Problems with the Existing Conception of Political Participation

While it is difficult to determine when the distinction between conventional and unconventional first came into use, there is much scholarship that utilizes it. For example, the dualism was used in Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies edited by Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase (Reference Kaase, Allan, Samuel H. and Max1979). In this book, conventional participation is understood as activities related to the electoral process and unconventional participation is defined as a protest behavior (Reference Barnes and MaxBarnes and Kaase 1979). Protest behavior is linked to illegality and violence. This association is an example of the normative division between the more ordained conventional participation and the unconventional participation defined as informal and unrestrained. In the time when Barnes and Kaase published their research, the attention in participation research was set on voting and other conventional forms that were considered to influence governments and politicians, such as contacting politicians or donating money (Reference Ekman and ErikEkman and Amnå 2012; Reference Van DethVan Deth 2001). However, voting and other forms of participation associated with political parties remain central themes of research despite 40 or so years of scholarship challenging the centrality of a limited number of prescribed activities, like voting and writing to one's representative, parsing to conventional participation (e.g., Reference ColemanColeman 2013; Reference GeysGeys 2006; Reference Mair and IngridMair and van Biezen 2001; Reference RolfeRolfe 2013). Also, the observed retreat of citizens from electoral politics, which represents the core of conventional participation, is considered not a sign of a shift to different forms of participation, but a result of social apathy and a general withdrawal from participation (e.g., Reference StokerStoker 2006). At the same time, this argument negates the assumption that unconventional participation is on the increase.

Scholars utilizing the narrow conventionalist perspective deliver a diagnosis of the state of democracy in various settings. For instance, if one concentrates on the contemporary role of women in Parliaments as venues of conventional participation, one will see a growing presence of women in those arenas. However, feminist scholars demonstrate that conventional sites of politics are only a small part of the picture when it comes to women's emancipation in society (Reference Kantola and EmanuelaKantola and Lombardo 2017; Reference Paxton, Gary and AmyPaxton 2008). On a similar note, a focus on the conventional alone can produce discourses that disengage people from participation. Lowering the voting age as a countermeasure for low voting turnout can be an example of such a situation. It preserves voting as the primary form of participation but does not encourage other forms of participation. It indeed allows younger people to vote, which undoubtedly emancipates some previously denied groups and discourses; however, lowering the voting age signifies the abandonment of those in higher age groups that do not participate through voting. This is especially true in times when people abstain from voting. Hence, the conventional discursive approach to political participation has the potential to divide and disempower people.

In contrast to those who negate the assumption that unconventional participation is on the increase, some maintain that indeed people are withdrawing from conventional participation, while a proliferation of unconventional forms of participation is taking place (Reference DaltonDalton 2008; Reference HayHay 2007; Reference NorrisNorris 2002). However, when unconventional forms of participation are being discussed, they are positioned in contrast to conventional participation such as in the work of Reference Linssen, Hans, Peer and Manfred teRik Linssen and colleagues (2011) and Reference Riley, Christine, Yvette and Kyriakos N.Sarah Riley and colleagues (2013). This distinction is often underlined by the replacing of the word “unconventional” with the word “alternative” to symbolize an alternative to traditional forms of participation. Thus, alternative participation is understood as a synonym for unconventional participation in their framework.

Reference Linssen, Hans, Peer and Manfred teLinssen and colleagues (2011) maintain that political participation is considered as participation to the extent that it is directed to influence government decision-making. According to the authors, “next to conventional participation, citizens can urge political authorities to represent their interests via unconventional means of participation. These activities are not structurally embedded in the political system and may be illegal” (2011: 4). However, to position political participation as necessarily state-centered but situate unconventional participation outside of the political system reproduces the uneven relationship between conventional and unconventional. The same problem is present in the work of Reference Riley, Christine, Yvette and Kyriakos N.Riley and colleagues (2013), where the scholars claim that leisure activity should be understood as an alternative form of participation. Leisure activity, like electronic dance music gatherings, is positioned as an alternative to conventional politics. The authors of this research state that such activity is genuine political participation because it tends to question existing social norms. Therefore, the political action done as a leisure activity is supposed to produce social plurality. However, through articulating the problem in terms of recognition of leisure in relation to the overwhelming presence of the conventional, the scholars reproduce the orthodox distinction between conventional and unconventional political participation.

Other studies, such as the work of Reference NorrisPippa Norris (2002), Joakim Ekman and Erik Amnå (2012), and Reference Van DethJan van Deth (2014), propose new ways to categorize political participation. Nevertheless, their ideas are not without limitations, as they tend to politicize specific modes of participation while excluding others.

Reference NorrisNorris (2002) names three categories that define political participation—that is, (1) agency, (2) repertoire, and (3) target. In doing so, she enables the inclusion of all kinds of participation in this broad framework. The framework thus helps to legitimize the new forms of political participation. However, there are several problems with this framework. First, while it enables us to include various modes in one category of political activity, it does not encourage scholars to acknowledge new forms of political activity. Second, as Pia Rowe and David Marsh point out, for Norris “an action is political to the extent that it is directly trying to influence government processes and policies” (2018: 91). Thus, Norris's consideration contains the same limitation as does that of Reference Linssen, Hans, Peer and Manfred teLinssen and colleagues (2011).

Reference Ekman and ErikEkman and Amnå (2012) have pleaded for the inclusion of latent participation in the framework of participation. Latent participation is a “pre-political” action “that may not be directly or unequivocally classified as political participation” (2012: 287). They also add nonparticipation as a form of participation, and thus create a broad categorization of political action. They argue that latent participation and nonparticipation can influence politics. Hence, in this framework some unconventional forms of participation, such as voluntary work in local communities, gain recognition. The framework offers an important departure from the conventional–unconventional dualism. However, while discussing nonparticipation, the authors define active and passive nonparticipation, and consider the latter a nonpolitical attitude characterized by a lack of interest in participation and politics. Nevertheless, the problem of nonparticipation has more than two dimensions. Structural oppression can produce disengagement, which is a cause of nonparticipation (Reference McNayMcNay 2014). In consequence, the categorization proposed by Reference Ekman and ErikEkman and Amnå (2012) deprives the field of political participation an important characteristic: the function of understanding the distinct reasons for the nonparticipation of individuals. Moreover, while the authors perceive everyday talk to be of significance to politics, their theory does not mention any other acts that have the potential to take place in the private sphere. This distinction between the private and public is a consequence of adopting a limited notion of participation. For example, they use a definition of political participation borrowed from Richard Adler and Judy Goggin (Reference Adler and Judy2005: 241): “Civic engagement conventionally refers to activities by ordinary citizens that are intended to influence circumstances in a society that is of relevance to others, outside the own family and circle of close friends” (Reference Ekman and ErikEkman and Amnå 2012: 291). While the definition is broad, it excludes family members and close friends from the concept. It is not clear whether participation can be based solely on the intention to influence circumstances in society. The example of lifestyle politics (Reference Portwood-StacerPortwood-Stacer 2013) and MamaBakers (Reference RoweRowe 2015) shows that a focus on family, friends, or the personal can motivate political action.

In this context, the categorization proposed by Reference Van DethVan Deth (2014) could be considered the most comprehensive mapping of political participation modes to date. The author uses existing notions of what political participation is to put together a robust categorization. Nevertheless, as Reference HoogheMarc Hooghe (2014) and Bengü Reference Hosch-DayicanHosch-Dayican (2014) suggest, the framework has some limitations. To give an example, Bengü Reference Hosch-DayicanHosch-Dayican (2014) suggests that the definition is exclusionary because it reduces online participation to forms of nonpolitical action.

The attempts to recategorize political participation are expanding the meaning of what participation is, and they are beginning to resolve the problem of unequal treatment of unconventional participation in both theory and practice. Nevertheless, they do not go far enough in addressing the uneven relationship between the conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. The existing proposals (e.g., Reference NorrisNorris 2002; Reference Ekman and ErikEkman and Amnå 2012; Reference Van DethVan Deth 2014) are also exclusive to certain ways of doing politics. Thus, they are not capable of recognizing potentially new or emerging forms of participation and discourses as political. Furthermore, a growing number of studies introduce new definitions to describe unconventional forms of political activity—that is, activity that is extreme, unofficial, informal, or unorthodox (Reference DemetriouDemetriou 2013). Many of the adjectives hold a negative meaning and are utilized to mark the participation as unconventional and a departure from whatever conventional participation is understood to be. Further, branding the forms of participation as unconventional (or through some other synonym) is counterproductive when it comes to recognizing those forms of political participation that elude capture or that are excluded by preexisting dualistic models of political participation that are designed to determine what counts as a legitimate political act.

There is a need to develop a framework that is not exclusive but inclusive of diverse forms of political action. Hence, it is essential to acknowledge acts of participation that have so far been denied recognition due to the normative distinctions placed upon the preexisting conventional–unconventional dualism. In this article, the attempt to deliver a new categorization of participation—alternative participation—starts by reconsidering the conventional and unconventional forms of participation.

Conventional Participation

Although there is little agreement on what forms of political participation should be defined as conventional and unconventional participation, voting is considered to be a conventional form (e.g., Reference Akram, David, Brendan, David, Martin and ColinAkram et al. 2014; Reference Barnes and MaxBarnes and Kaase 1979; Reference Lamprianou and Kyriakos N.Lamprianou 2013; Reference Linssen, Hans, Peer and Manfred teLinssen et al. 2011; Reference Riley, Christine, Yvette and Kyriakos N.Riley et al. 2013; Reference Van DethVan Deth 2001, Reference Van Deth2014; Reference Verba and Norman H.Verba and Nie 1972). Thus, conventional participation will be defined mainly based on the example of voting. It is an action done by citizens to elect their representatives on every possible level of state administration (representative democracy). The goal of voting is to obtain control over state administration. In the literature on voting and political participation in general, one can discover a set of six characteristics that have been used to describe conventional participation. At the same time, those characteristics represent the features of the democratic representative system of politics. Most of those characteristics are already well-known in political participation research and are associated with forms of conventional participation, such as legality and institutionalization (e.g., Reference Barnes and MaxBarnes and Kaase 1979; Reference HalupkaHalupka 2016; Reference Marien, Marc and EllenMarien et al. 2010; Reference MouffeMouffe 2005; Reference PittiPitti 2018; Reference Rowe and DavidRowe and Marsh 2018).

As mentioned above, the first two characteristics of conventional participation are legality and institutionalization (Reference Barnes and MaxBarnes and Kaase 1979; Reference KaaseKaase 1999; Reference Marien, Marc and EllenMarien et al. 2010). Conventional participation is legal, as it functions according to the rules of conduct written in the form of state law. It is institutionalized because there are formal structures and institutions (i.e., political parties) that allow participation. It makes it possible to choose formal representatives that are responsible for public policy and state management. This applies to voting and some forms of participation, which are also understood as electoral participation, for example campaign donations or party membership and activism. Those are institutionalized, since their presence is related to the existence of formal political parties.

The third characteristic of conventional participation is the internal logic it supports. In Reference LuhmannLuhmann's (1997) system theory, the differentiation between government and the opposition functions as a code that organizes the operation of a democratic political system. It can also be applied to understand the logic of conventional participation. Both voting and electoral politics are tools for political parties to accumulate support and gain control over the government. However, the government–opposition system guarantees that even if a party fails it still can win in the future. Through conventional participation, the public addresses their claims to government or opposition, thus enforcing parties’ differentiation and delivering alternatives to choose from (Reference LuhmannLuhmann 1997). The goal of participation is a peaceful competition and not a violent struggle leading to the elimination of adversaries (Reference MouffeMouffe 2005).

The fourth characteristic of conventional participation is the fact that it happens in specific arenas that are in the public sphere. According to Chantal Mouffe, “in traditional conception [of politics], one had to leave the private sphere in order to become political, and it was only in the public sphere, through party politics, that the political was achieved” (2005: 40). This explanation goes together with the “arena definition of politics,” which sees politics as taking place only in specific venues, such as Parliaments (Reference LeftwichLeftwich 2004). The idea connects with the definition of participation as an act directed at influencing governments.

The fifth feature of conventional participation is the collective nature of this type of participation; for example, Reference StokerGerry Stoker (2006) sees politics as necessarily collective. Although it is individuals who participate, considering the logic of government–opposition and the idea of representative democracy, it is the majority that obtains authority. This also means that the majority decide the future of the state, which has the potential to exclude the voices of the minority. It introduces a social order that represents the majority, producing certain power relations and the hegemony of norms.

The sixth and final feature of conventional participation is the promotion of social unity rather than plurality. As a consequence, this type of participation reduces social plurality. This is also true for political parties whose function is to catalyze social interest to such a state that it is observable for the political system. Conventional participation is designed to cultivate a certain amount of plurality, but the main argument against conventional participation and representative democracy is that through aggregation it reduces social plurality (Reference BarberBarber 2003; Reference DryzekDryzek 2010; Reference EscobarEscobar 2017; Reference MouffeMouffe 2005). Hence, conventional participation is a tool to elevate unity and promote majoritarian goals and interests.

Unconventional Participation

To define unconventional participation, one can refer to Reference LuhmannLuhmann's (1990, Reference Luhmann1997, Reference Luhmann and William2002) idea of making sense of reality by drawing distinctions in observation. While the use of Luhmann's system theory may seem misguided at first, it gives an interesting perspective on political participation. Luhmann's theory delivers a distinct understanding of society and the social construction of reality, vindicating the role of other-than-conventional forms of participation. Luhmann's ideas allow us to understand how meaning is created in society through drawing distinctions in observation, such as the conventional–unconventional distinction. He argues that every distinction is reductive and helps to simplify complex reality. However, to observe and give meaning to a complex reality, one must go beyond drawing simplified distinctions.

For Luhmann, society is a collection of closed systems—for example, the political system. The representative political system uses the government–opposition distinction to understand its environment (Reference LuhmannLuhmann 1990, Reference Luhmann1997). In Luhmann's theory, communications are filtered according to the government–opposition coding, or rather its designatory value, which in the case of the political system is “government.” What is understood as the government is relevant, and that what is understood as the opposition is not considered relevant until the opposition becomes the government. This is true in the case of ideology; conservatism is preferred when the government is conservative, but this may change if the liberal opposition becomes the government. In the case of the economy, the government may propose specific tools to stimulate changes in the economy; these tools will be seen as more effective than those that are anticipated by the opposition. Thus, through the distinction between government and opposition, the system can decide whether specific tools constitute successful stimuli. Human consciousness is also a closed system, and, as such, it observes and makes sense of society through drawing distinctions (Reference Luhmann and WilliamLuhmann 2002). All social meaning is organized around distinctions that can accumulate in the consciousness. An apple could be described through distinctions like eatable–uneatable, red–not red, and so on. Through these distinctions, closed systems create meaning for themselves. Hence, for Luhmann the distinction between the conventional and unconventional would also be a product of making sense of reality.

According to this logic, the unconventional is always defined as the opposite of conventional. By designating the conventional, it becomes possible—by default—to define its exterior (Reference LuhmannLuhmann 1997, Reference Luhmann and William2002). Based on this notion, the unconventional can be characterized with the help of features opposite to those used to define conventional participation. As it was argued in the previous section, the conventional is (1) legal, (2) institutionalized, (3) government–opposition–logic driven, (4) takes place in the public sphere, (5) collective, and (6) promotes social unity. For Luhmann, the consciousness understands reality through drawing distinctions; for example, if something is defined as legal, there also needs to be an opposite value. If this logic is given recognition, it is only natural to assume that the six features of conventional participation also have opposites, which define that which is not conventional participation and that which is unconventional participation. Unconventional participation does not fit into the government–opposition internal logic of the political system but follows a government–governed internal logic. Reference LuhmannLuhmann (1997) believed that the government–opposition coding is typical for democratic political systems. The government–governed form is typical for undemocratic regimes. It is a form that could be considered as Reference MouffeMouffe's (2005) notion of antagonism. The “we” of the participants is always placed in the position of the governed, and the “they” is placed in the position of the government. One side fights to abolish the other. Additionally, unconventional participation does not have the same function as the conventional to unify and select social discourses to increase the stability of the state or political system. Minorities or individuals engage in unconventional participation, which is there to foster social plurality. These are forms practiced outside the arenas of politics and outside the public sphere. In this sense, unconventional participation can be only illegal and not institutionalized. Those who practice unconventional participation do it outside of the available formal channels of political participation.

One particular example of unconventional participation is the underground self-production and print of state-censored materials critical of the actions of a regime: a form of action most likely common in totalitarian regimes, such as European communist states. The activity was considered to be illegal, not institutionalized, individual, and done in private; it also often promoted a different worldview, thus introducing pluralism. This activity was also motivated by a government–governed logic, where the participants acted against the regime.

The definitions of conventional and unconventional are, thus, erected around at least six dualisms: (1) legal–illegal, (2) institutionalized–not institutionalized, (3) government–opposition vs. government–governed logic, (4) public–private, (5) collective–individual, and (6) unity–plurality. This composition represents a truly dichotomous distinction between what is conventional and unconventional participation. At the beginning of this article, it was mentioned that scholars perceive the conventional and unconventional as dichotomous categories. The conventional and unconventional, in the Luhmannian perspective, is also a dichotomous category. A form of participation is not conventional if it is not legal, institutionalized, and collective, government-vs.-opposition-logic-driven; if it does not take place in the public sphere; and if it is not unity-building. The same applies to the category of unconventional participation, although it is often considered as a catch-all category. Hence, what needs to be done is to acknowledge that some forms can be defined as conventional and unconventional, but the strict demarcation automatically excludes many modes of participation from being recognized and categorized. The dualism thus is not appropriate to describe the complex nature of political participation. It is necessary to change the perspective to describe and observe modes of political participation that cannot be characterized by a strict dichotomous distinction.

Alternative Participation

Dualistic distinctions are used to understand observed reality (Reference LuhmannLuhmann 1990, Reference Luhmann and William2002). The introduction of these distinctions has shaped the notion of politics and political participation. Reference HegelGeorge W. F. Hegel (1956), for example, maintained that the division of individual and collective was introduced together with the Christian tradition. The notions of individualism and collectivism are also present within other religions (Reference Cohen, Michael Shengtao and JacobCohen et al. 2016; Reference DumontDumont 1983; Reference TurnerTurner 2020). In the West, this division was reproduced by the republican notion of the common good, which emphasizes the utmost role of collectives in contrast to individuals (Reference AgrestoAgresto 1977). With time, society has been understood more as a collection of individuals than as a collective (Reference Markantonatou and Kyriakos N.Markantonatou 2013). The distinction between the collective and the individual has been rearticulated as the distinction between public and private, and between unity and plurality. The ideas of the public sphere and unity have been given a positive moral connotation. Institutions were built around those concepts, which reproduced the image of legality. Institutions have been perceived as necessary to bring forth a democratic system based on a government-vs.-opposition logic.

Scholars have used these distinctions focusing on participation, especially the distinction between conventional and unconventional. To name but a few examples, the divisions between legal and illegal and institutionalized and noninstitutionalized have already been utilized by Reference Barnes and MaxBarnes and Kaase (1979) and more recently by Reference Marien, Marc and EllenSofie Marien and colleagues (2010). The distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere has been shared by such scholars as Reference Barnes and MaxBarnes and Kaase (1979) but also by scholars such as Reference Riley, Christine, Yvette and Kyriakos N.Riley and colleagues (2013). The collective–individual dualism has been accentuated, for example, by Reference StokerStoker (2006) and Reference BiestaGert Biesta (2011). The division between two different logics of participation can also be found in Reference MouffeMouffe's (2005) agonistic pluralism, where democratic struggles are agonistic (government–opposition logic) while other struggles are antagonistic (government–governed logic). The relation between the notion of political participation and some of the dichotomous distinctions, like public–private and collective–individual, has been recently discussed by David Marsh and Sadiya Akram (2015), Reference HalupkaMax Halupka (2016), and Rowe and Marsh (2018). In other words, the six dichotomous distinctions reproduce similar dualistic logics and are chiefly responsible for the way in which contemporary politics and political participation are comprehended. Although it is futile to pinpoint the exact time when each of the distinctions came into use, they appear to be a product of the process of drawing distinctions in observation. For Reference LuhmannLuhmann (1997, Reference Luhmann and William2002), differentiation through building distinctions is associated with the fact that consciousness is functionally separated from its environment, so that it can differentiate between itself and the exterior. Perhaps this is where the individual–collective distinction originates.

Reference LuhmannLuhmann (1990, Reference Luhmann and William2002) claims that modern societies originate from the differentiation of functional systems of society by means of applying distinctions. If this logic is correct, it becomes conceivable to argue that the presented distinctions have originated as a part of this process as a way for the society to describe itself to itself. Thus, the meaning of politics is reproduced from the way society defines itself, but the sides of the dichotomous distinctions are not evenly conceived in the meaning of politics. The actions that can be characterized as legal, institutional, government-vs.-opposition-logic-driven, collective, public, and unity-producing have been considered as the designatory value and normatively more adequate to represent politics. This development has produced an exclusive and reductive idea of politics and political participation. While we have seen attempts to broaden this definition, it is still based on the dualisms and thus remains exclusive. According to Reference Luhmann and WilliamLuhmann (2002), the disadvantage of drawing a distinction is the concealment of the totality, which was there before the division. Understanding politics and participation through the perspective of dualisms allows one to simplify the observed phenomenon, but misses its complexity.

The distinctions drawn between conventional and unconventional political participation create artificial boundaries between notions, for example between collective and individual. For instance, Reference LuhmannLuhmann (1997) maintains that, while the political system for its functionality defines the line between the common and individual good, such a distinction does not exist in reality. Similar conclusions come to mind when one focuses on the idea of connective action (Reference Bennett and AlexandraBennett and Segerberg 2012), which, by definition, lies somewhere between the collective and the individual. What is more, the same suppositions have been voiced about the public–private dualism (e.g., Reference Rowe and DavidRowe and Marsh 2018; Reference Van DethVan Deth 2001, Reference Van Deth2014).

Although referring to these dualisms is problematic, they are an integral part of the social construction of our reality. A framework that is not exclusive but allows us to analyze political participation cannot entirely discard the fact that making sense of reality takes place by drawing distinctions and instituting dualisms. We have to define political participation by utilizing dichotomous distinctions, although no preference should be given to any side of the distinction. Only in such form is it possible to comprehend participation in its totality, observe the emergence of new modes, and argue for an inclusive idea of political participation. The dichotomous distinctions should be understood as a range of variations between two opposites to overcome their limitations. A similar argument has been made by Reference Marsh and SadiyaMarsh and Akram (2015), Reference HalupkaHalupka (2016), and Rowe and Marsh (2018), who argue that the distinction between the social and political should be understood not as a dualism but as a duality.

For instance, Reference HalupkaHalupka (2016) shows how important it is to observe what lies in-between the dualism to grasp the significance of some forms of participation. By doing so, he describes a mode of participation—information activism—that exists between the public–private dualism and the collective–connective dualism. He argues that “the collective and connective action dualism informs our understanding of the efficacy of participatory forms, their capacity to bring about change in a democratic system” (2016: 3) and that “information activism is a conceptual anchor for a broader understanding of political participation, which sees political participation as a continuum, ranging from the personal sphere, through to the more formal political arena” (2016: 14). The argument is voiced here as well. However, a strong emphasis is placed on the importance of all six dualisms in defining political participation.^{Footnote 3} The analysis of the efficacy of information activism as an act of political participation would be more comprehensive if one discusses the other dualisms as well. For instance, information activism switches through noninstitutional action to a form of coordinated action, which propels the need of the participants to spread information and provide solidarity. Also, the will to disseminate information and influence public opinion suggests that there was a motivation to the action that could be characterized either through Luhmann's government–opposition logic or the government–governed logic of participation. If information activism was highly institutionalized and succumbed to the government–governed logic of participation, it would likely be spotted by state actors and regarded as obstructive to the state agenda. Halupka also considers the motivation of participants and institutionalization of the movement because those are issues that are directly linked with the dualisms he discusses. However, he does not identify the issue of motivation and organization as dualisms (these would be the government–opposition vs. government–governed and the institutionalized–not institutionalized dualisms) and does not discuss them at length.

Some scholars argue that an attempt at the marginalization of the conventional definition of participation (e.g., Reference HayHay 2014) undermines representative democracy. However, as Reference HalupkaHalupka (2016) points out, this is only true when the definition of the political is constructed based on dualisms: “By seeing a process definition as separate from an arena approach, one does tend to reduce the importance of the political arena. Similarly, by conceiving an arena definition as distinct from a process definition, one marginalises those emerging forms of engagement that do not conform to traditional avenues but are still seen as important by citizens” (2016: 5). For Halupka, to prevent marginalization it is essential to see dualisms that are incorporated into the meaning of politics and political participation as dualities. In different terms, the dualisms should be seen as a continuum set between two polar opposite points. Some forms of political participation will be easily defined by employing a dualistic distinction upon the conventional and unconventional, while others will require an alternative approach, which is the blurring of those dualistic distinctions.

Alternative participation is a category encompassing forms of political participation that exist between the strictly defined conventional–unconventional dualism. Those are the forms of participation that can be described through the six dualisms understood, however, as a continuum set of options between polar opposites. What is more, when every form of participation is analyzed with a focus on all six dualisms in conjunction, it is possible to position a form of participation in the continuum between conventional and unconventional participation. The positioning of a form of participation on the continuum determines whether it represents conventional, unconventional, or alternative participation. This perspective helps to explain why in a specific setting certain forms of participation are excluded as nonpolitical and what the necessary conditions for the politicization of specific forms of participation would be in a given setting.

Information activism, connective action, lifestyle politics, and the Indignados movement can be categorized as alternative participation. As for other examples of alternative participation, one needs to remember that a strict division between the conventional and unconventional has left certain forms of participation outside of the scope of these categories. This applies, for example, to protest, demonstrations, or boycotting products. These forms of participation are also alternative.