Civil protest and litigation are well-established mechanisms for social change in the US and other “Western” liberal democracies. In the Republic of Korea (Korea) and Japan, these efforts are typically seen as less sustained with fewer consequential results. Celeste L. Arrington, in Accidental Activists, revises that picture with a comparative study of cases where civil groups in both countries sometimes achieved responsive official inquiries, apologies, compensation, and reforms. This is a rare and important work, challenging conventional wisdom.
Arrington reveals three institutions that primarily contributed to the movements’ successes and failures: diversity of the news media, autonomy of the legal profession, and politicization of the activist sector. More politically diverse media, which exist in Korea, create low barriers for civil groups but limit the readership for a given story. Japan’s media are more homogeneous, which means fewer access points, but, once a cause gains the media’s attention, its message becomes ubiquitous. Korea’s politically connected legal community provides elite access for victim groups, but Japan’s more autonomous legal establishment, with a less politicized history of “cause lawyering,” is better at building grassroots movements. Korea’s well-established activist sector can influence policy-making, but it encourages Koreans to frame social issues in political terms to build a coalition of activist groups and appeal to politicians. The politicization of Korea’s media, lawyers, and civil society is an artefact of the 1980s democracy movement against the country’s authoritarian government. Japan’s postwar activism has, instead, grown from small, local self-help organizations, focusing on narrow issues and allowing for a less politicized and thus broad-based movement.
Arrington’s most interesting and counterintuitive revelation for both academics and civic groups is that early elite support retards the type of grassroots movement that can sustain pressure on governments for fuller redress. Elite support does not inherently undermine social movements; rather, the sequence of elite support matters.
She tests her model across three victim movements occurring contemporaneously in Korea and Japan: victims of Hansen’s disease (Leprosy), Hepatitis C (HCV)-contaminated blood products, and North Korean abductions. Success varied because of the distinct interactions among individuals (movement leaders, lawyers, and experts) and institutions (courts, media, and government) in determining social and government responsiveness. Each case offers its own lessons and reveals something about the dynamics of social change in these two relatively new liberal democracies that continue to carry the vestiges of their autocratic, development state histories.
Hansen victims were treated brutally by the Japanese and Korean governments through most of the twentieth century, including forced sterilization, abortions, and segregation, with discrimination continuing after those extreme policies ended. Victims’ claims accelerated during the 1990s in Japan and later in Korea. Because Japanese elites did not provide early support, Hansen survivors mobilized at the grassroots and obtained fuller redress than their Korean counterparts who found elite backers earlier. Korean HCV victims obtained early elite support and relied on the established haemophiliac organization, impeding a grassroots movement. Redress for victims of North Korean abductions and their families was partial in both countries because of early elite assistance, even with subsequent grassroots mobilizations.
Left unclear is whether the Korean cases can be partially explained by the public’s negative attitude toward political elites. Low trust in political leaders is also an artefact of the authoritarian era and the result of recent governance failures. Low transparency in decision-making triggered large protests against the decision to lift a ban on US beef imports (2008) and share military intelligence with Japan (2012). Regulatory failures were tied to the 2014 Sewol ferry sinking, killing 304 persons, mostly Korean adolescents. Several corruption scandals have further undermined trust, including the ongoing controversy over President Park Guen-hye’s relationship with Choi Soon-sil, who is accused of trading on her presidential influence. Perhaps, victim movements in Korea underperformed because elite allies were not able to lead on the issue, regardless of the sequencing of their support.
Also unclear is why courts, which often are an integral part of the victims’ success, are not “elite” allies that similarly deter grassroots mobilization and undermine public sympathy. Particularly in Japan, the courts seem to work synergistically with civil society, media, and political elites to achieve redress and public consensus supporting victim groups. However, in the US (which is not covered in Arrington’s book), abortion rights and same-sex marriage movements have not achieved comprehensive legislative victories or political/social consensus, in part because the process was interrupted by Supreme Court victories. Perhaps, then, Arrington has unintentionally exposed the problematic role of elites at any stage of social movements. Though the abortion rights and same-sex marriage movements in the US built strong grassroots organizations prior to their Supreme Court victories, the Court’s intervention left in place strong, oppositional movements, particularly with abortion. This same scenario may be unfolding in the US over the issue of transgender access to single-sex facilities like restrooms and dressing rooms. Thus, a related research question is whether elites, even operating with a strong grassroots movement, can interrupt the development of a social consensus on a contentious civil rights issue.
For those in North-East Asia, Arrington’s book has special meaning. Her inductions about the dynamics of successful victim movements may have broad application, but her case-study on Hansen victims offers a specific template for Korea and Japan (and China) to find common ground in solving the historical issues that continue to roil this region. The process that led the Japanese government to compensate Koreans living in Japan and Korea, along with the support Japanese lawyers provided victims in Korea, is one path for resolving remaining controversies, including forced labour during Japan’s colonization of Korea, Japanese textbooks’ descriptions of that colonial history, and the treatment of Koreans now living in Japan.
