Conceptualizing Pan-Slavism vis-à-vis its Contemporary Manifestations and Dimensions

Pan-Slavism can be classified primarily as a distinctive pan-nationalism, the origin of which is associated with the rise of the era of national awakening and nationalisms, and their parallel “pan-variants” in the 19^th century. The main idea of Pan-Slavism can be identified as an attempt to transcend a more isolated national identity and create a greater, “pan-national,” identity, including, in the spirit of the geopolitics of the time, a territory larger than the area of a nation state.

In contrast to one of the most substantial contributions to the field made by Louis L. Snyder (Reference Snyder1984), we believe that it is analytically fruitful to identify the difference between pan-nationalism, standing for a supra-national identity among “kindred” nations, and the macro-nationalism of post-imperial countries, which emphatically denies differences inside the metropolitan cultural core. While the former is epitomized by classic Pan-Slavism, which was the future-oriented vision of a new political entity embracing already existing states and regions, the latter could be seen, for example, in the geopolitical ideologies of the “Russian world” and “Holy Russia,” in which the bottom-line is the revanchist and nostalgic recreation of the split imperial unity, such as the union of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians.

There are multiple interpretations of Pan-Slavism in the academic literature and in the political discourses. “I am a Pan-Slav” almost always means something quite different from the indictment “you are a Pan-Slav!” Self-professed Pan-Slavs are usually expressing feelings of solidarity, cultural unity, spiritual bonds, or linguistic kinship, while accusations of Pan-Slavism are typically connected with criticism of imperialist thinking, irredentism, sedition, treason, and so on.Footnote ¹ Our contention is, however, that Pan-Slavism is a specific ideological phenomenon, with its internal morphology and historical genealogy, which is not the same as discourses about Pan-Slavism.Footnote ² In other words, a person calling herself a “Pan-Slav” is not necessarily pan-Slavic in our ideological sense, and the same is true when somebody is accused of being a Pan-Slav. In our understanding, a self-declaration is an important qualifying moment, but the center of gravity should lie in the contextual and history-specific analysis of the internal structure of political ideas (Freeden Reference Freeden, Freeden, Sargent and Stears2013). For example, for Russian intellectuals of the late imperial period of the 19th century, German unification provided a valuable pattern for thinking about the future Slavic Union, in which the Russian Empire would play the role of Prussia in the united Germany (Sharapov Reference Sharapov1905). Today’s Russian Pan-Slavists are inspired by both the historical experience of the bloc of former socialist countries, glued together by ideological resistance to the West as well as by the ethno-cultural proximity of the various Slavic countries.

Another important conceptual caveat is the need to distinguish the ideational complex of pan-nationalism from positive valorization of a specific country in international politics. In this sense, Pan-Slavism points to the ethnic proximity of certain nations as the main reason why these countries should establish a more cohesive political community. Of course, there could be other reasons – economic, political, and cultural – for international friendship or “soft power” (Nye Reference Nye1990) attraction among nations, such as the popularity of the US among some East European countries. This means that when we analyze Russophilic discourses among, for instance, the Serbian political elite, we need to understand if these discourses are motivated by metaphors of Orthodox Slavic brotherhood or by pragmatic calculations. To equate Russophilia with Pan-Slavism is to deflate the latter concept to a degree of irrelevance. Having said this, we need to highlight that in practice pan-nationalism often imbricates with other reasons for political friendship. For example, it is hard to separate Serbian Russophilia, motivated by anti-Westernism, and purely Pan-Slavic reasoning because the notion of “Russia” in this context becomes an “empty signifier” (Laclau Reference Laclau2007, 36), drawing in various meanings, including the concept of Slavic brotherhood.

In this article we propose a research focus that additionally zeroes in on a pan-nationalist component of the discourses about cultural attraction among nations. Hence, our position is that the rich history of Pan-Slavic solidarity as a movement and ideology did not disappear without a trace, but only shifted into the background, providing a canvas on which new political meanings can be painted in new styles and with new colors. For instance, a recent Russian initiative to establish an Institute for the Protection of Historical Memory in Belgrade (Zamakhina Reference Zamakhina2020) amalgamates old Pan-Slavic sentiments and reminiscences that Russia and Serbia were once brothers-in-arms in the war against Nazi Germany, with the new ideological agenda of sacralization of World War II and absolutization of Russia’s eternal confrontation with the West. Likewise, when we focus on the motives of the Serbian paramilitary squad “Jovan Šević” fighting on the side of the pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas conflict in 2014, we can observe that the anti-Western agendum of Serbian nationalists was amplified by discourses on Slavic solidarity and the memories of Russia’s volunteer movement in the Balkans in the 19^th century (Bacchi Reference Bacchi2014). In other words, it is our conviction that neglecting the pan-nationalistic element in the recent academic scholarship leaves out an important aspect of the contemporary politics and ideology in the formerly communist parts of Europe.

Pan-Slavism, which was constituted approximately in the period of 1830–1840, was one of the first politically conceptualized pan-nationalisms (Adams Reference Adams2001, 73). It followed Pan-Germanism that occurred a bit earlier, where the role of Ernst Moritz Arndt, who “emphasised the need of new and stronger ties for the German Reich,” needs to be mentioned (Kohn Reference Kohn1949, 788). Kohn discussed in length Arndt’s claims regarding Germans needing “the bond of a common state and political strength” (Kohn Reference Kohn1949, 788), with Pan-Germanism eventually coming to partly influence Pan-Slavism political unity projects. Pan-Germanism was additionally formulated in cultural terms as well, with other pan-nationalisms, such as Pan-Arabism and Pan-Scandinavism, arriving at the international scene somewhat later. Although pan-nationalisms resonated with many supporters in the 19^th century, ultimately they could not compete with nationalisms in terms of political mobilization and ideological conviction. One of the main problems of pan-nationalisms was their vagueness and low practical feasibility, which could not compete with clearly defined nationalist programs. In the case of Pan-Slavism, even at the time of its greatest popularity, the concept of unity of the various Slavic nations did not come to be clearly defined.

Although Russia historically was the champion of Pan-Slavic ideas, the first significant variant of Pan-Slavism did not count on Russian political influence. Both “Austro-Slavism” (from circa 1820s, with Herkel and Šafařík, to the 1830s, with Jan Kollár, and then roughly until the end of the First World War), and “Neo-Slavism” (1908–1918) had increasingly literary and emancipatory objectives, resonating with Central and South European Slavic nations that were part of the then gradually liberalizing Habsburg Empire and not under the whip of the Russian Tsarist autocracy (Nenasheva Reference Nenasheva1984). Gradually, however, Russia increasingly used Pan-Slavism in its imperialist policies, where aspects of Pan-Slavism were challenged by other concepts such as Eurasianism (Laruelle Reference Laruelle2008). The “classical” era of Pan-Slavism subsequently came to an end with the disintegration of Tsarist Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War that witnessed the birth of new Slavic states, among others. Soviet Russia (and later the USSR towards the middle of the 20^th century) utilized different concepts in its foreign policy, although Moscow at times relapsed to the use of Pan-Slavic motifs, for instance during the Second World War (Kohn Reference Kohn1952).

Today, Pan-Slavism is mostly seen as a historical and extinct version of pan-nationalism. This perception, however, ignores the fact that at the present time we can witness the revitalization of this concept towards its updated and reinterpreted forms, with the occasional retreat to historical Pan-Slavism either in a comprehensive manner or by means of using only certain aspects of it. These new forms of Pan-Slavism are very vague, as much as the traditional ones were, and perhaps even more difficult to define and grasp. For some aspects of this Pan-Slavic revival, it would be more appropriate to use the term Slavophilia, which may also contain political aspects of Slavic unity while at the same time oscillating on the border of the romantic-cultural perception of today’s Slavic identity. Very often, however, contemporary references to Pan-Slavism may also highlight a Russian influence in various political, largely nationalist, and cultural contexts and discourses. Sometimes, these references directly target and espouse the importance of pro-Russian politics, only to be shrouded in a particular Pan-Slavic garb.

New forms of Pan-Slavism/Slavophilia have been particularly visible in the last decade and notably used and abused in illiberal political agendas in Slavic societies where the Christian Orthodox milieu habitually plays a major role in identity politics. For example, consider contemporary Russia. Under Vladimir Putin’s rule, Russia’s foreign policy ambitions have grown significantly, and some aspects of Pan-Slavism in Russia’s foreign policy have therefore re-emerged (Suslov Reference Suslov2012, 575, 585). Pan-Slavism is being engaged with domestically as an ideological ingredient of nationalist, religious-fundamentalist, radical-conservative, and anti-globalist left-wing theorizations. Importantly, the Russian regime’s ideology in the past 10 years has incorporated a great deal of these theoretical perspectives and agenda into its mainstream (Chebankova Reference Chebankova2020; Lewis Reference Lewis2020; Suslov and Uzlaner Reference Suslov and Uzlaner2019). Similar tendencies, for that matter, may be found in other Slavic countries, for instance in the very secular Czech Republic that does not espouse predominant Orthodox milieu, or in Serbia that in its foreign policy constantly invokes its traditional and brotherly relations with Russia. These new forms of Pan-Slavism/Slavophilia can manifest themselves in both domestic and foreign policy, where they can disproportionately favor Russia’s foreign policy attitudes and ambitions, as well as deepen anti-democratic, anti-civic and populist tendencies. It is interesting to note that in recent years cultural, and sometimes quite apolitical, concepts, agenda, and narratives of Slavic unity have also begun to emerge, inspired by the rising trend of various neo-pagan movements (Golovneva Reference Golovneva2018; Laruelle Reference Laruelle2008). Lastly and importantly, these new forms of Pan-Slavism/Slavophilia can threaten EU integration.

This multifaceted nature and differences in the understanding of contemporary manifestations of Pan-Slavism are, therefore, important but unjustly neglected challenges to the current research of nationalisms and related issues in the context of politics and society in the contemporary Slavic world. Our brief survey of the ideological status of Pan-Slavism in today’s world shows that it can no longer be considered a sort of “failed nationalism,” striving to forge an unbreakable collective identity by connecting nation, state, and culture but having been derailed by historical contingencies. Pan-Slavism today should rightfully be called “Slavophilia” – a low-profile political sympathy for another Slavic country, motivated by the fact of its “Slavicness” in terms of ethnicity, culture, language, and history.

Pan-Slavism in the Contemporary Literature

With respect to the theoretical debate above, the research on Pan-Slavism can be divided into two major categories: 1) a traditional/historical Pan-Slavism and 2) more contemporary perspectives/manifestations of Pan-Slavism (Đorđević et al. Reference Đorđević, Čejka, Mocek and Hrabálek2021). The authors treating historical perspectives of Pan-Slavism in the 18^th, 19^th, and early 20^th centuries are more numerous, while there are a relatively small number of authors focusing on the more contemporary perspectives, most of them treating the relationship between Pan-Slavism and politics in the present-day context.

As for the historical Pan-Slavism, to begin with there are authors focusing on the political context. For instance, Maxwell (Reference Maxwell2020) describes the Slovak national awakening in the 19^th century, while his work in collaboration with Brown is focused on the Latinization campaign in Ruthenia in the beginning of the 20^th century (Brown and Maxwell, Reference Brown and Maxwell2016). Haraksim (Reference Haraksim, Teich, Kováč and Brown2011) discusses the formation of the Slovak national identity and the national question of the Slovak people in the 19^th century, while Cetnarowicz (Reference Cetnarowicz2021) examines relations of Slovenes with other Central European Slavic nations, Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles, in the second half of the 19^th century. Jaworska (Reference Jaworska2011) takes a different approach, examining non-Slavic countries and focusing on German propaganda and its anti-Slavic discourses in the interwar period. This topic was also dealt with by Adamantios Skordos (Reference Skordos, Gąsior, Karl and Troebst2014) in his scholarship.

In addition, there are authors addressing the issue of Pan-Slavism in other geographic contexts, such as the Balkans. Russia’s historical influence and the need to be geopolitically present in this part of Europe is treated in several studies through the prism of Russian state aid and its relentless efforts to maximize its influence. Hence, the authors focusing on Pan-Slavism in the Balkans discuss these points in detail, with Parppei (Reference Parppei2021) analyzing the Russian influence in the Balkans against the background of the Russo-Turkish War in the second half of the 19^th century. Vovchenko (Reference Vovchenko2010) and Gülseven (Reference Gülseven2017) deal with a similar topic, examining the form of the Russian influence, whereas Kasatkin (Reference Kasatkin2020) focuses on Pan-Slavism in Bulgaria in the 19^th century. Sotirović (Reference Sotirović2017) delves into the national identity of Croatians at the turn of the 17^th and 18^th centuries, examining it vis-à-vis ideas of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Croatianism (the notion of a Greater Croatia in the Balkans). Last of all, instrumentalization of Slavic solidarity by the Soviet Union has recently been spotlighted by Stefan Troebst (Reference Troebst, Gąsior, Karl and Troebst2014a) and Jan Claas Behrends (Reference Behrends, Gąsior, Karl and Troebst2014).

It is also important to note that there are researchers whose focus goes beyond the political and examines cultural aspects of Pan-Slavism from the historical perspective. To begin with, Burry and Orr (Reference Burry, Orr, Bowers and Kokobobo2015) focus on the Russian and Slavic cultural identities, examining the novel, Anna Karenina. Prieto (Reference Prieto, Konstan and Raaflaub2009), for her part, continues in very much the same manner, treating the influence of Pan-Slavism on the literature of Slavic nations, while Boldin (Reference Boldin2018) aims at the role of the Russian language for the integration of Slavs into one country or a kind of superstate of Slavic people, taking into consideration two generations of Pan-Slavists – the “patriarch of Russian Slavic studies” and a convinced Slavophile, V. I. Lamansky; and a supporter of the ‘new Slavic worldview’ and a leader of the Serbian Radical Party, Ljubomir Stojanović. Dusza (Reference Dusza2014) goes on to explore other arts, analyzing whether Pan-Slavic ideas did indeed find their way onto the canvas of the Czech painter Alfons Mucha, credited with the cycle of 20 large canvases called “The Slav Epic.” Additionally, Gąsior (Reference Gąsior, Gąsior, Karl and Troebst2014) addresses Slavic topics and motifs in the interwar Polish art landscape, again an attempt to discuss contexts other than literary contexts.

The second category of research on Pan-Slavism is composed of contributions aimed at more contemporary contexts. Suslov (Reference Suslov2012) goes into an analysis of contemporary Russian politics, dealing with the overreaching meta-narrative of Pan-Slavism in the context of the Russian state and its foreign policy. Laruelle (Reference Laruelle and Higher2013) continues in the same manner, focusing on meta-narratives associated with Pan-Slavism in Russian politics and society. The research on Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis Pan-Slavic ideas and notions can also be attributed to Grigorova (Reference Grigorova and Vuković2019), who discussed the ideological narrative behind the Russian foreign policy in the Balkans in the 1990s. Further, Kolossov, and O’Loughlin (Reference Kolossov and O’Loughlin2002) also treated the foreign policy perspective by focusing on the role of Pan-Slavic ideas in the foreign policy of Russia during the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s.

In addition, Temper (Reference Temper2009) discusses the Pan-Slavic rhetoric of the Belarussian authoritarian regime, arguing that it should be read as a political gimmick legitimizing President Lukashenko’s rule rather than a genuine belief in the solidarity among the Slavs. Troebst in his research highlights a very interesting point, problematizing the possibility of “Euroslavism” in the context of EU enlargement (Troebst Reference Troebst2009), claiming that when Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic (all in 2004), Bulgaria (2007), and Croatia (2013) acquired EU membership, the European Union was on the way to becoming a natural political habitat for most of the Slavic nations and hence a practical solution for Slavic unity. Additionally, Troebst goes on to underline the latent feature of Slavic reciprocity today, which is to say the relationship between Russia and other Slavic countries. He points out an inescapable imbalance between Russia and the rest of the Slavic world that is not conducive to the development of a Pan-Slavic sense of belonging to a single Slavic-only community (Troebst Reference Troebst2009, 19).

To continue, Troebst, in cooperation with Agnieszka Gąsior and Lars Karl, produced an edited volume entitled “Post-Panslavismus” (Gąsior, Karl, and Troebst Reference Gąsior, Karl and Troebst2014), incorporating chapters on identity, ideology, myths, and perceptions of “Slavicness” at different times and in different cultures. This volume has traded its coherence and focus for a richness and diversity of topics and approaches. It is, nevertheless, the most monumental contribution to our understanding of the “micro elements of ‘Slavic reciprocity’” (Troebst Reference Troebst, Gąsior, Karl and Troebst2014b, 21) in the 21^st century. Konstantin Nikiforov, the head of the Slavic Studies Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences, contributed a chapter to the volume. In his chapter, he argues that it would be a stretch to speak about a full-fledged resurgence of Pan-Slavism today, though it is far from forgotten either in Russia or in other Slavic countries. It resurfaces from time to time in the form of integrationist projects in the post-Soviet space, such as the ideas of Eurasianism and of a larger Russian nation/state. Nikiforov expresses apprehension that, within the EU, the Slavs are losing their identity, coming to recollect their “Slavicness” only in the times of hardship (Nikiforov Reference Nikiforov, Gąsior, Karl and Troebst2014, 130, 134–135).

The last study of this group is produced by DeDominicis (Reference DeDominicis2017). It deals with the period after the Cold War, analyzes the contemporary international political setting, and applies the framework of Pan-Slavic ideas to tackle soft power and hybrid warfare agenda in the Slavic world. The author claims that the manifestations of Pan-Slavism can today be used as an indicator of the Communist-era control systems of the 1950s and 1960s and their decaying legacy networks (DeDominicis Reference DeDominicis2017).

Taking Stock of Pan-Slavism, or Towards Broadening the Field

As the literature review indicates, the current research on Pan-Slavism is severely limited, offering relatively few analyzes and covering an arguably small number of topics. What remains most problematic in this respect is that the academic contributions do not seem to be in communication with each other (Đorđević et al. Reference Đorđević, Čejka, Mocek and Hrabálek2021), and as mentioned previously herein. We are, nevertheless, fully aware of the fact that works discussing Pan-Slavism scholarly literature and Pan-Slavism culture do not necessarily need to be communicating with those works discussing other perspectives within the same topic. This is the prime reason for this article and our call to authors to update the research in the field, and to provide more information on different aspects and issues within the field. This would result in the field of Pan-Slavism becoming more interconnected, with studies from different areas able to be associated, compared, and integrated in a more comprehensive manner. Therefore, with the aim of updating the field and with respect to our current research on Pan-Slavism addressing the politics and social aspects of the Slavic countries, we suggest that research should be done to make the field wider, more coherent, and more interconnected (Đorđević et al. Reference Đorđević, Čejka, Mocek and Hrabálek2021).

First, it is necessary to start addressing in more detail the foreign policy of Russia and other Slavic states, as the foreign policy field has in recent years witnessed the use and abuse of Pan-Slavic agenda and ideas. Besides only treating Russia that used these ideological grounds in its foreign policy even in the communist past when it was a part of the Soviet Union, it would also be valuable to explore if other Slavic states attempted and still attempt to use their “soft power” as well. For instance, the Serbian foreign policy of the 1990s has often been described as that of a European pariah state espousing anti-Western values (Pridham Reference Pridham2001), though there has been relatively little research on how much of that foreign policy was indeed influenced by the Pan-Slavic ideas as largely channeled by Moscow at that time. Milošević’s regime was severely anti-Western, even up to the point of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) trying to join a union of Russia and Belarus. This sort of political project may have indeed been far-fetched (and largely influenced by pragmatism), but they nevertheless exemplify how supposed Slavic “otherness” may be used for political purposes.

Furthermore, it is important to explore whether the Pan-Slavic agenda has had any impact on the domestic politics of the Slavic states, as we suspect they indeed have. For instance, Montenegrin and Serbian domestic politics alike host political entities that advocate and champion notions that are based on Pan-Slavic narratives. Montenegro is, in this regard, probably the most interesting case, as the country is split along identity lines that are heavily reflected in both domestic politics and culture, where independent Montenegrin identity has been disputed for years (Džankić Reference Džankić2013). Moreover, internal issues that Ukraine has been facing for quite some time also indicate how Pan-Slavic discourses can be used as a powerful tool in information wars towards gaining advantage over one’s adversary. Pro-Russian propaganda in eastern parts of Ukraine that are not under Kyiv’s control exemplifies such a case, being based on a portrayal of Ukrainians as (Western) fascists and forwarding an image of the need to defend the supposed Slavicness (in political, cultural, and other terms) of eastern Russia (Foreign Policy 2019; RFE/RL 2021).

It also seems logical to pay attention to various anti-Western, and at the same time deeply uncivic, illiberal, and undemocratic political and cultural concepts that have in the past decade often been aimed at the EU while bearing a Pan-Slavic ideational mark. Many of these have been quite significant, at times heavily intruding into the domestic politics of the Slavic states, not only those that are part of the EU but those that are waiting and hoping and negotiating to join the Union someday. Several anti-Western and anti-EU ideas may still be witnessed in, for instance, Central Europe, some of which are based on Pan-Slavic notions. Take an example from the Czech Republic: as has been noted, the country’s president, alongside a few other notable politicians, publicly praised “Slavic otherness” on more than several occasions, speaking of this otherness in political and cultural terms when compared to the non-Slavic West (Šlechta Reference Šlechta2016). This sort of pronouncement at public appearances is often tied to anti-EU rhetoric, questioning the need for the existence of the European Union, and allowing Russian foreign policy propaganda to gain more influence. Much of what is said at these public appearances is then replicated online, complemented by disinformation often found in conspiracy theories and shared in cyberspace by various social media groups, many of which share pro-Russian, anti-Western attitudes (iRozhlas 2020).

In addition, Christian Orthodoxy, and particularly its Messianism, are also points to be addressed in academic literature, chiefly with respect to the foreign policy agenda of states that often see and present themselves as (unofficial) leaders of the Slavic world, most notably Russia (Curanović Reference Curanović2021). As recently noted by Lewis (Reference Lewis2020), Putin’s rule has not only been characterized by a specific ideological turn and inclination to an increasingly authoritarian rule in domestic politics, but also by a specific return to what politicians like to tag as “traditional values,” many of which in the Russian case are rooted in the civilizational (read Slavic) otherness of the Russian (and hence Slavic) world standing firmly opposed to Western values and institutions. This Russian notion of Moscow ideationally leading the Slavic world is certainly a point to be focused on, particularly in the current period when Russian relations with the West have come to a low point, pitting the two against each other and reopening the West-East divide that was supposed to have been resolved decades ago. It is in this divide that the political narratives based on Pan-Slavism have become influential (Suslov Reference Suslov2012). Similar notions of the supposed defense of Slavicness, coupled with ideas of being at the “gates” defending the Slavic (predominantly Orthodox) world against all sorts of “invaders” existed in the politics (and partly also foreign policy) of Milošević’s Serbia. A few Serbian medieval myths of being the guardians of Orthodoxy at the time blended with the nationalist political agenda and became a perfect excuse for the supposed Serbian need to defend its national and cultural (read Slavic) identity in the Yugoslav wars (The Independent 1994; on Serbian Orthodoxy see, for instance, Flere and Rudi Reference Flere and Klanjšek2008). Therefore, taking stock of the Orthodox milieux in the Slavic states today and trying to delve into their influence in political and cultural terms remains a future task.

In drawing to a close, it should be stated that to better understand the contemporary situation in the Slavic societies one also needs to investigate gradual changes in the Slavic cultural identity vis-à-vis Pan-Slavism. There has been very limited research on this subject. Our initial insights have led us to believe that the number of cultural associations and groups throughout the Slavic world has increased in recent years. Some of these are even calling for a return to pagan Slavic roots. Most, however, remain apolitical, arguing for supposed Slavic unity in cultural terms, rather than any other (Golovneva Reference Golovneva2018; Laruelle Reference Laruelle2008); and, though there have been several studies in this respect, more research focusing on the contemporary Slavic culture would certainly be welcomed.