1. National Identity and Migrants’ Rights

Despite the academic interest in the study of nationhood, little attention has been paid to national identity as an explanatory variable; that is, to conceptions of national identity as input to explanations of immigration policy preferences (Foote and Goebel Reference Foote and Goebel2014; Green et al. Reference Green, Sarrasin, Fasel and Staerklé2011; Simonsen and Bonikowski Reference Simonsen and Bonikowski2020; Lindstam, Mader, and Schoen Reference Lindstam, Mader and Schoen2021). Given “the Eurocentric bias of mainstream nationalism scholarship” (Mylonas and Tudor Reference Mylonas and Tudor2023, 6), studies of this relationship outside the developed world are even less common.

We follow the social identity theory approach (Tajfel Reference Tajfel1981; Tajfel and Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Worchel and William1986) as a starting point. According to this perspective, national identity is a social identity, which derives from a person’s knowledge of their membership in a social group, together with the emotional significance attached to that belonging (Tajfel Reference Tajfel1981; Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009). How attached to their group people feel and how narrowly they set boundaries around the ingroup shapes their attitudes and behaviors towards outgroup members (Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009, 8). In this regard, we claim that the content of national identity can shape how people feel about migrants’ rights. In fact, previous studies have shown that conceptions of national identity influence opinions about language policy, racial profiling, and immigrant integration policies (Citrin, Wong, and Duff Reference Citrin, Wong and Duff2001; Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2005, Reference Schildkraut2011; Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009).

One key element for our study is the “constitutive norms” of national identity, meaning “the rules that define group membership” (Abdelal et al. Reference Abdelal, Herrera, Iain Johnston and McDermott2009, 19). Constitutive norms inform people how to behave as group members and guide attitudes and behaviors within a group (Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009). So, adherence to these rules helps to set boundaries between those who belong to the ingroup and those who are excluded from the “imagined community” (Anderson Reference Anderson1983).

When people think about the constitutive norms of their national identity, they think about the features they share with their community. The most relevant conceptual building blocks in the study of national identity are the following dimensions: (1) the ethnic vs. civic dimension; and (2) the nationalism vs. patriotism dimension (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1992; Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2014, 447; Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009; Green et al. Reference Green, Sarrasin, Fasel and Staerklé2011; Wright et al. Reference Wright, Citrin and Wand2012; Huddy Reference Huddy, Jürgen Grimm, Schmidt and Seethaler2016; Lindstam et al. Reference Lindstam, Mader and Schoen2021; Piwoni and Mußotter Reference Piwoni and Mußotter2023). We use these categories as a heuristic device in our empirical research, but we acknowledge the complex, polymorphous character of this classification. These dimensions should be regarded as a continuum rather than starkly different, immutable categories (Piwoni and Mußotter Reference Piwoni and Mußotter2023).

First, an ethnic view of national identity emphasizes the heritage of the past, the ancestral character of identity, and the role of racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural factors. Among the latter, ethnic views focus on common language and collective memory in the creation and reproduction of nations (Smith Reference Smith1991). In ethnic terms, boundaries are determined in part by the shared memories of their members (Anderson Reference Anderson1983; Miller Reference Miller1995) and in part by the boundaries purposedly crafted by political and intellectual elites (Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009; Miller Reference Miller1995). Although some of the ethnic characteristics can be acquired, such as learning a new language, most of them are ascriptive elements that are transmitted through the generations (Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2014, 447). So, these elements are considered strong identifiers that are more likely to set rigid boundaries regarding who belongs to the main group (Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009, 13; Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2014). Boundaries based on ethnic features demarcate who the prototypical member is.

Second, a civic conception of the national identity focuses on the idea of a political community derived from citizenship, entailing a series of laws, institutions, and shared values (Greenfeld Reference Greenfeld1992). The content of civic approaches to national identity is multidimensional. Civic concepts of national identity emphasize actions—such as willingness to actively contribute to public life—and identities—such as seeing oneself as and feeling part of the national group (Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2011, Reference Schildkraut2014). As long as these behaviors and identities are embraced, civic conceptions of national identity do not, in principle, exclude. In Schildkraut’s studies, civic identity—that is, endorsing the idea that to belong to the national group one must think and feel as a member of it—is even more determinant of policy preferences than civic doing.

Some studies suggest that different conceptions of nationhood explain attitudes towards immigrants and their inclusion (Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2005, Reference Schildkraut2011, Reference Schildkraut2014; Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009; Wong Reference Wong2010; Ariely Reference Ariely2020; Lindstam et al. Reference Lindstam, Mader and Schoen2021). Boundaries based on civic terms are considered weaker and more permeable than ethnic identifiers that can exclude (Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009; Lindstam et al. Reference Lindstam, Mader and Schoen2021). When national identity puts conceptions of citizenship rights and responsibilities at the center of its definition, this is likely to lead to more open policy preferences towards immigrants and their rights, as long as foreigners fulfil their duties as committed citizens willing to “do their part” for the common good (Ariely Reference Ariely2020).

The differentiation between ingroup and outgroup based on ethnic features is often conducive to discriminatory and hostile attitudes towards those perceived as not belonging to the ingroup (Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2005, Reference Schildkraut2011, Reference Schildkraut2014; Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009; Wong Reference Wong2010). For instance, research shows that those who define American identity in ethnic terms are less supportive of open immigration, more opposed to extending citizenship rights, or more in favor of selecting immigrants on the basis of language rather than education or skills (Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2005, Reference Schildkraut2011; Wong Reference Wong2010; Wright Reference Wright2011; Wright et al. Reference Wright, Citrin and Wand2012).

While there is evidence that embracing a civic dimension of national identity tends to correlate with more open immigration policy preferences (Green et al. Reference Green, Sarrasin, Fasel and Staerklé2011), some suggest a nuanced picture. For example, Schildkraut (Reference Schildkraut2005, Reference Schildkraut2011, Reference Schildkraut2014), in her research on what being American means, shows that the feeling (identity) aspect of civic nationhood is associated with endorsement of the assimilation principle that immigrants should make the effort to integrate. Moreover, the impact of the civic content of national identity on policy preferences seems to be conditional on the specific policy analyzed. This is well illustrated in the case of language policies, partly because language straddles the categories of ethnic trait, cultural trait (Kymlicka Reference Kymlicka2001; Shulman Reference Shulman2002), and civic duty, the last one if learning the local language is considered a civic obligation (Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2011, 48; Reeskens and Hooghe Reference Reeskens and Hooghe2010, 591).

There also seems to be heterogeneity regarding the immigrant group (Simonsen and Bonikowski Reference Simonsen and Bonikowski2020): if the immigrant group is perceived as not being compatible with the values that define civic belonging, embracing a civic conception of nationhood may not imply more support for foreigners’ rights (Reeskens and Hooghe Reference Reeskens and Hooghe2010; Lindstam et al. Reference Lindstam, Mader and Schoen2021). In other words, the impact of civic conceptions of national membership on immigration policy preferences is heterogeneous in terms of which policies and in terms of which immigrant groups. Besides, the co-existence of the two dimensions (ethnic and civic) possibly pushing in different directions may lead to ambivalent, unstable outcomes regarding conceptions of nationhood and preferences for migrant integration.

Lastly, beliefs about nationhood are also part of constitutive norms of national identity (Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2011, 6). These beliefs fall under two main categories: nationalism and patriotism (de Figueiredo and Elkins Reference de Figueiredo and Elkins2003; Wong Reference Wong2010; Huddy Reference Huddy, Jürgen Grimm, Schmidt and Seethaler2016; Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009; Piwoni and Mußotter Reference Piwoni and Mußotter2023). Nationalism tends to have a negative connotation since it involves an “uncritical and blind attachment to the nation” and feelings of superiority with respect to other countries and nationalities. ^{Footnote 3} In contrast, patriotism implies pride and love for the country and its institutions (Green et al. Reference Green, Sarrasin, Fasel and Staerklé2011, 369; Theiss-Morse Reference Theiss-Morse2009, 24; Piwoni and Mußotter Reference Piwoni and Mußotter2023). ^{Footnote 4} Patriotism, or love for the country, does not have any comparative or competitive implication. In their study, de Figueiredo and Elkins (Reference de Figueiredo and Elkins2003) contrasted nationalism with patriotism, finding that more nationalist individuals tend to be “bigots” (see also Green et al. Reference Green, Sarrasin, Fasel and Staerklé2011), but those who are more patriotic are not.

All considered, it seems that different conceptions of national identity play a multifaceted role in the attitudes of natives toward migrants’ rights. Using the Mexican case, we propose that historical processes of national identity construction solidified certain beliefs about what a national of a country should be in ethnic, civic (acting and feeling), and nationalist terms. As we show, the sedimentation of these beliefs helps to explain contemporary attitudes toward the socio-political inclusion of foreigners of Asian origin (popularly referred to as los chinos).

2. The Chinese in Mexico: Conceptions of National Identity and Socio-political Exclusion

We offer a brief account of the socio-political exclusion to which the Chinese community was subjected in the process of defining the Mexican identity. We argue that today’s socio-political exclusion cannot be detached from the anti-Chinismo that was central to the construction of the Mexican national identity, around the “mestizaje” project.

The history of the Chinese in Mexico is one of permanent harassment and recurrent attempts at social exclusion and eventually expulsion (Delgado Reference Delgado2012; Rénique Reference Rénique2015; Craib Reference Craib1996; Chao Romero Reference Chao Romero2011; Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin Reference Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin2014; Chang Reference Chang2017; Reference Chang2019). ^{Footnote 5} This history became deeply ingrained in the concept of what being Mexican means, and in the role assigned to the Chinese in the crafting of that identity. We propose that these constitutive norms linger in today’s attitudes of the Mexican public toward the Chinese, which continue to be marked by high levels of anti-Chinese sentiment (Acevedo and Meseguer Reference Acevedo and Meseguer2022).

Although the Chinese presence in Mexico is closely related to Porfiriato policies to attract cheap labor around the turn of the nineteenth century (1876–1911), including low-wage Chinese workers, our review of hostilities puts the focus on the period in which those hostilities heightened (during the Revolution and after), spreading to the rest of the country until they became a national anti-Chinese crusade (Craib Reference Craib1996; Chao Romero Reference Chao Romero2011; Delgado Reference Delgado2012; Rénique Reference Rénique2015; Chang Reference Chang2017; Reference Chang2019). ^{Footnote 6} Many acts of exclusion were motivated by the perception that the Chinese were racially and culturally unfit to contribute in a positive way to the vision of the nation that was embraced after the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920).

First, on ethnic terms, Sinophobia cannot be understood without reference to the revolutionary and the post-revolutionary construction of a Mexican racial identity around the ideal of mestizaje. Virtually since their arrival, the Chinese were regarded as spreaders of disease, a source of vice and germs, deficient in moral and physical integrity, and “racial poisons” (Craib Reference Craib1996, 17; Delgado Reference Delgado2012, 162, 189; Rénique Reference Rénique2015, 95). For this reason, the Chinese were often ostracized, if not openly harassed both informally and through explicit legislation, as we explain below. After the Revolution, the state building process embraced national eugenics and social hygiene movements as the model for building a new mestizo race that could homogenize and unify the country. Prominently after 1924, the mestizo project, inspired by José de Vasconcelos and Manuel Gamio among others, envisaged a new “cosmic race,” prescribing the “correct” miscegenation of indigenous peoples and Mexican-born Whites to produce a mestizo race (Rénique Reference Rénique2015, 106; Chang Reference Chang2019). In this context, Chinese miscegenation with Mexican women turned out to constitute the main threat to the new mestizo identity. Every union between Chinese men and chineras (Mexican women who married Chinese men) meant “the injection of sickly yellow blood,” which conflicted with the mestizo project of national state building (cited in Delgado Reference Delgado2012, 158). This justified all sorts of attacks on the Chinese community and indeed a politically orchestrated plan aimed at racial cleansing (Chang Reference Chang2017, 17, 25).

Second, on civic terms, the narrow ethnic vision of the new Mexican state that emerged from the Revolution was reflected in numerous anti-Chinese laws affecting all aspects of this group’s daily life, in both the public and private spheres. As Delgado aptly summarizes (Reference Delgado2012, 189), confining “civic belonging to narrow concepts of mestizaje” implied that despite the Chinese insistence on upholding their political and constitutional rights, the Chinese were “unmade as Mexicans.” In other words, civic identity and civic belonging was shaped by ethnicity, to the extreme of undoing or ignoring legally granted civic and social rights to this group.

Notably, anti-Chinese legislation openly contradicted the protection of civic rights granted to the Chinese, in existing legislation such as the 1917 Constitution, and even through their naturalization as Mexican citizens. In fact, naturalization often proved insufficient to protect the Chinese against anti-Chinista hatred. Several fronts on which anti-Chinese legislation conflicted with civic rights was in the regulation—indeed penalization—of mixed marriages, relocation of the Chinese to restricted parts of cities or sections of states to minimize the probability of miscegenation, and the limited value afforded to naturalization in terms of guaranteeing civic rights (Chao Romero Reference Chao Romero2011; Delgado Reference Delgado2012; Chang Reference Chang2017). For instance, barrioization, while often justified on the basis of sanitation concerns, had more to do with preventing miscegenation, and involved isolating mixed families and Chinese businesses by confining them to specific barrios (Chinatowns) or territories (Rénique Reference Rénique2015; Gómez Izquierdo 2019).

As for naturalized Chinese, while several pieces of legislation, prominently the 1917 Constitution, granted equal rights and full civic belonging, the daily life of Chinese Mexicans was often marked by xenophobic local laws. Anti-Chinistas vocally opposed the naturalization of the Chinese. A combative leader of the Sonoran anti-Chinese movement, José Angel Espinoza, stated that “every naturalization certificate [that] our government extends to a Chinese citizen is like a rattlesnake placed at the bosom of the motherland” (cited in Delgado Reference Delgado2012, 163). This statement tellingly reflects the strong opposition to granting the Chinese full civic rights. Their demands to be recognized as Mexican citizens and granted the same rights were occasionally heard, but only because national leaders were concerned about international criticism and reputation.

Finally, while xenophobic nationalism permeated both the definition of ethnic and civic identities, exclusionary nationalism (“Mexico for the Mexicans, China for the Chinese”) was most evident in the economic sphere. In our view, economic nationalism as described here is closely related to the civic conception of nationhood; that is, how a “true” member of the community must act. The perception of the Chinese as “ruthless business competitors,” “tax evaders,” and “an insatiable yellow hydra” (Delgado Reference Delgado2012, 109; Chang Reference Chang2017, 87; Gómez Izquierdo 2019, 208) raised continual demands to regulate their economic activities. On the economic front, the Chinese community suffered attacks on business ownership and severe labor laws. For instance, the so-called 80% law (1919) forced businesses to hire at least 80% Mexicans, defined in terms of ethnicity and birth. The Chinese appealed the law and invoked Mexican constitutional tradition, demanding the “full enjoyment of social and private rights” (Delgado Reference Delgado2012, 157). But as Delgado puts it, the Chinese learned the hard way that “the post-revolutionary project was Sinophobia and not the Constitution” (p. 159). In sum, ethnically, politically, and economically, the Chinese were regarded as “pernicious individuals” to be excluded from any constitutive norm (ethnic but also civic) of Mexicanness.

3. Hypotheses

Although the picture is attenuated by time, respect for legally granted civic and social rights, and considerable levels of political correctness, at least in the official discourse, ^{Footnote 7} the Chinese in Mexico continue to be portrayed today as an alien race, economically predatory, and reluctant to integrate (Armony and Velásquez Reference Armony and Velásquez2015). Anti-Chinismo is still evident on two fronts: first, when it comes to referring to China and the Chinese community’s contribution to the Mexican economy; and second, when the malleability and capacity to integrate of foreigners with Chinese ancestry is portrayed in contemporary media. Examples abound. For instance, the significant commercial deficit with China arouses frequent complaints among local producers about unfair Chinese competition practices. Chinese businesses are often charged with allegations of violating labor and wage standards, engaging in piracy, and smuggling (Armony and Velásquez Reference Armony and Velásquez2015; Cornejo et al. Reference Cornejo, Javier Haro Navejas and Luis León-Manríquez2013, 64). The import of products from China, such as prickly pears, which are regarded as national symbols of Mexico, has raised misgivings and provoked emotional pleas in written and digital media to protect local production (Lutz and Padilla Reference Lutz and Padilla2012). Chinese foreign investment often arouses mistrust about quality product and spurs demands for more employment of Mexican workers—which the National Immigration Institute forces to be 90% of the labor force per plant (Ortiz and Prudencio Reference Ortiz and Alberto Prudencio2022). Headlines of the sort “China, a threat,” “Mexico at war against China in the WTO,” or “Chinese pirates invade Chiapa” (cited in Cornejo et al. Reference Cornejo, Javier Haro Navejas and Luis León-Manríquez2013) suggest that China continues to be a “favourite villain” for business, media, and political elites in Mexico.

On the second front, that of the unmalleability of the Chinese, illustrations that suggest the endurance of negative stereotypes also abound (Lisbona Guillén and Balam Reference Lisbona Guillén and Balam2018). For example, the potential arrival of 1,000 Chinese families in the Caribbean associated with an investment project (Dragon Mat) raised concerns due to the “endogamy and resistance to integration in the host culture […]” (Cornejo Reference Cornejo2019, 890). The argument that the arrival of Chinese nationals posed a threat to community co-existence is aligned with the deeply ingrained perception that the Chinese are “clannish” and not trustworthy (Cornejo, Haro Navejas, and León-Manríquez Reference Cornejo, Javier Haro Navejas and Luis León-Manríquez2013; Foote and Goebel Reference Foote and Goebel2014; Cornejo Reference Cornejo2019). Racism continues to affect second, third, and fourth generation Chino-mexicanos, who continue to report bullying and forms of symbolic violence (Manzano-Munguía and Juárez Palomino Reference Manzano-Munguía and Juárez Palomino2020). More recently, the revival of racist discourse associated with the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that anti-Chinese racism is alive and well in Mexico (Lim Reference Lim2020; Sanchez-Rivera Reference Sanchez-Rivera2020; Manzano-Munguía and Juárez Palomino Reference Manzano-Munguía and Juárez Palomino2020) and elsewhere (Yiu Reference Yiu2022; Chan and Montt Strabucchi Reference Chan and Montt Strabucchi2021). Sinophobia appears to be inspired by factors similar to those that led to the ethnic, civic, and nationalist exclusion of the Chinese a century ago (Yiu Reference Yiu2022; Chan and Montt Strabucchi Reference Chan and Montt Strabucchi2021). For instance, in Mexico, the media, songs, and public figures associated the virus with Chinese eating customs and poor hygiene (Lim Reference Lim2020, 443; Sanchez-Rivera Reference Sanchez-Rivera2020, 35–36). ^{Footnote 8}

With this in mind, we hypothesize that the long history of discrimination reflected in so many instances of civic harassment and deprivation of rights has fed a deeply exclusionary national identity that regards the Chinese as an inferior, unsuitable, and un-civic outgroup. If the construction of Mexicanness succeeded in solidifying an image of the Chinese as undesirable foreigners, then even today, endorsement of a (racialized) civic definition of national membership, as well as ideas of national superiority will likely be reflected in little support for foreigners of Asian ancestry to enjoy access to socio-political rights. Therefore,

4. Data and Method

We use the 2016 Mexico application of Las Americas y el Mundo to analyze whether and how the content of Mexican national identity shapes mass public preferences regarding foreigners’ access to socio-political rights (access to public education, family reunification, voting, and forming political organizations). The survey data is from 2,400 respondents in a nationally representative sample (Maldonado et al. Reference Maldonado, Marin, Schiavon and González2018).

Recall that our main research question is whether and how these policy preferences are shaped by ethnic (ascriptive), civic (permeable), and nationalistic (exclusionary) constitutive norms of Mexican national identity. The survey features an embedded experiment on the origin of foreigners which by itself allows us to explore the importance of migrant national origins on policy preferences. Prior to the questions on migrant access to the above policies, and without adding any other information, respondents were primed with an image of a hypothetical foreigner in Mexico. There are three treatment groups in addition to the control group, which did not receive a priming image. Respondents were randomly assigned an image of an immigrant. The three treatments vary the ethnic profile of the immigrant, while gender is held constant (males): White Anglo-Saxon (Picture B), Asian (Picture C), and indigenous Central American (Picture D). ^{Footnote 9} As interviewers show the image of the migrant (Figure 1), respondents are asked to keep “the image of the foreigner in mind” when they answer the above questions about migrant rights. ^{Footnote 10}

Figure 1.

Survey Treatments

The experimental treatments, photos of hypothetical foreigners, seek to reveal how implicit biases interact with different framings of Mexican identity. The experimental cues from the photographs were not accompanied by any other additional information regarding migrants. Respondents were not told about the racial or ethnic background of the person in the photo. Therefore, the priming is a suitable way to reveal respondents’ implicit biases against these groups. Considering the previous historical account about the presence of the Chinese in Mexico and how the process of national identity construction developed, we think it reasonable to assume that the Asian phenotype likely prompted respondents to think of foreigners of Chinese origin. The results must be interpreted with this assumption in mind.

The survey features a battery of 11 questions asking respondents what makes someone Mexican. Importantly, these questions were asked before the experimental assignment and before the series of questions on support for migrants’ rights. We use these 11 questions to identify relevant dimensions of Mexicanness, which we then use as independent variables to tackle the question of whether endorsing ethnic, civic, and nationalist dimensions of national identity influences opinions regarding the socio-political rights of foreigners.

Table 1 shows the responses to the questions. Importantly, some of the items included in the Mexico y el Mundo survey are standard questions in survey modules about national identity (for example, “respecting laws and institutions,” or “language” and “place of birth”). Others, however, are specific to the Mexican context (for instance, “defending Mexico in war”). Also, some questions typically included in widely used national identity modules in surveys were not asked in ours, most important among them, a question on citizenship. ^{Footnote 11} This omission is particularly important because access to citizenship can transcend the limitations to accessing rights that the ascriptive trait “place of birth” may entail.

Table 1.

Importance for Mexican Identity

With these limitations in mind, it is interesting to observe that some traits show greater importance than others. The three most important constitutive norms for respondents are being born in Mexico, which is supported by a solid majority of Mexicans (77.27%); feeling proud of being Mexican (72.59%); and considering Mexico as the best country (62.68%). These top three traits correspond to what the literature describes as ascriptive norms (being born in Mexico); civic norms in the identity dimension (feeling proud of being Mexican); and a nationalistic, comparative belief (belief that Mexico is the best country) (Smith Reference Smith1991; Schildkraut Reference Schildkraut2011; Reeskens and Hooghe Reference Reeskens and Hooghe2010). In contrast, there are traits that respondents find “not at all” important, such as being Catholic (20%) and not supporting the United States (22%).

We use factor analysis to consolidate the 11 items into three dimensions of Mexican identity. Factor analysis is a tool widely used in the study of national identity. Confirmatory factor analysis enabled us to test the usefulness of the conceptual building blocks to address national identity in the case of Mexico. In our view, the use of factor analysis reduces arbitrariness when it comes to classifying the above items into conceptual dimensions. For the most part, the dimensions that this exercise returns make sense to us. Following Schildkraut’s (Reference Schildkraut2011) procedure to produce variables that capture different constitutive norms of Mexican identity, the factor analysis justifies three latent variables on Mexican identity. Roughly, they correspond to ethnic, civic, and nationalist content (see the scree plot in the Appendix, Figure B3). The rotated factor loadings in Table 2 show which of the traits fall into each dimension with a 0.4 loading as the cutoff. ^{Footnote 12} Only two traits fall into the ethnic factor: being born in Mexico and speaking Spanish. ^{Footnote 13} Five traits contribute the most to the civic dimension of Mexican identity: feeling proud of being Mexican, respect for patriotic symbols, defending Mexico in war, paying taxes, and respect for Mexican laws and institutions. Note that under this civic umbrella, most of the items refer to how a true Mexican should act (respect for patriotic symbols, defending Mexico in war, paying taxes, and respecting Mexican laws and institutions); but there is also one item concerning how a true Mexican should feel (being proud of being Mexican). ^{Footnote 14} The nationalist factor groups the traits that allude to Mexican superiority and are explicitly comparative: thinking that Mexico is the best country in the world, preference for Mexican arts over those of other countries, and not supporting the United States. Catholicism contributes to the nationalistic factor, more so than to the ethnic dimension where a priori it would be expected to belong. Catholicism has a factor loading of 0.447 for the ethnic factor but a higher loading (0.511) on the nationalist factor. ^{Footnote 15} Remember that as an individual item, being Catholic receives little support as constitutive norm of Mexicanness (Table 1).

Table 2.

Factor Analysis

Next, for each dimension of national identity (ethnic, civic, nationalist), we created an additive index based on the items that contribute to each factor. Following Schildkraut (Reference Schildkraut2011), we summed the responses and divided by the number of items for that factor. For example, the civic factor added together the responses from the five items that contribute to the factor (Table 2). The variables are scaled from 0 to 1, where 0 means that respondents said that all the items for the civic factor are not at all important, while 1 means very important. Table 3 presents the summary statistics for each national identity dimension. ^{Footnote 16} The mean level of the ethnic factor is 0.85 and of the civic factor 0.82. Therefore, large majorities of Mexicans place a high importance on the ethnic and civic dimensions of what defines someone as Mexican. For the average Mexican, the nationalist dimension, while still important, weighs less than the civic and ethnic dimensions (0.61).

Table 3.

Summary Statistics for Factors

The dependent variables, in turn, are measured using questions capturing levels of support for a number of rights, namely, (1) family reunification; (2) access to public education; (3) migrants’ right to form organizations; (4) and the right to vote. Table 4 presents the responses to these four questions. The responses are on a four-point scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The first question asks respondents to what extent they agree that migrants should have the right to bring their family over to live with them. Almost 80% of respondents either somewhat or strongly agree with family reunification. The second question addresses whether foreigners should have access to public education. Similar to family reunification, solid majorities of Mexican respondents show a high support for granting migrants access to education. The third question asks whether migrants should have the right to form organizations to defend their rights. The responses show greater variation than the previous two questions, with 66% of respondents showing support for foreigners having the right to form organizations. The final question asks whether foreigners should have the right to vote. Even though a majority of respondents support migrants having the right to vote, this question yielded the lowest support among the four policies under scrutiny (60%). Therefore, the average Mexican shows less support for granting migrants political rights than they do for granting access to social rights and policies, such as access to public education and family reunification. We rescaled the responses from zero to one, and standardized them to ease the interpretation.

Table 4.

Support for Migrant Rights

In the regression analysis, we interact the indices of ethnic, civic, and nationalist dimensions of Mexicanness with the Asian treatment. This allows us to test whether and how the relationship between ethnicity (being primed with an Asian profile) and natives’ preferences for immigrants’ access to rights is moderated by the three constitutive norms of Mexican identity.