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Solidarity and Accountability: Can the Global Compact on Refugees Enforce Refugee Protection Obligations?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2026

Fatima Khan
Fatima Khan*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa
*
Email: fatima.khan@uct.ac.za
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Abstract

While it is evident that the burden-sharing proposed by the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) is a form of solidarity, it remains to be seen whether this represents solidarity between states to the exclusion of refugees themselves. If so, this may justify the critical conclusion drawn by renowned refugee scholar James Hathaway that the GCR is a cop-out by the global North to pick and choose who, when and how they want to share the burden of refugee protection rather than a form of solidarity. This article therefore considers whether the solidarity and community foreseen by the GCR have made things better for refugees who are supposed to be the primary beneficiaries or merely better for the refugee hosts. Recognizing that the basis of the GCR is the rights-based approach of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, this article argues that an investigation is warranted into whether the solidarity envisioned by the GCR can operate as a legal concept in this context and therefore hold the international community accountable for the protection of refugees.

Keywords

refugeesglobal compactsolidarityburden-sharingenforcement mechanismsglobalization

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Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of African Law , Volume 70 , Issue 2 , June 2026 , pp. 205 - 217
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
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© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London.

Introduction

Solidarity as a concept has long attracted the interest of scholars who have, among others, explored whether solidarity based on the recognition of “interconnectedness and interdependence [is] necessary for improving global governance”,Footnote 1 whether solidarity could impose legal obligations on statesFootnote 2 or whether the moral underpinning of solidarity lends itself to individualism rather than a sense of community and therefore not fit for globalization.Footnote 3 This interest continues with the formulation of the UN Draft Declaration on the Right to International Solidarity which boldly states in its preamble that it is “convinced that overcoming current and future global challenges, achieving internationally agreed development goals and the full realization of human rights for all critically rest on international solidarity”.Footnote 4

This article will explore the notions of solidarity and community and their consequences on refugee protection by reflecting on the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR).Footnote 5 A form of international solidarity is undeniably envisaged by the GCR which can take place in the form of a pledge of assistance by stakeholders at a global refugee forum held every four years.Footnote 6 To facilitate this inquiry, the first part of this article will address the issue of whether there is such a thing as international solidarity and a global community or society and, if so, whether the GCR has sufficiently identified the stakeholders who make up this global community to provide protection to refugees. An innovation of the GCR appears to be the adoption of a whole-of-society approach in the protection of refugees. This article therefore considers whether this is a new, more palatable form of globalization and whether it is realistic to expect a level of solidarity from the identified stakeholders without any enforcement mechanism in place or if it is likely to be just “pie-in-the-sky” as suggested by the title.

An analysis of solidarity in the form of pledge-making is covered in the second part of this article. While it is evident that the burden-sharing proposed by the GCR is a form of solidarity, it remains to be seen whether this represents merely solidarity between states or solidarity with refugees themselves. If the GCR’s notion of solidarity is state-centric, there may be credence to the critical conclusion drawn by renowned refugee scholar Professor James Hathaway that the GCR is a cop-out by the global North to pick and choose who, when and how they want to share the burden of refugee protection rather than a form of solidarity.Footnote 7 Consideration will therefore be given to the non-binding nature of the solidarity and community envisaged by the GCR and whether it has made things better for refugees – supposedly the primary beneficiaries of the GCR – or better for the refugee hosts.

The third section of the article concludes on a less pessimistic note. As the basis of the GCR is the rights-based approach of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 UN Refugee Convention),Footnote 8 the further question of whether solidarity expressed through these shared human rights is a viable option is explored. This part will therefore explore how solidarity operates in this rights-based context as a legal concept, and whether the international community can therefore be held accountable for the protection of refugees in general based on their acceptance of human rights.

Aligning the perceived concepts of international solidarity with refugee protection

The concept of international solidarity ought to be seen as a concept synonymous with refugee protection. After all, the very essence of refugee protection is the promise to provide protection to non-nationals. Accepting that solidarity can be expressed in several ways, this article considers what would be an effective form of international solidarity for refugee protection.

Refugee protection envisaged by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention was established to provide surrogate protectionFootnote 9 to non-nationals who faced persecution in their own countries for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group and political opinion.Footnote 10 This surrogate protection is surely a form of international solidarity, yet the international community found the 1951 UN Refugee Convention to be profoundly inadequate because the responsibility and burden of the international protection for refugees was found to be skewed toward states bordering conflict zones. A further call for international solidarity was made in 2018 in New YorkFootnote 11 which resulted in the adoption of the GCR.

How is international solidarity viewed theoretically?

To understand the concept of solidarity and whether it aligns with known refugee protection practices, this section will unpack the thoughts of some political theorists and philosophers to establish whether they are aligned in their understanding of international solidarity.

At the broadest level, to understand the international solidarity expressed for refugees generally I will firstly turn to philosophers such as O’NeillFootnote 12 and MillerFootnote 13 who distinguish between two senses of solidarity, that is, solidarity among and solidarity with.Footnote 14 According to these philosophers, solidarity among usually requires a similarity in the attitudes and characteristics of its members. On the other hand, solidarity with does not require symmetry between the members. For example, one might act in solidarity with an earthquake victim when one donates money to a non-governmental organization (NGO) providing relief to those victims. A typical example of solidarity with is the Catholic notion understood as a form of caritas, or charity. As Tischner, who was influential in Poland’s solidarity movement, writes:

“With whom, therefore, is our solidarity? It is, above all, with those who have been wounded by other people, with those who suffer pain that could be avoided – accidental, needless pain. This does not preclude solidarity with others, with all who suffer. However, the solidarity with those who suffer at the hands of others is particularly vital, strong, spontaneous.”Footnote 15

Philosophers are divided on whether these asymmetric, unilateral forms of aid and support from individuals to other individuals, or from outgroup members to ingroups, count as genuine solidarity.Footnote 16 Sangiovanni argues that the “unilateral, asymmetric reading, tends to vitiate the egalitarianism at the heart of solidarity, and does not fit well with the practices in which the term was, historically, most prevalent”. He also argues that solidarity with, in this narrower sense, is not distinguishable from other, related terms, such as “humanitarian aid”, “charity”, “benevolence” or “support for a good cause”. He states further that “there is nothing gained in calling forms of humanitarian aid or support for a good cause ‘solidarity’, and running the two ideas together under a single banner tends to obscure the value of solidarity as a form of egalitarian collective action”.Footnote 17

When applying the above analysis of solidarity to the issue of refugee protection it is evident that most of the aid provided to refugees can be determined to be humanitarian in nature. This occurs mainly in emergency situations where the provision of humanitarian aid is the norm. Whether provided by states or humanitarian agencies, the assistance provided can be deemed to be a form of charity.Footnote 18 However, whether this type of solidarity can in any way stem the refugee flow or provide a durable solution for refugees is highly questionable. Development theorists therefore justifiably challenge it as a genuine form of solidarity. They believe development aid to be a more substantive form of international solidarity rather than charity.Footnote 19

According to Miller and O’Neill, solidarity among members of a group presupposes a relation among individuals who share a common identity or are part of the same group, often requiring a rough symmetry in attitudes and dispositions. This form of solidarity often includes a readiness to be attentive to one another and a shared commitment to a group’s well-being.Footnote 20 The unity in question is composed, on all plausible views, by a connecting set of “attitudes, dispositions, and characteristic actions” displayed by members. The condition that members of the social group be disposed to put aside narrow self-interest in coming to each other’s aid when required. Some philosophers believe that these two conditions – identifying as a member of a social group and a willingness, on that basis, to set aside narrow self-interest in coming to a fellow’s aid – are necessary and sufficient for solidarity. Van Parijs, for example, writes: “When I help you out of solidarity, I do so because you are ‘one of us’, because ‘I could have been you’, because, in this sense, I ‘identify’ with you”.Footnote 21

The 1951 UN Refugee Convention is a post World War II document, and the rights awarded to refugees are generous. There appears to have been an understanding that among the drafters there was an “it could be me” attitude.Footnote 22 That is, we could have been these refugees. What was missing from the 1951 UN Refugee Convention was the understanding that the “us” in this case could have been the host states. This was a clear oversight by the drafters. There is no substantive article in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention that addresses burden-sharing among statesFootnote 23 and it appears that one of the issues to be rectified by the GCR would be to address this solidarity among states. States in the GCR have pledged to support each other. States have recognized that some are carrying a larger burden than others because of their proximity to the conflict situations (see below for an analysis of the solidarity envisaged by the GCR). States on the periphery had therefore opted to provide humanitarian aid to larger refugee-hosting states to assist refugees and not because of an international legal obligation to solidarity.

The sentiments expressed by the above-mentioned philosophers (with or among) do provide some insight into solidarity with refugees. However, when combined with the views of political philosophers a truer picture regarding solidarity with refugees emerges. When considering the view of political theorists regarding international solidarity, Scholz offers a view of solidarity that is explicitly political and oppositional. For Scholz, political solidarity arises in opposition to something; it is a movement for social change that may occur at many levels of social existence. She states, “political solidarity as I present it has a social justice content or aim; it opposes injustice, oppression, tyranny, and social vulnerabilities”.Footnote 24

Solidarity, from this point of view, is always geared toward overcoming injustice; it is essentially political. Hence in her proposition of what is deemed to be international solidarity, the good Samaritan, the humanitarian aider and those sending money to earthquake victims will be excluded. Scholz also argues that the concept entails the existence of positive moral obligations among participants. This type of solidarity is more in line with those who have committed to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and other human rights instruments. Scholtz’s idea of solidarity is aligned with the protection of human rights. The protection of the rights of others and the fact that they are universally recognized rights is what gives types of solidarity a universalist character and these common values are founded on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).Footnote 25 It is evident that some type of international solidarity is promoted in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, however, more directly toward refugees rather than refugee-hosting states based on their entitlement to a range of rights offered by the convention.

Positioning the Global Compact on Refugees in the international solidarity context

The GCR on the other hand forefronts burden-sharing among states as a key component of international solidarity. It states: “The global compact emanates from fundamental principles of humanity and international solidarity, and seeks to operationalize the principles of burden- and responsibility-sharing to better protect and assist refugees and support host countries and communities”.Footnote 26 The GCR is thus driven by the principles of burden-sharing, cooperation and solidarity which are operationalized through pledges made to refugees and stateless persons and their host communities. The GCR opens by stressing that “[t]here is an urgent need for more equitable sharing of the burden of and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States”.Footnote 27

It formally “intends to provide a basis for predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing among all United Nations Member States, together with other relevant stakeholders as appropriate”.Footnote 28 There is an acknowledgement that “the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries”,Footnote 29 typically countries neighbouring a conflict area and others can show solidarity by firstly recognizing the burden and then actively pledging to assist. The overall objective of the GCR is fourfold: to ease the pressures on host countries, to enhance refugee self-reliance, to expand access to third-country solutions and to support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.Footnote 30 In addition, it advocates for a developmental and multi-stakeholder approach in achieving these objectives; broadly, increased funding and opportunities for refugees and the mobilization of resources to bolster and expand the infrastructure of refugee-hosting communities.

The GCR identifies a community of stakeholders, individually and in co-operation, such as states, regional intergovernmental organizations, multilateral development banks, education institutions, civil society organizations, faith-based actors, the private sector and others make pledges of assistance to refugees and stateless persons and / or hosting communities.Footnote 31 Solidarity is thus embedded in the multi-stakeholder and or whole-of-society approach. This solidarity takes the form of pledge-making.Footnote 32 Pledges primarily take the form of financial, material and technical assistance. The GCR also envisages the development of resettlement places and complementary pathways for admission to third countries and other actions that states can take at the national level in support of the objectives of the GCR. Pledges are captured at the Global Refugee Forums that take place every four years for the purpose of reviewing progress and providing a platform for new pledges.

The 2018 New York Declaration was an acknowledgment of the gaps in the international protection of forcibly displaced persons, as well as a commitment to fill these gaps. In filling the gaps in international protection, there has been increasing acknowledgment of the limits of humanitarian funding. A developmental approach has emerged through which various stakeholders ensure comprehensive and predictable funding mechanisms both for forcibly displaced persons and the communities that host them. This is the essence of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) codified by the New York Declaration. Implementation of the CRRF and its humanitarian / developmental approach began in 2017, and the lessons learned therefrom eventually formed the basis of the GCR.

Even though the GCR has expanded the stakeholders and the approach to international solidarity, the fact that it is voluntarist in its approach make it questionable as a more palatable form of international solidarity. The GCR can be viewed in the same way as the non-binding UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee (EXCO) decisions on burden-sharing – as relevant, as it too has expanded the stakeholders. Furthermore, that it carries moral weight and has led to collective action to support refugees and host communities, is undeniable. Like the GCR, the basis of the UN EXCO decisions is international solidarity and shared responsibility for refugee situations. This is evidenced by the financial and resource commitments of Member States, the fact that it guides UNHCR’s operational planning and programme approvals and provides a framework for developing durable solutions like resettlement and local integration to ease pressure on host countries.

A better approach would be a combination of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, that is, the rights-based approach, combined with responsibility and burden-sharing of the GCR. It appears a natural progression would therefore be for international solidarity to be recognized as a right as envisaged by the Draft Declaration on the Right to International Solidarity which promotes international solidarity as a right. The declaration boldly states that “it shall create an enabling environment for reducing asymmetries and inequities between and within states”.Footnote 33 The right to solidarity hinges on an understanding of solidarity as “an expression of unity by which peoples and individuals enjoy the benefits of a peaceful, just, and equitable international order, secure their human rights, and ensure sustainable development”.Footnote 34

How the pledge-making suggested by the Global Compact on Refugees lends itself to a form of international solidarity

The GCR promotes a whole-of-society approachFootnote 35 which includes states, academia, NGOs, civil society and development actors. The purpose of the GCR was therefore to expand assistance for refugees beyond the hosting states as the pledge-making process enables all stakeholders to participate. When compared to existing human rights documents, the GCR appears to be a newer and broader form of international solidarity with refugees which allows for the burden to be shared among a range of stakeholders.

Pledging as a strategy adopted by the Global Compact on Refugees

Among the strategies adopted to operationalize the GCR is for stakeholders to pledge support either directly to refugees or to those providing services to refugees such as NGOs or to refugee hosting states. The system of pledging is forefronted in the GCR, it calls on states to implement the GCR by pledging support. It encourages stakeholders to show support through pledging.Footnote 36 At paragraph 17 it informs stakeholders when they can announce their pledges. It outlines the periodic Global Refugee Forums, at ministerial level, which will be convened for all UN Member States, together with relevant stakeholders, to announce concrete pledges and contributions towards the objectives of the GCR, and to consider opportunities, challenges and ways in which burden- and responsibility-sharing can be enhanced every four years in Geneva. The first forum was convened in 2019 and the second in 2023.

It also informs stakeholders of the various forms these pledges can take.Footnote 37 As stated above, pledges and contributions made at Global Refugee Forums could take different forms, including financial, material and technical assistance. Various types of pledges, whether healthcare or resettlement, are outlined at paragraph 92 and attention is drawn to resettlement places and complementary pathways for admission to third countries, as well as other actions that states have elected to take at the national level in support of the objectives of the GCR. Part III.B of the GCR serves as a non-exhaustive guide for areas against which pledges and contributions could be made.Footnote 38

Large number of pledges

In 2020, UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner Gillian Triggs was very optimistic about the pledge-making process and progress as a form of international solidarity. She considered the progress made on burden and responsibility sharing by considering the number of pledges made.Footnote 39 Thousands of pledges have been made at the forums, many of them coming from states and other actors that have not traditionally played a major role in protection. Many pledges came from development actors who, having previously felt no obligation to provide support to refugees, now through a development lens (the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)) reached out to provide support to refugees and their hosts.Footnote 40 Hence, according to Triggs, the sheer number of pledges is in itself a measure of the success of the GCR.

Development actors

A further success of the GCR is the adoption of the whole-of-society approach which allows for the inclusion of development actors and hence development funding, in addition to ongoing humanitarian assistance in some cases. There is a greater emphasis on the self-reliance of refugees. Given the fact that most of the world’s refugee persons and communities remained consigned to the bottom of society in terms of economic opportunity, social inclusion and political participation, the principal objective of the 2030 Agenda “to reach the furthest behind first” and “leave no one behind” distinctly applies to refugees. All 17 SDG goals are relevant to refugees but some have a stronger link with refugees than others. The pledge-making system of the GCR has made it easy for development actors to participate in the protection of refugees. It may be too early to state that because of the development approach of the GCR, the burden on host states has been reduced and it has at the same time empowered refugees (resulted in their self-reliance) and is therefore a fairer form of international solidarity especially when compared to a purely humanitarian approach. However, it is undeniable that development actors have embraced the GCR and provided for refugees in ways not even considered before the adoption of the GCR.

Joint contributions

Furthermore, the pledge-making system lends itself to international cooperation. In providing guidance on the kinds of pledges and contributions that could be made at the Global Refugee Forum, UNHCR encouraged states and other stakeholders to consider developing joint contributions, which “could help focus on longer-term cooperation to build a broad, sustainable base of support for refugees and their hosts”.Footnote 41 The idea behind proposing these was to encourage states and others to work together to develop some of their pledges and contributions, communicate about possible pledges, identify where shared interests could be advanced through cooperation (in the spirit of the GCR) and establish peer-to-peer accountability between actors that had pledged jointly. More than one-sixth of pledges were made jointly, showing both that the idea of joint pledging has potential for future Global Refugee Forums, and that more work remains to be done.Footnote 42

Joint pledging can take various forms. One such form, which the UNHCR describes as “partnership contributions”, involves several actors pledging separate contributions towards one common goal. This type of pledging was found to be particularly attractive by development actors. Denmark pledged DKK 70 million to support Uganda and Ethiopia in their commitments to include refugees in their national education systems. Germany has pledged to partner with Mexico to strengthen the social, cultural and economic inclusion of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced people and migrants in vulnerable situations across 15 Mexican municipalities. Secondly, UNHCR is exploring the process of “matching” pledges whereby several pledges that were not made jointly but that complement one another and can be implemented jointly are combined. The mobilization of joint contributions, argue Triggs and Wall, shows potential for bringing together a range of stakeholders in the future.Footnote 43

“Common contributions” are another form of joint contribution which describe several actors making similar or identical pledges. Norway, Germany, Mexico and Switzerland committed to improving international cooperation on disaster-induced cross-border displacement which today functions through the Platform on Disaster Displacement.Footnote 44 The Netherlands, for example, has committed EUR 500 million over four years to support a range of international agencies to “take a joint, integrated approach using their complementary strengths to improve prospects for refugees and host communities” in eight hosting countries. Korea will expand activities under its Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus Strategy, with a particular focus on refugees and internally displaced people. Japan supports this initiative and Zambia is a beneficiary.Footnote 45 UNHCR continues to work with those states to further define the specific amounts involved and the countries and sectors of focus, including with a view to matching them with pledges whose implementation requires support. The above example of pledge-making clearly lends itself at the very least to international cooperation. It is also evident by the types of pledges outlined above that there is an acknowledgement that everyone is entitled to a certain standard of living.

Stock-taking

Beyond the mechanics of pledge-making, the GCR draws attention to taking stock and measuring progress of the pledges and contributions made. The GCR calls upon UNHCR to establish a mechanism for tracking the implementation of pledges and contributions made at the Global Refugee Forum, in consultation with states and other relevant stakeholders.Footnote 46 This tracking mechanism serves the additional purpose of measuring the impact of the GCR. Thus far UNHCR has established an online dashboard that allows users to view and categorize data on the ongoing and completed implementation of pledges.Footnote 47 It is apparent that the pledging envisioned by the GCR falls broadly into the main themes of the GCR, namely developmental funding mechanisms to assist and complement humanitarian funding. This is aimed fundamentally at the self-reliance of refugees and improving the infrastructure of host communities. It advocates for a multi-stakeholder approach (in funding and alliances) and increased data collection.

Critical analysis of the pledge-making process – has the GCR enhanced international solidarity and is this voluntarist approach the beginning of a new form of international solidarity?

As stated above, the promise of international solidarity is embedded in the concept of refugee protection. It is trite that the refugee problem is one that requires international collaboration. Any country that has ratified any of the refugee conventions is cognisant of the fact that they have signed on to provide surrogate protection to nationals of another country. However, from the above, it appears that the 2018 New York Declaration is a recognition that the international solidarity as envisaged by the conventions has led to an unequal burden on those countries bordering refugee-producing countries despite its human rights approach. Hence the specific clause on burden-sharing in the GCR and a ground-breaking effort to support refugees and refugee hosting states by a large number of stakeholders, ie a whole-of-society approach.Footnote 48 Acknowledging that the role of the GCR is envisaged as complementary and not a replacement, and that it uses a multi-stakeholder approach to improve responsibility sharing and provides innovative tools, such as complementary pathways and local solutions, it remains unclear what type of solidarity is envisaged by the GCR; is it a human rights obligation, a moral obligation or is it charity? We do know from the above that the GCR’s solidarity contains a development approach but it is not clear what has inspired this solidarity. The answer may well lie in its pragmatism.

Has the Global Compact on Refugees replaced the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and therefore the human rights approach?

Several scholars are critical of the pledge-making strategy employed by the GCR.Footnote 49 A major criticism of the pledging mechanism of support and of the UNHCR is that it has shifted the focus of refugee protection to the GCR and away from the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.Footnote 50 The question thus arises; has the GCR replaced the substantive 1951 UN Refugee Convention and therefore shifted the focus away from states obligation and away from a human rights approach?

Arnold-Fernández cautions that the manner in which the GCR is used in practice by the UNHCR and by states can have an impact on the understanding and implementation of states’ obligations to ensure human rights are respected, protected and promoted.Footnote 51 Arnold-Fernández situates her argument within a theoretical framework of the law and society movement, which recognizes that the law, legal practices and legal institutions can only be understood by seeing and explaining them within a social context.Footnote 52 She adopts this approach as opposed to legal formalism which informs us that the GCR is soft law and therefore subordinate to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. She states further that this theoretical understanding does not align with the dominant practices of forced migration responses since the adoption of the GCR. The GCR appears to have replaced the 1951 UN Convention in practice insofar as stakeholders, including the UNHCR, turn to the GCR for their interaction with refugees and refugee hosting states. Hosting states too pledge their support for refugees through the GCR instead of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention that they have ratified.Footnote 53

However, she states that perhaps the pledging process can lead a state to a stronger adherence of human rights norms:

“A review of the pledging process to date, and an examination of a highly-touted pledge related to refugees’ economic rights, suggests that while some human rights advances may be possible through this process, those advances are likely to be limited – and may reify state action that falls substantially short of a state’s actual human rights obligations.”Footnote 54

Whilst that may be the case, it is evident that stakeholders who do not have a direct legal responsibility toward refugees, have exercised an international solidarity by pledging support through the GCR. Is this support or solidarity a purely moral obligation or is this obligation based on well recognized human rights such as the right to education or health care or work? The evidence indicates that stakeholders have responded largely to either assist with access to such rights or have enhanced entitlements to such recognized human rights.

Arnold-Fernandez’s criticism though remains valid because pledges are voluntary, and progress reports are only expected every four yearsFootnote 55 so states can get away with the bare minimum. Even states that have ratified the Refugee Convention can pledge the implementation of a human right or pledge to create a human rights system or improve on those rights through resources and report on it every four years. Furthermore, cooperation among stakeholders is entirely voluntary and the UNHCR and refugees remain powerless as they are unable to force or pressure states and other stakeholders to act in alignment with their human rights obligations.

Is it too early to measure the Global Compact on Refugee’s promise of sustainability?

Kruger and Sader in their analysis of pledges made to eradicate statelessness in the Southern African region advise that “arguably, as the GCR is built atop a developmental approach, progress should be measured in the long term”.Footnote 56 However, they note that though the pledging system is a means to make incremental progress through smaller, achievable deliverables, the low implementation rate reveals early concerns of unsustainability. The GCR’s dashboard shows that pledge-making spikes in the years of the Forums, yet the rate of implementation has remained below 30 per cent.Footnote 57 Hence, Triggs’ measure of the pledging system as a success because of the numbers involved does not necessarily translate into sustainability.

What is the yardstick against which the pledges are measured?

The GCR’s pledging has some similarities to human rights enforcement mechanisms. For example, it demands regular state reporting, just as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does vis-à-vis the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.Footnote 58 It encourages and rewards progress toward concrete actions to address failings, as the Universal Periodic Review process does.

However, the pledging process is distinct from the structures of human rights mechanisms because the yardstick against which a state is measured is created by the state itself, not by an external entity such as a treaty body or group of peer states. Moreover, the state creates this yardstick by selecting elements on which it will be measured, allowing it to evade responsibility or even consideration of its performance on elements that involve human rights obligations. At the Global Refugee Forums, states report on their compliance with pledges they voluntarily created, whereas at human rights reporting forums states report on their compliance with mandatory treaty obligations. Thus, while the form is similar, that is, there is a reporting structure, the substance is substantially different.

Is solidarity expressed through shared human rights achievable?

In trying to understand how solidarity can operate in the rights-based context of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, as a legal concept, we can direct our attention to the 2019 report to the UN General Assembly, where former independent expert on international solidarity and human rights, Obiora Chinedu Okafor, emphasized international solidarity “as a foundational principle undergirding the provision of international protection to refugees”.Footnote 59 Okafor however points out that obligations that states assumed under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and other international human rights instruments may well be international in scope insofar as states are providing protection to non-nationals who seek asylum in their territories. By doing so he acknowledges that they are upholding their commitment to human rights. However, providing protection, even generous protection, to those who find themselves on your territory does not amount to a commitment to international solidarity. He states that:

“The polycentric nature of the refugee issue has led to a disparity in refugee protection by global north and south states and the fact that global north states can claim to provide protection to refugees and at the same time does not show international solidarity with other states or more specifically with states of the global south has revealed the gaps between human rights and international protection.”Footnote 60

There is an unmistakable gap – the current refugee regime (1951 UN Refugee Convention) does not guarantee solidarity among refugee-hosting states. As is, refugee-hosting states do not have a right to international solidarity – they are not entitled to assistance in the protection of refugees from other states even though they may be carrying an unequal burden. Even with the GCR there is no right to international solidarity. It is well noted that states of the global North contribute significant financial resources to fund the global refugee protection effort. Nevertheless, states in the global South tend to host nearly 90 per cent of the world’s refugees. It is questionable whether the financial support amounts to solidarity with refugees or even among states when crucially, states in the global North have adopted more stringent measures to deny refugees from the global South entry to their territories. This externalization approach adopted by the global North is the antithesis of a human rights approach.Footnote 61

In his first report to the Human Rights Council in 2018, Okafor recognized that “inadequate attention has thus far been paid to the importance of international solidarity to the fuller realization of human rights, including the right to development and economic, social and cultural rights, as well as to its centrality to the effective implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”.Footnote 62 In contrast, in his second report to the Human Rights Council presented to the General Assembly, he emphasized the:

“Positive expressions of human rights-based international solidarity towards refugees by elements within civil society, cities and other local governments, countries, regional organizations, and at the global level, should be reinforced, expanded, supported by others, and celebrated more widely as imperative pro-human rights and pro-humanitarian acts that save the lives of thousands of global migrants.”Footnote 63

It appears he has endorsed the whole-of-society approach by recognizing the work of the above-mentioned stakeholders. He also, using the test devised by Phillip Alston, convincingly argues that international solidarity can function as a human right.Footnote 64

Though it is evident that the GCR has come a long way to increasing assistance to refugees and to refugee hosting states, it however falls short in its approach to international solidarity because it leaves it up to the stakeholder to volunteer whereas the draft declaration goes a step further and promotes international solidarity as a basic human right and affirms the principle of international solidarity to enable the full realization of human rights. The GCR’s pragmatic approach in the meantime fills a gap left by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and proposes solidarity with both refugees and refugee hosting-states. It appears to be preparatory work for the adoption of international solidarity as a human right. The GCR is thus on the right track but still a way to go.

Conclusion

The GCR has undeniably expanded the scope of international solidarity for refugees and refugee-hosting states even though it is non-binding. The novel approach of pledge-making is in its nascent state and for that reason it is not easy to conclude that it is indeed a viable form of international solidarity. The GCR allows for solidarity with refugees as well as solidarity among refugee-hosting states but its non-binding nature means that stakeholders can pick and choose whether they want to express this solidarity, and if not, there continues to be an unequal burden on refugee-hosting states which is the opposite of international solidarity.

Competing interests

None

Footnotes

*

Professor at law and director of the Refugee Rights Unit, University of Cape Town, Law Faculty.

References

1 See Edinburgh Law School and the Law Schools Global League “Call for Papers: LGSL Academic Conference” (18 February 2025) Law Schools Global League, available at: <https://lawschoolsgloballeague.com/events/call-for-papers-lsgl-academic-conference-18-february-2025/> (last accessed 6 January 2025). See also Pascal Lamy (former director of the World Trade Organization) (8 March 2012, speech at Oxford University), available at: <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl220_e.htm> (last accessed 6 January 2025).

2 L Ariemma, C Bailliet and N Torres-Salas “International solidarity as a human right, shared goal, and community action” (2025) 119 American Journal of International Law Unbound 30.

3 L Wilde “The concept of solidarity: Emerging from the theoretical shadows?” (2007) 9/1 British Journal of Politics & International Relations 171.

4 Revised Draft Declaration on the Right to International Solidarity, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/solidarity/reviseddraftdeclarationrightInternationalsolidarity.pdf> (last accessed 29 September 2025).

5 UN Global Compact on Refugees (2018) (GCR). 181 countries voted in favour of the GCR, except the USA and Hungary.

6 Id, para 17.

7 JC Hathaway “The global cop-out on refugees” (2018) 30/4 International Journal of Refugee Law 591.

8 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) UN Treaty Series vol 189 (1951 UN Refugee Convention).

9 JC Hathaway “International refugee law: The Michigan guidelines on the internal protection alternative” (1993) 21/1 Michigan Journal of International Law 131.

10 Art 1A(2) of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention defines a refugee as any person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.

11 At the summit, all 193 Member States of the UN unanimously adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Resolution 71/1).

12 O O’Neill Towards Justice And Virtue: A Constructive Account Of Practical Reasoning (1996, Cambridge University Press) at 201.

13 D Miller “Solidarity and its sources” in K Banting and W Kymlicka (eds) The Strains Of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies (2017, Oxford University Press) 61.

14 A Sangiovanni and J Viehoff “Solidarity in social and political philosophy” in EN Zalta and U Nodelman (eds) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (25 March 2023), available at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/solidarity/> (last accessed 8 January 2025).

15 J Tischner The Spirit Of Solidarity (trans MB Zaleski and B Fiore, 2nd ed, 1984, Harper & Row).

16 Sangiovanni and Viehoff “Solidarity in social and political philosophy”, above at note 14.

17 Ibid.

18 See “Refugees: EU humanitarian aid to those forced to flee” European Commission, available at: <https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/humanitarian-aid/refugees-eu-humanitarian-aid-those-forced-flee_en> (last accessed 6 January 2025).

19 Sangiovanni and Viehoff “Solidarity in social and political philosophy”, above at note 14.

20 Miller, above at note 13; O’Neill, above at note 12.

21 P Van Parijs “European values: Solidarity” (2021) 34/2 Ratio Juris 95.

22 “The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux préparatoires analysed with a Commentary by Dr Paul Weis” UNHCR, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/media/refugee-convention-1951-travaux-preparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul-weis> (last accessed 6 January 2025).

23 The 1951 UN Refugee Convention does, however, state in the preamble: “Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation”.

24 SJ Scholz Political Solidarity (2008, Pennsylvania State University Press) at 54. See also CT Mohanty Feminism Without Borders: Decolonising Theory, Practising Solidarity (2003, Duke University Press) at 7.

25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR).

26 GCR, above at note 5, para 5.

27 Id, para 1.

28 Id, para 3.

29 Id, para 2.

30 Id, para 7.

31 Id, paras 3 and 17.

32 Id, paras 17–19.

33 Revised Draft Declaration on the Right to International Solidarity, art 3(3). See also J Haaf and F Anderl “A right to international solidarity: World ordering from the margins through international law” (2014) 4/3 Global Studies Quarterly 1 at 1.

34 Revised Draft Declaration, id, art 1(1).

35 GCR, above at note 5, para 3.

36 Id, paras 17–19.

37 Id, para 18.

38 These include reception and admission, safety and security, registration and documentation as well as meeting various needs, including jobs and livelihoods, education, health and those specifically of women and girls.

39 See GD Triggs and PCJ Wall “‘The makings of a success’: The Global Compact on Refugees and the inaugural Global Refugee Forum” (2020) 32/2 International Journal of Refugee Law 283 at 327. Triggs and Wall considered the pledges made at the 2019 Forum, of which there were more than 1,000. The GCR Dashboard shows that there have been a total of 3,320 pledges made as of 31 December 2024: “Pledges & contributions” Global Compact on Refugees, available at: <https://globalcompactrefugees.org/pledges-contributions> (last accessed 29 January 2025).

40 See N Kelley People Forced to Flee: History, Change and Challenge (2022, Oxford University Press) at 287–93; SD Miller “The GCR and the role of developmental actors with refugees: A game-changer, or more of the same?” (2019) 57/6 International Migration 173.

41 UNHCR: Global Refugee Forum Coordination Team “Global Refugee Forum: 17 and 18 December 2019” (Guidance Note: Pledges and Contributions and Good Practices, April 2019) at 7.

42 Triggs and Wall “The makings of a success”, above at note 39 at 330.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. This was initially launched in 2012 as the Nansen Initiative as a result of the pledges made by Norway, Germany, Mexico and Switzerland at UNHCR’s Ministerial Intergovernmental Event on Refugees and Stateless Persons in 2011. The 2011 Ministerial Event showcased an early iteration of the pledging system.

45 See “Pledges & contributions” Global Compact on Refugees, above at note 39.

46 GCR, above at note 5, para 103.

47 “Pledges & contributions” Global Compact on Refugees, above at note 39.

48 Triggs and Wall “The makings of a success”, above at note 39 at 306; GCR, above at note 5, para 3.

49 Hathaway “The global cop-out on refugees”, above at note 7 at 596; EE Arnold-Fernández “The Global Compact on Refugees: Inadequate substitute or useful complement?” (2023) 5 Frontiers in Human Dynamics 1 at 8–9.

50 Arnold-Fernández, id at 4.

51 Id at 2.

52 Ibid.

53 Id at 5.

54 Id at 8.

55 The primary mechanism for monitoring and making pledges is the Global Refugee Forums that take place every four years in Geneva, however, the GCR also provides for the meeting of high-level officials every two years. These are meant to take place between the forums as a means of “mid-term review” and are open to all UN Member States and relevant stakeholders. The first took place in 2021 and the second is scheduled to take place on 15–17 December 2025. See GCR, above at note 5, paras 19 and 104.

56 S Kruger and S Sader “Strengthened or sidelined? evaluating pledges to eradicate statelessness in the Southern African Development Community” (2025) 11/2 African Human Mobility Review 110 at 125–26.

57 Ibid.

58 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), UN Treaty Series vol 993 (ICESCR).

59 OC Okafor “Report of the Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity” (17 July 2019) General Assembly A/74/185, para 5.

60 Ibid.

61 F Khan “States and the Refugee Convention: Circumventing, but not blatantly disregarding” (keynote address at Refugee Law Initiative, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 11 June 2021), available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5yRtRL9Bjh8> (last accessed 8 January 2025).

62 OC Okafor “Report of the independent expert on human rights and international solidarity” (11 April 2018) A / HRC/38/40, para 4.

63 OC Okafor “Report of the independent expert on human rights and international solidarity” (20 July 2018) A/73/206, para 50(b).

64 J Kamradt “Solidarity as a human right? Reflections on the draft declaration on human rights and international solidarity” (2024) 56 International Law and Politics 779.