Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-pkds5 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-04-13T12:28:12.403Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The consequences of delegation to independent agencies: Separation of powers, discursive governance and the regulation of telecommunications in Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Thomas Gehring
Thomas Gehring*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, University of Bamberg, Germany
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Whereas the delegation of regulatory powers is usually examined from the principal's perspective, this article explores the consequences of delegation for the regulatory output. Empirically, it finds that the dissolution of the original German postal authority led to the establishment of a system of divided labour in which different actors, including an (almost) independent regulatory agency, depend on each other's performance of specialized functions. Theoretically, it contributes to the ongoing debate over the role and operation of independent agencies in two main respects. First, based on the modern theory of social systems, it draws attention to the fact that the reform process was characterized by an increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision‐making. Second, drawing on the Habermasian theory of communicative action, it is argued that functional differentiation supports the transformation of interaction from interest‐based bargaining to deliberative arguing both in the legislative and the administrative arenas. As political actors are made unable to resort to their power resources, reasons become a key source of influence.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of Political Research , Volume 43 , Issue 4 , June 2004 , pp. 677 - 698
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 European Consortium for Political Research

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Baake, P. & Perschau, O. (1996). The law and policy of competition in Germany. In G. Majone (ed.), Regulating Europe. London: Routledge, pp. 131–156.Google Scholar
Bawn, K. (1997).Choosing strategies to control the bureaucracy: Statutory constraints, oversight and the committee system. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 13: 101–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benz, A. (1997). Privatisierung und Regulierung im Post‐ und Fernmeldewesen. In K. König & A. Benz (eds.), Privatisierung und staatliche Regulierung. Bahn, Post und Telekommunikation, Rundfunk. Baden‐Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 262–346.Google Scholar
Berger, H. (1993).Zwischen Postreform I und Postreform II. Zeitschrift für öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen 16: 80–95.Google Scholar
Brennan, G. & Buchanan, J. (1985). The reason of rules: Constitutional political economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Coleman, J.S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Belnkamp.Google Scholar
Cukierman, A. (1994). Commitment through delegation: Political influence and central bank independence. In J. Onno de Beauford Wijnholds, S.C.W. Eijffinger & L.H. Hoogduin (eds.), A framework for monetary stability. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 55–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Döhler, M. (2002).Institutional choice and bureaucratic autonomy in Germany. West European Politics 25(1): 101–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Egan, M. (1998).Regulatory strategies, delegation and European market integration. Journal of European Public Policy 5(3): 485–506.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elster, J. (1979). Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in rationality and irrationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Elster, J. (1989). The cement of society: A study of social order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elster, J. (ed.) (1998). Deliberative democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elster, J. (2000). Ulysses unbound: Studies in rationality, precommitment and constraints. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epstein, D. & O'Halloran, S. (1994).Administrative procedures, information and agency discretion. American Journal of Political Science 38: 697–722.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epstein, D. & O'Halloran, S. (1999). Delegating powers: A transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gehring, T. (2003). Communicative rationality in European governance? Interests and communicative action in functionally differentiated single market regulation. In E.O. Eriksen, C. Joerges & J. Neyer (eds), European governance, deliberation and the quest for democratisation. Oslo: Arena Report No. 02/2003, pp. 57–140.Google Scholar
Geppert, M., Ruhle, E.‐O. & Schuster, F. (1998). Handbuch Recht und Praxis der Telekommunikation. Baden‐Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.Google Scholar
Gramlich, L. (1997).Entwicklungen der staatlichen Wirtschaftsaufsicht: Das Telekommunikationsrecht als Modell? Verwaltungsarchiv 88: 598–644.Google Scholar
Gramlich, L. (1998). Ohne Regulierung kein Wettbewerb. Zum Start der Regulierungsbehörde für Post und Telekommunikation. Computer und Recht 14: 463–472.Google Scholar
Habermas, J. (1992). Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates. Frankfurt‐am‐Main: Suhrkamp.Google Scholar
Hancher, L. & Moran, M. (1989). Organizing regulatory space. In L. Hancher & M. Moran (eds), Capitalism, culture and economic regulation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 271–299.Google Scholar
Hopenhayn, H. & Lohmann, S. (1996).Fire‐alarm signals and the political oversight of regulatory agencies. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 12(1): 196–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huber, J.D. (2000).Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political Research 37(3): 397–413.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huber, J.D., Shipan, C.R. & Pfuhler, M. (2001).Legislatures and statutory control of bureaucracy. American Journal of Political Science 45(2): 330–345.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Humphreys, P. (1992). The politics of regulatory reform in German telecommunications. In K. Dyson (ed.), The politics of German regulation. Aldershot: Dartmouth, pp. 105–135.Google Scholar
Keech, W.R. (1995). Economic policy: The costs of democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kiewiet, R. & McCubbins, M.D. (1991). The logic of delegation: Congressional parties and the appropriations process. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Luhmann, N. (1984). Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie. Frankfurt‐am‐Main: Suhrkamp (2nd edn., 1988).Google Scholar
Luhmann, N. (2000). Organisation und Entscheidung. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Majone, G. (ed.) (1996). Regulating Europe. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Majone, G. (1999).The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems. West European Politics 22(1): 1–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Majone, G. (2001).Nonmajoritarian institutions and the limits of democratic governance: A political transaction‐cost approach. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Politics 157: 57–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayntz, R. (1988). Funktionale Teilsysteme in der Theorie sozialer Differenzierung. In R. Mayntz et al., Differenzierung und Verselbständigung. Zur Entwicklung gesellschaftlicher Teilsysteme. Frankfurt‐am‐Main: Campus Verlag, pp. 11–44.Google Scholar
McCubbins, M.D. & Schwartz, T. (1987).Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. American Journal of Political Science 28(1): 165–179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCubbins, M.D., Noll, R.G. & Weingast, B.R. (1987).Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3(2): 243–277.Google Scholar
Moe, T.M. (1990). The politics of structural choice: Toward a theory of public bureaucracy. In O.E. Williamson (ed.), Organization theory: From Chester Barnard to the present and beyond. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 116–153.Google Scholar
Müller, M.M. (2001).Restructuring the new regulatory state in Germany: Telecommunications, broadcasting and banking. German Politics 10(3): 37–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Münch, R. (1994). Sociological theory, Volume III: Developments since the 1960s. Chicago, IL: Nelson‐Hall.Google Scholar
Niskanen, W.A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago, IL: Aldine.Google Scholar
Pollack, M. (2002).Learning from the Americanists (again): Theory and method in the study of delegation. West European Politics 25(1): 200–219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riehmer, K.W. (1995). Organisation und Regulierung der Telekommunikation in Deutschland. In E.‐J. Mestmäcker (ed.), Kommunikation ohne Monopole II. Ein Symposium über Ordnungsprinzipien im Wirtschaftsrecht der Telekommunikation und der elektronischen Medien. Baden‐Baden: Nomos, pp. 369–395.Google Scholar
Schmidt, S. (1996). Privatizing the federal postal and telecommunications services. In A. Benz & K.H. Goetz (eds.), A new German public sector? Reform, adaptation and stability. Aldershot: Dartmouth, pp. 45–70.Google Scholar
Schmidt, S.K. (1998).Commission activism: Subsuming telecommunications and electricity under European competition law. Journal of European Public Policy 5(1): 169–184.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shapiro, M. (1988). Who guards the guardians? Judicial control of administration. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.Google Scholar
Shapiro, M. (1992). The giving‐reasons requirement. University of Chicago Legal Forum: 180–220.Google Scholar
Shapiro, M. (1997).The problem of independent agencies in the United States and the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 4: 277–291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, K.A. (1991). Discretion, institutions and the problem of government commitment. In P. Bourdieu & J.S. Coleman (eds.), Social theory for a changing society. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 245–263.Google Scholar
Shepsle, K.A. (1992).Bureaucratic drift, coalitional drift and time‐consistency: A comment on Macey. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 8(1): 111–118.Google Scholar
Steinmetz, H. (1956). Die staats‐ und verfassungsrechtliche Stellung der deutschen Bundespost. Jahrbuch des Postwesens 6(1955/1956): 18–54.Google Scholar
Stone Sweet, A. (2002).Constitutional courts in parliamentary democracy. West European Politics 25(1): 77–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strøm, K. (2000).Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political Research 37(3): 261–289.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thatcher, M. (1998).Institutions, regulation and change: New regulatory agencies in British privatized utilities. West European Politics 21(1): 120–147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thatcher, M. & Stone Sweet, A. (2002).Theory and practice of delegation to non‐majoritarian institutions. West European Politics 25(1): 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tsebelis, G. (1990). Nested games: Rational choice in comparative politics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Vanberg, V. & Buchanan, J.M. (1989).Interests and theories in constitutional choice. Journal of Theoretical Politics 1(1): 49–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Werle, R. (1990). Telekommunikationspolitik in der Bundesrepublik. Expansion, Differenzierung, Transformation. Frankfurt‐am‐Main: Campus.Google Scholar
Williamson, O.E. (1987). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar