Introduction

In recent years, many states have restricted the space for civil society to carry out their roles—especially political ones (CIVICUS, Reference Chambers and Kopstein2020; Dupuy et al., 2016; Hossain et al., Reference Hossain, Khurana, Mohmand, Nazneen, Oosterom, Roberts, Santos, Shankland and Schröder2018; Rutzen, Reference Rutzen2015; Toepler et al., Reference Toepler, Zimmer, Fröhlich and Obuch2020). These restrictions are not a range of isolated incidents, but inherently structural in nature, where states have deliberately and systematically attempted to undermine civic space (Buyse, Reference Buyse2018). This has given rise to an important body of research that focuses on the strategies by which states restrict civil society. For example, Van der Borgh and Terwindt (Reference Van der Borgh and Terwindt2012, pp. 1070–1072), integrating existing research, distinguished five sets of actions and policies that can restrict operational space for CSOs: physical harassment and intimidation; preventative and punitive measures; administrative restrictions; stigmatization and negative labelling; and pressure in institutionalized forms of interaction and dialogue between government entities and civil society, distinguishing co-optation or closure of newly created spaces.

While some of these studies discuss the strategies and justifications used by states to restrict civil society, others have focused on the effects of restrictions, charting how these delimit and reshape the nature of civil society and its operations. Common effects are the stopping of operations, shifting from advocacy to service delivery (Broeckhoven et al., Reference Broeckhoven, Reda, Townsend and Verschuuren2020), shifting topic (Van der Borgh & Terwindt, Reference Van der Borgh and Terwindt2014) and depoliticization of the advocacy (Tadesse & Steen, Reference Tadesse and Steen2019). A final, smaller topic of attention is the way CSOs may seek to respond strategically to navigate restrictions to protect their operational space. Researchers point to such strategies as reframing into less-threatening language, shifting from national-level to local-level advocacy or from agenda-setting advocacy to implementation (Fransen et al., Reference Fransen, Dupuy, Hinfelaar, Mazumder and Sharp2020), the management of visibility (Van Wessel et al., Reference Van Wessel, Katyaini, Mishra, Naz, Balasubramanian, Manchanda and Sahoo2019) and the building of trustful relations with state actors (Tadesse & Steen, Reference Tadesse and Steen2019).

Much of this research focuses on restrictions as damaging the claim-making role of civil society (Toepler et al., Reference Toepler, Zimmer, Fröhlich and Obuch2020), which is often executed in the public sphere and sometimes in consultation with government agencies. Work on the crackdown on civic space raises doubts about whether this role, essential for civil society’s contribution to articulating and promoting alternatives (Bebbington et al., Reference Bebbington, Hickey, Mitlin, Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin2008), and including less-heard views and interests can be executed in many contexts today, especially considering how restrictions obstruct autonomy and silence challenging voices. The constraints on civic space are often selective, with new restrictions mostly affecting human rights defenders, social movements, and marginalized and disempowered groups (Hossain et al., Reference Hossain, Khurana, Mohmand, Nazneen, Oosterom, Roberts, Santos, Shankland and Schröder2018, pp. 7–8, 14; Skokova et al., Reference Skokova, Pape and Krasnopolskaya2018). Previous work on this topic has largely focused on restriction of freedoms (e.g. of expression, association, and assembly) and their expression through, for instance, confrontational advocacy strategies in the public sphere, where regimes are openly challenged (Lewis, Reference Lewis2013).

Notably, much of this research, taking autonomy and voice as central to the discussion, does not go much into what happens in collaborative relations between states and CSOs, even as collaborations are common. The attention that is there mostly concerns the nature and implications of co-optation: situations in which CSOs are allowed to participate within fixed limits in processes of policy formulation, decision-making and implementation, while denying participants significant influence on fundamental decisions (Wischerman et al. 2018, p. 98). There is also attention for legitimation roles, in which CSOs through their contribution to meeting societal needs and legitimating state ideology legitimize and thereby strengthen the state (Skokova et al., Reference Skokova, Pape and Krasnopolskaya2018; Toefler et al., Reference Toepler, Zimmer, Fröhlich and Obuch2020).

While some of this literature seeks to develop broadly applicable typologies of e.g. motivations, roles and implications (Toepler et al., Reference Toepler, Zimmer, Fröhlich and Obuch2020), some of it (also) emphasizes the need to look closely to the interplay that can be found in specific cases and contexts, zooming in on the role of agency and manoeuvring of individual state agencies and CSOs (Spires, Reference Tadesse and Steen2011; Heiss, Reference Heiss2017; Wischerman et al. 2018).

It is here that we seek to contribute, exploring the idea that for CSOs that collaborate with the state, their roles will at least partly take shape through the interplay between state and CSOs and the possibilities offered by the relations. Our starting point is that in day-to-day governance, individual government agencies and CSOs entering into collaboration engage with each other at a level where interests and agendas converge. Personal perspectives and interdependencies, and diverse forms of relating may also come into play. In this article, we investigate how state actors and CSOs relate to each other as collaborators within a context of restricted civic space. Using disaster governance as a case, we ask: How does state-civil society interplay shape CSO collaboration in disaster governance in India? We answer this question through the following sub-questions: what roles do state agencies assign to CSOs? What criteria do state agencies use to select CSOs to work with? What roles do CSOs take up in the collaboration, and how do they navigate the possibilities of these roles considering their own agendas?

State–Civil Society Relations

It is widely acknowledged that the role of civil society in constituted in its relation with the state. Since Hegel, states have enjoyed supremacy in the public sphere and are placed above civil society. Much civil society literature stresses its autonomous role as a countervailing power. However, as Chandhoke (Reference Chambers and Kopstein2001, p.8) notes, ‘the very state that civil society supposedly positions itself against, enables the latter in the sense that it provides the legal and the political settings for the sphere to exist and maintain itself’. In other words, the state acts as a precondition for the existence of civil society. Considering the importance of states, Krygier, (Reference Krygier1996) argues that ‘strong’ and ‘facilitating’ states are a prerequisite for the growth and functioning of civil society. For him, states may be strong in various ways. For example, despotic and authoritarian states obstruct civil society by preventing it to emerge or suppressing it when it has already emerged, as civil society challenges the legitimacy of these states. This was evident in 1970s and 80s in former communist states of Eastern Europe and Latin America (O’Donnell & Schmitter, Reference O’Donnell and Schmitter1986; Sahoo, Reference Sahoo2013), and continues in countries like China and Russia and lately Hungary, Poland and Turkey. By contrast, liberal democracies are examples of strong, facilitating states, which provide favourable conditions for the emergence and growth of civil society. For Krygier (Reference Krygier1996), while strong obstructive states like authoritarianism are detrimental to civil society, weak states are no better; they lack the basic rule of law that is required to protect the autonomy of civil society. Other literature stresses interdependencies between state and civil society, with the state requiring civil society’s recognition as legitimate power-holder, and its collaboration in meeting societal needs (Heiss, Reference Heiss2017). More generally speaking, civil society is widely considered a necessary element for inclusive and democratic development, with main and often interconnected roles including service delivery, capacity strengthening, knowledge production, advocacy and collaborative roles in governance, and mobilization and organization of societal groups around issues and interests. While not often embracing all of these roles, states commonly allow for CSOs to play some important development roles, especially when state capacities to provide key services are insufficient (Lewis et al. 2021).

At the same time, the diversity of civil society and the manoeuvring of that diversity by the state are important dimensions of the interplay between state and civil society. In general terms, literature already points to considerations that may come in for states. States often find an active, engaged and empowered civil society threatening (Weinstein & Christensen, Reference Weinstein and Christensen2013). States may perceive a threat coming from ‘uncivil’ elements within civil society that may hinder democratic development or the state as such (Amarasingam et al., Reference Amarasingam and Argentino2020; Chambers & Kopstein, Reference Chambers and Kopstein2001; Krygier, Reference Krygier1996; Sahoo, Reference Sahoo2013). States may also avoid collaborating with and suppress CSOs that question their specific development model (see e.g. Talukdar, Reference Talukdar2018). Christensen and Weinstein (2013) add that regime vulnerability is a strong predictor of restrictions on civil society. Furthermore, longer-term developments in the way civil society manifests itself can shape ways of relating in new directions. For example, developments include democracy promotion (i.e. CSOs questioning state policies); development cooperation (i.e. CSO autonomy owing to foreign funding); and information and media technology (i.e. anti-state mobilization through social media) may lead states to constrict civic space. Terrorism, counter-terrorism and securitization (i.e. security justifications) may also lead to such constricting (Buyse, Reference Buyse2018, p.974). States are thus selective in their approach in collaborating with CSOs, acting on their understanding of state and civil society roles as well as analysis of civil society and its behaviour in relation to the state.

State–Civil Society Collaborations

Existing literature on state-CSO collaborations in conditions of restricted civic space mostly focuses on the implications of collaboration with authoritarian and hybrid states (combining democratic institutions and repression) for CSOs’ roles. Co-optation is a commonly discussed risk, which has been discussed mainly in terms of CSOs providing services in line with the state’s goals (Lewis, Reference Lewis2013; Spires, Reference Spires2011). Thus, CSOs do not necessarily contribute to democratization (Lewis, Reference Lewis2013) and may actually work against it. Collaboration is mainly considered as one more way in which CSOs’ role voicing societal views and demands gets diminished, while at the same time establishing some ways to serve society through collaboration. CSOs may be motivated in this by a wish to balance between mission-driven and instrumental needs (Heiss, Reference Heiss2017, p. 269; Giersdorf & Croissant, Reference Giersdorf and Croissant2011). Lorch and Bunk (Reference Lorch and Bunk2017) provided an overview of how states may use CSOs to legitimate authoritarian rule: CSOs offer a facade of democracy, where organization is permitted but space for critique is limited, embedding civil society in bureaucratic practices. By complying with and adapting to constraints so that they can act effectively, CSOs reaffirm the authoritarian order and potentially contribute to its legitimacy, Lorch and Bunk argue. CSOs may also strengthen the regime discourse, while critical CSO voices are suppressed (Lorch & Bunk, Reference Lorch and Bunk2017, pp. 990–991). At the same time, when CSOs use available avenues for limited participation, social discontent is depoliticized and channelled into forms of collective action that provide learning about pressing demands and facilitate responsiveness without threatening the authoritarian or hybrid state. Through service delivery, CSOs may also contribute to meeting fundamental social needs not met by the state apparatus.

While this literature suggests careful assessment and management of CSO roles by the state, a few publications show similarly careful assessment and management from CSOs’ side. Spires (Reference Spires2011) shows how ‘illegal’ CSOs in China engage local officials to be able to do the service delivery work they want to do ‘constructing a relationship that is symbiotic in that CSOs are looking to meet social needs, while government officials, especially at the local level, seek to make sure all ‘problems’ in their jurisdictions are dealt with in ways that do not attract unfavourable attention from their higher-ups’ (p. 12). Tadesse and Steen, (Reference Tadesse and Steen2019) similarly show how CSOs in Ethiopia navigate civic space by working on their individual position with state actors, for example by seeking to enhance their autonomy through building strong relations with state actors who can help ease state control. Kulmala, (Reference Kulmala2016), writing about CSOs in Russia, shows how ostensibly apolitical, service-oriented organizations, within these roles, can still be seen taking up political roles, for example by creating new services for ignored groups like HIV-positive mothers, or articulating and thereby politicizing issues like domestic violence. Importantly, these roles develop in interconnection with service work.

These publications indicate that relations between states and CSOs, and thus CSO roles, develop in interplay (cf. Pauly et al., Reference Pauly, De Rynck and Verschuere2016), and collaborations can offer possibilities, also in authoritarian and hybrid states. In present conditions of increasingly constricted civic space, these questions are important in light of challenges of inclusive development. Recent literature does approach the role of associations in authoritarian and hybrid contexts as complex, taking these as ‘polyvalent’, and stressing the importance of taking a ‘theoretically grounded, power-focused, and relational perspective’, and of studying the complex relations and interactions between state and society (Wischerman et al., 2018). However, questions of interplay have thus far hardly been addressed in ways that consider the sensemaking of state and CSOs at the level of individual relations between CSOs and state agencies in contexts of collaboration—while relations and thus possibilities may typically develop exactly in such situations.

Case and Methods

For this study, we selected India as a case that has a thriving and diverse civil society (Van Wessel et al., Reference Van Wessel, Rajeswari, Naz, Mishra, Katyaini, Sahoo and Deo2018, Reference Van Wessel, Katyaini, Mishra, Naz, Balasubramanian, Manchanda and Sahoo2019, Reference Van Wessel, Naz and Sahoo2020; Katyaini et al., Reference Katyaini, Wessel and Sahoo2021). While state-civil society relations in India have undergone several transformations under different political regimes—ranging from confrontation and cooperation to co-optation—most recently civic space is facing heavy restrictions (Chakrabarti et al., Reference Chakrabarti, Saravanamuttu, Tahseen, Wu, Magno and Thu2018), as we will discuss below. Despite such restrictions, collaboration between state and civil society is common. We selected the domain of disaster governance as one in which the state’s and CSOs’ agendas converge on many fronts but where there are also substantial differences. Many CSOs advance agendas differing from the state’s regarding, for example, the importance accorded to the rights, interests and inclusion of marginalized and vulnerable groups such as tribal populations, Dalits, and women (Katyaini et al. 2020; Van Wessel et al., Reference Van Wessel, Katyaini, Mishra, Naz, Balasubramanian, Manchanda and Sahoo2019).

We conducted fieldwork in the two states of Bihar and Gujarat and in the capital Delhi. Both Bihar and Gujarat are prone to multiple hazards. Bihar is mostly affected by floods, earthquakes, and droughts. Because of sediment-carrying perennial rivers originating in Nepal, 28 districts in the state are vulnerable to flooding in the monsoon months. Moreover, 32 districts of Bihar are vulnerable to earthquakes because of their proximity to the Himalayan tectonic plates in the Bihar–Nepal border area and the Gangetic plains. Gujarat is vulnerable to floods, earthquakes, droughts, cyclones, and other natural and manmade disasters. The 2001 earthquake in Bhuj, Gujarat, was a catalyst for establishing India’s first State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) in Gujarat and eventually resulted in the formation of the national-level NDMA. In both Bihar and Gujarat, the SDMAs have developed State Disaster management Plans (DMPs) through which disaster governance activities are implemented. For our study, these two states offered different governmental and CSO contexts, facilitating the analysis of patterns in the data between the states.

In each state, we interviewed staff members from two key state-level government agencies involved with disaster governance (Bihar: the Bihar SDMA and the Disaster Management Department; Gujarat: the Gujarat SDMA and the Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management). We also interviewed staff members from two key Delhi-based national-level authorities involved in disaster management (the NDMA and the National Institute of Disaster Management). The interviewees also included staff members from four Indian CSOs and three international NGOs working with government agencies on disaster management at the national, state, and/or district level; a consultancy agency; two intergovernmental agencies; and the secretariat of a national-level platform for governmental and non-governmental actors working on disaster governance. Finally, interviews were conducted with two former government employees who had been part of an SDMA and the NDMA and had worked extensively in disaster governance collaborations with different agencies and stakeholders. For confidentiality reasons, we have anonymized the names of the interviewees and CSOs. In total, we conducted 30 interviews with government officials and 12 interviews with CSO staff. Fieldwork was conducted August–December 2018. Using ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis software, we analysed the data to identify patterns concerning the roles state agencies assign to CSOs, the criteria state agencies use to select CSOs to work with, the roles CSOs take up, and the ways CSOs navigate the roles offered by the state.

India and State–Civil Society Relations

Historically, relations between the Indian state and civil society have varied. The Nehruvian state of the first decades after independence in 1947 provided active political and financial support to CSOs, but civil society then suffered during Indira Gandhi’s regime (1966–1977). The state experienced a growing crisis of governability and legitimacy, and several civil society movements emerged opposing Gandhi’s rule, which led her to institute a state of emergency (1975–1977) and enact several laws restricting civil society’s activities. However, soon after the ‘Emergency’, civil society was actively encouraged and supported by the Janata government (1977–1980). After assassination put an end to Indira Gandhi’s final stint in power (1980–1984), the subsequent government of her son Rajiv Gandhi further promoted CSOs, making them active partners in inclusive development. However, since then, under neoliberalism, the Indian state has become increasingly intolerant towards civil society groups that oppose the government’s market-driven development agenda. The Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party-led governments of the past decades have taken different approaches to dealing with CSOs and marginalized communities. During their decade-long rule (2004–2014), the Indian National Congress tried to advance a form of ‘inclusive neoliberalism’—‘market-oriented accumulation strategies coupled with social policy interventions that aim to protect poor and vulnerable groups from marginalization and dispossession’—which has been replaced by ‘authoritarian populism’ under the Modi government (Nilsen & n.d., Reference Nilsen2020 pp. 2–3).

While both the Congress and BJP governments have imposed restrictions on civic space, the extent of these restrictions has increased, and tightening of laws controlling CSOs’ access to foreign funding has been an important policy instrument. In some cases, it has selectively enforced these laws, appearing to restrict mainly the actions of groups taking a critical stance regarding human rights or environmental issues (Talukdar, Reference Talukdar2018) and groups touching upon key economic interests. Stigmatization too has been made policy. These tendencies can be seen in the well-known instance of India’s Intelligence Bureau accusing NGOs of ‘reducing India’s GDP by 2 to 3 per cent per annum, by campaigning against projects that the Indian government argued to be integral to economic growth’ (Doane, Reference Doane2016). CSOs have also been put under surveillance, and raids on CSO offices have been repeatedly reported in the media (see e.g. www.ndtv.com, 2018). Thousands of CSOs’ licenses to receive foreign funding have been revoked for non-compliance (Chakrabarti 2018). A United Nations report classified Indian laws as unacceptable because of the risk that they will be used to silence CSOs whose views differed from those of the government (Kiai, Reference Kiai2016, p. 3). CSOs challenging the state are commonly delegitimized as ‘anti-national’ (Chacko, Reference Chacko2018). Academic freedom and freedom of the press have also been restricted (Chakrabarti et al., Reference Chakrabarti, Saravanamuttu, Tahseen, Wu, Magno and Thu2018). However, as different authors have noted, civic space does not shrink for all civil society actors affected to the same degree or in the same way (Hossain et al., Reference Hossain, Khurana, Mohmand, Nazneen, Oosterom, Roberts, Santos, Shankland and Schröder2018). While specific CSOs, journalists, activists and academics are countered by the state, thousands of CSOs continue to operate in India, including those with views and interests that are not in line with government agendas. Demonstrations continue to take place, although these have been met with violence on several occasions. And many CSOs are involved with the state in collaborations (Van Wessel et al., Reference Van Wessel, Rajeswari, Naz, Mishra, Katyaini, Sahoo and Deo2018). This begs the question how the differentiated relations are negotiated between the organizations involved. Disaster management is a domain where collaborative relations exist, while agendas and perspectives may differ, suggesting this domain as one suitable for the study of such negotiation.

Disaster Governance in India and the Role of Civil Society

The government’s main disaster management policy documents profess an integrative approach in which prevention, preparedness, risk reduction, resilience, and recovery are central. As part of the United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction in the 1990s, India established the National Centre for Disaster Management in 1995 (now the National Institute for Disaster Management) to plan and promote disaster management training and research and to develop disaster management policies, prevention mechanisms, and mitigation measures. Additionally, a high-powered committee was set up in 1999 to assess India’s disasters and disaster vulnerability. In January 2001, an earthquake in the Kutch district of Gujarat provided the government with an opportunity to establish formal disaster management institutions. The State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) for Gujarat was immediately established, followed by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in 2002. The Indian Ocean Tsunami in December 2004 called attention to the need for a national disaster management act articulating the roles and responsibilities of all governmental agencies in a disaster. The National Disaster Management Act was formally passed by Parliament in December 2005, followed by the more detailed National Policy on Disaster Management in 2009 (NDMA, 2009).

The National Policy on Disaster Management and the State Disaster Management Plans (DMPs) identify the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of all stakeholders, including government agencies, civil society, the corporate sector, and the media. These documents place the primary responsibility for disaster management on the state and its departments/agencies, but CSOs are regularly mentioned as stakeholders sharing this responsibility. While the CSO–government relationship is often defined as a partnership, most CSOs are involved in complementing roles (i.e. supporting capacity development, awareness raising, mobilization, relief, reconstruction, and rehabilitation) rather than representing groups or influencing policy development more broadly (Pal & Shaw, Reference Pal and Shaw2018; Bahadur et al., Reference Bahadur, Lovell and Pichon2016; NDMA, 2016; Gujarat SDMA, 2016–2017; Government of Bihar n.d.). Policy documents provide no insight into state–CSO collaborations as they have developed in reality. The limited research available reveals that CSOs have played roles in disaster management, including roles involving interaction with the government (e.g. Chatterjee et al., Reference Chatterjee, Gupta and Jain2010; Vahanvati & Mulligan, Reference Vahanvati and Mulligan2017). These roles are generally in line with the assigned roles mentioned above, but a few previous studies (e.g. Jones et al., Reference Jones, Oven and Wisner2016; Pal & Shaw, Reference Pal and Shaw2018) and some policy documents (e.g. Government of Bihar, 2016) indicate that development organizations also conduct advocacy. However, the existing research offers limited insights into the strategizing involved, or the dynamics of the relations involved.

Findings

CSOs have been involved in disaster governance policy development and implementation in both Gujarat and Bihar, although different circumstances have shaped the two states’ approaches to CSO collaboration. Our interviews in Gujarat revealed a fairly well-established bureaucratic machinery for disaster management, with a long chain of command down to the district level. In line with the State DMP, each district has its own District DMP and a District Project Officer responsible for overseeing all disaster-related operations, including (1) formulating a District DMP for multi-hazard risk and vulnerability assessment; (2) building an incident response system in case of disaster; (3) arranging equipment and resources; and (4) maintaining a list of community-based organizations in the district that can be contacted during an emergency. The District Project Officers mainly implement following SDMA directives, along with local government institutions; CSO involvement occurs only at the local level. There are some formal collaborations between CSOs and the Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management arranged through memoranda of understanding, with CSOs undertaking research and training activities for the Institute. In Bihar, district authorities hold the major responsibility for disaster management, and the SDMA works with CSOs to formulate and implement activities. Most CSOs working on disaster governance in Bihar have come together to form a recognized inter-agency group in which they exchange ideas and represent interests collectively to the government. The Bihar SDMA has also commissioned the formulation of District DMPs to nine CSOs.

At the state level in Bihar and at the national level, we found ad hoc and variable engagement with CSOs. In both states and in the national-level agencies, we found that these hinge on practical concerns. Participants from the state agencies acknowledged that CSOs were stakeholders in the disaster management process, and most believed that collaborations with CSOs were important. In their practical dealings with CSOs, they viewed CSOs’ contribution very specifically in terms of providing required functional inputs. There appears to be an invisible hierarchy of organizations, where experience and resources are highly valued, with the state partnering with organizations with international and interstate experience and seeking their input for policy and programme planning. Local and state-based CSOs engaged in partnerships fulfil implementation roles, drawing on and building community ties. Below, we outline the different roles assigned to CSOs by state agency staff and then discuss the interviewees’ criteria for selecting CSOs for collaboration.

Criteria for CSO Selection

In the interviews with state agency and CSO staff members, we found that state agencies use relational, organizational, and performance criteria in CSO selection.

Relational Criteria

We identified three specific relational criteria, which concern CSO–government relations: trustworthiness of the CSO, working in complementarity with the state while being non-threatening, and contributing non-governmental financial resources. First, in the state’s view, the CSOs with which they collaborate should be trustworthy. This appeared to mean that collaboration should not have undesirable implications for the government. An international NGO representative provided an example of this:

If we ask for information that the government considers sensitive, they know that we will not release it to the media or misuse the information. For example, if during floods we ask which are the most affected districts or blocks so that we can extend our services there, they may tell us, but they may not be in a position to release this information to the media. It might become a political issue [...]

CSOs are also expected to complement the state’s work by helping to fill gaps, while avoiding being threatening to the state, meaning not contesting the government’s claims and having no history of radical thought or anti-state protest. Some interviewed CSO staff members asserted that the state does not want open opposition to its work and that CSOs able to understand and comply with this can win the state’s trust. The CSOs were sensitive to this issue, and many altered their approach to make themselves more relevant and visible to the state, moving away from confrontation and towards more collaborative relations with the state. A representative of an international NGO in Bihar summarized this as follows:

Earlier, NGOs were of an activist type; zaraa sa kuch hua to jhanda-danda lekar nikal jaate the [with a little bit of provocation, we all used to take out flags and be ready for a protest]. But now the approach has changed. We do not compete with the government. We supplement their work.

A third dimension of relational criteria involves the capacity of some CSOs to work with non-governmental resources, which, in addition to being financially helpful to the government, also helps disaster governance to proceed in a more timely and flexible way. All governmental funding, regardless of urgency, must go through a tendering process. A former SDMA civil servant explained this as follows:

For work in the government, funding provisions are outlined […] Funding or money is important to sort out beforehand because, for the government, money means accountability and transparency in its spending. Since they are dealing with public funds, everyone has a right to know where it is being spent.

CSOs working with non-governmental funding and/or with access to local resources such as fishing boats (for rescue operations) can bypass the arduous and time-consuming tendering process. Describing this situation, a senior national-level official said, ‘They [CSOs] should have the adaptability to dovetail the capacity of the government and the local resources because the government will always go by a standard procurement procedure to get any material required’. Formal work with the government operates through memoranda of understanding and expressions of interest, where both parties list specific objectives and outline the funding modalities, but some organizations prefer to work without governmental funding. However, most interviewed CSO representatives did not express this preference. Whereas international NGOs, intergovernmental agencies, and other large NGOs and CSOs, as specialized institutions with multiple intellectual and material resources, might be able to work without government funding, local NGOs and smaller district- or community-based organizations are not in a position to do this.

Organizational Criteria

The second set of criteria concerns CSOs’ reputations. Government agencies require CSOs to be effective and efficient, and to have non-criminal and ‘non-partisan’ ways of working. A representative of an international NGO in Delhi articulated this as follows:

The reasons that the government works with any CSO is, to put it in a nutshell, what values you bring to the table. It is not only about what work you do, but also how you deliver the things you have promised. The government is aware of all organizations, but the ability of an organization to encapsulate the learnings and provide the deliverables is important.

Many interviewees discussed CSOs’ reputations in a similar way, and reputation was repeatedly described as a distinguishing feature for CSOs. A senior representative of a Gujarat-based CSO described the importance of reputation as follows:

While working [for one of the projects], we got to know that the state agency referred to us as khul ja sim-sim Footnote ¹ […] They used to tell us that ‘Everyone tells us the problems we already know about, and we want solutions. You offer that to us’.

Moreover, in light of the Indian government’s crackdown on NGOs and CSOs, as well as the exposure of criminal offences taking place in a CSO-managed orphanage in Bihar in 2018, organizations were cautious in their dealings with government agencies and with other CSOs. They expressed an awareness that the government would not partner with them if their reputation became tarnished, which could happen because of non-compliance with norms or even interaction with other organizations labelled as troublemakers by the government.

Performance Criteria

The final set of criteria concerns CSOs’ performance. Each CSO has its own expertise and themes. These eventually become its specializations—areas where the CSO has proven its quality—and several interviewees explained that being seen as having expertise in particular specializations was a main reason why government agencies sought collaboration with them. An intergovernmental agency representative said, ‘The basis of the relationship depends on the faith that the government has in the organization’s work, in the quality of work already showcased, and that they have proven themselves in the area’. Relatedly, other interviewees pointed out the importance of having done ‘good work’ in the field, which leads to a good organizational reputation for a particular specialization. Having done ‘good work’ was also seen to aid in gaining social acceptance in communities where the organization worked; this could, in turn, be important to government agencies, as discussed above.

Figure 1 elaborates the various roles envisioned for CSOs by the state and the qualities the state looks for in selecting CSOs for collaboration. These roles and criteria provide a sense of the interplay between the state agencies and the CSOs, from the state’s perspective. It is possible that the interviewees left out certain reasons for collaboration and overemphasized others, purposely framing their considerations in publicly acceptable discourse and including certain aspects for legitimation purposes rather than seeking to reflect their actual rationales. For example, we could not expect corruption-based criteria, which may be common (Asian Centre of Human Rights, 2013), to be shared easily and openly in our research interviews. However, the nature of the shared discourse is nevertheless telling, revealing at least the forms of reasoning interviewees appeared to see as publicly legitimate. It is similarly telling that scant space was given to CSOs’ representative roles. Their roles as actors giving voice to society, contesting the state, and holding it accountable received little mention or were rejected. Instead, the delivery of politically unproblematic ‘results’ was described as important. The above discussions also bring to light CSOs’ awareness of the roles and criteria considered most important for the state, as well as CSOs’ sensitivity to these and their general will to mould themselves accordingly. The next section elaborates on the nature of state–CSO collaborations as understood by the interviewed CSO staff and describes how CSOs manoeuvred within the space offered by the state.

Fig. 1

State agency interviewees’ assignment of roles for CSOs, and their considerations

Discussion and Conclusion

The shaping of CSOs’ roles through collaboration under conditions of restricted civic space is only partly defined by the across-the-board restrictive policies that have been the focus of much existing research on restricted civic space and its implications for CSOs. The interplay between specific state actors and CSOs turns out to be important for the shaping of CSOs’ roles. This is where this paper’s contribution to the debate on CSOs’ roles in constricted civic space lies: in showing how interplay at the level of individual state agencies and CSOs, based on mutual perceptions, diverse organization-level considerations and actions, and evolving relations, shape who collaborates with whom and to what effect. Shedding a rare light on these relations at micro-level, our findings provide three main insights into the nature of the interplay involved. First, this interplay defines who has a chance to be in and for what purposes, through multiple selection criteria and the roles state actors offer to CSOs, and the sensitivity of CSOs towards these criteria and role offerings. Secondly, within collaborative relations, CSOs seek to comply but may also use the relations of trust that develop to insert elements of their own agendas. While pressure from the state limits space for representation that is critical of the state, collaborations may open space for the careful insertion of CSOs’ agendas as interdependencies and trust develop, for the addition of expertise that advances the values of inclusive development, and for the under-the-radar inclusion of multiple perspectives in policy implementation and in other areas. Co-optation seems to happen, but without CSOs necessarily relinquishing their agency and strategic acumen. The careful management of relations and forms of communication appears to be of key importance here. Third, the different roles of working, with, as and for the state may each provide different possibilities of inserting CSO agendas. Clear distinctions between ‘types’ of CSOs as oriented towards either service delivery or advocacy, loyal or independent, as seen in some existing literature (e.g. Toepler et al., Reference Toepler, Zimmer, Fröhlich and Obuch2020) thereby turn out to be too crude as reality can be both more fine-grained and dynamic. While small-scale and limited to a single policy domain and context, our article hereby offers a novel angle towards researching the possibilities of CSO roles under conditions of restricted civic space; with more attention to the importance of interplay.

However, the findings also indicate the limits of the possibilities, and insights into this form a second way in which this paper contributes to the debate on civic space: the interplay only goes so far as the state allows, and the CSOs interviewed for this study appear to stay within the conditions the state imposes. State agencies in the domain of disaster governance work with CSOs when they think this is useful, asking of CSOs to show specific qualities and behaviour that are in line with these understandings of usefulness, while rejecting other qualities and behaviour often thought to be important to CSO roles, such as holding government to account. Based on these criteria, state actors offer limited roles for civil society, and CSOs in this context are sensitive to the criteria and role expectations. CSOs assess the space offered by the state and manoeuvre their interventions to maximize the benefit to all stakeholders, including the state, communities, people they seek to work for and represent, and themselves. The state and CSOs may be aligned in their ambition to address certain inequalities, vulnerabilities, and exclusions. But CSOs also often self-censor to avoid sensitivities such as appearing too critical, publicly contesting state claims, or associating with other CSOs with confrontational stances or possibly even a less favourable image. Moreover, collaborations such as those discussed in this study may also contribute to silencing CSOs as they seek to protect their relations with the state.

With this, our findings lead us to suggest a deeper and disturbing significance of the limits we see for the possibilities of CSO roles within collaboration as we see in this case study. Research on civil society in authoritarian and hybrid regimes has stressed detrimental consequences for civil society’s role of producing and sharing perspectives alternative to dominant state perspectives (Lewis, Reference Lewis2013, p. 337). Within the collaborations we studied, CSOs steer clear from such producing and sharing of perspectives. Certainly, CSOs propose ways for disaster governance to be more inclusive and insert related agendas into policy development and implementation. However, this likely cannot go much beyond understandings of inclusive development that have already been accepted by the state (cf. Mitlin et al., Reference Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington2007), or at least the CSOs appear to accept this limit. Moreover, the acceptance of a focus on ‘performance’ in terms of delivery in collaborations shows CSOs largely falling in line with the regime. In addition, relatively politically oriented CSOs working on disaster governance appear to find themselves largely excluded from the state–CSO collaborations discussed in this article (Katyaini et al., Reference Katyaini, Wessel and Sahoo2021; Van Wessel et al., Reference Van Wessel, Katyaini, Mishra, Naz, Balasubramanian, Manchanda and Sahoo2019). This is particularly important considering that disasters (like many other issues on which states and CSOs collaborate) are potentially highly political in multiple ways, including the definition of disaster, the political capital disasters may bring to actors such as states, and different ideas about risks and responsibilities (Warner, Reference Warner and Hihorst2013). Addressing disasters’ root causes can also be very political, challenging economic and political power relations at multiple levels. However, no CSOs involved in the present study sought to politicize disaster, indicating important limits to their role as voices of society and sources of alternatives, within collaborations with the state.

With many states around the world tightening control over civil society, the question of how to relate to such conditions when it comes to collaborating with the state is highly pertinent for CSOs, academics, and donors. This study points to CSO agency, and the requirement of skilful manoeuvring within specific relations. It thereby raises for CSOs questions of what they can or should do in contexts of restricted civic space, considering dilemmas they may face between following ideals of autonomy and voice, leading to exclusion and persecution, and the potential of continued relevance (within limits). As one CSO interviewee commented, ‘Working with the government can be a source of life or a kiss of death’: Working with state agencies can create possibilities to do good work, but, if someone angers a state official, it can lead to their CSO being blacklisted. CSOs thus often try to tread carefully, seeking to manage their work under both more and less favourable conditions. What could be appropriate policies for CSOs for handling constraints and approaching possibilities, seeking to maintain or develop some space for their own agendas or to critique the state? Denouncing CSOs’ efforts to work within limits as simple co-optation may fail to do justice to CSOs’ actual engagement with their work and efforts to overcome the dilemmas they face. Future research may seek to do more justice to this than we could do in this small-scale, domain-specific study. Academics studying the role of CSOs can approach them as agents struggling with civic space issues and looking for ways to find a meaningful role in a specific policy domain, aware of the limits in place and their constraining effects. Academics can also undertake studies of the nature of CSOs’ agency in specific roles (e.g. working with, as or for the state) in collaborations with government agencies under conditions of constricted civic space. In that regard, this exploratory study has offered a novel angle, but it has only scratched the surface.

When it comes to donors, we suggest for them to consider CSOs as agents navigating their possibilities within specific political and policy contexts, supporting their efforts to contribute to inclusive development under challenging circumstance, facing dilemmas but also options that they may build and capitalize on. However, we also find it wise for donors to consider the limits this agency may run into, and the conditions under which to support CSOs working with government agencies in contexts of restricted civic space.