a The Normative Essence Approach

The normative essence approach, developed by Young, seeks to identify the fundamental and indispensable elements of rights based on foundational normative values such as dignity, equality and freedom. This approach often links the core of rights to overarching moral principles – such as survival, life, or human flourishing – emphasising their intrinsic relationship with the concept of human dignity.Footnote ³³ While this method offers a strong philosophical and ethical framework for interpreting rights, it leaves their practical application and universal validity somewhat indeterminate.Footnote ³⁴ One significant difficulty lies in the elusive nature of human dignity itself, a concept that remains undefined in human rights law (see Section 5.2.2).

Shaver has examined the application of the normative essence approach to the right to science by proposing two distinct dimensions. The first involves recognising certain essential technologies as prerequisites for a life in dignity and ensuring their universal accessibility. According to this view, human dignity necessitates access to basic technological tools. The second dimension addresses the concrete benefits of scientific progress, with Shaver urging a focus on society’s most vulnerable. She illustrates this with the example of the sanitary pad – an elementary yet often stigmatised or inaccessible technology for many menstruating people. Its absence can result in shame, reduced educational opportunities and social exclusion, particularly for women and girls.Footnote ³⁵ As such, access to technologies that enable a life in dignity, like the sanitary pad, should be considered part of the core content of the right to science.

Against this backdrop, Shaver identifies two challenges. Firstly, there is the issue of defining technology itself, with a risk of focusing too much on advanced innovations and neglecting simpler, crucial technologies. Secondly, determining which technologies are essential mirrors the challenge in defining the core of rights in terms of dignity. As technologies evolve, it is vital not to overlook those considered outdated or too new. For example, the telephone, while old, remains essential, akin to the internet’s significance today. Shaver warns that these issues could narrow our understanding of essential technologies, affecting clarity and specificity.Footnote ³⁶

Yet, in Shaver’s exploration of the core content of the right to science, an essential preliminary step is inadvertently bypassed: the definition of the right itself. Before delving into the core of the right to science, one must first comprehend its full spectrum of protection. This includes, but is not limited to, identifying the range of technologies covered. Furthermore, the core aspects’ intrinsic nature can and should be elucidated through treaty interpretation. By focusing on the entire scope of protection, which surpasses merely technological aspects, the essential dimensions of the right can be discerned through the lens of treaty interpretation.

Embracing a pro homine approach within the framework of teleological interpretation proves particularly beneficial for capturing the essence of a right or the concept of ‘a life in dignity’. The pro homine approach stresses that the option most favourable to the human being should be chosen (see Section 1.1.2.3).Footnote ³⁷ This interpretative method also underscores that the overarching aim of human rights is to safeguard the most vulnerable members of society and could consequently provide clearer insights into the essential dimensions of the right to science, ensuring that the emphasis is placed on protecting and enhancing human dignity and welfare.

b The Minimum Consensus Approach

The minimum consensus approach, identified by Young, conceives of the minimum core as a foundational baseline that has received endorsement from the international community. By rooting the core in broadly accepted standards, this approach bolsters its credibility and legitimacy. It adopts a more positivist stance than the normative essence approach, relying on state practice to identify areas of mutual agreement.Footnote ³⁸

While commendable for its focus on shared values and legal recognition, the consensus-based approach faces the challenge of determining whose agreement carries weight. This ambiguity raises concerns about the inclusivity and representativeness of the consensus, potentially overlooking diverse perspectives and priorities among states and communities.Footnote ³⁹ The difficulty is reminiscent of debates in customary international law, where both state practice and opinio juris are likewise challenging to ascertain.Footnote ⁴⁰

Another critical concern with a consensus-based approach is its potential to be ‘overly conservative’, gravitating towards the ‘lowest common denominator’. This inclination risks inadequately safeguarding the interests of vulnerable populations by setting the bar too low for the protection of their rights.Footnote ⁴¹ This finds reflection in the worrying trend where other interests, such as IP and trade, tend to overshadow fundamental human rights considerations. This shift can dilute the essence of human rights protections, prioritising economic and commercial concerns over the basic rights and well-being of individuals.Footnote ⁴² Especially in the context of the right to science, the prevailing approach is often dominated by market orientation, privatisation and exclusivity of access – values and principles fundamentally at odds with the ethos of human rights. Shaver highlights that, especially concerning the right to science, marked disparity exists between theoretical entitlement and practical realisation. This discrepancy suggests that the consensus approach might fall short in effectively bridging the gap between the theoretical scope of protection of rights and their actual implementation.Footnote ⁴³

In conclusion, the proposition that state practice should determine the core content of human rights deserves critical scrutiny. This scepticism is well founded, as states are both the primary duty bearers under international human rights law and, frequently, the very entities from which rights holders seek protection – or expect safeguards against third-party violations. The argument becomes even more compelling considering that the concept of core content emerged as a normative tool developed by the Committee to address persistent non-implementation and to delineate minimum standards requiring immediate realisation under Art. 2(1) ICESCR. Accordingly, the identification of core content must remain a legal exercise, grounded in treaty interpretation and entrusted to independent oversight bodies such as UN treaty bodies. It must not be reduced to a political exercise shaped by the preferences of states. In this respect, an analogy with customary international law is instructive: as with the identification of opinio juris and state practice, it is international supervisory and expert bodies – such as the ICJ and the ILC – that are tasked with interpreting the law, not the states themselves.Footnote ⁴⁴

c The Minimum Obligations Approach

The minimum obligations approach centres on the obligations inherent in the rights themselves and examines how international bodies and domestic courts interpret and enforce these obligations. This approach, as noted in Section 5.2.1, is also endorsed by the Committee. Often building upon the insights derived from the normative essence or consensus core approaches, the minimum obligations approach translates identified rights into explicit, non-negotiable state obligations. By defining which state duties are fundamental, it ensures these obligations are clear, enforceable and thus justiciable. Crucial to operationalising human rights, this approach substantially strengthens state accountability.Footnote ⁴⁵

A key advantage lies in the reversal of the burden of proof: when a complaint alleges non-compliance with core obligations, the onus shifts to the state. This not only reinforces the binding nature of these obligations but also eases the evidentiary burden on rights holders, enhancing their ability to claim their rights. It requires states to demonstrate that they have taken adequate steps to fulfil their obligations, promoting both transparency and a more proactive stance towards compliance. This procedural shift may also serve as a deterrent to non-compliance and contribute to clarifying the scope and content of obligations.

The minimum obligations approach aligns closely with Chapman’s violations approach, both aiming to define rights and corresponding state duties with sufficient precision to ensure their justiciability in concrete cases (see Section 1.1.3).Footnote ⁴⁶

d The Immediacy Approach

Tasioulas offers a distinct perspective, arguing that the core content of human rights should not be defined by criteria such as special value, non-derogability or justiciability. Instead, he emphasises immediacy: once a human right has been identified, along with its scope and obligations, attention should turn to those obligations requiring immediate fulfilment. To support compliance, he proposes the use of indicators to track progress.Footnote ⁴⁷

Yet, by focusing primarily on immediacy, Tasioulas risks conflating the normative nature of core content with its legal effects. This perspective may appear to reverse the logical sequence by foregrounding the consequences of core content before clarifying its underlying principles. While his approach offers a useful reminder of the importance of timely implementation, it closely resembles existing practices in human rights law, particularly those already reflected in the work of the Committee.

e The Pragmatic Approach

Shaver proposes a pragmatic approach to defining core content – one that adapts to the specific challenges and realities of our time. She focuses on two key concerns: the growing privatisation of scientific research and the sidelining of public interest in favour of intellectual property rights (see Section 4.2.3). In this view, the core content of a right like the right to science is shaped not only by fixed normative principles but also by the surrounding socio-economic and political context. As private actors increasingly dominate science and IP protections sometimes outweigh the public good, the core content must respond directly to these developments. This includes ensuring fair access to scientific advances and protecting the public from the negative effects of unchecked IP enforcement. Shaver’s approach thus offers a flexible and responsive way to keep human rights relevant as circumstances evolve.Footnote ⁴⁸

At the same time, her approach does not necessarily require a new conceptual model. As discussed in Section 5.2.1.3a, the interpretative tools already established in the VCLT – and the evolving practice of human rights treaty bodies – offer a strong and coherent framework for identifying core content.Footnote ⁴⁹ While the VCLT focuses on treaty interpretation rather than on defining core rights directly, its goal-oriented (teleological) method is well suited to this task. When combined with the pro homine approach – which supports interpretations that most effectively uphold human dignity and well-beingFootnote ⁵⁰ – it provides a meaningful way to capture the essence of a right. This method aligns naturally with the idea of ‘a life in dignity’, which underpins the notion of core content,Footnote ⁵¹ as discussed further in Section 5.2.2.

a The Right to Scientific Progress

For science to be enjoyed, scientific progress is essential. A core right within the right to benefit from scientific progress is, therefore, the actual realisation of such progress.Footnote ⁶⁸ This interpretation is grounded in Art. 15(2) ICESCR, which mandates that states parties undertake necessary steps for the conservation, development and diffusion of science. The Committee outlines this as a core obligation to ‘adopt and implement a participatory national strategy or action plan for the realisation of this right that includes a strategy for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science’.Footnote ⁶⁹ Essentially, this implies that science must be available, which means that ‘scientific progress is actually taking place, and that scientific knowledge and its applications are protected and widely disseminated’.Footnote ⁷⁰

This core right was also raised in a complaint on the right to science submitted to the Committee. Complainants argued that Law 40/2004 violated their right to benefit from scientific progress because it impeded the progress of research that could potentially find a cure for hereditary multiple osteochondromas, a disease that affects one of the claimants and possibly her descendants. Despite her personal and family connection to the disease, the legislation restricts her ability to donate affected embryos for scientific research, thereby limiting her contribution to the search for a cure. However, the Committee did not address the question of a violation of the right to science for procedural reasons; the complainants did not sufficiently substantiate their claims as to how the prohibition on donating their embryos for scientific research violated their right to science.Footnote ⁷¹ Nonetheless, recognising scientific progress as a core right suggests that such legislation, by unduly restricting progress, may amount to a violation – an argument that might have influenced the case’s outcome.

Reflecting on the centrality of scientific progress and the core obligations set out by the Committee, several components of the core right to scientific progress can be identified. This right incorporates both formal requirements, such as creating a conducive environment for scientific endeavours, as well as material requirements that delineate the essence of progress as an integral part of the right to science.

The formal requirement for the right to scientific progress refers to the necessary framework conditions, which pertain to the core rights of freedom of science (see Section 5.4.3). Furthermore, this includes the right to access and participate in scientific progress (see Section 5.4.5), as mirrored in the core obligation to ‘[d]evelop a participatory national framework law on this right that includes legal remedies in case of violations and adopt and implement a participatory national strategy or action plan for the realisation of this right that includes a strategy for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science’.Footnote ⁷²

The material requirement is clarified by interpreting what constitutes scientific progress in the context of the right to science (see Section 3.2.2.1). As discussed in Section 3.2.2.2, within the domain of the right to science, scientific progress is closely linked to ‘positive impact on the well-being of people and the realisation of their human rights’Footnote ⁷³ and thus signifies a dedication to human advancement and the wider achievement of human rights. This concept of progress also encompasses the implementation of ESC rights (Art. 2(1) ICESCR), under the principle of progressive realisation. This provision suggests a right to enhancing living standards for the fulfilment of ESC rights. In this context, it is further established as a core right that scientific progress should receive prioritised funding in sectors with the most urgent need for scientific development – particularly health, food and other fundamental needs related to ESC rights and the general welfare of the population, prioritising vulnerable and marginalised groups. This prioritisation ensures that endeavours in scientific progress directly contribute to addressing the most critical challenges faced by society.Footnote ⁷⁴

b The Right to Accurate Scientific Information and Protection from Mimics

The right to benefit from scientific progress inherently includes access to scientific knowledge – specifically, to scientific information – promoted in ways that protect individuals from its mimics, such as misinformation, disinformation and pseudoscience (see Section 3.2.2.3d). This aspect is deliberately incorporated into the core content of the right to science by the Committee, which highlights the obligation to promote ‘accurate scientific information and refrain from disinformation, disparagement and deliberately misinforming the public in an effort to erode citizen understanding and respect for science and scientific research’.Footnote ⁷⁵ Additionally, another core obligation involves ‘mechanisms to protect people from the harmful consequences of false, misleading and pseudoscience-based practices, especially when other economic, social and cultural rights are at risk’.Footnote ⁷⁶

This core obligation translates into the core right to scientific information and protection from its mimics. Interconnected with freedom of expression, particularly the right to seek and receive information, this right includes access to data and records maintained by public bodies and institutions – subject only to valid exceptions such as privacy or national security concerns (see Section 4.2.7).Footnote ⁷⁷

While the Committee emphasises the need for scientific information to be accurate, this may seem redundant: scientific information, by its nature, requires accuracy, guaranteed by the scientific process and mechanisms such as peer review. For the general public, the ‘accurateness’ of scientific information should be supported by high-quality science journalism positioning ‘accurateness’ as a quality element of the right to science. The Committee describes quality as referring to ‘the most advanced, up-to-date and generally accepted and verifiable science available’Footnote ⁷⁸ applicable both to the process of scientific creation and access to the benefits of science, including necessary regulation and certification to ensure responsible and ethical scientific development and application.Footnote ⁷⁹ The Committee’s message implies the need for scientific information to be presented by scientists and scholars in ways that are comprehensible for the general public. Scientific publications alone often fall short of this aim, especially for non-specialists or lay persons.Footnote ⁸⁰

Complementing the core right to accurate scientific information is the core right to protection from its mimics. Under the scope of the right to science, non-scientific, unscientific and pseudoscientific information is not protected (see Section 3.2.2.3d). This also includes a right to public awareness about the credibility and reliability of information, particularly given the vast volume of online content. Importantly, mimics of science must be distinguished from the potentially harmful effects of science itself (see Section 5.4.1.1c). The Committee’s inclusion of mechanisms to counter misinformation, disinformation and pseudoscience reflects a recognition that these phenomena may hinder the enjoyment of the right to science, just as adverse effects from scientific progress and applications can.

Examples of how misinformation, disinformation or pseudoscience affect economic, social and cultural rights are numerous. These include misinformation about medical treatments, as well as distorted historical or cultural claims that fuel prejudice and division. The core right to accurate scientific information and protection from mimics is particularly vital in areas such as public health, environmental policy and electoral integrity. In these contexts, reliable scientific information enables rights holders to make informed decisions in line with their values – especially when public policy is shaped by scientific knowledge and literacy.

c The Right to Be Protected from the Adverse Effects of Scientific Progress and Its Applications

Science, like power, can liberate or oppress. Yet, the Committee does not mention the right to be protected from the adverse effects of science within the core content of the right to science. Nonetheless, the right to be protected against the adverse effects of scientific progress and its applications constitutes an integral part and, thus, at least in its non-discriminatory dimensions, core right of the right to science. The principal aim of the right to science is for rights holders to enjoy the benefits from scientific progress. This requires e contrario that rights holders are also protected from the adverse effects of scientific progress and its applications.Footnote ⁸¹ Adverse effects of scientific progress and its applications are those that undermine human welfare, dignity or human rights or are ‘dual use’.Footnote ⁸² This understanding of the core right of protection against adverse effects translates into a core obligation for states to take measures when the adverse effects of science pose a threat to other human rights, which can ultimately result in limiting the right to science to safeguard other human rights (see Chapter 9).Footnote ⁸³

The right to be protected against the adverse effects of scientific progress and its applications focuses on mitigating negative impacts that may arise directly from scientific advances and applications. This must be clearly distinguished from the core right to accurate scientific information and protection from its mimics, which addresses misinformation and other misleading content that may fall outside the protective scope of the right to science but still cause public harm (see Section 3.2.2.3d).

d The Right to Mechanisms for Policies and Programmes Informed by Scientific Evidence

Another core right flowing from the right to benefit from scientific progress is the right to mechanisms for policies and programmes informed by scientific evidence. The Committee, as part of the eighth core obligation of the right to science, emphasises the need for states to ‘[a]dopt mechanisms aimed at aligning government policies and programmes with the best available, generally accepted scientific evidence’.Footnote ⁸⁴ This approach, drawn from the UNESCO Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers, outlines that ‘Member States should establish and substantially strengthen human and institutional capacities, including by using scientific and technological knowledge in decision-making and policies’.Footnote ⁸⁵ The Committee further elaborates that a ‘clear benefit of scientific progress is that scientific knowledge is used in decision-making and policies, which should, as far as possible, be based on the best available scientific evidence. States should endeavour to align their policies with the best scientific evidence available’.Footnote ⁸⁶ Another example is in the context of epidemics: ‘It should also improve early warning mechanisms, based on timely and transparent information provided by states on emerging epidemics that have the potential to transform into a pandemic, which would allow early interventions, based on the best scientific evidence, aimed at controlling the epidemics and preventing them from becoming a pandemic.’Footnote ⁸⁷

The choice to define the core right to benefit from scientific progress as ‘the right to mechanisms for policies and programmes informed by scientific evidence’ is a deliberate effort by this author to pre-empt and circumvent prevalent misunderstandings. Historically, this aspect has been framed as a ‘the right to evidence-based policymaking’.Footnote ⁸⁸ In this context, a recent editorial in the journal Nature raised a pertinent question regarding the right to science: ‘But does Article 27 imply, for example, that people universally have a right to enjoy a clean environment and a stable climate – issues that research has brought to the forefront of the public consciousness in the past 75 years?’Footnote ⁸⁹ Such concerns highlight a broader unease with the notion of evidence-based policymaking, often rooted in fears of technocratic overreach or ‘scientific imperatives’ that might override democratic deliberation. To clarify this, some context is necessary.

The ‘epistemisation of the political’Footnote ⁹⁰ sheds light on the complex interplay between science and politics, a relationship prominently showcased during the COVID-19 pandemic. The limitations on human rights, such as the freedom of movement for health protection as experienced during shutdowns or lockdowns, is ultimately and fundamentally a question of values rather than of mere linear understanding of scientific evidence. This can also be observed in the context of climate change, where revivalist slogans such as ‘Unite Behind Science’ and ‘Follow Science’ risk conflating scientific findings (what is) with normative conclusions (what ought to be). This perspective suggests a seamless integration of scientific understanding with moral and ethical directives, implying that scientific knowledge inherently dictates specific courses of action.Footnote ⁹¹

Historically, the role of science and scientific experts was confined within well-defined institutional frameworks, such as courtsFootnote ⁹² and political structures,Footnote ⁹³ and in specific capacities such as expert witnesses or institutionalised policy advisers. In these settings, the role of science and scientific experts were clearly delineated. However, the contemporary landscape sees science and thus scientific experts frequently transcending these traditional boundaries, especially in times of crisis. They adopt multiple roles, functioning not only as witnesses but also as critics or judges. While claiming to offer clarity in complex situations, this practice has led to a blurring of epistemic boundaries and an expansion of the expert role. Increasingly, experts are merging science and thus their specialised knowledge with activism and intellectualism, leveraging crises as opportunities to wield political influence.Footnote ⁹⁴ To counteract this, these experts should act as ‘Honest Brokers of Policy Alternatives’,Footnote ⁹⁵ presenting unbiased scenarios and separating themselves from lobbyists or activists.Footnote ⁹⁶ A clearer role separation for researchers in politics is advocated to preserve the integrity of each role. In the end, ‘Science and democracy, at their best, are modest enterprises because both are mistrustful of their own authority’.Footnote ⁹⁷

As such, the Committee deserves commendation for emphasising that evidence-informed policymaking should not be interpreted as a linear, technocratic process but instead concerns adopting mechanisms through which scientific insights can inform policy.Footnote ⁹⁸ Thus, contrary to the question posed in the Nature editorial, it is not a core right to have policies dictated by scientific imperatives. Rather, the right pertains to establishing appropriate mechanisms that ensure scientific perspectives are duly considered and heard in the political arena. Importantly, the decisions regarding which paths to pursue, laden with inherent values, should be made by those who are democratically elected and legitimised to do so. These decision-makers bear ultimate responsibility to the general public, a fact that underscores the essential democratic principles at play in the process of formulating policy. Their responsibility to the electorate is a cornerstone of the democratic rule of law, ensuring that policy decisions reflect the will and interests of the broader community. A prerequisite for the right to have policies and programmes informed by scientific evidence is ensuring that individuals responsible for making such decisions, as well as those impacted by these decisions, possess an adequate level of scientific education as well as literacy, furthering the core rights of the right to science.

e Right to Scientific Education

A third benefit of scientific progress, in addition to the immaterial and material benefits of science, is the ‘role of science in forming critical and responsible citizens who are able to participate fully in a democratic society’ (see Section 3.2.2.3f).Footnote ⁹⁹ Against this backdrop, the Committee outlines a core obligation that states must ‘[e]nsure that people have access to the basic education and skills necessary for the comprehension and application of scientific knowledge’Footnote ¹⁰⁰ and ‘that scientific education in both public and private schools respects the best available scientific knowledge’.Footnote ¹⁰¹ From these core obligations, a core right to scientific education can be inferred. The Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights further delineates the right to science education from the interconnectedness of the right to science and those to education and information, outlining ‘a right to be introduced to and informed about main scientific discoveries and their applications’.Footnote ¹⁰²

The right to science education can be seen as enhancing the overall quality of education, which also refers not only to classic educational settings such as schools or higher education institutions but also to the training of professionals. Against this backdrop, the Committee outlines that states must ‘[e]nsure that health professionals are properly trained in using and applying modern technologies and medicines resulting from scientific progress’.Footnote ¹⁰³ From this, it can be inferred that the core right of scientific education also extends to health professionals to receive quality education concerning modern technologies.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ The concept of the ‘best available scientific knowledge’, as outlined in Core Obligation No. 5, is indicative of an element of quality, defined by the Committee as ‘refer[ring] to the most advanced, up-to-date and generally accepted and verifiable science available at the time, according to the standards generally accepted by the scientific community’.Footnote ¹⁰⁵

The right to scientific education becomes particularly poignant at the intersection of religion and science within an educational setting. An interesting point arises from comparing the core obligations outlined by the Committee in General Comment No. 25 on ESC rights related to science with the earlier Draft General Comment. One notable difference is the approach to addressing the relationship between science and religion in education. The draft suggested a more explicit separation – ‘religious visions, when necessary, should be presented in a distinct context’Footnote ¹⁰⁶ – not included in the final General Comment, likely due to the politically sensitive nature of the subject. By omitting this detail, the Committee may have intended to avoid potential accusations of advocating for de lege ferenda interpretations.

However, the following brief analysis argues that the interpretation presented in the Draft General Comment does not represent a de lege ferenda perspective but rather conforms substantially to the lex lata when viewed through the comprehensive lens of international human rights law. This conclusion rests on recognising the intrinsic interconnectedness of relevant rights – namely, the freedoms of thought and conscience, the right to education and the right to science. It is precisely this interconnected nature that grounds the argument, highlighting the need to interpret these rights in concert to fully grasp their broader implications within the legal framework of human rights.

In the context of the right to freedom of thought and conscience, the HRC stipulates that states must respect the freedom of parents and, when relevant, legal guardians to ensure their children’s religious and moral education aligns with their own beliefs, as stipulated in Art. 18(4) ICCPR. The HRC elaborates that this provision permits public school instruction in subjects such as general history of religions and ethics, as long as it is imparted neutrally and objectively. The liberty of parents or legal guardians to guarantee that their children receive religious and moral education that reflects their convictions, as detailed in Art. 18(4) ICCPR, correlates with the freedoms related to teaching religion or belief, as outlined in Art. 18(1) ICCPR. The HRC observes that public education that includes instruction in a specific religion or belief violates Art. 18(4) ICCPR unless it offers non-discriminatory exemptions or alternative choices that respect the preferences of parents and guardians (see Section 4.2.6).Footnote ¹⁰⁷

The right to education entails a right to ‘free choice of education without interference from the State or third parties, subject to conformity with ‘minimum educational standards’ (Art. 13(3) and (4)).Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Yet, while educational freedom is recognised, private schools and their curricula must comply not only with the minimum criteria stipulated by the right to education in Art. 13(1) ICESCR, that

See Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.6.

Integrating the right to freedom of thought and conscience with the rights to education and science illuminates a nuanced perspective. While rights holders have the freedom to receive religious education, it must be imparted in a manner that contextualises this knowledge within the broader framework of established scientific understanding. This approach requires respect for and incorporation of scientific knowledge. For example, a curriculum that exclusively promotes creationism to explain the origin of the world, neglecting the wealth of established scientific theories, would conflict with these three interconnected human rights. Such an educational approach would not only undermine the right to science by disregarding the best available scientific knowledge but also compromise the right to education’s goal of fostering a comprehensive understanding of the world that includes respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Finally, the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights interprets scientific education as the ‘right to be introduced to and informed about main scientific discoveries and their applications, regardless of frontiers. It also entails education instilling a spirit of scientific inquiry’.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ It also, she notes, entails an education that fosters a spirit of scientific inquiry – thereby highlighting a key outcome of scientific education: scientific literacy.

f The Right to Scientific Literacy

As mentioned, the third benefit of scientific progress is the ‘role of science in forming critical and responsible citizens who are able to participate fully in a democratic society’ (see Section 3.2.2.3f).Footnote ¹¹⁰ Yet, the benefit of scientific progress transcends the mere acquisition of knowledge by scientific education and fosters an informed and analytical public, which is crucial in an era plagued by infodemics, including misinformation, disinformation and post-truth politics.

Science fosters critical thinking, or a ‘spirit of scientific inquiry’,Footnote ¹¹¹ enabling people to scrutinise information and make informed decisions, a key aspect of democratic participation. In addition, the ethical dimension of science promotes awareness of moral dilemmas, which is essential to balance different values. A scientifically literate population is better equipped to participate in debates on key scientific and technological issues, such as climate change and data protection. This understanding is an integral part of the right to policies and programmes informed by scientific evidence (see Section 5.4.1.1d).

Scientific literacy requires that the educational and skill-based requirements for understanding and applying scientific knowledge are accessible for everyone. The right to scientific literacy is thus closely intertwined and based on scientific education: basic education should encompass scientific education to facilitate the comprehension and utilisation of scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge should not remain an exclusive domain of those privileged to pursue higher education, where such expertise is frequently developed, particularly at the doctoral level. Hence, fostering scientific literacy must start from the primary school level and continue throughout one’s educational journey, including vocational training paths. An illustrative example of implementing the right to scientific literacy could be mandating education on artificial intelligence within school curricula. Such an initiative would not only enhance digital literacy but also empower children with critical skills to navigate and interact with artificial intelligence technologies effectively.Footnote ¹¹²

a The Right to Access Scientific Applications Critical for the Enjoyment of ESC Rights

The core right to access scientific applications essential for the enjoyment of ESC rights is grounded in the core obligation identified by the Committee, which requires states to ‘[e]nsure access to those applications of scientific progress that are critical to the enjoyment of the right to health and other economic, social and cultural rights’.Footnote ¹¹³ While core obligations are generally articulated with sufficient specificity to enable direct implementation, this particular obligation notably leaves considerable scope for interpretation. The determination of which scientific applications are deemed critical to the enjoyment of human rights is not fixed. Yet, this interpretive flexibility is crucial: it ensures that the core right retains its relevance over time and must therefore be understood in a dynamic and evolutive manner, responsive to changing societal needs (see Section 1.1.2.3).

Some clarity on this issue can be gained by returning to the foundations for core rights set out in this book (see Section 5.2). As a core right, what is considered critical for the enjoyment of ESC rights must be rooted in human dignity, which serves as the basis and starting point of core rights. As such, scientific applications indispensable for a life with dignity should be accessible to everyone, particularly marginalised populations. Examples provided by the Special Rapporteur are scientific advances that possess a considerable influence on human rights, such as electricity, ICTs and nanotechnology.Footnote ¹¹⁴ It bears repeating that scientific applications are not limited to cutting-edge innovations; technologies that support daily life are equally critical to the enjoyment of ESC rights and human dignity.

To further illustrate which scientific applications may be regarded as critical, and thus essential for the enjoyment of ESC rights, one may turn to the core content of other ESC rights. Although a full account exceeds the scope of this book, the following paragraphs provide selected examples drawn from the core content of related human rights already analysed (see Section 4.2).

The core content of the right to health includes the right to essential medicines, exemplifying the critical role of scientific applications, and stipulates the need for further applications of science, such as basic shelter, housing, sanitation and access to safe and potable water, all of which call for technologies, such as waste and water purification systems, that are not yet universally standard.Footnote ¹¹⁵ In a similar vein, the right to water’s core content requires scientific applications to ensure the availability of a minimum essential amount of safe water for personal and domestic use, which is also essential for disease prevention and includes facilitating access to adequate sanitation facilities and service.Footnote ¹¹⁶

The right to health further entails access to minimally essential food that is nutritionally adequate and safe, ensuring freedom from hunger.Footnote ¹¹⁷ Correspondingly, the right to food mandates that such food be available in quantities and qualities sufficient to meet dietary needs, free from harmful substances, culturally acceptable and accessible sustainably without impeding other human rights.Footnote ¹¹⁸ Hence, agricultural technologies and food sciences, critical to the enjoyment of the right to health and food, significantly influence freedom from hunger (see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3).

Although the Committee’s formulation of Core Obligation No. 6 primarily addresses access to scientific applications in the context of ESC rights, their importance extends to a wider spectrum of human rights, surpassing the scope of the ICESCR.Footnote ¹¹⁹ For instance, ICTs such as the internet, mobile devices and social media platforms are crucial for rights such as freedom of opinion and expression. Furthermore, scientific applications are pivotal in combating climate change to realise the rights to a healthy environment and to development. It is regrettable that the Committee missed an opportunity to bridge the gap between ESC and CP rights. Such an approach could have underscored the integral connection CP rights and the right to science, which, in outdated ‘dichotomous terminology’, is viewed as a cultural right (see Section 4.2.1.4c).

a Terminology

Historically, research was primarily conducted within universities and similar institutions (see Section 3.2.2.3a), where the concept of academic freedom first emerged. In that context, the term ‘academic freedom’ was appropriate. However, with the expansion of research into commercial and private sectors during the Industrial Revolution, scientific inquiry began to extend well beyond higher education. This broader research landscape likely informed the wording of Art. 15(3) ICESCR, which refers to the ‘freedom indispensable in scientific research’ rather than ‘academic research’. The provision reflects an understanding that scientific research is not confined to academia but occurs across a range of institutional settings.

The choice of terminology – whether referring to scientific or academic freedom – has significant implications for the scope of protection. The UNESCO Recommendation for Open Science, intended as an international framework for open science policy and practice, provides an illustrative example, defining ‘open science’ as ‘an inclusive construct that combines various movements and practices … and to open the processes of scientific knowledge creation, evaluation and communication to societal actors beyond the traditional scientific community’.Footnote ¹⁶⁵ Yet, despite this inclusive framing, the document primarily refers to academic freedom. This is a missed opportunity: given that open science explicitly seeks to involve actors outside academia, a reference to ‘scientific freedom’ would have been more accurate in capturing the broader landscape of scientific practice.

Similarly, the Venice Statement, which addresses the ‘enabling and participatory environment for the conservation, development and diffusion of science and technology’, emphasises the necessity of academic freedom.Footnote ¹⁶⁶ While the statement highlights the importance of academic freedom, the term ‘scientific freedom’ would have more precisely captured the full spectrum of actors and institutions involved in science. Scientific freedom reaches beyond the academic world, encompassing individuals and groups engaged in research in a range of settings.

Against this backdrop, this book adopts the term ‘freedom of science’ to collectively describe both scientific and academic freedom. This choice reflects a deliberate effort to acknowledge the plurality of knowledge systems and institutional contexts that make up contemporary scientific practice. The term better encapsulates the expansive reach of scientific inquiry and the range of actors engaged in it, moving beyond the traditional confines of the academic sphere.

b Scope

A crucial distinction between scientific and academic freedom lies in the extent of protection each affords. The deciding factor from which one is protected depends on the person’s affiliation, which determines both personal scope (see Sections 6.1.1, 6.2 and 7.2.2) and substantive scope.

Academic freedom generally offers broader protections compared to scientific freedom, a difference stemming from the unique role of universities in their search for truth and advancing knowledge.Footnote ¹⁶⁷ While scientific activities in non-university environments are safeguarded under the broader concept of scientific freedom, researchers in these contexts do not require the same heightened level of protection as their academic counterparts.Footnote ¹⁶⁸ By contrast, higher education institutions play a foundational role in society as centres for knowledge production, innovation, cultural preservation, skills development and scientific advancement. They also foster democratic discourse, international collaboration and individual self-realisation.Footnote ¹⁶⁹ In this regard, these institutions are not only centres for academic and professional advancement but are also crucial in shaping societal values and driving intellectual and cultural development (see Section 5.4.3.2d).

Individuals working in higher education possess a distinct responsibility to drive scientific knowledge forward. Academic freedom assures the autonomy of academics to engage in research, teaching and the dissemination of their work, regardless of any potential controversy or discomfort caused by their findings.Footnote ¹⁷⁰ This safeguard is vital for preserving a space where intellectual exploration is unimpeded by external pressures, thus ensuring the integrity and development of academic fields. Due to the special responsibility researchers in higher education possess, which also includes the duty to teach and thus impart their knowledge, they are more vulnerable to hostilities, which is why they are afforded special and enhanced protection.Footnote ¹⁷¹ For this reason, academic freedom merits enhanced legal and institutional protection. In many respects, it may be compared to the protections enjoyed by parliamentarians, whose independence in political debate is seen as indispensable to democratic functioning. Likewise, academics require freedom to question, critique and publish without fear of sanction. This necessity justifies the more expansive scope of academic freedom in comparison to scientific freedom.Footnote ¹⁷²

a Intellectual Freedom

The first core right of freedom of science is intrinsically linked to the freedom of thought and conscience. Mirroring the forum internum aspect (see Section 4.2.6) of the freedom of thought and conscience (Art. 18 ICCPR), intellectual freedom ensures that thoughts and opinions in the scientific sphere are safeguarded from external coercion.Footnote ¹⁸⁸ The prevention of any form of interference, be it political or otherwise, is consequently essential for the preservation of freedom of science.Footnote ¹⁸⁹

Intellectual freedom is closely intertwined with the freedom of scientific opinion, which pertains to the forum externum aspect (see Section 4.2.6). This aspect encompasses the right to publicly defend one’s convictions, pivotal in protecting researchers from undue influences that could compromise their independent judgment. This is elaborated upon in Section 5.4.3.2c.Footnote ¹⁹⁰

b Freedom of Scientific Opinion and Inquiry

Another core right of freedom of science is shaped by the core right of freedom of opinion (Art. 19(1) ICCPR), which includes the right to hold and express opinions without interference, extending specifically to scientific opinions.Footnote ¹⁹¹ This right affirms the autonomy of researchers to define the aims, objectives and methods of their work.Footnote ¹⁹² Rights holders must be free to determine the direction of their research, provided it adheres to the universal principles and methods of scientific inquiry.Footnote ¹⁹³ Within these parameters, they retain the liberty to choose their research topics and methodologies independently. Crucially, this right also encompasses the freedom to revise or abandon one’s scientific opinions – recognising that science is not static but continually evolving. It includes the entitlement to question and critically assess the ethical implications of scientific projects and, where necessary, to withdraw participation on the grounds of conscience. Researchers must be free to articulate and share views concerning the ethical, human, social or ecological dimensions of scientific activity. This ensures that freedom of scientific opinion is not confined to technical aspects alone but extends to the normative and societal impact of science.Footnote ¹⁹⁴

c Freedom of Scientific Expression

Another core right integral to freedom of science is freedom of scientific expression, derived from the broader freedom of expression. This right guarantees the ability to communicate scientific opinions and findings without interference, ensuring that researchers can freely disseminate their work within the scientific community and to the wider public.Footnote ¹⁹⁵ Analogous to Art. 19(2) ICCPR, scientific information can be imparted across borders through various means: orally, in writing, in print or in any other chosen media. This freedom encompasses the publication of scientific findings in books, journals, posters or legal submissions and underscores the unrestricted nature of scientific expression.Footnote ¹⁹⁶ Teaching is an essential form of scientific expression, knowledge dissemination and idea exchange. The educational process, an integral aspect of the academic and scientific landscape, facilitates the transmission of intellectual and scientific knowledge.Footnote ¹⁹⁷

The freedom of scientific expression entails the unfettered sharing and publication of research findings, both nationally and globally, without fear of censorship. This core right encompasses the ability to express critical perspectives, including those that may be considered unfavourable, controversial or unsettling. Researchers must be able to voice such opinions without fear of repression, harassment or censorship, as this freedom is essential for the integrity and progress of scientific inquiry.Footnote ¹⁹⁸ It also entails disseminating scientific data and analysis to policymakers and the public.Footnote ¹⁹⁹ For instance, subjecting scientific statements to systematic preventive control, as proposed by some Swiss parliamentarians during the COVID-19 pandemic,Footnote ²⁰⁰ would contravene the core of scientific freedom.Footnote ²⁰¹ Academics should be free to publish and disseminate their research through discussion, documentation, production, creation or writing. Furthermore, they should be free to express opinions about the institution or system where they work without fear of institutional censorship.Footnote ²⁰²

However, when examining the freedom of scientific expression within academic contexts, it is important to distinguish between three forms of expression: intra-mural speech (pure academic speech within the university context), extra-mural speech (academic expressions in the field of expertise but outside the higher education context) and off-topic speech (all speech outside an academic’s field of expertise).Footnote ²⁰³ Pure academic speech is identifiable by its specific context and the participants involved.Footnote ²⁰⁴ Intra- and extra-mural speech enjoy protection under the auspices of academic freedom, whereas off-topic speech does not. Off-topic speech includes expressions and opinions that do not contribute to academic discourse or scholarship, potentially encompassing personal, political or social viewpoints unconnected to the academic’s professional realm. While such speech remains vital to the fabric of democratic societies and is protected under the general right to freedom of expression, it does not enjoy the heightened protections afforded by academic freedom. Freedom of expression encompasses a broad spectrum of speech, including the dissemination of falsehoods. In contrast, academic freedom is a specialised form of protection designed to preserve the integrity and focus of scholarly work. This demarcation ensures that the special trust and status conferred upon academics are not misused to lend undue credibility to personal view or non-academic objectives.Footnote ²⁰⁵

At the same time, this demarcation must not produce a chilling effect. Academics must not be dissuaded from engaging in public discourse out of fear of institutional repercussions. The UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Higher Education Personnel stresses that academics’ exercise of their civil rights should not be obstructed, nor should they be penalised for such engagement.Footnote ²⁰⁶ Striking this balance is essential: it clarifies the scope of academic speech while safeguarding both academic freedom and the broader right to freedom of expression, ensuring that the academic platform is used responsibly and remains a space for rigorous and open intellectual debate.

d Institutional Freedom and Autonomy

Another core right pertaining particularly to academic freedom is institutional freedom and autonomy – the ‘institutional form of academic freedom and necessary precondition’.Footnote ²⁰⁷ Dworkin highlights that higher education institutions are pivotal in modelling and educating democratic values. They fulfil a dual role: developing essential skills and services and enabling individuals to make informed, creative societal contributions (see Section 3.2.2.3f).Footnote ²⁰⁸

Institutional freedom and autonomy entail a level of self-governance indispensable for informed and independent decision-making in the realm of higher education. This autonomy is particularly important in matters related to academic activities, institutional management and the maintenance of academic standards.Footnote ²⁰⁹ It ensures that academic communities retain the authority to regulate their own affairs – such as setting professional entry criteria, defining benchmarks of scientific quality and establishing peer review procedures – thereby safeguarding the intellectual integrity and credibility of academic work.Footnote ²¹⁰

Three key components underpin this autonomy: academic self-governance, collegiality and tenure.Footnote ²¹¹ Academic self-governance ensures that higher education teaching personnel have both the right and the opportunity to actively participate in institutional decision-making processes. This ensures respect for the participation rights of others and enables them to elect a majority of representatives to academic bodies within their institutions.Footnote ²¹² Collegiality refers to inclusive decision-making across a range of domains – administration, policy development, curriculum design, research and resource allocation – ensuring that academic voices shape the direction of higher education.Footnote ²¹³ The principle of tenure, finally, is a cornerstone of academic freedom. It protects scholars from arbitrary dismissal, ensures continuity of inquiry and teaching and must remain secure even in periods of institutional reorganisation. Tenure should be granted following a reasonable probation period and based on objective criteria related to teaching, scholarship and/or research.Footnote ²¹⁴

The high degree of freedom afforded to higher education institutions carries with it corresponding responsibilities. Institutional autonomy must be balanced with robust, fair and transparent accountability mechanisms.Footnote ²¹⁵ The UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel includes the following:

• upholding quality, excellence and integrity in teaching, scholarship and research functions;

• implementing and adhering to non-discrimination policies and procedures;

• assisting in the fulfilment of ESC rights and preventing the misuse of knowledge, science and technology in ways that could infringe upon these rights while protecting generally accepted academic ethics, human rights and peace;

• providing access to up-to-date libraries and facilities to support academic activities; and

• encouraging and facilitating international co-operation in academic and research endeavours.Footnote ²¹⁶

Yet, it must be emphasised that such accountability mechanisms must never be wielded to curtail academic freedom. Oversight should serve to support academic integrity – not to suppress dissent, critique or intellectual autonomy.

a Definition of ‘Discrimination’

Understanding the right to non-discriminatory participation in science first requires an understanding of what constitutes discrimination. The Committee defines discrimination as ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal footing, of Covenant rights. Discrimination also includes incitement to discriminate and harassment’.Footnote ²³³

It is important to distinguish between discrimination and differential treatment. The latter, if based on prohibited grounds, is considered discriminatory unless it can be justified as reasonable and objective. This assessment involves an evaluation of whether the aims and effects of the measures or omissions are ‘legitimate, compatible with the nature of the Covenant rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. In addition, there must be a clear and reasonable relationship of proportionality between the aim sought to be realised and the measures or omissions and their effects’.Footnote ²³⁴

In the context of differential treatment, the example of university admissions is relevant. It is legitimate and reasonable for universities to establish entry requirements, ensuring that all incoming students possess the necessary foundational knowledge and skills for academic success. This form of differential treatment is aimed at maintaining educational standards. However, if the entry requirements include disproportionately high tuition fees or deny access based on any prohibited ground, such as race, gender or socio-economic status, this transcends the bounds of justifiable differential treatment. In such cases, the measures are not only disproportionate but also potentially discriminatory; they create barriers that are not aligned with the objective criteria of academic merit and potential.

Lastly, a failure to address discriminatory treatment due to a lack of resources does not constitute an objective and reasonable justification, unless it is established that every effort has been made to use all available resources at the disposal of the state party, giving priority to the elimination of discrimination.Footnote ²³⁵

b Manifestations of Discrimination in Scientific Participation

In practice, discrimination in scientific participation manifests in various forms. Gender bias remains a persistent obstacle to equal participation in science. Educational curricula and policies may unintentionally reinforce gender stereotypes. Workplace policies, such as inflexible working hours and inadequate parental leave, can disproportionately affect women in the workplace. Recruitment and promotion practices that favour men, combined with persistent social stereotypes, limit women’s advancement in scientific and technological fields. Furthermore, unequal access to funding and research opportunities compounds these challenges.Footnote ²³⁶ While the Committee specifically accentuated the importance of non-discrimination in the participation of women and girls in scientific and technological domains,Footnote ²³⁷ this prohibition of discrimination of course extends to other marginalised groups as well.Footnote ²³⁸

With respect to Indigenous peoples, the Special Rapporteur has observed that they continue to face systemic and structural discrimination. Under their right to self-determination, Indigenous Peoples must be able to participate fully in the cultural and public life of broader society, while also preserving and advancing their own systems of knowledge, technologies and sciences. This includes a guarantee of free, prior and informed consent in any project or decision that affects their interests.Footnote ²³⁹ Furthermore, in relation to the definition of science, Indigenous Peoples have called for the recognition of Indigenous sciences as legitimate forms of science, contesting the false hierarchies and prejudices that have traditionally marginalised their knowledge systems.Footnote ²⁴⁰

Moreover, geographical considerations can also affect the right to non-discriminatory participation in science, when, for example in a globalised scientific landscape, participation is restricted at times for non-Western researchers, who experience prejudice and for whom barriers to access to scientific publications have been replaced by barriers to publishing. Furthermore, much research is conducted in English.Footnote ²⁴¹

c Intersecting Forms of Discrimination in Scientific Participation

An inclusive understanding of non-discrimination must also take account of intersecting forms of disadvantage. No individual’s experience of discrimination is entirely identical, even among those who share similar group identities. This diversity of experience necessitates a nuanced and flexible approach to human rights protection – one that recognises what Atrey has called the ‘intersectional universality of human rights’.Footnote ²⁴²

Intersectional universality rejects the assumption that universal rights require identical experiences. Rather, it embraces human difference as a foundation for equal rights protections. Oppressive structures – including racism, patriarchy, ableism, homophobia, transphobia, capitalism and imperialism – intersect in complex ways that shape individuals’ experiences of marginalisation.Footnote ²⁴³

In the realm of science and technology, the implications of intersecting discrimination are particularly stark. Consider the example of a woman of colour from a socio-economically marginalised background. Her experience in the scientific field may be shaped by a convergence of racial and gender stereotypes, which can lead to underrepresentation, implicit bias and obstacles to professional advancement. These may be further exacerbated by socio-economic barriers to education and professional networking – factors that are often essential for career development in scientific disciplines. Systemic impediments, such as the lack of relatable mentors, limited access to research funding and exclusion from informal professional networks, may further reinforce these challenges, impacting her confidence, inclusion and long-term career trajectory.

Another good example of intersecting forms of discrimination in light of the right to science is the report by the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples concerning Indigenous women and the development, application, preservation and transmission of scientific and technical knowledge. The report examines the central role of Indigenous women as custodians of scientific and technological knowledge under international human rights law and identifies the contemporary threats and intersecting challenges that Indigenous women face as a result of their unique position at the intersection of gender and Indigenous identity.Footnote ²⁴⁴