appropriate to healthy welfare states. We also recognize that the power of private corporations has increased since Rawls developed his theory (Berkey Reference Berkey2021).

Nevertheless, such criticisms do not diminish the value of Rawls’s fundamental premise that social welfare and access to healthcare are essential foundations for self-respect (Blanc and Al-Amoudi Reference Blanc and Al-Amoudi2013; DeGrazia Reference DeGrazia1991). They are prerequisites for enjoying other primary social goods, such as basic liberty rights in a democratic polity. In other words, Rawls’s work reminds us of social institutions’ importance in ensuring fairness and justice in the liberal market economy by distributing primary goods. Despite its drawbacks, Rawls’s work offers valuable insights through his prescient arguments on justice that inspire liberal societies’ pursuit of fairness, reasonableness, and solidarity.

The questions addressed by Rawls’s work continue to confront ethicists (e.g., medical and business ethicists) and are difficult to answer based on traditional ethical theories alone (Doorn Reference Doorn2010). Unsurprisingly, his work has been extensively applied in the field of ethics, and particularly in business ethics (for an inventory of recent applications, see Doorn Reference Doorn2010). It has formed the basis for a plethora of publications in leading academic journals, including Business Ethics Quarterly (e.g., Berkey Reference Berkey2021; Blanc Reference Blanc2016; Norman Reference Norman2015; Phillips Reference Phillips1997; Singer Reference Singer2015) and the Journal of Business Ethics (e.g., Alm and Brown Reference Alm and Brown2021; Cohen Reference Cohen2010; Lindblom Reference Lindblom2011; Martin Reference Martin2015). Moreover, core business ethics theories, such as stakeholder theory (Freeman Reference Freeman1994) and the social contract theory of the firm (Fia and Sacconi Reference Fia and Sacconi2019), are genuinely Rawlsian in their inspiration. Overall, Rawls’s work, promoting the idea of a just society that prioritizes social security and care for the less privileged, is a valuable tool for our analysis of GoFundMe’s involvement in social welfare provision. Nevertheless, we also note room for critical evaluation and examination of how far Rawls’s fundamental premises can explain and promote justice in today’s world. Thus, while we adopted an increasingly critical stance towards his approach to justice in the course of our analysis, we concur with Berkey (Reference Berkey2021) and Chandler (Reference Chandler2023) that Rawls is still our go-to philosopher. The questions he poses concerning the just distribution of scarce resources are more relevant than ever. For example, Price and Edwards (Reference Price and Edwards2020) reveal that since the policy shift toward neoliberalism more than four decades ago, the US has seen a wealth redistribution of over $50 trillion from the working class to the wealthiest 1 percent, threatening the country’s future (Price and Edwards Reference Price and Edwards2020).

In the next section we examine Rawls’s work, highlighting concepts and ideas central to our arguments and its extended application to understanding shifts in contemporary welfare provision. We also discuss its limitations before proceeding to our ethical critique in Section 4.

3. RAWLS’S JUST SOCIETY AND THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ACTORS

The issues of justice, social equality, and welfare are central to Rawls’s (Reference Rawls1971, Reference Rawls1977, Reference Rawls1980, Reference Rawls1999, Reference Rawls2001, Reference Rawls2005) highly influential work. Rawls (Reference Rawls1971, Reference Rawls2001) developed a framework for establishing and maintaining a well-ordered society by creating a distributive system of social goods that emphasizes fairness over absolute equity. His hypothetical concept of the “original position” was a thought experiment to identify the principles that free and equal citizens will agree to in designing a fair society. This was one of Rawls’s (Reference Rawls1971, 62) critical thought experiments elaborating on justice as fairness by nullifying “the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance” (Rawls Reference Rawls1971, 62). In this position, individuals operate under a metaphorical “veil of ignorance” that screens out knowledge of social positions, comprehensive doctrines, native endowments, ethnic background, and sex. Decision makers are assumed to be ignorant of their physical and social endowments or social disadvantages, obliging them to distribute primary goods rationally and opt for social arrangements favoring the least advantaged if in a position to do so.

Rawls (Reference Rawls1971) postulated that individuals in the original position will select two principles of justice: the liberty principle and the difference principle. The first asserts an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties, including “freedom of the person” and freedom of speech. The second stipulates two sub-requirements for acceptable inequalities: that social positions must be equally accessible to those endowed with similar talent and motivation, and that any inequalities must always benefit the least advantaged members of society (Rawls Reference Rawls1971, Reference Rawls2001). Rawls assumed that decision makers in the original position are rational. However, this assumption has been extensively criticized for being either irrational (e.g., Choptiany Reference Choptiany1973; Harsanyi Reference Harsanyi1955; Reference Harsanyi1975) or holding when the original contracting parties are extremely risk-averse (e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Roemer Reference Moreno-Ternero and Roemer2008; Roemer Reference Roemer2002). Experimental philosophers have explored this kind of decision making in the lab, strongly disproving Rawls’s assumption of rationality (e.g., Bruner and Lindauer Reference Bruner and Lindauer2020; Lissowski, Tyszka, and Okrasa Reference Lissowski, Tyszka and Okrasa1991). For instance, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (Reference Frohlich and Oppenheimer1993) found that subjects placed in circumstances of choice approximating the Rawlsian original position, in choosing the restricted utilitarian principle, appear to want to balance the needs of the badly off with those who have worked harder and thus deserve to receive more. We agree that individual decision makers are rarely rational thinkers and tend to underestimate the risks accruing from their choices (as in referendums on important and complex policy issues such as Brexit). However, even if not those that individuals in the original position would choose, they must still obey these principles, as they dictate the distribution of primary goods by designated social institutions.

Another crucial idea in Rawls’s work is the basic structure of society (BSS), defined as the “major social institutions [that] distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls Reference Rawls1971, 7). The BSS distributes primary goods, including basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement, free choice of occupation, powers and prerogatives, opportunities, income and wealth, and social bases of self-respect (Rawls Reference Rawls1971, Reference Rawls2001). Self-respect is “perhaps the most important primary good” (Rawls Reference Rawls1971, 440; Reference Rawls2001, 60). Hence, providing social foundations for self-respect is an essential function of basic institutions to ensure that citizens have a sense of their worth as people and can advance their ends with self-confidence. Rawls did not specifically include healthcare as a primary social good, seeing it as a “natural good” less amenable to direct control by the BSS. Sen (Reference Sen1992) and Nussbaum (Reference Nussbaum1999) criticized Rawls’s use of primary social goods as the principal measure of equality because individuals’ ability to access and use them varies. Access to healthcare is rarely a matter of individual choice, but is vital for functioning, enjoying a fair and rightful share of primary goods, and flourishing. Accordingly, scholars have argued for extending Rawls’s ideas to include the right to health and fair healthcare distribution as an essential component of welfare, claiming that any social system concerned with justice must provide access to healthcare (Ekmekci and Arda Reference Ekmekci and Arda2015).

The primacy of the BSS means that some principles of justice have methodological and regulative primacy over others (Freeman Reference Freeman2019): “Justice as fairness starts with domestic justice—the justice of the basic structure. From there, it works outward to the law of peoples, and inward to local justice” (Rawls Reference Rawls2001, 11). Crucially, Rawls drew a critical distinction between a well-ordered society of justice as fairness and the concept of a “private society” (Blanc and Al-Amoudi Reference Blanc and Al-Amoudi2013). In his view, the domain of influence of the principles of justice belongs to the BSS and does not guide individuals’ actions or define the fair distribution of privileges within private voluntary organizations and firms (Child and Marcoux Reference Child and Marcoux1999; Phillips and Margolis Reference Phillips and Margolis1999). However, Rawls is notorious for failing to unambiguously define the BSS (Blanc Reference Blanc2016). His stance on the boundaries of the BSS and the role of corporations in this structure is rather loose, because “the concept of the basic structure is somewhat vague” (Rawls Reference Rawls1971, 9). Rawls generally treated corporations as private voluntary associations outwith the BSS (Rawls Reference Rawls2001, 10, 164), yet he considered ownership of the means of production to be integral to the BSS (Rawls Reference Rawls1999, 6), hinting that corporate governance might also belong within this structure (Rawls Reference Rawls2001, 178).

The elusive Rawlsian dichotomy of the BSS between the “main elements of the economic and social system” and the “rules and practices of private associations” (Rawls Reference Rawls1971, 7–8) has generated extensive debate on whether private corporations should be subject to Rawlsian principles. On the one hand, scholars like Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks (Reference Phillips, Freeman and Wicks2003), Freeman (Reference Freeman and Freeman2018), and Singer (Reference Singer2015) have argued that principles of justice apply only to institutions that exert a “pervasive influence” on individuals’ life prospects (Rawls Reference Rawls1971, 82). This view, which Berkey (Reference Berkey2021) calls the “coercive account,” posits that corporations fall outside the BSS because they are voluntary associations with no power to inhibit those who do not share their basic rules from exiting contracts. In the coercive account, institutions belong to the BSS only if their rules are imposed on them rather than chosen voluntarily, and this should be “universally true,” that is, true for all individuals (Singer Reference Singer2015, 80). Government rules are coercive because “the power of the government cannot be evaded except by leaving the state’s territory” (Rawls Reference Rawls2001, 93). Corporations, by contrast, are not legally coercive because exiting their authority is neither lawfully nor otherwise universally restricted.

On the other hand, a plethora of scholars have criticized this limiting view of the BSS and called for reassessment of its boundaries and the domain of the principles of justice under specific conditions and contexts (Arnold Reference Arnold2013; Blanc Reference Blanc2016; Blanc and Al-Amoudi Reference Blanc and Al-Amoudi2013; Fia and Sacconi Reference Fia and Sacconi2019; Hsieh Reference Hsieh2004; Néron Reference Néron2015; Rönnegard and Smith Reference Rönnegard and Smith2024). As Norman (Reference Norman2015) argues, the current economic, legal, and sociological context and the increasingly prominent role played by corporations should push egalitarians to correct errors and omissions in Rawls’s analysis. Blanc (Reference Blanc2016) suggests that corporations coercing citizens through labor law are entitled to enter the domain of basic institutions, as they de facto discharge BSS functions. Arnold (Reference Arnold2013) concurs that corporations establish authority relations with employees, and consequently do not fit into the category of free associations. Similarly, Majumdar (Reference Majumdar2019) and Martins (Reference Martins2018) argue that corporations now have deontic powers that did not exist before, while also shaping power relationships through various means, exerting economic, social, and political influence. As they continuously shape social cooperation, they must fall within the domain of the Rawlsian principles of justice. Overall, this view on extending the BSS, which Berkey (Reference Berkey2021) calls the “profound effects account,” is grounded in Rawls’s (Reference Rawls1999, 7) claim that the basic structure is the primary subject of justice because “its effects are so profound and present from the start.” Thus, whenever firms distribute primary goods, they allocate power and authority, incomes and wealth, and the basis of self-respect. Therefore, they should be seen as part of, or at least connected to, Rawls’s BSS.

Nevertheless, scholars who accept the “profound effects” account do not always agree with including corporations in the constitutional design of society, because justice is a characteristic of the conduct of both individuals and private actors who are not part of the BSS (Murphy Reference Murphy1998; Cohen Reference Cohen1997). Critiquing Rawls, Cohen (Reference Cohen1997) argues that we should not focus exclusively on coercive institutions, but must apply the principles of justice to all social interactions, including individual conduct. If “the basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the start” (Cohen Reference Cohen1997, 7), it is unclear why our notion of the BSS should rule out institutions that do not operate through legally coercive mechanisms, but whose effects are, indeed, tremendously profound and present from the start. As Berkey (Reference Berkey2021) shows, there are reasons to reject the view that the principles of justice do not apply to the internal affairs of private associations, even if they are not part of the Rawlsian basic structure.

We argue that, despite its limitations, Rawls’s contractarian work is highly appropriate for analyzing GoFundMe’s ethical footprint. Remaining loyal to the exit criterion in determining whether an institution is part of the BSS, GoFundMe is not legally coercive; hence, it cannot be part of the BSS because fund-seekers can exit the relationship by securing welfare support elsewhere without incurring any cost. However, we stress that Rawlsian principles should be applied to GoFundMe and other welfare crowdfunding platforms in the US context, not because they are legally coercive institutions, but because some tenets of justice must apply to the conduct of private institutions (Berkey Reference Berkey2021). Since the US welfare state can no longer guarantee effective redistribution policies, GoFundMe is currently performing, at least partly, the function of the BSS by distributing welfare funds in a failing welfare state. Indeed, as discussed in section 2, GoFundMe has started to exercise some systemic influence over the distribution of basic goods in the US, and its power and influence are expected to grow further. This may prompt detrimental developments, with even more extensive roles in BSS institutions. As we shall show in our ethical analysis, dependence on GoFundMe in the future may empower it to act in a way that will (or might) affect the US welfare state (Berkey Reference Berkey2021).

4. AN ETHICAL CRITIQUE OF WELFARE CROWDFUNDING

Rawls’s first principle of justice, emphasizing the protection of basic rights and liberties, provides a prima facie justification for GoFundMe’s existence. Considering the decline of the welfare state and GoFundMe’s potentially vital role in protecting basic liberty, the platform is unlikely ever to be prohibited in the US. Building on this pragmatic argument, we posit that GoFundMe serves an essential objective of justice from below through participation in direct democratic procedures. Given its potential to democratize welfare provision by empowering citizens and promoting their involvement in deciding the best arrangements for their welfare, we do not advocate its prohibition. Nevertheless, we claim that GoFundMe currently functions counter to the establishment of a fair society from a Rawlsian perspective. Its institutional arrangements relying on “crowds” cannot harness its potential to respond to unmet needs without undermining the principles of justice.

We present three distinct but interrelated arguments for why the current form of welfare crowdfunding, represented by its leading platform, GoFundMe, is morally problematic and merits ethical criticism. Our arguments delineate the conditions under which GoFundMe might pose moral dilemmas from a Rawlsian perspective. However, we cannot claim that fairly functioning welfare crowdfunding platforms might offer less fair or less feasible solutions than a fully-fledged welfare state. In practice, even robust welfare states have proven unable to ameliorate all inequalities, not least because of the competing particularistic and universalistic claims of different social groups, such as those in employment, the elderly, and disabled people versus the unemployed, poor, immigrants (Fotaki Reference Fotaki2022), and racial minorities (Perocco Reference Perocco2022). Accordingly, we neither argue against distributing welfare funds through GoFundMe per se, nor advocate for welfare states as the best possible way to achieve equitable distribution. Rather, our practical aim is to inform and guide improvements to GoFundMe and similar platforms to reduce their adverse effects on fairness and equality while building on their democratizing potential.

5. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE

This paper is the first to offer a compelling analysis of the complex but important topic of the ethics of welfare crowdfunding. Our analysis has several critical theoretical implications for business ethics and further research. First, it extends the emerging evidence base on the ethical implications of crowd-based practices, especially those concerned with social welfare causes (Sajjad et al. Reference Sajjad, Zhang, Alarifi, Battisti and Arrigo2023), including microfinance (Hudon and Sandberg Reference Hudon and Sandberg2013; Hudon and Ashta Reference Hudon and Ashta2013), crowd labor (Sheehan and Pittman Reference Sheehan and Pittman2019), and crowdsourcing (Du et al. Reference Du, Babalola, D’Cruz, Dóci, Garcia-Lorenzo, Hassan, Islam, Newman, Noronha and van Gils2024). In this article, we question the assumption that individual donors are best placed to distribute welfare funds ethically, even if motivated by pro-social behavior (Sajjad et al. Reference Sajjad, Zhang, Alarifi, Battisti and Arrigo2023), not least because this assumption considers neither preexisting differences in education, social class, race, and other inequalities, nor growing evidence of biases and other irrational behaviors on crowdfunding platforms. Although platforms could offer the infrastructure necessary to reduce disparities and inequalities, instead they function in ways that strengthen them, favoring the already privileged. In identifying ethical problems that may arise when unregulated digital platforms play a central role in distributing public goods like healthcare, we also challenge the view that technological advances lead to greater social inclusion, equality, and social welfare (Armstrong, Riemenschneider, and Giddens Reference Armstrong, Riemenschneider and Giddens2018; Steinberg Reference Steinberg2020). As we demonstrate, platformization is not only a techno-social process, but also a political-economic one with complex and far-reaching ethical ramifications for people’s lives (Dowling Reference Dowling, Strüver and Bauriedl2022). This suggests a need for a greater involvement of businesses with ethical considerations, especially when their activities intersect with public policy services in the context of the marketized welfare.

Second, our work contributes to Rawlsian scholarship in critiquing Rawls’s limited conception of institutional roles and functions that must be included in the BSS. Given the complex and ongoing debate about the contours of the basic structure, we argue that the principles of justice should be applied to institutions (including private, non-legally coercive ones) whenever they act as occupants of roles within a basic structural institution. This is justified, we argue, because institutions’ roles, responsibilities, and social impacts have also been reassessed since Rawls’s influential works were published. Rawls developed his conception of welfare in a high-employment economy (for a discussion of the welfare state under high employment with wage differentials and high unemployment, see Blanc and Al-Amoudi Reference Blanc and Al-Amoudi2013). The subsequent and continuing decline of the welfare state constitutes a significant contextual transformation affecting the systemic distribution of primary goods, prompting our extension of the application of the principles of justice to include informal structures such as private corporations and platforms (Blanc and Al-Amoudi Reference Blanc and Al-Amoudi2013; Fia and Sacconi Reference Fia and Sacconi2019).

Contemporary corporations are more similar to political institutions than voluntary associations, and American corporations have become characterized as “private government” (Anderson Reference Anderson2015, 55). Their power and influence have grown exponentially in the globalized economy, often creating conditions in which states are so weak or burdened that businesses take on responsibility for activities traditionally reserved for states (Wettstein Reference Wettstein2010; Hsieh Reference Hsieh2017). As we argue, private corporations like GoFundMe may discharge the functions of the BSS under certain conditions, for example in the absence of adequate welfare institutions, but are not regulated appropriately. Therefore, following Berkey (Reference Berkey2021), we posit that the Rawlsian ethical framework applies to certain corporations, such as GoFundMe, even if they are not part of the BSS. However, this does not mean that we support the idea that every private corporation should be similarly subject to Rawlsian principles. Rather, we propose that private corporations like GoFundMe ought to be subject to obligations for justice because they distribute primary goods and influence public expectations of primary goods, constructing power relations that shape the public sphere (Berkey Reference Berkey2021). This is because, as Cohen (Reference Cohen2000, 122) argues, “justice cannot be a matter only of the state-legislated structure in which people act but is also a matter of the acts they choose within that structure, the personal choices of their daily lives.”

Our work further contributes to Rawlsian scholarship by adding to debate on what constitutes primary social good by extending it to healthcare (Daniels Reference Daniels2009). We argue that healthcare is a primary good, as it enables individuals to function and flourish (Nussbaum Reference Nussbaum1999; Sen Reference Sen1992), allowing them to realize their life plans and attain the Rawlsian concept of “good” as satisfaction of rational desires (Ekmekci and Arda Reference Ekmekci and Arda2015). Likewise, we agree with Moyn’s (Reference Moyn2018) criticism of the conception of human rights, and particularly social rights, which opposes the distribution logic of sufficiency as minimalist and ill-equipped to address the imperative of equality. Although not aimed at Rawls, Moyn proposed institutional design rather than legal entitlements to protection alone. On balance, our work makes valuable contributions to business ethics in demonstrating that Rawlsian theory can offer useful analytical tools to support the case for substantial regulation of platforms’ internal governance by the basic structure, at least under current US welfare conditions.

At the same time, we posit that although Rawls’s work is valuable, it is also ripe for reassessment. For instance, the concept of “justice as fairness” does not go far enough and is insufficiently egalitarian: it does not account for the importance of health in the BSS, nor for the position occupied by private corporations in today’s society. Hence, we suggest that contemporary Rawlsians will reach different conclusions if they take his theory more seriously than he did. However, our primary focus is not on whether Rawls was correct in all his theorizations and predictions, but on reviving his prescient argument for justice and fairness in the liberal market economy. We propose a revised Rawlsian theory of justice that offers unique insights into crowdfunding for welfare, although there is a scope for theoretical analyses of crowdfunding platforms based on alternative frameworks (e.g., Michel Foucault’s work).

Third, this article contributes to literature on philanthrocapitalism, and particularly on the premise of applying market strategies to philanthropic giving, fundamentally reshaping the charitable sector (Bishop and Green Reference Bishop and Green2015). Our work reveals that the attempt to reconfigure philanthropy as a for-profit activity, which is a central aspect of philanthrocapitalism, may have significant ethical implications. Promoting market forces and business strategies in philanthropic activities risks mission drift away from the social purpose in favor of business objectives (Clark and McGoey Reference Clark and McGoey2016; McGoey Reference McGoey2012). For instance, GoFundMe’s manipulative and emotive narratives, combined with opaque information about its ownership, governance structure, and profitability, raise the question of whose interests these “benevolent” platforms serve. As we show, in embracing neoliberal ideals, GoFundMe, as a paradigmatic exemplar of philanthrocapitalism, may entrench and accentuate wealth and power inequalities (Amarante Reference Amarante2018; McGoey Reference McGoey2012). We concur with Rogers (Reference Rogers2011) and Clark and McGoey (Reference Clark and McGoey2016) that “powerful, unaccountable philanthrocapitalists” shape government policies, and are concerned that GoFundMe may reshape public views on welfare provision, contributing to policy change. GoFundMe’s tactics to intensify need for its services, presenting itself as the best—and sometimes the only—solution to the crowd’s problems (Berliner and Kenworthy Reference Berliner and Kenworthy2017), may play a fundamental role in establishing perceptions of “philanthropic sufficiency” suggesting that voluntary action is a preferable way of dealing with social problems. GoFundMe and similar platforms differ from traditional philanthropy as they rely on a broader reach via technology, promoting platform capitalism without democratic accountability. Therefore, they are more effective in offering powerful new financial, human, and organizational means to achieve the political ambitions of neoliberalism, as encapsulated in the “Big Society” slogan with its evocation of the virtues of a small state with greatly devolved powers and the importance of community and citizens’ autonomy (Bulley and Sokhi-Bulley Reference Bulley and Sokhi-Bulley2014). Yet these ambitions promote the neoliberal minimalist idea of “sufficiency,” rather than addressing inequalities in individuals’ possession of the good things in life (Moyn Reference Moyn2018). Ideally, GoFundMe and other platforms involved in welfare provision should become online spaces that highlight structural inefficiencies and emphasize how these might be collectively addressed, rather than being concerned solely with addressing unmet needs to make profits.

Lastly, our work contributes to scholarship relating to the ethical issues of market solutions for delivering welfare (Blanc and Al-Amoudi Reference Blanc and Al-Amoudi2013; Haque Reference Haque and Bevir2010) and the ideal arrangement of tasks between market and state (Smith Reference Smith2019). Market mechanisms and market values increasingly dominate welfare provision in our societies, and it is important for business ethicists to recognize the ethical implications of this and to ask how welfare crowdfunding platforms, as emerging market actors in welfare provision, can be regulated to contribute to a fairer society. Our arguments imply the rather trivial notion that depending on voluntarism through for-profit, unregulated platforms cannot guarantee that welfare services will reach those who need them most (Fotaki Reference Fotaki2011). We query the claim that platforms promote free choice following market principles, arguing instead that, in practice, they are unethical as they circumvent such freedom and principles. While the exercise of liberty depends on freely available information to enable people to make informed choices, information in welfare crowdfunding is restricted, opaque, and often distorted. Yet the market can only provide certain, primarily consumerist, goods without altering their meaning and value. Anderson (Reference Anderson1990) explains this by focusing on the difference between welfare economists and libertarians on the issue of dividing common goods that are nonrivals in consumption and may be more efficiently provided on a nonexclusive (public) than on an exclusive basis based on people’s ability to access funds and services.

In examining the ethical ramifications of digital platforms that take on responsibilities normally within the purview of government, we call business ethicists to rethink why, and to what extent, welfare crowdfunding platforms need to be regulated to serve a fair society. We argue that welfare states’ inefficiencies and past failures to achieve equality do not justify the takeover of their functions by private platforms that have proven even less suited to fulfilling welfare needs. Despite many imperfections and problems in existing welfare systems, research shows that market-led solutions tend to worsen common social problems such as healthcare (Haque Reference Haque and Bevir2010). Shifting such responsibilities to private entities tends to perpetuate economic and political inequalities, privileging already advantaged members of society by concentrating economic power and political influence (O’Neill Reference O’Neill2009).

However, we do not suggest that business ethicists preclude GoFundMe’s potential to promote a fairer society if it were to fulfill certain conditions by providing relevant information to users or, even better, functioning as a cooperative endeavor in the public interest rather than for private profit generation. We appreciate that crowdfunding platforms address unmet needs for access to welfare, and express the desire for more democratic control via community involvement and co-ownership of structures tasked with providing primary goods like healthcare. Thus, we urge business ethicists to compel platforms to operate within appropriate institutional and legal frameworks to ensure that they contribute to an extended idea of justice as fairness relevant to the twenty-first century, involving community members and experts. In other words, we call for institutional norms and principles to be infused with pragmatic justice from below. Investigating such topics might form the future agenda for research on crowdfunding’s ethical implications. As Chandler (Reference Chandler2023) suggests, reviving Rawls for twenty-first-century public policymaking requires us to “prioritize the life chances of the least well-off,” combining liberty with equality to challenge “prevailing ideas about economic justice on both left and right.” Nevertheless, so far, GoFundMe has thrived on waves of market-oriented policies such as deregulation, privatization, budget caps, and cuts, and has expanded to fill gaps in welfare provision arising from successive retrenchments of the state that have enlisted non-governmental actors to fulfill public purposes well beyond their actual capacities (Elliott and Salamon Reference Elliott and Salamon2002). Thus, we identify the danger that people may abandon redistributive principles altogether in the declining welfare state, resigning themselves to the services provided by ever more powerful private welfare crowdfunding platforms like GoFundMe.

Our analysis also has implications for policy and practice. These relate to regulating platforms to prevent manipulation of donors, since their current configurations lack sufficient control over where the money goes, which kinds of projects are funded, and what ideas are promoted. Granting platforms power to distribute welfare without adequate fraud-prevention procedures and credible rule-enforcement mechanisms may have wide-ranging adverse ethical ramifications. Although platforms’ terms of service typically include disclaimers that they are not responsible for safeguarding donors’ financial contributions, these are found only in the “small print.” A morally problematic consequence of this lack of transparency is that the crowd commonly assumes that internal procedures are employed to screen out opportunists (Moysidou and Hausberg Reference Moysidou and Hausberg2020). Our recommendation for addressing this ethical issue is that, at the very least, platforms must clearly declare that they do not conduct fraud checks on fundraisers and cannot ensure that campaigns are legitimate. This is imperative because crowdfunding platforms are at the centre of the trust-building process vis-à-vis donors, effectively transferring trust from platforms to their host campaigns (Moysidou and Hausberg Reference Moysidou and Hausberg2020). Eventually, platforms must commit to integrating mechanisms to deter misconduct and ensure that opportunists do not exploit the crowd’s charitable giving and altruistic behavior. Belavina, Marinesi, and Tsoukalas (Reference Belavina, Marinesi and Tsoukalas2020) offer a compelling overview of specific technology configurations and appropriate platform designs to prohibit unethical behavior and protect users from fraud.

In addition, while we agree that policymakers are unlikely ever to take the radical and, in our view, inadvisable step of imposing an outright ban on crowdfunding platforms, we urge them to start to design well-considered and informed policies and strategies to eliminate biases and increase the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups on those platforms. Policymakers might impose restrictions on campaigns that are proven to perpetuate existing biases detrimental to the most vulnerable in society, including extensive personal information on fund-seekers’ race, gender, and educational and professional achievements. Moreover, we propose that crowdfunding platforms should make efforts to raise people’s awareness of welfare injustices and the systemic reforms needed to create a fairer society. Platforms might serve as conduits for deliberation between stakeholders, enabling different constituencies to hear from others and engage in critical discourse on what public policies are needed. For example, rather than compelling users to attribute their financial distress to “bad luck” or unforeseen emergencies (Berliner and Kenworthy Reference Berliner and Kenworthy2017), platforms might instead encourage users to explain that their inability to cover their welfare needs is a consequence of systemic failure, a framing that has been proven to induce collective action for healthcare reform in medical crowdfunding campaigns (Moysidou and Cohen-Chen Reference Moysidou and Cohen-Chen2023). Finally, platforms should unambiguously declare that, unlike public institutions dedicated to welfare provision, they are for-profit entities that neither control the veracity of funding requests nor promote campaigns based on meritorious criteria. Platforms might also openly acknowledge and educate the public that decision making and funding allocations occur through the crowd’s potentially biased impulses and personal preferences. This might lead people to realize that platforms are only a temporary and inadequate fix for welfare problems and cannot (and should not) replace public institutions in welfare provision.