In recent times in Australia there have been a number of changes in the leader of the governing party at both Commonwealth and State level, leading to a change in the holder of the office of Prime Minister or Premier. These changes have occurred not as a consequence of retirement or the loss of an election, but because of the loss of support for the leader by the leader's parliamentary party. They include the South Australian change of Premier from Mike Rann to Jay Weatherill, the New South Wales changes of Premier from Morris Iemma to Nathan Rees to Kristina Keneally and the change in Prime Minister from Kevin Rudd to Julia Gillard. Earlier examples include the change from Bob Hawke to Paul Keating and from John Gorton to Billy McMahon. This article explores the connection between the loss of party support for a leader and the role of the Governor or Governor-General in the appointment and removal of the Premier or Prime Minister.

In this paper is the agreement between Argyle, Traditional Owners for the mine area and the Kimberley Land Council. This paper carries all the rules to make sure that we treat each other properly. It has taken many years and a lot of hard work to make this agreement. We are very proud to sign it. With this agreement as a start, we can make the future better for Traditional Owners and Argyle.

This article examines the tax issues that arise in respect of native title agreements and recent proposals for tax reform by the Australian Government. Native title agreements sit at the intersection of indigenous economies, the market economy and the state. They contribute to sharing the benefits of resource development with traditional owners and compensate for the replacement value of non-renewable resources to the future generations.

Since the late 1990s it has become increasingly clear that the Commonwealth Constitution is the dominant influence upon judicial review of administrative action in Australia. The Constitution provides for a minimum entrenched provision of judicial review by recognising and protecting the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. This protection comes at a price because the separation of powers doctrine and the division and allocation of functions it fosters impose many limits upon the reach and content of judicial review of administrative action. This protective and restrictive effect of the separation of powers upon judicial review of administrative action arguably reflects a wider tension in the separation of powers, in which the powers and limits of each arm of government are balanced in a wider sense.

The extent to which these competing principles apply to judicial review at the State level has long been unclear. There seemed good reason why judicial review at the State level should not be subject to the restrictions that have arisen at the federal level. After all, the various State constitutions did not adopt an entrenched separation of powers like that of the Commonwealth Constitution.

The general test for standing in Australia requires an applicant to have a ‘special interest‘ in the subject matter of the action. It is well known that under this test environmental groups face challenges in being granted standing. So what happens when legislation extends standing to allow these groups to bring judicial review proceedings? The cases and academic literature suggest that there may be a number of consequences. It may be that other aspects of the litigation process such as costs, non-justiciability, or powers to stay proceedings for being an abuse of process operate to curb inappropriate proceedings. It is also possible that standing-related issues are handled by the grounds of judicial review, such as procedural fairness or failure to consider a relevant matter. This could occur in two different ways. Judges may be wary of being drawn into what they regard as political disputes and take a restrained approach to the grounds of review that emphasises orthodox limitations.

The High Court has held that the Constitution entrenches a ‘minimum provision of judicial review’. In the context of privative clauses, the contours of that minimum provision are settled – the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court and the State Supreme Courts to review for jurisdictional error cannot be excluded. In respect of privative clauses contained in Commonwealth legislation, conflict with s 75(v) of the Constitution provides the constitutional anchor for the minimum provision, while in State jurisdiction the textual anchor is found in the constitutional definition of a ‘court’, as that term is used in Ch III. In respect of other elements of judicial review, particularly the substantive principles of review, the position is radically unclear. One commentator has observed that, if the Constitution does contain principles prohibiting the exclusion of the substantive principles of judicial review, 'it is not obvious where they lie or what the justification for them might be.

Section 128 of the Commonwealth Constitution provides that proposals for constitutional change at a referendum are carried if they are supported by double majorities ‘of the electors voting.’ It is not immediately clear whether informal votes are to be included in the total or denominator when determining whether the yes votes are a majority. The point could determine the result in a future referendum. Indeed if such ‘votes’ are to be included in the total ‘voting’ the referendum on 28 September 1946 to give the Commonwealth additional social security powers would have been lost.

In a paper to the 2002 Conference of the Samuel Griffith Society I expressed the view that informal votes must be included in the denominator, or total, to determine whether ‘the majority of the electors voting approve the proposed law’. Further research has caused me to change my opinion.