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Loss modelling from first principles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2024

Pietro Parodi*
Affiliation:
SCOR Property & Casualty, London, UK Bayes Business School, City University of London, London, UK
Derek Thrumble
Affiliation:
Adesco, London, UK
Peter Watson
Affiliation:
SCOR Property & Casualty, London, UK
Zhongmei Ji
Affiliation:
SCOR Property & Casualty, London, UK
Alex Wang
Affiliation:
Gen Re, P&C Treaty, Paris, France
Ishita Bhatia
Affiliation:
QBE, London, UK
Joseph Lees
Affiliation:
Protector Forsikring, Manchester, UK
Sophia Mealy
Affiliation:
Hiscox Re, Bermuda
Rushabh Shah
Affiliation:
Marsh Advisory, London, UK
Param Dharamshi
Affiliation:
KPMG, London, UK
Federica Gazzelloni
Affiliation:
Freelance, Rome, Italy
*
Corresponding author: Pietro Parodi; Email: pparodi@scor.com
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Abstract

A common statistical modelling paradigm used in actuarial pricing is (a) assuming that the possible loss model can be chosen from a dictionary of standard models; (b) selecting the model that provides the best trade-off between goodness of fit and complexity. Machine learning provides a rigorous framework for this selection/validation process. An alternative modelling paradigm, common in the sciences, is to prove the adequacy of a statistical model from first principles: for example, Planck’s distribution, which describes the spectral distribution of blackbody radiation empirically, was explained by Einstein by assuming that radiation is made of quantised harmonic oscillators (photons). In this working party we have been exploring the extent to which loss models, too, can be derived from first principles. Traditionally, the Poisson, negative binomial, and binomial distributions are used as loss count models because they are familiar and easy to work with. We show how reasoning from first principles naturally leads to non-stationary Poisson processes, Lévy processes, and multivariate Bernoulli processes depending on the context. For modelling severities, we build on previous research that shows  how graph theory can be used to model property-like losses. We show how the methodology can be extended to deal with business interruption/supply chain risks by considering networks with higher-order dependencies. For liability business, we show the theoretical and practical limitations of traditional models such as the lognormal distribution. We explore the question of where the ubiquitous power-law behaviour comes from, finding a natural explanation in random growth models. We also address the derivation of severity curves in territories where compensation tables are used. This research is foundational in nature, but its results may prove useful to practitioners by guiding model selection and elucidating the relationship between the features of a risk and the model’s parameters.

Information

Type
Contributed Paper
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries
Figure 0

Figure 1. A conceptual view of the structure of this paper.

Figure 1

Figure 2. Top left: An example of a Poisson process. The x-axis shows the timing of the jumps (losses) while the y-axis shows the cumulative number of jumps, $X\left(t\right)$. Note how each jump has unitary size ($X\left({t}_{j}\right)-X\left({t}_{j}^{-}\right)=1$ if there is a jump at ${t}_{j}$), as in a Poisson process there is no clustering of events (events are “rare”). The condition that the jumps have unitary size can be relaxed – as long as all the jumps have exactly the same size the process is still called Poisson. Top right: an example of a non-stationary Poisson process. Notice how the frequency of losses is higher for $400\lt t\lt 600$ and $750\lt t\lt 1000$. Bottom left: an example of a pure-jump Lévy process, where the jump values are integers (the negative binomial process falls under this category). Bottom right: An example of non-stationary pure-jump Lévy process (again with integer jump values). Note that the process at the bottom right shares with the one at the top right the timings of the jumps (hence the similarity), but the jumps do not necessarily have unitary size in the bottom right figure.

Figure 2

Figure 3. Top: A Lognormal fit to a large number (around 10,000) of employers’ liability claims in the UK market. ($\ll 0.1\mathrm{\%}).$ Bottom: A lognormal fit to a large number of motor bodily injury claims in the Indian market. In both cases, based on the value of the KS statistic, the probability that the data set comes from a lognormal distribution is negligible ($\ll 0.1\mathrm{\%}).$ The original losses have been masked by a scalar factor.

Figure 3

Figure 4. Examples of the emergence of the power law in economics.

Figure 4

Figure 5. Survival function for increasing time periods, showing the increasing move away from the lognormal distribution towards the steady-state Pareto distribution.

Figure 5

Figure 6. KS distance for test set versus (data-calibrated) model, test set versus training set, test set versus true model for different values of the sample size. Left: no threshold. Right: 90% threshold. Note that the KS distance (rather than the normalised KS distance, which will remain relatively flat) is shown here.

Figure 6

Figure 7. In this simulation example, we are assuming that each node represents a unit of worth equal to 1, so the total insured value (TIV) equals 8. The maximum possible loss (MPL) is equal to 6, the size of the largest connected component. The origin of the fire is selected at random (node 2 in the example), then the edges are removed with probability equal to 1 minus the weight of that edge. The size of the connected component that includes node 2 is then calculated, and the loss is divided by the MPL, giving the damage ratio. The process is then repeated for the desired number of scenarios. Figure taken from Parodi & Watson (2019).

Figure 7

Figure 8. The result of the simulation with the random time approach with the following parameters: $\lambda = {1 \over 2},{\rm{Pr}}\left( {{\rm{open}}} \right) = 0.8$, ${n}_{\text{open}}=1$, ${n}_{\text{closed}}=10$, ${n}_{\text{wall}}=30$. The severity (left) and exposure (centre) curves for different property structures and for the whole portfolio, obtained simulating 100,000 different scenarios. (Right) The parameters $k={\rm ln}\left(b\right)$, $l={\rm ln}(g-1)$ of Bernegger’s curves for the various property structures and the portfolio and compared with the values of k and l corresponding to different values of c for the Swiss Re $c$ curves (the black curve).

Figure 8

Figure 9. Left: example of the BE regime: time evolution for a Swiss Re curve with $c=1.5$ (residential property). Increasing the value of c yields the same type of behaviour but with a lower acceleration/convexity; Centre: example of the MB regime: evolution for a Bernegger curve with $b=0.1,\mathrm{}g=10$; Right: example of the FD regime: evolution for a Bernegger curve with $b=0.01,\mathrm{}g=10$.

Figure 9

Figure 10. Oil and gas network example.

Figure 10

Table 1. The dependency matrix for Figure 10. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, such a matrix can be viewed as a representation of a weighted (directed) graph, with an edge from $j\mathrm{}$ to $k$ if the value at $(j,k)$ is $\gt 0$

Figure 11

Table 2. Business interruption: Lower order effects

Figure 12

Table 3. Business interruption: Lower order effects, revised

Figure 13

Table 4. Direct BI versus Indirect BI: Original and revised network

Figure 14

Figure 11. A simplified, linearised version of the cyber disruption pattern.

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Table 5. Example of assessment of the parameters of a cyber disruption pattern.

Figure 16

Figure 12. Three random scenarios generated by varying the parameters of the cyber disruption period.

Figure 17

Figure 13. The empirically derived CDF plot for the damage ratio (left) and exposure curve (right) for the finance and insurance sector.