The electoral defeat of Donald J. Trump may have raised hopes that the populist momentum in many Western liberal democracies is subsiding. William A. Galston's book, which was republished with a new preface just before the election, cautions us to not get our hopes up too quickly. By fruitfully combining theoretical insights and evidence from empirical and historical sources, Galston highlights liberal democracies’ contemporary weaknesses. He follows this up by offering a battle plan for those that seek to guide Western societies back onto a path of prosperity and to push back against the ongoing populist challenge.

As a starting point, Galston leans on the “crisis of democracy” theme. He provides empirical evidence to support the claim that democracies are in decline around the globe and further provides several compelling explanations for this development (chap. 1). Among them are economic effects such as highly imbalanced growth (15), social effects such as mass immigration (15) and the cultural divide between cities and rural areas (16), and political effects resulting from a persistent democratic gridlock in Western societies after the fall of the Berlin Wall (16). The result is an increasing demand for strong political leaders. Populists, Galston argues, have emerged to meet that demand (11). He continues by establishing four vital aspects of functioning liberal democracies (chap. 2): the republican principle (19), democracy (24), constitutionalism (26), and liberalism (27) as well as liberal democracies’ commitment to the market economy (30). This system is now challenged by populism. In line with the predominant conceptualization, Galston defines populism as a distinct set of claims that build on the apparent conflict between a homogeneous virtuous people and a corrupt elite (chap. 3). Since populists reject checks and balances as well as a pluralist understanding of democracy, populism and liberal democracies are fundamentally incompatible (39).

Galston proceeds by laying out a historical analysis of the rise of populist parties in Europe focusing on Hungary, Poland, and France (chap. 4). His inquiry leads to the conclusion that populist voters share a discontent with current economic developments, a desire to defend the Western culture against Islam, a general aversion to immigration, and deep skepticism toward EU bureaucrats. Given his analysis, Galston claims the cure to populism in Europe cannot be purely transnational but must instead include a decent (i.e., pluralist) understanding of nationalism (63). He then goes on to examine the origin of populist developments in the United States (chap. 5). Among these are recent transformations such as the economic divide between cities and rural areas and the stagnation in low skill labor's wages (68), which, combined with the emerging pressure from immigration and international trade, makes some citizens feel left behind (71). Galston further claims that political polarization is at an all-time high at a congressional level, rendering the government itself ineffective (72). Populist leaders can appeal to the electorate since they promise to break some rules to “set things right” (74). Although he concludes the part by observing that the American institutions lived up to the challenge Trump posed toward liberal democracy, Galston still insists that populism substantiates the claim that we cannot take liberal democracy for granted (82).

In the last part, Galston outlines a vast number of political actions that can be taken to mitigate the populist threat to democracy in the US. He provides a plethora of ideas for accelerating economic growth and distributing the resulting gains more fairly (chap. 6). Further, he argues in favor of targeting full employment (87), increasing wages via policy (89), raising a capital gains tax (89), and distributing broadband internet to rural areas (90). Also, aspects like boosting population growth via state-financed childcare (92) and copying the Canadian immigration model (96) are high on his list. In addition, he recommends various political reforms, ranging from adjusting the federal budget procedures to avoid government shutdowns (100) to the relocation of decision-making power to the local level (97). To make this possible, Galston hopes for a cultural shift in the American debate that allows the citizens to overcome deep polarization and then punish the officials most responsible for gridlock (101).

Yet, he also points out that this shift will require good democratic leadership (chap. 7). Strong democratic leaders, Galston claims, are not a paradox if their authority solely rests on a mandate by the people (109). He reflects on the actions of exceptional American leaders who managed to guide the nation through difficult times via skillful persuasion and a strong sense for when to act. Galston further points out that democratic leadership is apparently compatible with democratic principles but at odds with democratic citizens’ inherent aversion toward hierarchies. Going beyond this inherent friction point, which can also be found in populism's anti-elitist sentiment, he closes his book by discussing some further indelible yet manageable shortcomings of liberal democracy (chap. 8). Despite the flaws he lists, Galston points out that the biggest strength of liberal democracy is its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and requirements (136) and that this strength must be drawn on once more to meet the populist challenge.

Overall, Galston contemplates that liberal democracy's survival mainly hinges on its ability to produce substantial economic growth and to combine it with an adequate redistribution scheme. To implement the required policies, America apparently needs a shift in political culture that can be brought about by exceptional democratic leaders. In the way Galston lays out his plan, one cannot shake off the impression that he sees the salvation for twenty-first century liberal democracies in reproducing those economic characteristics that transpired in the “golden age of growth” from 1950 to 1970 (Reference PikettyPiketty 2013: 98). While it is worthwhile to draw policy inspiration from positive examples of the past, Galston should have addressed some of the additional complexities of our time to make his policy prescriptions truly instructive. Take only climate change and increased global dependencies as examples. He does not even entertain the option that ecological factors may limit the nature and amount of attainable economic growth today, although this possibility is stressed by various scholars (see, e.g., Reference NordhausNordhaus 2018). Would this mean that liberal democracy is doomed? It is further questionable whether Galston's policy suggestions even stand a chance in the US without fundamental institutional reform. How would incorruptible democratic leaders willing to implement Galston's policy suggestions even come to power in a state that is structurally more responsive to the interests of the rich than to those of the poor (see, e.g., Reference Schäfer and HannaSchäfer and Schwander 2019)? Galston's pessimistic view on the capacity of US institutions to reform themselves (96–101), and his lack of innovative institutional propositions, leave me with doubts whether the outlined battle plan to save liberal democracy has any realistic chance of succeeding.

Leaving these concerns aside, Anti-Pluralism clearly offers stimulating insights for anyone interested in the concept of democratic leadership and for those that seek a short, grounded introduction to the complex problem of populism in the West.