Rethinking bureaucratic reform: The need for an organizational perspective on the Occupation

Narratives of bureaucratic continuity typically focus either on the micro level of personnel or the macro level of the state administration’s overall political power—with the former often used to help explain the latter in part (for example, Halliday Reference Halliday1975: 174). With regard to the broader power configuration, scholarly consensus holds that the bureaucracy maintained, or even expanded, its authority from the prewar and wartime periods into the early postwar years. In one of the earliest comprehensive studies of Japan’s postwar bureaucracy, Tsuji (1969: 264–281) identified a “tendency to preserve and strengthen the bureaucracy” (kanryōsei no onzon to kyōka no keikō), rooted in the indirect rule of the Occupation, public trust in administrative neutrality, and the weakness of political parties. These factors, he argued, enabled the bureaucracy to maintain its leading position in postwar Japan. Johnson (Reference Johnson1975: 14) went so far as to claim that, at least between 1948 and 1955, Japan was effectively governed by its bureaucrats. Dower (Reference Dower1990: 62–65) similarly observed an increase in bureaucratic power under the Occupation, suggesting that the reforms reinforced existing wartime tendencies rather than reversing them. From this perspective, the Occupation appears as a brief interlude in the history of Japanese bureaucracy—one in which the administrative apparatus emerged largely unscathed or even strengthened.

A rare dissenting voice is Richard Finn (Reference Finn1992), who expressed reservations about the prevailing assumption of bureaucratic continuity. In Winners in Peace, he sharply challenges the dominant narrative and its accompanying critique that the Occupation implemented too few reforms. He emphasizes that such views neglect not only the extensive dismissals at various levels of the state apparatus but also the significant changes in the number and structure of ministries (Finn Reference Finn1992: 176–177). Although his remarks are brief, they point to an important blind spot in the continuity thesis: transformations at the organizational level.

The significance of such organizational transformations—lying between the micro level of personnel and the macro level of bureaucratic power—is often overlooked. As a result, the dissolution or reorganization of ministries and agencies, shifts in responsibilities, and structural reforms are frequently dismissed as lacking real consequence. Yet, the dissolution of the Home Ministry in 1947 tells a different story. While it is undisputed that many former officials were redeployed to successor institutions—such as the Ministry of Welfare and the newly established Ministry of Labor—thus ensuring continuity in areas such as labor policy (Garon Reference Garon1984), this alone does not justify the conclusion that nothing had changed or that “business as usual” prevailed. On the contrary, the elimination of a ministry previously considered so powerful and prestigious that it was labeled the “government within the government” (kanchō no naka no kanchō) marked a fundamental shift in the power structure of the postwar administration. The Home Ministry had long functioned as a central coordinating agency within the bureaucratic system (Kurosawa Reference Kurosawa2013: 8–12). In inter-ministerial conflicts, it often acted as mediator because of its institutional supremacy—a role Mikuriya Takashi described as the “peace of the Home Ministry” (Naimushō ni yoru heiwa) (Mikuriya Reference Mikuriya1996: 124–125). While this central role had already weakened in the 1930s, and plans for reorganization or dissolution had been discussed during the war years (Yoneyama Reference Kenkyūkai2025: 211–214; Kurosawa Reference Kurosawa2013: 165–215), its actual dissolution only occurred under the influence of the Occupation. It was preceded by intense negotiations both within the Japanese government and between Japanese and American officials, which underscore that this was by no means a trivial or technical reform (Momose Reference Momose2001; Hirano Reference Hirano1990). Indeed, its dissolution held considerable political significance, especially for other ministries. Japanese officials from competing agencies actively supported this reform so as to expand their own influence over regional administration (Kurosawa Reference Kurosawa2013: 239–241). This political-power dimension clearly demonstrates that the dissolution of the Home Ministry was not just a symbolic gesture but a meaningful reconfiguration of administrative structures.

Although the Home Ministry’s complete dissolution is often treated in the literature as an exceptional case, in fact, no ministry remained untouched by occupational restructuring, personnel shifts, or changes in programmatic focus. A more comprehensive analysis of these reforms is essential to assess their long-term implications. The existing portrayal of a largely unchanged administrative apparatus is thus overly simplistic and fails to withstand even a cursory examination of individual ministries.

The lack of attention to changes at the organizational level stems from the tendency of post-1950s research to focus primarily on explaining how the state administration—regarded as a pillar of the “Iron Triangle” (bureaucracy, Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], and business corporations)—came to hold such a dominant position in postwar Japanese politics, even if it is debatable whether this dominance is truly exceptional in international comparison.Footnote ¹ From this perspective, it seemed natural to attribute the enduring power of the bureaucracy to structural continuities with Japan’s authoritarian wartime and prewar regimes and to explain it through the perceived failure of the Occupation to implement meaningful reform. This approach has produced a research bias that favors continuity over change. As a result, studies have tended to focus on the relationships between the bureaucracy and other political or economic actors while largely overlooking internal dynamics and interorganizational developments within the administrative apparatus. As Pempel’s remark suggests, attention was directed toward the “bigger picture” rather than the institutional nuances.

However, the problem with this “bigger picture” is that it is vague and does not allow for an assessment of the Occupation period with regard to reforms of the administrative apparatus. Even if, as mentioned above, an increase in the power of the bureaucracy is noted during this period, the question remains as to which ministry or agency this actually applied. Who benefited from the abolition of the business conglomerates known as zaibatsu, the military, or the Home Ministry, and who did not? As early as 1975, Johnson had already emphasized the need for “ministry-by-ministry analyses” to answer such questions. Using the example of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI; Tsūshō sangyōshō, known as Shōkōshō before 1949), he showed that it was able to expand its control over industrial policy during the Occupation precisely because of the dissolution of the zaibatsu (Johnson Reference Johnson1975: 14–18). But what about other ministries?

To date, there is a lack of detailed organizational studies that comprehensively answer this question. While the last three decades have seen a wealth of scholarship on the Occupation period (e.g., French Reference French2018; Kramm Reference Kramm2017; McLelland Reference McLelland2012; Takemae Reference Takemae2003, Dower Reference Dower1999), the organizational histories of individual ministries have largely remained unexplored. In English-language research, Johnson (Reference Johnson1982) remains the sole exception, although he had already emphasized in an earlier essay that an understanding of Japanese politics would only be possible if studies on most ministries, public enterprises, and other authorities were available and had thus called for more organizational research (Johnson Reference Johnson1975: 2–3).

Such organizational studies are also necessary to clarify in detail who was responsible for the reform projects and how the Japanese government and the Occupation authorities interacted in this process. Did the Japanese hold the scepter in their hands, or did the Americans have the final say? Recent scholarship on the Occupation has highlighted Japanese agency in various fields of reform, such as business (Ericson Reference Ericson and French2018), national security (French Reference French2014), and education policy (Krämer Reference Krämer2005). In the case of bureaucratic reforms, however, the picture is less clear. For instance, in the case of the dissolution of the Home Ministry the Americans exerted strong pressure (Hirano Reference Hirano1990: 58–85). By contrast, the organizational autonomy and continued existence of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry were threatened less by the Americans than by power struggles with other bureaucratic actors, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimushō). In these bureaucratic struggles, the American authorities were “not so much ‘supreme’ as a major player on a national chessboard, sometimes the queen but more often merely a pawn” (Johnson Reference Johnson1982: 177). How this played out in other ministries and how the differences can be explained remain important questions that merit closer attention.

To assess the significance of the Occupation years for the development of bureaucracy in Japan, further detailed studies of individual organizations are needed to answer the following questions: What was changed or retained, by whom, for what reasons, and with what consequences? This article attempts to answer these questions for the MOC. This is a particularly interesting case, as it was the only ministry to be re-established owing to Japanese initiative during the Occupation after it was dissolved in 1943 as part of a government reform and reduced to the status of a Cabinet agency with a significantly smaller area of responsibility. The decision to do so was preceded by months of discussion within the General Headquarters (GHQ) and between it and the Japanese government. The case of the MOC also became a precedent in which the Americans decided the extent to which they wanted to interfere with the organization of the Japanese government and administrative apparatus. The decision not to do so had far-reaching consequences that went beyond the case of the MOC and have thus far received little attention in research.Footnote ² A more detailed analysis of the discussions at the time is also very revealing with regard to the relationship between the GHQ and the Japanese government and also shows how divided opinion was on the subject of organizational reform at the GHQ in the early phase of the Occupation and what major role proactive Japanese involvement played.

However, the MOC only existed for a short period of time. Under pressure from the Americans, the Ministry was split into a Ministry of Posts (Yūseishō) and a Ministry of Telecommunications (Denkitsūshinshō) in 1949, with the latter being transformed into the public company Nippon Denshin Denwa (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone [NTT]) in 1952. Johnson (Reference Johnson, Johnson, Tyson and Zysman1989: 187) and Anchordoguy (Reference Anchordoguy2001: 515) claimed that the MOC’s reputation as a “cockpit” or “hotbed” for ultranationalism played a role in its dissolution. Yet, it is questionable whether the Americans held such an image of the Ministry as a whole. The sources give no indication of this, and the question arises as to why they agreed to the re-establishment in the first place. As will be shown below, specific ideas of efficiently organized communications administration and the separation of politics and administration among the Americans played the most important role in the decision to dissolve the Ministry.

A brief look at the reforms of the communications administration shows that it was subject to considerable changes during the short Occupation period, which continued to have an impact. The reasons for these changes and the process leading up to them are therefore crucial to understanding the postwar development of the administrative system as a whole.

The following analysis is based primarily on the source material left behind by the occupying authorities, namely the GHQ and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Central documents from the Government Section of the GHQ, which was responsible for government reforms, are now available as an edited collection of sources and serve as the basis for this essay.Footnote ³ Other sources, such as newspaper articles, organizational histories, and memoirs, were also used.

To provide a clearer context for the subsequent reforms, let us begin with a brief overview of the history of the MOC during the prewar and wartime periods before analyzing the developments of the Occupation period in chronological order.

The MOC before 1945

The MOC was founded on December 22, 1885, with the introduction of a modern Cabinet system in Japan. At the time, its areas of responsibility were telegraphy, postal services, marine merchants, and lighthouses. However, over the next 40 years, many other areas of responsibility were gradually added to the Ministry, such as telephony, water transport, electricity, life insurance, postal pensions, civil aviation, and radio. Even the railway administration fell under the remit of the Ministry from 1892 to 1908.Footnote ⁴ Contrary to the name, the Ministry developed into a gigantic infrastructure ministry responsible for large parts of the transport, energy, and social infrastructure, in addition to the communications infrastructure. The size of the Ministry, which employed between 200,000 and 350,000 people in the 1930s and 1940s (Yūseishō 1971a: 84–85), was one reason why its officials often spoke of the “Great MOC” (Dai-Teishinshō) from around the mid-1930s. This expression also highlights the Ministry’s social significance and, above all, its political influence. It reflects a newfound self-confidence among its officials, rooted in the conviction that they now stood on an equal footing with traditionally prestigious ministries such as the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Finance (Ōkurashō). The Ministry’s continued organizational and technical expansion on the Asian mainland, together with increases in staff and budget and political achievements such as the enforcement of the Electric Power Control Law (1938), were seen as evidence of its growing importance in a resource-intensive war against China, during which the infrastructure under its jurisdiction played a decisive role in the success or failure of the Japanese state. In retrospect, Shindō Seiichi, a civil servant employed in the Ministry’s leadership at the time, saw this as the “golden age” (ōgon jidai) of the MOC (Shindō Reference Shindō1960: 92–93).

This supposedly golden age ended in October 1943, however, when the Ministry was dissolved as part of a large-scale “administrative reform for the decisive battle” (kessen gyōsei kikō kaikaku) (Kagawa Reference Kagawa and Kataoka1994: 339–445). The reform aimed to eliminate pronounced sectionalism between government agencies by reorganizing and reducing the number of ministries, thus making administrative actions during the war more efficient. To this end, supervision of the transport and communications infrastructure essential to war efforts was centralized in one ministry. The Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC; Un’yu Tsūshinshō) was therefore founded, incorporating not only the areas of responsibility of the Ministry of Railways but also certain transport-related functions from other agencies, as well as those of the MOC. Within the domains previously administered by the MOC, the exceptions were electricity and aircraft production, both of which were transferred to the newly established Ministry of Munitions (Gunjushō) (Un’yushō 1980: 75–76). As the MTC was too large and the administration of the communications operations proved to be too cumbersome, the Japanese government separated the communications operations completely from the MTC on May 18, 1945, for the purpose of simplified and more efficient operational management and placed them directly under the Cabinet. The MTC was thus renamed the Ministry of Transport (Un’yushō) and the communications operations were organized into a Board of Communications (BOC; Teishin’in) (Un’yushō 1980: 77). This step initiated the separation of communications and transport into distinct administrative domains, thereby dissolving an institutional connection that had defined the MOC since its establishment. The once “Great MOC” thus became a smaller agency for communications infrastructure in the narrow sense of the word.

The re-establishment of the MOC (1946)

After Japan’s defeat in the war and the arrival of American troops, the fate of the Japanese government and administrative organizations was initially unclear. Nevertheless, it quickly became apparent that an indirect form of Occupation would be chosen, in which the Japanese government would actively participate in the development and implementation of the reform program under the leadership of the Occupation authorities. Yet, it was still unclear what form this would take and which powers would remain with the individual administrative organizations. The Japanese government did not wait for American instructions but took action itself. For example, on December 21, 1945, the Japanese government passed a resolution to reorganize the administrative apparatus, which also affected the BOC. It was to be re-granted the status of a ministry (Asahi Shinbun 1945: 1). According to the Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun, there was also a proposal to return the shipping and electricity administration to the Ministry to resurrect the old MOC. This plan, however, proved difficult to realize owing to “various circumstances” (shohan no jōsei), and the paper reported that the MOC’s responsibilities would be confined to communications operations only (Asahi Shinbun 1945: 1). The article does not specify which individuals or organizations were behind the proposal to elevate the BOC’s status. It was, however, most likely advanced by BOC officials, who had the most to gain from reclaiming the “Great MOC.” This became clear in a subsequent dispute with the GHQ.

At the GHQ, the decision to elevate the BOC status to a ministry caused irritation. Alfred R. Hussey, Jr. (1902–1964), who was employed as an Occupation officer in the Government Section (GS) of the GHQ responsible for government reforms, said that he first learned of the plan to restructure government organizations from an article in the Nippon Times on December 24 and informed his superiors of this in a letter dated January 2, 1946. In the letter, he expressed his displeasure that the Japanese government had initiated reforms without prior consultation with the GHQ. He pointed out that he had already informed the Japanese-run Central Liaison Office (CLO), which acted as a liaison office between the Japanese government and the GHQ, that prior consultation with the GHQ would be “desirable” in the event of government reforms. It would also be advisable not to make recently adopted changes until they have been discussed with the GHQ (GHQ: 27). On Hussey’s initiative, a memorandum was also drawn up on January 9 calling on the Japanese government to refrain from making unauthorized changes to the government and administrative apparatus without prior permission from the GHQ and to inform the GHQ of all planned reforms through detailed reports. Hussey justified this step by stating that it was impossible to restructure the Japanese government in accordance with Occupation guidelines if the Japanese government retained the authority to reorganize its administrative structure at its own discretion and without prior consultation (GHQ: 30–31).

Although this dampened the plan to elevate the BOC’s status to that of the MOC, it was not abandoned. After the project had come to a brief standstill due to the constitutional reform and the decree on the dismissal of civil servants (Amakawa Reference Amakawa2014: 263), the deputy head of the CLO Shirasu Jirō (1902–1985) wrote to the GS at the behest of the Cabinet on March 19, 1946, and presented the arguments for the status increase (GHQ: 33). He first pointed out that the BOC had originally been an independent ministry and had only been forced to merge with the Ministry of Railways as a result of the militaristic policies of the war years and expressly against the will of the employees, before the current BOC was created as a Cabinet authority in May 1945. According to this argument, reestablishing the MOC would continue a long-established tradition from the prewar period. Shirasu argued that the BOC employed 400,000 people and was responsible for some of the country’s most important state-run enterprises. In his view, it was therefore just as important as the Ministry of Railways, and its significance for national reconstruction could not be overstated. He also emphasized that the restoration and expansion of the communications infrastructure were urgently needed to meet future demand in the new democratic era. From this perspective, he maintained, it was difficult to justify the absence of Cabinet representation for the communications administration. On these grounds, he insisted, granting the BOC ministerial status was both necessary in the national interest and urgently desired by employees (GHQ: 33).

The arguments and terminology clearly show how much Shirasu endeavored to anticipate reservations at the GHQ and to align the reform project with the general guiding principles of the Occupation policy. He portrayed the MOC as a victim of militaristic policy, indirectly rejecting any responsibility for the war on the part of this authority. The explicit mention of the “democratic era” signaled acceptance of the new political system and a determination to place the communications operations at its service. Establishing a connection between communications services and reconstruction, while emphasizing the will of employees, was also aligned with the objectives of the Occupation program. The latter aimed to highlight that it was not high-ranking bureaucrats motivated by a desire for power who sought to elevate their authority but rather ordinary employees whose empowerment was a declared concern of the Occupation policy.

However, it is doubtful whether these employees genuinely wished to attain ministry status. Individual interest in this issue was likely limited owing to the severe hardships of the immediate postwar turmoil, and no demands in this direction could be found from the union either, which was still in the phase of reconstruction and reorganization at the time (Teishinshō Rōmukyoku Rōmuka 1949: 133–136). Nonetheless, it is clear that the initiative originated from the Japanese government—or more precisely, from the BOC itself—as gaining ministerial status would enhance its prestige and strengthen its position in the inter-agency competition for budgets and responsibilities. This is evident from a memorandum enclosed by Shirasu in his correspondence to the GS, which outlines the rationale for the proposed status upgrade from the BOC’s perspective (GHQ: 35–37). The memorandum elaborated on the justifications for the change and presented several additional arguments. Among them were concerns about the lack of Cabinet representation—where key national decisions were made—and the inability to exercise independent control over expenditures and personnel. Given the vital role of communications infrastructure in the reconstruction of a “new peaceful Japan” (GHQ: 35), the BOC deemed this situation inadequate.

The memorandum further emphasized that communications services were in no way inferior in scope or importance to the railways, which had always been overseen by a dedicated ministry. From this perspective, the re-establishment of the MOC was portrayed as both logical and necessary. The memorandum also argued that, as a Cabinet-level agency, the BOC required direct supervision by the prime minister—a task considered virtually impossible given the agency’s size and range of responsibilities. Additionally, the memorandum pointed to recent labor unrest, noting that communications workers had begun organizing to demand improved working conditions. Only a fully-fledged ministry, it claimed, would be capable of addressing these challenges effectively and ensuring the uninterrupted operation of communications services. Such a step, it concluded, would not only raise morale among workers but also improve the overall quality of communications infrastructure (GHQ: 36).

Following the submission to the GHQ, deliberations dragged on for a while but gained momentum between May 29 and June 13. On May 29, a conversation first took place between Hussey and J. D. Whittemore, who was employed as Deputy Chief in the Civil Communications Section (CCS) (GHQ: 39). The CCS was responsible for the demilitarization and modernization of the entire communications infrastructure, from post and radio to telecommunications, and was therefore the agency that was in close contact with communications officials (Takemae Reference Takemae2003: 194). Hussey argued to Whittemore that there was a view in the GS that the areas of communication and transport should be depoliticized and that it would therefore make sense to establish public authorities in these areas. The establishment of an MOC would run counter to the goal of depoliticization. He further stated that the timing for such an organizational change was poor and that it would not be advisable to authorize a major governmental reorganization by Cabinet ordinance or Imperial rescript while the Diet was in session. Whittemore, in contrast, favored granting the BOC Cabinet representation to ensure fair treatment in budget allocations. However, he also agreed with the GS’s view that the communications sector should be kept out of politics. For the time being, a compromise to have the interests of the BOC represented in the Cabinet by a minister without portfolio was reached (GHQ: 39). Such a minister would have no control over the internal affairs of the BOC and would not be involved in its day-to-day administration. The concept of a minister without portfolio (mu-ninsho daijin) was by no means unfamiliar in Japan. It had been discussed and occasionally applied in the 1930s and 1940s as a means to counter inter-ministerial sectionalism (cf. Sekiguchi Reference Sekiguchi2016: 40–48, 101–104, 266–270). The idea was that such a minister should represent a specific policy area independently of organizational interests and solely from the perspective of national welfare. This was intended to prevent political turf battles between ministries.

The idea of separating politics and administration is deeply rooted in the American tradition of governmental thinking and had a significant influence on the handling of administrative reforms during the Occupation in general (Pempel Reference Pempel, Ward and Sakamoto1987). In the case of communications administration, the question was whether a ministry was necessary for efficient implementation or whether an authority without Cabinet representation might suffice. In the Japanese government, where administrative organizations were part of the political power center, this view was met with criticism. Shortly after the conversation between Hussey and Whittemore, a round-table discussion on the establishment of an MOC was held on June 1, 1946. On the American side, Hussey and Whittemore were joined by George A. Nelson, Jr., of the GS, while the Japanese delegation included Shirasu, acting BOC president Shintani Torasaburō (1902–1984), and his secretary. Shirasu pointed out that the Japanese communications infrastructure could not be rebuilt without an improvement in the plight of employees in terms of food and wages as well as better equipment. Improvements in this situation could only be ensured by an independent ministry with Cabinet representation. The Americans, however, insisted on keeping the communications business apolitical and placing it in the hands of public companies. Until a parliamentary decision was made to establish such a body, a minister without portfolio represented the legitimate concern for the immediate improvement of the BOC and its employees in the Cabinet. It was explicitly stated that the minister should not have any further responsibility. The BOC was to be headed by a president and a vice president, instead of having only a vice president serving concurrently as acting president (GHQ: 40–41).

The Japanese participants at the round table criticized this proposal and pointed out that the problems in the communications sector must be solved politically and not administratively, and that no one other than a minister could be considered for this task. However, a minister without portfolio would be too weak. They were also skeptical about the idea of a public company: Such a body would only work in a “utopia,” under perfect conditions. Furthermore, they argued that “semi-autonomous bodies are typical of the militarists”—an argument that was already described as “specious” in the summary of the discussion (GHQ: 40–41).

Among the arguments from the Japanese side, the BOC’s growing workers’ union movement made the most impression on the Americans. In a private conversation with Nelson, Whittemore raised concerns about this issue. According to Whittemore, this could jeopardize the project of depoliticizing the communications services and put everyone involved under great pressure to act:

Whittemore thus drew attention to the urgency of improving working and living conditions and, ultimately, the question of reorganizing the BOC. He also pointed out that Shintani had already announced to the union that he would assert himself against the Occupiers regarding the establishment of a ministry. Therefore, according to Whittemore, there was a fear that Shintani might resign if this plan failed, although this was never to be accepted by the Americans (GHQ: 41).

In an internal letter to the head of the GS dated June 12, Nelson expressed the opinion that the decision about whether to establish the MOC should be made by the Japanese Diet as long as this did not jeopardize the plans for the comprehensive restructuring of the Japanese government and administrative apparatus and, in particular, the plan to establish public companies. He thus contradicted the view of his colleague Hussey, who saw decision-making power in this matter as lying with the GHQ and not with the Diet or even the Japanese government. According to Nelson, there was a telephone conversation between the Deputy Chief of the GS, Charles Louis Kades (1906–1996), and Whittemore on June 8. Subsequently, the CCS emphasized to the GS in a further letter that the BOC needed Cabinet representation and that this decision was now in the hands of the GS (GHQ: 42).

As the above remarks show, the dispute within GHQ over the re-establishment of the MOC sparked a fundamental debate about how much freedom should be granted to the Japanese government and the Diet in matters of governmental and administrative organization. There was no consensus in the GS on this matter. After Hussey and Nelson presented their opinions, political scientist John M. Maki and government analyst and secretary Ruth A. Ellerman joined the debate as members of the GS (GHQ: 43). In a memorandum addressed to the section head on June 13, they argued in favor of not giving in to the Japanese government. A fundamental change such as the creation of an additional ministry could only be agreed upon after thorough consideration and research on both the American and Japanese sides. Until a final decision was reached, the proposal by Hussey and Whittemore to appoint a minister without portfolio to represent the BOC in the Cabinet was to be followed (GHQ: 43).

Maki and Ellerman also pointed out that the Japanese government had not yet presented any convincing arguments in favor of its claims that an increase in ministry status would benefit employees of the communications infrastructure or increase the efficiency of operational processes. They also recalled that the Japanese government’s warning—that failure of the status elevation project could trigger a strike—was soon shown to be unfounded after the Labor Division of the GHQ investigated the matter. In their opinion, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Shidehara was merely attempting a “political maneuver” (GHQ: 43).

In conclusion, the two authors called for further discussion on whether government authorities should be transformed into public bodies and warned against making hasty decisions. However, they were positive about the transformation of the BOC into a public company and at the same time cautioned against accommodating the power interests of bureaucrats:

Maki was extremely skeptical about the Japanese bureaucracy and its compatibility with the democratic political system, as he clarified in an essay from 1947. He recognized the role of the bureaucracy as a pillar of the prewar and wartime militaristic system and sharply criticized its continuity in terms of personnel and structure.Footnote ⁵ As he stated in the first sentence of his essay, it even had the potential to jeopardize the project of pacification and democratization of Japan:

This background explains why, even in this situation, he showed mistrust of the Japanese government’s initiatives and great sensitivity to possible attempts by officials to extend their power.

This skepticism was fundamentally shared by Milton J. Esman (1918–2015), who, like Maki, was involved in the reform of the Japanese administrative apparatus as a political scientist in the GS and later pursued a university career. Esman saw the Japanese bureaucracy as incapable of adapting to a modern, democratically organized society. For this reason, he considered it essential for the GHQ to put pressure on the Japanese government to reform (Takemae Reference Takemae2003: 159, 305). However, in the BOC’s case, he disagreed with Maki’s opinion. In a memorandum dated June 13, 1946, addressed to the head of the GS, which he had prepared at Nelson’s request, he argued in favor of accepting the Japanese proposal to establish the MOC, as there were no convincing counterarguments. Whether public enterprises, such as communications, should be organized as “public authorities” could only be decided after further research. He also ensured that the decision in favor of the Japanese government’s proposal would not be treated as a binding precedent for future cases. He described the proposed “compromise” (placed here in inverted commas by Esman himself) of leaving the BOC as it was and appointing a minister without portfolio as a “meaningless and futile evasion” that should not be associated with the GS. Ministers without portfolios are not expected to be fully committed to the BOC’s interests. According to Esman, however, the communications services deserved “a full fledged Minister, not an amorphous liaison officer” (GHQ: 44).

In Esman’s opinion, the Japanese government should not be forced to leave this decision to the Diet, as it had the full right under the current constitution to make such a change within its own authority. The Diet would also be preoccupied with more important matters, and such a diversion would result in a delay of weeks. For this reason, Esman recommended accepting the Japanese government’s proposal and approving the elevation to ministry status (GHQ: 44–45).

The head of the GS, Courtney A. Whitney (1897–1969), agreed with this view and, after consultation with Douglas MacArthur, decided on June 13 to grant the Japanese government’s request for an elevation to ministry status. Whitney did not go into the specific circumstances of the BOC in his justification but argued in principle. MacArthur’s decision to implement reforms in cooperation with the Japanese government rather than on his own presupposed that the Japanese population regarded its government as an authority endowed with strength and deserving of respect. Unnecessary or excessive interference in the interests of the Japanese government would violate its “dignity” and do more harm than good to the continued Occupation. According to Whitney, as long as no negative effects on the Occupation were expected, the application to elevate the status of the BOC to a ministry should be approved. Whitney had previously assured himself in a conversation with MacArthur that this was in line with the Occupation policy (GHQ: 46).

As a result of this decision, the Japanese government passed a new organizational charter (Teishinshō kansei) on July 1, 1946, which transformed the BOC into the MOC (Yūseishō 1963: 171–172). In the draft explanation prepared for the Privy Council (Sūmitsuin), the prime minister outlined the reasons for this reform. He emphasized the political, economic, and cultural importance of various communications services, such as post services, telecommunications, postal savings and exchange, insurance, and pensions, which would form the backbone of the development of the state and society and now required rapid reconstruction in view of the enormous war damage. A large budget of over one billion yen had already been made available for this purpose. In addition, he emphasized that it was urgent to improve the situation of workers who were suffering and were now unionized in the fight to improve their working conditions. A ministry was needed for these tasks, as only a minister would be able to bring “communications policy” (teishin seisaku) into the Cabinet and thus promote it to the tableau of “general state policy” (ippan kokusaku) (Yūseishō 1963: 172). With the re-establishment of the MOC, Japanese officials did not succeed in building on the era of the “Great MOC,” but at least they managed to reverse the decline in status and power that they had suffered with the separation of the communications services from the former MTC in May 1945.

One problem, however, was the search for the new Communications Minister. Ōwada Teiji (1888–1987) was originally intended for the job. Ōwada had been a civil servant in the MOC between 1917 and 1940 and had served as head of the Electricity Department and finally administrative vice minister (1939–1940) during the war. He was one of the masterminds behind the Electric Power Control Law that was a major milestone in establishing a war economy in Japan and became president of the gas company Nippon Soda (Nihon Sōda) in 1941.

According to Ōwada’s autobiography, the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet Narahashi Wataru (1902–1973) had already offered him the position of minister at the beginning of March 1946. However, an article published shortly afterward in the Nippon Times complicated the plan, as the anonymous author accused Ōwada of allying himself with the militarists, turning Nippon Soda into an armaments company and preparing the invasion war in East Asia with the Electric Power Control Law. According to Ōwada, these were all unfounded and slanderous allegations, but they led to an investigation at GHQ, which Ōwada survived with the support of Narahashi (Ōwada Reference Ōwada1952: 108–109). More problematic, however, was the fact that the Mainichi Shinbun learned of the plan to appoint Ōwada as Minister of Communications only a short time later and made this public in an article. According to Ōwada, the basic rule at the GHQ was that personnel matters still under negotiation should remain strictly confidential until the official announcement and should not be made public. It was, therefore, agreed among newspaper publishers to consider this when reporting, but this did not happen in the case of the article in question. According to Ōwada, the journalist in question was therefore expelled from the press club at the prime minister’s residence. However, this made it impossible for him to be appointed minister (Ōwada Reference Ōwada1952: 109–110). The ministerial office was subsequently taken over by the lawyer and party politician Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi (1875–1973).

Ōwada’s case raises the question of personnel continuity between the old MOC and its significantly downsized successors. A detailed statistical study of the MOC’s staff in this regard does not yet exist; however, some conclusions can be drawn from studies on forced dismissals. Masuda (Reference Masuda1998: 85–86) analyzed the purges of civil servants and broke down the number of dismissals in the Cabinet, Diet, ministerial bureaucracy, and other authorities. In 1946 and early 1947, only 13 people were analyzed for the MOC, and none of them were dismissed, which is the lowest dismissal rate compared with other ministries. Although it is still necessary to determine how many people left voluntarily, retired, or were dismissed for other reasons, these figures are at least an indicator of high staff continuity in the MOC. The low number of people suspected in the first place also indicates that the MOC was not necessarily perceived as a haven for militarism and ultranationalism at that time.

In terms of the organizational structure, an increase in status did not initially result in any changes. Similar to the BOC, the MOC consisted of the Ministerial Secretariat (Daijin Kanbō) and the seven departments of General Affairs (Sōmukyoku), Post (Yūmukyoku), Telecommunications (Denmukyoku), Engineering (Kōmukyoku), Broadcasting (Denpakyoku), Savings and Insurance (Chokin Hokenkyoku), and Materials (Shizaikyoku) and a special department for construction and repairs (Eizenbu) (Yūseishō 1963: 172). In the course of the following 3 years, however, various reorganizations were carried out, including the establishment of a separate Labor Department (Rōmukyoku) for the needs of the communications workers and the administrative separation of the postal savings and insurance business into two departments (Yūseishō 1963: 173–174).

The division of the MOC into the Ministries of Post and Telecommunications and the establishment of NTT (1949–1952)

As early as the spring of 1946, the CCS, with the participation of experts from the United States, began to carry out fundamental investigations into the constitution and operation of telecommunications in Japan. This was because the differences in the development of telecommunications between the United States and Japan were evident and could not be attributed solely to the obvious differences between the private sector and state organizations. Suzuki Kyōichi (1898–1987), the administrative vice minister of the MOC from July 1946 to June 1949, later recalled that the Americans were surprised by the MOC’s wide range of responsibilities and particularly annoyed that telecommunications was placed on the same administrative level as seemingly unrelated sectors such as postal services, insurance, and postal savings. This structure was criticized as being too cumbersome and inefficient and was identified as a reason for the underdevelopment of telecommunications in Japan. Therefore, a joint committee of MOC officials and CCS members was established in February 1947 to work on structural reforms that would strengthen the telecommunications administration and make it more efficient. An analogous committee for the postal organization also existed but did not develop any comparable activity in the further course (Yūseishō 1963: 193).

The Joint Committee on Telecommunications (Denki Tsūshin Kikō Kyōdō Iinkai) then developed various proposals for structural reform aimed at strengthening telecommunications within the MOC rather than transferring it to a separate ministry (Yūseishō 1963: 194–197). The decisive initiative for the separation of posts and telecommunications came from MacArthur himself, who wrote to the Prime Minister in July 1948 calling for the reorganization of the MOC. He considered it sensible to separate the postal service from the other operations to increase operational efficiency and to divide the Ministry into two separate “agencies” (Yūseishō 1963: 197–198). The arrangement initially caused confusion in the MOC, as it was not clear whether the term “agencies” meant ministries or only extra-ministerial offices. After discussions with the CCS, the final decision was left to the Japanese government. The MOC then drew up a proposal that provided for its division into a Ministry of Postal Affairs (MPA, Yūseishō) and a Ministry of Telecommunications (MOT; Denkitsūshinshō), and after various consultations with the Americans and discussions about the specific organizational structures, it was passed in the Diet in December 1948 and came into force the following June. The MPA was responsible for postal operations, insurance, postal savings, and postal pensions, while the MOT oversaw telegraph and telephone operations, supervised broadcasting, and had a special external department for aviation safety (Yūseishō 1963: 198–206). These organizational transformations were part of a broader government reform program initiated by the American Occupation authorities, which aimed to reduce the size of government institutions by 30 percent in the interest of cost-efficiency. From the American perspective, a further benefit of this policy was the weakening of public-sector labor unions. The MOT, the MPA, and the railway administration—already among the most overstaffed institutions in 1948–1949—were particularly affected by these cuts.Footnote ⁶

It was important for MacArthur to expand the Japanese telecommunications business and return it to a profitable state, and he saw the previous organizational structure as an obstacle. However, a solution in the form of a ministry could only be a provisional measure at best. He initially favored a private monopoly company along the lines of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), while other Occupation officers influenced by the ideas of the “New Deal” in the United States suggested a public company along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority, which also found supporters on the Japanese side (Anchordoguy Reference Anchordoguy2001: 515). In April 1950, the Cabinet had already decided to convert the MOT into a public enterprise, but this was put aside by the Americans owing to the outbreak of the Korean War. Shortly before the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, discussions on this issue flared up again and ended with the dissolution of the MOT and the founding of the NTT, which was placed under the supervision of the Post Ministry (now renamed the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications [MPT] in English). A few months later, in March 1953, the Kokusai Denshin Denwa Kabushiki Gaisha (KDD) was established as a joint-stock company responsible for international telecommunications to improve international competitiveness (Yūseishō 1971b: 705–706).

Splitting the MOC had serious consequences for the political landscape. The MPT suffered a significant loss of authority and status compared with its predecessor. The 64th and 65th Prime Minister of Japan, Tanaka Kakuei (1918–1993), who served as the postal minister in 1957 and 1958, expressed this in the following words:

Tanaka entered working life in the 1930s—then still an architect and later, in the 1940s, an entrepreneur—precisely at the time when the MOC was at the zenith of its power, and its areas of responsibility were attracting particular public attention.Footnote ⁷ It is therefore not surprising that the old, “Great MOC” and its ministers appeared to him to be influential political players compared with the much smaller MPT. The MPT was essentially responsible for the administration of postal service and therefore had to contend with the reputation of being a “business” (gengyō) and not a “policy” (seisaku) ministry (Nakano Reference Nakano1998: 97–98). After the founding of NTT, telecommunications became formally subordinate to MPT. However, this was not accepted by NTT employees, who at the time of the MOT were able to act on an equal footing with the MPA. After the split-up of the MOC, almost all the technically trained staff went to the MOT and remained there after its transformation into the NTT. Many employees found it difficult to follow instructions from postal officials who lacked experience with and knowledge of telecommunications policy and had previously been on equal footing. This was particularly true in the case of the MPT’s administrative vice ministers, who were always recruited from among the MPT’s officials from the 1950s to the 1970s and therefore enjoyed little recognition among NTT employees. Ultimately, employees in the Telecommunications Department of the Ministry were recruited from the NTT, which meant that the MPT only had nominal competencies, but the NTT acted autonomously to a certain extent (Anchordoguy Reference Anchordoguy2001: 516–518). For the ambitious officials of the MPT, the core concern in the following decades was therefore to regain greater control over telecommunications and thus make a name for themselves as a “policy ministry,” which resulted in intense disputes over competences with MITI (cf. Nakano Reference Nakano1998; Johnson Reference Johnson, Johnson, Tyson and Zysman1989). Some officials of the MPT even dreamed of the “return of the Great MOC” (Dai-Teishinshō no fukkatsu) with regard to status (Johnson Reference Johnson, Johnson, Tyson and Zysman1989: 188). Even the renaming of the MPT to MOC was discussed in this context at the time (Asahi Shinbun 1959; Shindō Reference Shindō1960: 97–100). However, neither has become a reality.