Introduction
Ethnic minorities and their perceptions of national identity is an important issue for scholars and policy-makers in a multiethnic environment. After 1991, the government of Kazakhstan claimed to have more than 130 different ethnic groups living on its territory. Ethnic Russians, the largest group, counted up to 38% of the overall population of Kazakhstan, while ethnic Kazakhs were in a minority (Peyrouse Reference Peyrouse2007). For the last 30 years, however, the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan has changed drastically. In 2023, the number of ethnic Kazakhs had grown up to 70.6%, while the percentage of ethnic Russians dropped to 15.1%. Ethnic Kazakhs now represent a majority in many cities and provinces throughout the country. Among other minorities, there are 3.2% of Uzbeks, 1.9% of Ukrainians, 1.5% Uyghurs, 1.1% of Germans and 1.1% of Tatars (gov.kz).
The scholarship of national identity issues in Central Asia and Kazakhstan has largely focused on the study of nation-building projects, including the status and usage of the Kazakh language, toponyms, nationalism, and civic-ethnic dichotomy (Sharipova Reference Sharipova2020; Burkhanov and Sharipova Reference Burkhanov and Dana2014; Isaacs Reference Isaacs2015; Fierman 2021). Some scholarly works centered on the perceptions of ethnic and civic nationalisms and interethnic relations (Hanks Reference Hanks2011; Commercio Reference Commercio2017; Sharipova et al. Reference Sharipova, Burkhanov and Alpeissova2017; Bond and Koch Reference Bond and Koch2010; Megoran Reference Megoran2007). Other researchers studied individual ethnic groups and their attitudes to their home country. Initially, the focus was largely on the ethnic Russians; later, the research attention gradually shifted to other ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan (Eschment and De Cordier Reference Eschment and De Cordier2021). However, not much research has been done on how ethnic minorities of Kazakhstan perceive their ethnic and national identities on the ground. This article focuses primarily on the following question: To what extent ethnic minorities identify themselves with Kazakhstani identity and/or their own ethnic identity? We argue that despite the government’s efforts to construct one united Kazakhstani nation and state rhetoric about the unity of the nation, this has not happened yet. The results of the survey show that the society remains fragmented along ethnic lines.
Our research draws on a nation-wide survey (N = 4,000) that included representatives from different ethnic groups and semi-structured interviews. It provides a bottom up approach of how ethnic minorities position themselves in Kazakhstan and how they relate to Kazakhstani nation or ethnicity. The uniqueness of the study is that it contains data on perceptions and attitudes of 12 ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan. This is one of the largest studies on nation-building conducted in Kazakhstan.
Literature review
There is a substantial body of literature on ethnic minorities and the nation-building process in Kazakhstan. Researchers examined the sense of belonging, perceptions and attitudes of ethnic groups toward their ethnic and national identities. Across publications on national identity issues in Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet Central Asian countries, many have explored the complex and multifaceted nation-building process in the region. These complexities include discussion of the “revengeful” nationalist policies (Oka Reference Oka2002; O Beachain and Kevlihan Reference O Beachain and Kevlihan2013), the complex relations between ethnic Kazakhs and other ethnicities, particularly Russians, in Kazakhstan (Peyrouse Reference Peyrouse2008; Faranda and Nolle Reference Faranda and Nolle2011; Omelicheva Reference Omelicheva2015) and the intra-Kazakh divisions, especially between rural and urban populations (Fierman Reference Fierman2000). Additionally, several studies have explored the role of other, perhaps less evident but arguably very important manifestations of identity issues, such as architecture and urban design (Fauve Reference Fauve2015), cinema and entertainment industry (Isaacs Reference Isaacs2018), media discourse (Burkhanov Reference Burkhanov2020), national anthems and banknotes (Insebayeva and Insebayeva Reference Insebayeva and Insebayeva2022), intra-elite participation and exclusion (Kudaibergenova Reference Kudaibergenova2017), religion (Yerekesheva Reference Yerekesheva2020) and language policy (Dave Reference Dave2007; Daminov Reference Daminov2020).
This discussion was moved forward with more studies focused specifically on ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan which may not fit neatly into the dominant perception of identity dichotomy in Kazakhstan (Terzyan Reference Terzyan2021; Werner et al. Reference Werner, Emmelhainz and Barcus2017). Much of the scholarship here sought to explain how those ethnic groups were able to adapt to the new reality and be part of the nation-building process in Kazakhstan. Among other scholarly works on Kazakhstan’s minorities published in the late 1990s-early 2010s, many scholars studied the formation of diasporas in Kazakhstan and provided an in-depth analysis of the patterns of the multi-ethnic construction of Kazakhstan. For instance, Akiner (Reference Akiner, Atabaki and Mehendale2005) studies formation of diasporas in Kazakhstan and provides a typology of diasporas based on the analysis of the patterns of nation-building of Kazakhstan. Similarly, Demmers examined deterritorialization and delocalization of conflict through the prism of diasporas and the long-distance nationalism (Demmers Reference Demmers, Atabaki and Mehendale2005). This research agenda was expanded by prominent Kazakhstani scholars who explored ethnic dimensions of Kazakhstan’s population dynamics and history (Masanov Reference Masanov1997). Kamalov (Reference Kamalov2012) primarily focused on studying the Uyghur community of Kazakhstan by exploring local histories of Kazakhstani Uyghurs in the post-Soviet period and identity discourses in the Uyghur community (Kamalov Reference Kamalov2012; Reference Kamalov2016; Reference Kamalov2021). Other scholars focused on other ethnic groups, including ethnic Koreans (Kim Reference Kim2003a; Oka Reference Oka and Uyama2007), Chechens (Eschment Reference Eschment2021; Pohl Reference Pohl2002), Uyghurs (Kamalov Reference Kamalov2021; Oka Reference Oka and Uyama2007), Germans (Kim Reference Kim2003b; Reference Kim2009; Reference Kim2012), Russians (Laruelle Reference Laruelle2018; Laruelle et al. Reference Laruelle, Royce and Beyssembayev2019; Peyrouse Reference Peyrouse2007; Kosmarskaya Reference Kosmarskaya2013), Dungans (Imyarova Reference Imyarova2022; 2021), Tatars (Davenel Reference Davenel and Fernandez2009; Davenel and Yim Reference Davenel, Yim, Isaacs and Polese2016), among others.
At the same time, some studies used a top-down approach toward the nation-building process, examining how state policies and state rhetoric and discourse influence ethnic minorities (Schatz Reference Schatz2000a; Burkhanov and Sharipova Reference Burkhanov and Dana2014; Rees and Burkhanov Reference Rees and Burkhanov2018). Burkhanov and Sharipova (Reference Burkhanov and Dana2014) showed that state messages can be ambiguous and serve different audiences. Yet, other works were also devoted to the interethnic relations and conflicts in post-independence in Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Aitymbetov et al. Reference Aitymbetov, Toktarov and Ormakhanova2015; Tutumlu and Imyarova Reference Tutumlu and Imyarova2021; Terzyan Reference Terzyan2021). All in all this variety of studies of ethnic minorities targeted to explain the nation-building project in Kazakhstan.
The research works published in the 1990s-early 2000s mostly featured relations between two major ethnic groups of Kazakhstan – Kazakhs and Russians. It has been argued that the relations between the two groups defined nation-building in Kazakhstan (Zardykhan Reference Zardykhan2010). One of the salient issues was the status of the Russian and Kazakh languages. According to the law, the Russian language received the status of the “official language”, while the Kazakh language has the “official status”. Sebastian Peyrouse (Reference Peyrouse2007) argues that the status and influence of ethnic Russians in the country has decreased due to several factors, including Russians’ immigration to Russia, the non-homogenous nature of ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan, and the difficulty of the Russians leaders to choose between the defense of political rights and cultural rights.
Other ethnic minorities also have become the focal point of various scholars who examined the sense of belonging and relations of ethnic minorities to their homeland countries. Oka (Reference Oka and Uyama2007) studied ethnic Uyghurs, Koreans, and Russians. She argued that the Uyghurs developed a strong sense of attachment to Kazakhstan because they have lived for a long time on this territory. Similarly, ethnic Koreans, despite growing ties between Kazakhstan and South Korea, do not feel close to their co-ethnics in South Korea but have more in common with citizens of Kazakhstan rather than with South Koreans. Lack of fluency in the Korean language contributes to the weak sense of belonging to their historic homeland. Oka characterized Koreans as an “ideal minority” due to their loyalty to Kazakhstan and the lack of irredentist or separatist ideas in the beginning of the 1990s (Oka Reference Oka and Uyama2007). In a similar fashion, German Kim argues that ethnic Koreans face the problem of intra-ethnic solidarity and interethnic integration in the new political and socioeconomic life and experience duality between ethnic revival and ethnic survival for members of an ethnic group dispersed in the population (Kim Reference Kim2003b). Ablet Kamalov (Reference Kamalov2021) investigated ethnic-national identity of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan, which has been transformed from “Sovietness” to “Kazakhstanness”. The scholar has argued that the post-independence development produced both threats and opportunities for the Uyghurs’ ethnic identity. He concludes that Kazakhstani Uyghurs consider Kazakhstan as their homeland (Kamalov Reference Kamalov2021). Beate Eschment (Reference Eschment2021) also discussed the issue of relations of Chechens to their homeland of Chechnya. The author has claimed that Chechens give preference to Kazakhstan as their second homeland due to the possibility of preserving some form of ethnic identity. The research on Tatars showed that they regard Kazakhstan as their ‘fatherland’ because they have lived on this territory for a long time and have some attachments to the land and friendly relations with other nationals (Davenel Reference Davenel and Fernandez2009). All these authors discuss how ethnic minorities experience the crisis of identity and how they were able to adapt and rethink their identities in Kazakhstan, despite some connections with their home countries.
Scholars also examined interethnic clashes and discrimination of minority rights in Central Asia. One of the biggest interethnic conflicts took place in Osh, Kyrgyzstan in 2010; scholars explored political, economic and social factors, including the legacy of the Soviet ethno-political system that led to the outbreak of violence (Terzyan Reference Terzyan2021; Hanks Reference Hanks2011; Commercio Reference Commercio2017; Bond and Koch Reference Bond and Koch2010; Megoran 2007). Some scholars also focused on conflicts that took place in Kazakhstan, including the most recent violent incident that occurred between ethnic Dungans and Kazakhs in February 2020 (Dave 2005; Tutumlu and Imyarova Reference Imyarova2023; Terzyan Reference Terzyan2021).
Despite all these diverse and insightful works, not much research has been done on how ethnic minorities perceive and navigate their identities vis-a-vis the state policies and state rhetoric about national unity.
First, we are going to evaluate to what extent respondents identify themselves with the Kazakhstani nation or their ethnicity, their sense of belonging and unity with other members of the society, which is one of the important goals of the nation-building process. We expect to see that ethnic minorities can have overlapping civic and ethnic identities, as discussed in earlier works (Sadvokassova et al. Reference Sadvokassova, Burkhanov and Sharipova2024; Sharipova Reference Sharipova2020; Burkhanov Reference Burkhanov2017; Rees and Williams Reference Rees and Williams2017). This is due to the trajectory of Kazakhstan’s nation-building approach, in which primordialist ethnicities are recorded and to a degree institutionalized, is complemented with the state-backed attempts to create a civic “Kazakhstani nation”. These two dimensions of nationalist sentiments in the context of Kazakhstan would be important as the scholarly discourse, empirical evidence and our survey data discussed below suggest that ethnic attachments are strong in the country due to the ethnocultural dimension of the nation-building process in Kazakhstan. As discussed in the scholarship (Rees and Williams Reference Rees and Williams2017, Sadvokassova et al. Reference Sadvokassova, Burkhanov and Sharipova2024), Kazakhstan’s official nation-building discourse declared commitment to respecting ethnic diversity and cultures of various ethnic groups living in the country. For instance, both of Kazakhstan’s post-independence constitutions (1993 and 1995) emphasized commitment of the state to develop the national traditions and languages of ethnic groups living in the country. In line with the APK mission, each of the officially recognized ethnic minority groups has its own “national-cultural center,” funded and supported by the state via the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. As such, it is reasonable to expect that ethnic groups of Kazakhstan would embrace both identities, belonging to their ethnic group as well as a civic Kazakhstani identity.
On the one hand, one could expect that ethnic minorities of Kazakhstan would support the government’s civic identity-promoting efforts more than ethnic Kazakhs because they would view civic identity as a way to protect their own ethnic identity against assimilation into Kazakh ethnicity. Indeed, the Kazakhization process started in the 1990s was rather negatively perceived by ethnic minorities. The loss of the Russian language status, change of toponyms, revision of history, and making Kazakhs as a titular or core nation with the state for the core nation, was taken with uneasiness among the Russian-speaking population. Since independence, Kazakhstan has demonstrated a steady path of empowerment of ethnic Kazakhs and Kazakh language (Smagulova Reference Smagulova2008; Schatz Reference Schatz2000b; Imyarova Reference Imyarova2025; Diener Reference Diener and Laruelle2016; Kudaibergenova Reference Kudaibergenova and Laruelle2016; Tutumlu and Imyarova Reference Tutumlu and Imyarova2021; Malakhov and Osipov Reference Malakhov and Alexander Osipov2023). Nationalization resulted in emigration of the Russian speaking population (Brubaker Reference Brubaker2011). In addition, ethnic minorities were concerned with access to education in other languages (Terzyan Reference Terzyan2021). As such, some minorities had concerns in regard to the Kazakhization process in Kazakhstan and were perhaps uncertain and threatened by those processes. This could imply some resistance to the Kazakhization process and inclination to support civic identity.
In addition, we would expect that ethnic minorities may be reluctant to fully embrace the state narrative about interethnic peace and harmony. After more than thirty years of independence and governmental efforts to construct a nation, one could expect that ethnic minorities would develop a stronger sense of unity and solidarity; however, this is not the case yet. As research shows, society is not unified and cohesive yet as one would expect. During the independence period, there were a few interethnic clashes, including tensions between Kazakhs and Chechens in 2006 and 2007, Uighurs and Kazakhs in 2006 and Kurds and Kazakhs (2007), as well as recent events in Qorday in 2020 (Imyarova Reference Imyarova2023, Tussupova Reference Tussupova2010). These tensions demonstrate that not everything is so peaceful and harmonious and there are some points of tensions and concerns. Often these conflicts reflect the inequality, poverty and injustice that are channeled along the ethnic lines. Finally, we would expect to see that ethnic minorities would rather positively evaluate and accept the knowledge and use of the state language. We can assume that after 30 years of independence many minorities have accepted the importance of the Kazakh language as an integrative and nation-building resource. The knowledge of the state language might increase access to various opportunities and reduce barriers in communication. It can demonstrate ethnic minorities’ desire to belong to the Kazakhstani nation.
Methodology
In this study, a nation-wide survey (N = 4,000) and semi-structured interviews were used. The survey was conducted in 2023 by the sociological research center called “Public Opinion Research Institute”,Footnote 1 which has more than 22 years of experience conducting sociological research and collecting data in Kazakhstan and beyond. This research center has an extensive regional network of supervisors and interviewers. Training of interviewers had been done before the survey was launched in the regions. The survey was implemented in all 17 administrative regions of Kazakhstan and 3 major cities – Almaty, Astana, and Shymkent. The survey was based on quota sampling of 12 major ethnic groups of Kazakhstan. The respondents were 18 years old and older. The sampling size was made in accordance with the official data of the Bureau of National Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan based on the population in each region, gender and age for 2023. The sample includes 1,400 ethnic Kazakhs (70 from each region) and Russians – 1,000 people (50 people from each region). All other respondents – Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Uyghurs, Germans, Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Koreans, Tajiks, Dungans, and Chechens – included 160 people from each ethnic group in accordance with the territorial settlements of each ethnic group. There were 46.4% of males and 53.6% of females in the sample. In terms of age, the distribution was the following: 19-29 y.o – 24.1%; 30-45 y.o. – 38,8%, 46- 60 y.o. – 23.9%, and 61 and older – 13.3%. Rural residents comprise 36.7%, while urban residents include 63.3%. The survey sample included 23.5% of respondents with secondary education, 44.5% with vocational education, 32.8% with higher education, and 1.3% having no education. The use of surveys provides us with knowledge of ethnic minorities’ perceptions and attitudes about their identities. Asking the same questions across different ethnic groups allows us to make a comparative analysis across the groups.
It is a known fact that conducting research in a politically restrictive environment is not an easy task. However, it does not preclude scholars from gathering data and doing research. One of the ways to recruit the participants and observe ethical standards is to have an oral (not written) informed consent from the participants and ensure their voluntary participation. This also ensures that participants understand what kind of research is implemented. As evidence suggests, written informed consents and other formal procedures such as recording interviews are not received positively by participants in Central Asia because they create risks and anxiety for subjects (Heathershaw and Mullojonov Reference Heathershaw, Mullojonov, De Guevara and Bøås2020; Kurmanov Reference Kurmanov2024; Collins et al. Reference Collins, Sharplin and Burkhanov2024). Another important way to ensure that respondents will provide truthful answers is to provide anonymity and confidentiality to the respondents so that they would feel comfortable to answer the questions. All these conditions were observed when the survey was conducted. In addition, to ensure the answers from the respondents and decrease bias, cross-check questions were included.
In this study, a country-wide survey (N = 4,000) and semi-structured interviews were used. The survey was conducted in 17 regions of Kazakhstan and 3 major cities – Almaty, Astana and Shymkent. The survey was based on quota sampling of 12 major ethnic groups of Kazakhstan; the respondents included 18 years old and older. The sampling size was made in accordance with the official data of the Bureau of National Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan based on the population in each region, gender, and age for 2023. The sample includes 1,400 ethnic Kazakhs (70 from each region) and 1,000 ethnic Russians (50 people from each region). All other respondents – Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Uighurs, Germans, Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Koreans, Tajiks, Dungans, Chechens – included 160 people from each ethnic group in accordance with the territorial settlements of each ethnic group. There are 46.4% of males and 53.6% of females in the sample. In addition, there were 250 semi-structured interviews in all regions of Kazakhstan among 12 ethnic minority groups. Snowball method was used to sample interviewees.
This survey asked Kazakhstan’s citizens to assess their views on the nation’s nation-building policies, language use, and what might serve as a unifying factor in Kazakhstan’s development. While recognizing that some respondents may have provided socially or politically favorable responses, the goal is to uncover trends in how people perceive issues like identity, interethnic relations, and belonging. The data indicate that, although ethnic identities continue to play a significant role in the country, many Kazakhstani citizens actively engage with the country’s civic and inclusive nation-building vision.
Nation-building and Ethnic Minority Policies in Kazakhstan
The government applies a top-down approach to nation-building in Kazakhstan. One of the important measures to support interethnic stability and ethnic minorities was the creation of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (APK) in 1995 by the country’s first President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The Assembly is a consultative body in charge of promoting harmonious interethnic relations. After the amendments to the Constitution in 2007 and 2022, the role of the Assembly has increased as it proposes five candidates to the President for appointment to the Senate, the upper chamber of the Parliament. In addition, the Assembly coordinates and oversees ethno-cultural centers, which are non-commercial organizations that have common goals and objectives with the Assembly. According to the Law on the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, its task is to support the development of traditions, languages, and culture of various ethnic groups. These ethno-cultural centers are involved in the implementation of “the state policy to ensure social harmony and national unity, contribute to the strengthening of Kazakhstan’s identity on the basis of the principle of citizenship, patriotism, spiritual and cultural community of the ethnic groups of Kazakhstan with the consolidating role of the Kazakh people.”Footnote 2 The Assembly, however, is criticized for being limited in powers and playing no important role in the resolution of tensions (Burkhanov Reference Burkhanov2017).
The government has adopted a number of documents to regulate the status and relations among ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan. One of the important documents is the Doctrine of National Unity.Footnote 3 The Doctrine, proposed in 2009, contains the main guidelines of Kazakhstan’s policy toward minorities (Aitymbetov et al. Reference Aitymbetov, Toktarov and Ormakhanova2015, 8–9). For instance, Section 4 of the Doctrine sets the goals in different subfields of ethnic policies such as institutional, cultural, educational, legal, information, and inter-confessional policy measures (Doktrina Natsionalnogo Edinstva Kazakhstana [National Unity Doctrine of Kazakhstan] n.d.). The Doctrine states that ethnic peace has become the achievement and symbol of Kazakhstan. One of the approaches endorsed in the Doctrine is “unity in diversity” that emphasizes the existence of many ethnic groups. The document also supports the idea of the national spirit, which is based on traditions, values and culture and language. The document stresses the importance of equal opportunities for every citizen regardless of ethnic or religious background to develop ethnic culture, traditions and language. Although the Doctrine gives a key priority to the expansion of the usage of the Kazakh language, the state provides opportunities for learning and supporting languages of ethnic minorities.
The language policy is an important part of the nation-building processes in Kazakhstan. It influences all spheres of life, including interethnic relations and attitudes of various ethnic groups to the titular nation. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 1993 Constitution of Kazakhstan promoted the status of the Kazakh language as a state language, while Russian became “the language of interethnic communication”. The 1995 Constitution, instead, allowed the usage of Russian on equal grounds with Kazakh in state bodies and organizations. The status of the Kazakh language as a state language was reconfirmed by the Language Law adopted in 1997. It states that the knowledge of Kazakh is a duty of every citizen of Kazakhstan. The status of Russian as a language of interethnic communication, however, was eliminated but it continued to be used on an equal basis with the state language (Burkhanov Reference Burkhanov2017). Obviously, the usage of Kazakh language has expanded significantly since the collapse of the USSR. The paperwork in civil service is done in Kazakh language. The Language Law also stipulated that Kazakh language broadcasts should constitute at least 50 percent of the total amount of TV and radio broadcast content. In reality, however, this system encountered resistance from private broadcasting companies.
In general, the nation-building policies have deliberately been framed rather ambiguously (Burkhanov and Sharipova Reference Burkhanov and Dana2014). The government officials were often sending different messages to both Kazakh and Russian-speaking audiences. Under these conditions, it is crucial to understand how ethnic minorities perceive and navigate their own identities. So, what are people’s perceptions and responses to state policies on the ground?
Nation-building and Ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan
Navigating different identities
Many observers argued that the current model of nation-building of Kazakhstan is emulating the Soviet model with the creation of homo sovieticus or Soviet people along with preservation of separate ethnic identities (O’Beachain and Kevlihan 2013; Kudaibergenova Reference Kudaibergenova and Laruelle2016; 2019; Burkhanov and Sharipova Reference Burkhanov and Dana2014). Today, the government seeks to build a civic Kazakhstani identity along with the preservation of ethnic identities. A number of scholars exploring the civic-ethnic dichotomy have found that these identities could be very situational and context-dependent (O’Beachain and Kevlihan 2013; Rees and Burkhanov Reference Rees and Burkhanov2018; Burkhanov Reference Burkhanov2017; Sharipova et al. Reference Sharipova, Burkhanov and Alpeissova2017; Eschment and De Cordier Reference Eschment and De Cordier2021). It was found that although people support civic Kazakhstani identity, they do not abandon their ethnic backgrounds. It might also reflect contradictory or ambiguous state nation-building policies. We can assume that the number of people who would support civic identity would be higher among ethnic minorities than among ethnic Kazakhs. One possible explanation would be that ethnic minorities could be afraid that the processes of Kazakhization or “nationalizing state”, to use Brubaker’s term, can push ethnic minorities towards assimilation. This is particularly related to those ethnic minorities who are close to ethnic Kazakhs, i.e. Tatars, Uzbeks, Uyghurs, etc (Davenel and Yim Reference Davenel, Yim, Isaacs and Polese2016). In this case, they would support civic identity more than ethnic Kazakhs would do. Previously, some scholars showed that ethnic entrepreneurs of ethnic groups promote civic or citizen integration (Davenel and Yim Reference Davenel, Yim, Isaacs and Polese2016).
Alternatively, we can assume that ethnic minorities are against the creation of the “Kazakhstani nation” model because they are afraid of potential loss of their own ethnic identity. This model would imply that ethnic minorities must abandon their ethnic identities and stick to civic identity. Some scholars have, in fact, argued that the nation-building project in Kazakhstan became similar to Brezhnev’s model of the “Soviet people”, which allegedly dropped ethnic divisions and focused on modernization and achievement of common goals (Tutumlu and Imyarova Reference Tutumlu and Imyarova2021). This approach, however, seems to operate on the assumption that the Soviet leadership consistently tried to eliminate ethnic divisions under Brezhnev’s tenure. This assessment does not seem accurate, as 1) the ethno-federal structure of the USSR had continued to exist, and 2) it was Nikita Khrushchev more than L. Brezhnev, who started to incorporate references to the “Soviet people” in the Soviet political rhetoric. In fact, scholars of the Soviet period focused on the ethnogenesis of each nationality, thereby emphasizing and entrenching ethnic identities. Even the politico-administrative structure of the Soviet Union was operating on the “ethnic federalism” principle, in which various ethnicities were given some form of statehood, e.g. Union republic, an autonomous republic, autonomous oblast or district. In addition, even if we assume that the Brezhnev model included such an important element as promotion of intermarriages to consolidate and form the “Soviet people” (Edgar 2008), 1) the institute of mixed marriages has not been part of a state policy or ideology, and 2) this approach has failed particularly in Central Asia and Caucasus. In fact, scholars recorded the reverse trends in mixed marriages since the 1970s in the Central Asian region. In general, the majority of ethnic groups were endogamous in the Soviet Union (Edgar 2008). In post-independence Kazakhstan, the intermarriage as an instrument of creation of one Kazakhstani nation has not been endorsed. As such, it is important to find out what people on the ground, specifically representatives of different ethnic groups, experience in terms of their identities after thirty years of nation-building. Do they really adhere to their civic identity, or do they stick to their ethnic identities or is it a mixture of both?
The survey results showed that some ethnic minorities identify themselves more often with their ethnicity rather than civic identity. For instance, most Uzbeks (79%), Azerbaijanis (55.4%), Tajiks (55.6%), Chechens (71%), and Dungans (69%) identified with their own ethnic identity. However, ethnic Russians (59%), Germans (63%), Uyghurs (59%), Tatars (62%) and Koreans (53%) more often identify themselves with civic identity. Thus, there is a variation across ethnic groups and their identification with either ethnic or civic identity. The difference in perceptions of minorities can be explained by the asymmetric relationship of each ethnic group. Ethnic identity might be particularly salient for those who experience threats (real or perceived) to it (Jumageldinov Reference Jumageldinov2014). Smaller ethnic groups experience threats to their self-identification and thus may develop a sentiment that their ethnic identity needs to be defended. On the other hand, the lifestyle of ethnic groups also can affect the choice of ethnic identities. Some ethnicities such as Dungans or Chechens tend to live in more isolated and rural communities and thus may represent more closed ethnic groups compared to more geographically dispersed ethnic Russians or Koreans.
Respondents were also asked how often they feel belonging to people of their ethnic group. Belonging means that “individuals identify with a certain type of community and, conversely, that communities see and construct themselves as containers for individual belonging” (Christiansen and Hededoft Reference Christiansen and Hedetoft2004, 2-3). Sense of belonging can be explored from different perspectives, including sources of belonging, feelings of belonging and ascriptions and constructions of belonging. In this study, we focus on people’s feelings of belonging. The survey results revealed that more Chechens (77.5%) than any other ethnic group answered that they often feel ethnic belonging, followed by Tatars (70.6%), Uyghurs (67.5%), Ukrainians (60.6%), Uzbeks – 56%, Tajiks – 55%, Germans – 54%, Azerbaijani 52%, Russians 50%, and 45% Dungans, while the lowest number of those who often feel the sense of belonging to their ethnicity is among ethnic Koreans – 29%. This variation in perceptions of ethnicity and sense of belonging shows differences in terms of within-group solidarity. Ethnic Chechens tend to have a stronger sense of belonging due to a certain degree of self-isolation and limited contacts with the rest of society. They are the least assimilated and acculturated ethnicity in Kazakhstan (Eschment Reference Eschment2021). In this sense, we can argue that ethnic Chechens support their ethnic boundaries through the distinctions that they make between others and themselves. This can be explained by the Chechen kinship-based community structures, where interethnic marriages are not supported. These strong intra-ethnic ties and self-isolation might be a result of historical memory of deportation and threats to the Chechens’ identity posed by two wars in Chechnya.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, ethnic Koreans may have the least experience of belonging to their ethnicity. As was mentioned, there is poor intra-group solidarity, lack of knowledge of Korean language and dispersion of ethnic Koreans across the country (Kim Reference Kim2003a; Davenel and Yim Reference Davenel, Yim, Isaacs and Polese2016). Ethnic Koreans also have intermarriages with other ethnic groups. As Barth (Reference Barth1965) argued, social practices are important to support ethnic identity and ethnic boundaries. These factors impede the formation of a strong sense of ethnic belonging among ethnic Koreans. Overall, all other ethnic groups fall in between these two extremes. More than 70% of respondents across all ethnic groups answered that it is important to preserve and follow their ethnic traditions. For many people, traditions embody their ethnic culture and provide people with a sense of continuity across generations. Thus, ethnic identity continues playing an important role in self-identification of people; however, different groups experience different levels of ethnic belonging. It shows that ethnic identity is not fixed or given and might depend on the context, social practices, and intra-solidarity.
In terms of pride of ethnicity, the majority of ethnic groups answered that they are proud of their ethnicity – 85% of Chechens, 82% of Tatars, 79, 4% of Tajiks, 77,5% of Germans, 71, 6% of Kazakhs and 71,3% of Uzbeks. There was some percentage of respondents who said that they sometimes are proud of their ethnic belonging and sometimes are not. For instance, 17% of Russians, 23% of Uzbek, 11% of Ukrainians, 11,3% of Tatars, 27% of Azerbaijani, 19% of Koreans, 16% of Tajiks, 22% of Dungans, and 8% of Chechens experience mixed feelings. There were also some respondents who said that ethnicity does not mean anything to them. The highest percentage was among ethnic Dungans – 14,4% followed by Germans – 13,8%, then Koreans – 13, 1%, Russians – 12,6%, and Ukrainians – 9,4%. We can assume that these people were brought up in mixed families where ethnic background was not emphasized. The variation in answers shows that ethnic Chechens and Tatars are those who are the proudest of their ethnicity, while more ethnic Dungans mentioned that ethnic identity means nothing to them. This variation in being proud of their own identity can be the result of different factors – family upbringing, intragroup ties, socialization, as well as some common historical traumas of deportation as in the case with Chechens and Crimea Tatars.
Notably, many respondents answered that they do associate themselves with Kazakhstani identity. According to the survey results, 79% of Chechens, 79.4% of Azerbaijani, 77% of Uyghurs, 75% of Tatars, 76% of Ukrainians, 73% of Germans, 72,4% of Russians have a sense of belonging to Kazakhstan. The lowest percentage is among ethnic Koreans – 52%. Thus, we can argue that ethnic minorities also embraced and support the idea of civic identity. The distribution of answers changed, however, when the respondent had to answer the question “Who do you often feel?” People had to choose between three options – Kazakh, Kazakhstani, or their own ethnicity. It became evident that many ethnic groups prefer their own ethnicity rather than the Kazakhstani identity. For instance, only 23% of Chechens and 20% of Uzbeks answered that they often feel themselves as Kazakhstani; however, 71% of Chechens and 79.4% of Uzbeks chose their own ethnicity. A similar situation was with ethnic Dungans (69% vs 24%), Tajiks and Azerbaijanis.
Some ethnic groups, however, indicated that they feel themselves more often as Kazakhstani people rather than representatives of their own ethnic groups, including ethnic Tatars (62%) and Germans (63%). Previously, it was found that Russians and Kazakhs are less differentiated from each other than they are distinguished from the other ethnic groups. In other words, there was more commonality between Russians and Kazakhs in responses than between Kazakhs and other ethnic groups, i.e. Kyrgyz or Uzbeks in 2008. It showed that ethnic boundaries are independent of objectively defined commonalities (Faranda and Nolle Reference Faranda and Nolle2011).
What can we infer from these answers? First, there is variation across different ethnic groups in their preferences to identify either ethnic vs. civic identities. Second, since people can have multiple identities, they can choose what might be convenient and comfortable for them at a particular moment. In other words, identities can be context dependent and situational and ethnic minorities can have different preferences (Barth Reference Barth1965). Minorities in Kazakhstan may have multiple layers of identity, including civic and ethnic belonging, though the salience of each identity layer can vary from one individual to another, or one ethnic group to another, oftentimes depending on context. From the data that we collected we show that people share Kazakhstani identity, but they also keep their ethnic identifications.
The quantitative data are supported by qualitative results. One of the interviewees, an ethnic Tatar, mentioned:
[I identify myself with] Kazakhstani, not Kazakh identity. Because I am a Tatar. I am more of a cosmopolitan. I feel that I am a citizen of the world who does not have any boundaries or passports. (Tatar, Karagandy, 57 y.0., August 15, 2023)
An ethnic Dungan said that they associate themselves with the civic identity:
Kazakhstani…Maybe because we do not have such a Kazakh-Kazakh. We have different nationalities. And I think we are all Kazakhstani. Yes, we should know our state language because it must be native to us. Regardless of our nationalities, we must know it because it is our motherland. In principle, I think we are Kazakhstani. (Dunghan, Zhambyl region, August 30, 2023)
Similarly, an ethnic Russian said:
I feel myself Kazakhstani…for instance Kazakh is a nationality, right [?]. How a Russian person can be Kazakh that’s why I am rather Kazakhstani but not Kazakh. (Russian, 37 y.o.Petropavlovsk, August 5, 2023)
The government of Kazakhstan promoted the idea of Kazakhs as a titular nation around which all other ethnic groups should be united. The idea has been supported by the majority of ethnic groups (70% and higher) who believe that Kazakhs can become the core nation and unite all other ethnic groups. This shows that ethnic identity is very strong in the population. Many people do not want to abandon their ethnic identity. This reflects the state policies of nation-building when the government promotes Kazakhstani identity and supports ethnic groups through ethno-cultural centers and the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.
Although people have different attitudes toward civic or their ethnic identity, the majority of ethnic minorities are proud to be citizens of Kazakhstan. For instance, 86% of Russians, 95% of Uzbeks, 88% of Ukrainians and 93% of Uyghurs, 93% of Germans, 97% of Tatars, 93% of Azerbaijani, 80% of Koreans and 90% of Tajiks, 88,8% of Dungan’s, and 90% of Chechens are proud to be citizens of Kazakhstan.
Definitely [I am proud to be a citizen of Kazakhstan]. Because our country has started developing. For a long time, it was dependent; we always were under someone’s rule. After the breakup of the Soviet Union finally we gained our independence. Now, our country is developing in economy, international and internal politics. We began to produce our own goods, we have oil, gas…This is the reason to be proud to be a citizen of Kazakhstan. And in the first place, it’s about people. (Dungan, 22 y.o, Zhambyl region, August 30, 2023)
Another respondent said:
Of course, I am proud. I think that Kazakhstan is a big state and Kazakh people, and Kazakh culture is an ancient culture. I think that it is an old civilization. I visited different places…I understood that our country is developed and it is powerful (Shymkent, 65 y.o.Russian, August 17, 2023)
There were also some people who answered that they are not so proud of Kazakhstan due to the low level of development of the country.
Yes, I am a citizen of Kazakhstan. I was born and lived here. Of course, I am proud to some extent that we have a developed country, flourishing…We have natural resources. However, all this is not channeled into the right direction…for some reason we are not so developed. I am proud but not to the fullest degree, I would say that way (Petropavlovsk, 37, Russian, August 5, 2023).
One of the latest trends in nation-building in Kazakhstan is the idea to be called Kazakhs rather than Kazakhstani. This alternative has been supported by ethnic Kazakhs and some representatives of ethnic minorities. For instance, 71% of ethnic Russians answered that they are part of the Kazakhstani nation, while 17.3% said that they are part of the Kazakh nation. Similarly, 13% of Ukrainians, 8% Tatars, 6% of Germans, 12% of Dungans, 19% of Koreans and 9% of Tajiks answered that they are part of the Kazakh nation.
One of the interviewees, an ethnic Azerbaijani, noted:
“Most likely, I identify myself as a Kazakh, to be honest. Kazakhstani [identity] has no connection/relation…understand? I was born here; I gained all the benefits of this Kazakh land, this mentality. I visited many places but your own land is your own land. Talgar is the motherland where I was born, grew up, where I inhaled the air of the land, let’s say that way.” (Azerbaijani, Almaty region, 50 y.o., August 17, 2023).
Although a high number of ethnic Russians indicated, they do not mind if citizens of Kazakhstan are called as Kazakhs (rather than Kazakhstani), in qualitative data it was evident that some ethnic Russians and other representatives from other ethnic groups do not support this idea. One of the interviewees said:
I have a negative attitude toward this. I believe that at birth every man has his own nationality that he gets from his parents. Even if we live in another country, initially we are born Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs and we should keep this nationality throughout our life. Kazakh is a nationality and an ethnic Russian cannot be called as Kazakh (Russian, Petropavlovsk, 37, August 5, 2023)
An ethnic Dungan mentioned:
I have a negative attitude toward this. I think it is disrespectful to other ethnicities. Even in America there are nationalities. For instance, he is an American of one’s origin. I would like to be either Kazakhstani or like in America… (Dungan, 22, Zhambyl region)
It is difficult to see the trend and say what ethnic groups are more inclined to support the idea of being called Kazakhs. The majority of ethnic respondents support their own ethnicity, language, culture and traditions. The cultural intelligentsia of these ethnic groups also promotes the idea to maintain and develop ethnic traditions. Thus, the majority feel more affiliated with their own ethnicity and prefer civic identity rather than to be called Kazakhs.
However, among other ethnic groups, more Koreans support the idea that citizens of Kazakhstan should be called Kazakhs. This is in line with previous answers to our questions about ethnic Koreans who have weak ethnic identity and choose either Kazakhstani or Kazakh identity. There is a relatively high rate of interethnic marriages between ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Koreans. Interethnic marriages as a policy emerged in the 1930s and then were promoted by the Communist party to create a unified Soviet people. Mixed marriages were considered as proof of the success of Soviet nationality policy and consolidated Soviet identity (Edgar Reference Edgar2007). Despite the efforts of the Soviet leadership to create sovetskii narod, more than 90 percent of Soviet nationalities remained endogamous. As Edgar states, “[i]t was marginal people – those living outside their home republics, and small minorities within larger republics – who were most likely to intermarry” (2007). In the post-independence period, the idea of intermarriage was neither peddled nor suppressed. Currently, the intermarriage rate among Koreans is over 40 percent (Kim Reference Kim2003). One of the interviewees, an ethnic Korean, said:
There are interethnic marriages. I have a normal attitude. It is not my business. For instance, I cannot tell my uncle why he married an ethnic Russian. It is strange. For me ethnicity is not important in marriage. However, I like men with a European look more than Asian ones. It is important that he should not be radically religious. In general, I do not care. (Korean, Almaty region, August 23, 2023)
However, the survey data have shown that quite a large share of ethnic minorities believe that interethnic marriages can lead to the disappearance of their ethnicity – 69% of Uzbeks, 67% Azerbaijanis, 54% Chechens, 53% Uyghurs, 41% Koreans, 34% Tatars, 35% Russians, 24,4% of Ukrainians. This confirms the idea that for ethnic groups, ethnic identity matters since intermarriages would mean assimilation. People are not willing to mix or assimilate with other ethnic groups and prefer to keep their ethnic group boundaries. This also confirms the idea that ethnicity is very important thirty years later after the collapse of the USSR.
Interethnic relations: harmony or discord?
The issue of interethnic relations has been a matter of concern in multinational states. The leadership of Kazakhstan always emphasized the importance of stability and peace as the main value and achievement of Kazakhstan compared to other states. According to the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, there are 900 ethno-cultural associations in the country and 192 ethno-educational facilities and “houses of friendship”.Footnote 4 These centers serve as interethnic communication hubs and provide education in minorities’ languages, conduct various cultural events. There are 88 schools where the language of instruction is Uzbek, Tajik, and Uyghur. In 108 schools, 22 languages of ethnic minorities can be studied. There are 195 linguistic centers where both children and adults can study 30 different ethnic languagesFootnote 5. Ethnic minorities also have their representation in the Parliament, since the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan elects five deputies to the Senate. These measures should decrease or even eliminate ethnic conflicts and tension in Kazakhstan.
One of the questions was related to the people’s attitudes toward interethnic problems in Kazakhstan. The results show the variation in the degree people take the problems of interethnic problems seriously. For instance, 49% of ethnic Tatars were among those who did not take interethnic problems seriously. Similarly, 36% of Russians, 36% Uyghurs, 31% of Ukrainians, 19% Uzbeks, 29% of Germans, 29% of Chechens, 30% Dungans,19,4% Azerbaijanis, 22% Tajiks, 32% Koreans answered that they do not take ethnic issues seriously. These numbers demonstrate that ethnic groups do not think that there are ethnic problems in Kazakhstan. It might also be an indicator that people have not encountered discrimination based on ethnic background. Some research has shown that there is no discrimination in terms of state policies in Kazakhstan (Hierman and Nekbakhtshoev Reference Hierman and Nekbakhtshoev2014). However, it does not mean that people have not experienced some issues in terms of the knowledge of the Kazakh language that we will discuss later.
The survey results have also shown the degree of tolerance toward other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. A small percentage of ethnic groups answered that they get irritated when communicating closely with other ethnic groups. The most tolerant ethnic groups, according to the survey, are ethnic Tatars and Germans. Only 8,8% of Tatars and the same percentage of Germans answered that they are irritated when interacting with other ethnic groups, while 22,5% ethnic Koreans answered that they are irritated. All other groups fall between these two numbers. One of the interviewees, an ethnic Dungan noted,
Unfortunately, we are still divided…there is a division…we are divided not only in terms of nationalities but also in terms of material status, rich and poor…We cannot tell that we are united. Even inside of the city we are divided…in other words, I cannot say “us” for the whole country.
This quote reveals that even if the government promotes the rhetoric of unity of all Kazakhstani people, stability and peace, not all people agree with this. The data show that society is rather fragmented in terms of ethnic, religious, and class lines. Despite the government rhetoric and the efforts of the authorities to have stability, there were ethnic clashes in Kazakhstan. The growing inequality exacerbates these cleavages along ethnic lines as it was the case in Osh (Commercio Reference Commercio2017). Economic grievances are translated into ethnic cleavages and tensions between ethnic groups.
On the question if you have experienced negative attitudes toward yourself because of your ethnic background, 6.8% of Kazakhs, 10% of Russians, 6.3% of Uzbeks, 15.6% of Uyghurs, 5.7% of Koreans, 13.8% of Tajik, 1.9% of Dungans, and 1.9% of Ukrainians answered often and very often, while the majority answered very rarely or never. This shows that some ethnic minorities feel more uncomfortable and experience more negative attitudes than other ethnic groups. Similarly, some questions, related to the easiness of communication with other ethnic groups, demonstrated the variation across respondents with different ethnic backgrounds. Almost 30% of Russians, 26% of Kazakhs, 22% of Koreans answered that it is difficult and very difficult to find common language with other ethnic groups. 34% of ethnic Dungans, answered that they do not seek to find common language with other ethnic groups. 24% of Tajiks and the same percentage of Azerbaijani, 23% of Koreans, 21% of Uzbek and Ukrainians do not seek to do that either. This demonstrates that inter-ethnic ties and the level of communication are low. Despite the common legacy, citizenship, and culture, ethnic groups do not share many common values. People prefer to live, work, and communicate within their ethnic communities rather than develop inter-group ties or as Robert Putnam calls it the “bridging” capital. Previous research has shown that bonding (or “dark”) capital prevails in Kazakhstan. The intra-ethnic ties are stronger than intergroup ties. This leads to a higher level of distrust across different ethnic groups. Overall, Kazakhstani society is characterized by a high level of general and interethnic distrust. People trust mostly their immediate and close circles of family members, relatives, and friends (Kudebayeva et al. Reference Kudebayeva, Sharipova and Sharipova2023). The majority of respondents mentioned the lack of knowledge of language, culture and traditions as the reasons for difficulty in communication with other ethnic groups. In turn, a poor level of integration can lead to distrust, more tensions, and even violent clashes.
One of the latest and violent incidents was the conflict between ethnic Dungans and ethnic Kazakhs in the Qorday region. The clashes between the two groups left 11 people dead, 192 injured (including 19 police officers), while thousands of Dungans fled to Kyrgyzstan (Tutumlu and Imyarova Reference Imyarova2023). The violence took place in four villages of Masanchi, Bular Batyr, Aukhatty, and Sortobe, which are populated mostly by ethnic Dungans. The trigger was a minor issue that grew to violent clashes between the two communities. The houses and shops were destroyed, and cars were burnt. The incident showed that, on the one hand, this ethnic community may feel more isolated from the rest of Kazakhstan. On the one hand, some media reports indicate that there was relatively little degree of interaction between the Dungan and Kazakh communities.Footnote 6 On the other hand, the Qorday clashes demonstrated that ethnic identities remain very important for many ethnicities of Kazakhstan, especially living in isolated communities. Earlier research (Sharipova et al. Reference Sharipova, Burkhanov and Alpeissova2017) suggested that in the case of low trust in the state institutions, ethnic solidarity becomes more important and salient. These events have also demonstrated that the pre-existing ethnic tensions may be easily weaponized not necessarily in the domain of ethnic politics, but rather by social and economic spheres. The growing inequalities, lack of social lifts, and low access to education may lead to further ethnic fragmentation and alienation of ethnic groups and cultures in society. Tutumlu and Imyarova (Reference Imyarova2023) demonstrated that economic inequalities and relative deprivation can lead to grievances, which, in turn, can cause violence. Furthermore, the issue of the state language continues to play an important role in consolidation of society. Although most of the population recognized that it is important to know and speak the Kazakh language, it is still not used widely. In the next section, we will consider the attitudes of ethnic minorities toward the state language.
The Attitudes toward the Kazakh Language
The citizens are aware that it is important to master the state language. The majority of respondents recognized that it is very important and important to know and speak the state language, including 62,7% of Russians, 68,7% of Uzbeks, 64,4% of Ukrainians, 91,3% of Uyghurs, 86,2% of Tatars, 78,1% of Chechens, 35% of Koreans, 79,4% of Dungans. However, there are some ethnic representatives who consider that the knowledge of the state language is not that important. For instance, 60% of Koreans, 24% of Tajik, 20,6% of Chechens, 31% of Uzbeks, 32% of Ukrainians, 28,7% of Germans., 17% of Dungans answered that it is not important However, the question about the knowledge of Kazakh by Kazakhstani citizens provides a different picture. Many respondents agreed that for Kazakhstani citizens it is important to master the Kazakh language. 97,3% of Kazakhs 98% of Uighur, 94,4% of Tajiks, 97% of Dungans and other ethnic minorities believe that it is important to master the state language.
The respondents also had to agree or disagree with the statement that the knowledge of Kazakh should be mandatory for all citizens of Kazakhstan and there should be a strict demand from every citizen to master the state language. Here we observe some variation in response of ethnic groups. 36,8% of Russians, 34% of Ukrainians, 49% of Germans, 44% of Tatar, 43,4% of Koreans disagree with this statement. It shows that, on the one hand, many ethnic minorities agree that Kazakhstani citizens must know Kazakh language but disagree that there should be a strict demand to learn the state language. The statement “The knowledge of the Kazakh language is personal matter of each citizen” has been supported by many of the respondents – 72% of Russians, 71% of Ukrainians, 61% of Uyghurs, 82.5% of Germans, 64% of Tatars, 54% of Koreans, 42.6% of Tatars, 84.4% Dungans, 75.7% of Chechens. Thus, the answers to various questions show that although citizens of Kazakhstan should know the state language, there should not be a strict demand for that and, in fact, it is a personal matter of every citizen to know the Kazakh language or not. Here we also observe some variation and contradiction between socially desirable responses and what people think in reality. On the one hand, everyone agrees that every citizen of Kazakhstan must know the Kazakh language, at the same time with a cross-check question, respondents believe that the knowledge of Kazakh is a personal matter, and individuals can decide if she or he should learn Kazakh. If so, then the duty of a citizen of Kazakhstan to know the state language becomes an individual choice.
At the same time, there is a trend among ethnic groups to send their children to Kazakh kindergartens where they can learn Kazakh. One of the interviewees said,
We speak in Russian at home. However, my daughter goes to Kazakh kindergarten. There are Russians, Koreans; different nationalities go to this kindergarten and all teachers use Kazakh language. All of them are Kazakhs and speak Kazakh. Children understand them very well. It proves that in the future all will learn Kazakh.
The language issue remains very sensitive. The data also show that few representatives of ethnic minorities faced discrimination on the basis of language during communication. On the question “have you experienced negative attitudes and relations due to the lack of knowledge of the Kazakh language”, some respondents answered positively. Among the respondents, 15,2% ethnic Russians encountered negative attitudes because of the lack of knowledge of the Kazakh language, while around 1, 2% of Azerbaijani, 1,9% of Chechens, 2% of Germans, 2,6% of Uzbeks, 4,4% of Tatars, and 3,8% of Ukrainians experienced negative attitudes. However, many respondents answered negatively. Thus, there are some incidents of discrimination due to the lack of knowledge of Kazakh, but most citizens of Kazakhstan do not discriminate against the lack of knowledge of Kazakh. The percentage who experienced some negative attitudes due to the lack of knowledge of the language include 11,3% of Tajiks, 11,2% of Koreans, and 12,5% of Dungans. As evidence suggests, there is variation across ethnic groups. This can be explained by the fact that Azerbaijani, Tatars, and Uzbeks can easily understand Kazakh as a Turkic language. Many Germans could speak Kazakh because most of them lived in rural areas among Kazakhs. Ethnic Tajiks, Koreans, and Dungans speak Russian and/or their own language, which are different from the Turkic languages. In addition, the widespread use of Russian also precludes some people from learning Kazakh.
It might also depend on the size of the ethnic group and the area of living. The usage of the Kazakh language is widespread in the south of Kazakhstan, while in the northern part it is not used so widely due to ethnic Russians that dominate that region. One of the interviewees said that she did not face any discrimination in northern Kazakhstan because all ethnic groups – Russians, Kazakhs, Tatars, Germans and others – live in friendship and harmony. However, in the southern part, predominantly inhabited by ethnic Kazakhs, she noted that Kazakhs tend to speak mostly the Kazakh language even with Russian people. The interviewee said,
You do not understand the language, but they [Kazakhs] can speak Russian; however, they do not want…You try to explain in Russian, but they speak in Kazakh…And they say that you live in Kazakhstan you should learn Kazakh and must know the Kazakh language (Russian, Petropavlsovsk, August 5, 2023)
This quote shows that some ethnicities expect ethnic Kazakhs speak in Russian since most Kazakhs are bilingual. The data also show that some representatives of ethnic minorities are not willing to learn the state language.
The study also had the question related to the discrimination about the lack of the knowledge of the Russian language. The majority of respondents answered that they very rarely or never experienced any discrimination due to a poor knowledge of the Russian language. However, some percentage of respondents – 7,3% of Kazakhs, 6,3% of Uyghurs, 3,8% of Tajiks, 2, 6% of Dungans – have often or very often experienced negative attitudes due to the lack of knowledge of the Russian language, while other ethnic groups have not experienced often any discrimination. The survey also had a question related to the importance of the mother tongue. The majority of respondents answered that it is very important to know their native language, which is a marker of ethnic identity. However, the majority of ethnic groups see Kazakhstan in the future as a “Multiethnic country where the population speaks Kazakh and Russian languages”. Therefore, Kazakhstan in the future is viewed as a multiethnic country with two languages – Kazakh and Russian. Although more and more citizens of Kazakhstan speak both languages, there is still much to be done so that every citizen would become bilingual.
Conclusion
This article has examined how ethnic minorities perceive and navigate their identities. It focused on ethnic groups’ views and attitudes toward civic and ethnic identity, the state language as well as their attitudes toward their co-ethnics and other ethnic groups. We found some interesting results. Although many groups declare socially desirable and expected outcomes about being Kazakhstani people, many representatives of ethnic groups strongly support their own ethnic identity, the importance of knowledge of their mother tongue, culture and traditions. Thus, the choice between identities is often made in favor of ethnic identities. However, we cannot deny the formation of civic identity among people of Kazakhstan. Since people can have multiple identities, ethnic minorities have both civic and ethnic identities, but the latter is more salient. In addition, the articulation of various identities is uneven and might depend on context, interactions, social practices and other factors. Many ethnic groups have strong intra-ethnic ties, which Putnam called bonding capital, and poor inter-ethnic ties, or bridging capital.
We also found some degree of fragmentation across ethnic groups. This is in contrast to the state rhetoric about the unity of the Kazakhstani nation. The research shows that some groups are more isolated than others due to various factors – internal intra-group structure, cultural traditions, and values. For instance, ethnic Chechens and Dungans are rather closed communities. This also can be the result of different ethnic boundaries that ethnic representatives seek to maintain. Ethnic Chechens support ethnic boundaries through a limited number of intermarriages, observation of their own culture and traditions, religious practices, and the experienced trauma of deportation. Thus, there is variation across different ethnic groups in terms of their attachment toward their ethnic identity. Some groups have a stronger sense of belonging to their ethnic identity than others. This can be linked to different values, intragroup structures, cultural traditions, cultural traumas, and others.
Notably, many people mentioned that it is difficult to find common language/grounds with other ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan due to the poor knowledge of language, culture and traditions of other ethnic groups. It indicates that society in Kazakhstan is quite fragmented, despite the emerged civic identity. This can be a result of the lack of a national idea that could unite all groups in a one consolidated nation. People do not hold common values that can be accepted by every citizen despite the efforts of the government to inculcate those values. The recent events in Qorday provide a good example of poor integration of some ethnic groups into society. They also show that there are certain ethnic boundaries that ethnic groups seek to support through “othering” other ethnic groups. This leads to reinforcement of ethnic identities. This finding is in contrast to the state discourse about harmony and unity of ethnic groups.
Another important finding is that some respondents among ethnic minorities do not recognize the importance of knowing and speaking the Kazakh language. Some of them believe that it is a personal choice of an individual to learn the state language. This finding is also in contrast to the official language policy and state rhetoric. It shows that Kazakh language does not still occupy a dominant position in communication across different ethnic groups or in the public domain, albeit the situation is gradually changing. In the realm of nation-building, the state language can be one of the important venues of this process.
To manage ethnic divisions in Kazakhstani society, the government has implemented various strategies, including promoting the idea of a civic Kazakhstani nation, albeit with an ethnic Kazakh core. At the same time, the regime has generally steered clear of major reforms or sparking potentially divisive debates. As this article shows, public views on national identity reveal differing interpretations of key issues, such as the notion of ‘state ownership’ and the status of non-Kazakh ethnic groups in today’s Kazakhstan. Despite a gradual shift in grassroots perceptions of national identity toward a more citizenship-oriented civic identity, some of the existing fragmentation along the ethnic divisions remain visible.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that while the civic-based Kazakhstani identity holds significance for most citizens, its visibility and interpretation often vary depending on the context and differ among ethnic groups. The civic identity in Kazakhstan is not perceived as entirely separate from ethnicity, but rather as an inclusive framework that incorporates existing ethnic identities which aligns with the official narrative of nation-building (Sadvokassova et al. Reference Sadvokassova, Burkhanov and Sharipova2024).
The government of Kazakhstan has put a lot of effort into creating an image of public consolidation and unity, both in terms of support of the political course as well as of the state-endorsed nation-building narrative. This article has tested whether Kazakhstani society and especially various ethnic minorities of Kazakhstan have embraced regime-backed identity vision. We also argue that in order to promote a sense of belonging to Kazakhstan, other policies should focus on creating social lifts, reducing inequality, and ensuring equal access to quality education and healthcare. Very often socio-economic grievances of the population are translated via ethnic or religious lines and result in ethnic tensions and conflicts. To avoid this, the government needs to raise the well-being of all citizens of Kazakhstan. In this case, it might also lead to the increased level of trust and the rise of “bridging” capital in the population and to the government. Higher levels of trust and better wellbeing can lay the foundation for consolidated society and creation of the Kazakhstani nation.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their comments and feedback.
Financial support
This work was supported by the Committee of Science of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Grant Number BR 18574231 titled “The Scientific and Methodological Bases of Nation-building in Kazakhstan: Assessment of Modern Conditions, Trends and Projective/Evaluation models of the Polyethnic Society Development.” This publication has been funded under Nazarbayev University’s transformative agreement with Cambridge University Press
Disclosure
None.
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