Theoretical approach

The basis for considerations is the concept of ontological security, which indicates the construction of the identity of the state, and which is implemented through political decisions and social practices (for example, remembering important historical events). The theory of ontological security reviews the motives that increase state behavior. They can be found in the need to maintain or recreate a positive identity anchored in a coherent and self-reflective narrative about ourselves and the community we identify with (Giddens Reference Giddens2002, 90). Thus, maintaining a narrative is undertaken by memory. Halbwachs points out that various groups rebuild their past. However, “when they recreate it, they deform it at the same time,” all in order to maintain the unity of views (Halbwachs Reference Halbwachs2008, 421–422). “This is why the society strives to remove from its memory everything that could divide individuals, distance groups from each other, and in each epoch, it changes its memories in such a way that they are compatible with the changing conditions of social equilibrium” (Halbwachs Reference Halbwachs2008, 422). Additionally, A. Giddens points out the identity and names four basic issues, such as (1) an appeal to tradition, (2) to the past and to the memory of pre-eminent issues of circumstances that affect the present, (3) to the language that bears a certain culture, and (4) the continuity of identity that is burdened with the issues of fear or recognition (Giddens Reference Giddens2002, 68–77).

Taking into account the assumptions of constructivists’ theory of international relations and security studies (Lebow Reference Lebow2008, Wendt Reference Wendt1992, Buzzan, Hansen Reference Buzan and Lene2013), B.J. Steele, confronts the approach to ontological security in the framework of critical security research. He assumes that nation-states are primarily interested in their own survival, including survival in an international environment. B.J. Steele views ontological security in the following way: “While physical security is (of course) important to states, ontological security is more important because its fulfilment affirms a state’s self-identity (i.e. affirms not only its physical existence but primarily how a state sees itself and secondarily how it wants to be seen by others)” (Steele Reference Steele2008, 2–3). Maria Malksoo claims that ontological security “establishes an inevitable link between state identity and security, emphasizing the role of “national memory” in the biographical self-narrative of the state. It indicates an ideational factor – the biographical self-narrative of the state, including its historical memory (Malksoo Reference Malksoo2015, 2–6). Here, the memory is treated as a social construct. Historical memory has a considerable impact on bilateral relations between countries that used to be in conflict, like Serbia and BiH. Such states strive to establish their own narrative in order to keep the identity and unified memories of their communities, both on global and local/national levels. External actors such as states or international organizations (the European Union, OSCE, UN, NATO) are also engaged.

Historical memory generates numerous research questions – Who is the architect/leader of memory? What are the actors/institutions? What are the mechanisms, tools and instruments of its creation? In the example analyzed, leaders use historical memory to create separate identities, commemorate chosen and appropriate victims, and develop selective narratives. Historical memory is present in celebrating important dates, historical places, monuments, and events, and creating national heroes. Marc Howard Ross understands collective memory as “selective narratives that will be plausible explanations found at a culturally memorial site, such as school texts, videos, memorial events, family stories, and sacred sites that are emotionally important to groups” (Ross Reference Ross and Ginty2013). On the other hand, Astrid Erll defines it as a particular detail carried by groups, subject to time and space limitations. She notes that “groups are therefore characterized by highly evaluative and hierarchical memory” which shapes identity (Erll Reference Erll2020, 37). Thus, constructing memory by political leaders provokes conflicts over its shape. Memory refers to its collective host (leaders, institutions), whose memory depends on the perspective of using memories, and indicates its selective but also strategic use (Assmann Reference Assmann, Przybyła and Saryusz-Wolska2009, 120–132; Erll Reference Erll2020, 64–65; Szacka Reference Szacka2006, 38) in the bilateral relations and keeping states security. Memory constitutes the basis of group identity, including political identity, making it easier to distinguish between “Us” and Strangers” (Sztop–Rutkowska and Białous Reference Sztop-Rutkowska, Maciej, Opiłowska, Dębicki, Dolińska, Kajta, Kurcz, Makaro and Niedźwiecka-Iwańczak2020, 129).

Moreover, historical memory refers to finding national memory whose multi-level (external and internal) foundations can be traced back to geopolitical and geocultural factors. The concept of the nation is important for imagined geography and geopolitics of memory (Todorova Reference Todorova2008). Finding new traditions or imagining communities (Hobsbawm and Ranger Reference Hobsbawm and Terence2012; Anderson Reference Anderson2016) also relates to the perception of enemies of a given state/nation. It consolidates communities. Also, the external enemy will create its own vision of politics, which will often provoke emotional reactions and lead to conflicts.

Thus, memory is a complicated creation in which relations can change (relativism) in political discourse. National remembrance remains the basic identification for society, and the politics of remembrance means celebrating memories. Among the selected events of the past, war, and conflict seem to have the greatest emotional charge and are events that shape the national identity as well as the state. Thus, the nation and the state will constitute the main framework of identification. On the one hand, the perception of memory from the perspective of internal influences (for example, the elite and shaping national identity) and external influences (bilateral, international relations) include places and events important for the region or neighboring countries in the research on memory and politics of memory. Borderlands comprise an important part where often culturally and ethnically mixed entities constitute either a “bone of contention” or a contribution to cooperation. An example of borderlands might be Sarajevo or the division of BiH into two entities, with Srebrenica as an ethnically mixed city. Ethnic rootedness reveals an Us-Them perception, which is not easy to overcome. Hence, it is justified to refer to ethnic matters both in remembering (commemorating) and in the processes taking place in inter-ethnic and interstate relations.

Likewise, in the context of ensuring a sense of security, the ethnic aspect is raised to a high level of concern for state systems. In approaches to ethnic studies such as primordialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism, each of them engages memory in the creation of ethnicity and revives historical memory. According to primordialists, ethnicity appears as a primal identity that is essentially unchanged. They claim that people tend to attach themselves to a specific identity, especially related to religion and language, which their parents convey to them. On the other hand, instrumentalists focus on following community leaders and building ethnic solidarity. An example is the ethnic solidarity of Serbian political leaders and Bosnian Serbs in RS in the case of Srebrenica. It should be noted, however, that Serbia’s disagreement on recognizing Srebrenica as genocide creates an image of an occupied “identity” that can be seen as a threat to the Serbian state. Thus, the Serbs try to create an image of themselves as victims, not as perpetrators. BiH, in turn, does not recognize Kosovo because of the RS entity. The underlying causes of the conflict are often socio-economic considerations, and ethnicity is added to the clarification of the situation. As Stuart J. Kaufman has pointed out, ethnic conflicts will arise when the parties involved are divided primarily along ethnic lines and for whatever other reasons, such as when economists support “their” group. He pinpoints that people are taught ethnic hatred, not born into it (Wang Reference Wang2018, 13). Constructivism, on the other hand, emphasizes that ethnicity is a social construct, supported by inventing traditions and creating a mythological-symbolic complex related to the mythology of history. An interesting paradigm is that ethnosymbolism does not ignore political, geopolitical, and economic factors, but focuses instead on subjective, symbolic ethnic identity, myths and memory, and socio-cultural elements (Smith Reference Smith2007).

The creation of friendly relations between states is conditioned by significant elements in which memory is used as a factor in building peace and mutual understanding. Conciliation leaders and their leadership in bilateral and international relations contribute to mutual reconciliation. However, it is noticed that history is used instrumentally by leaders in international relations and foreign policy. Zheng Wang pinpoints that “key historical events – both traumas and glories – are powerful ethnic or large-group markers […] as historical traumas can bring a group together, so can historical events instil feelings of success and triumph” (Wang Reference Wang2018, 15). An important role is played by creating a common narrative and vision of the future, overcoming memory conflicts and education—teaching that history brings images of history closer, enabling the transmission of history and memory. Therefore, it contributes to building a community. J. Galtung also describes the chosenness-myths-trauma (CMT) complex, which helps to define national identity and to understand how states react in conflict (Wang Reference Wang2018, 15–17). In the case of the Balkans, diaspora diplomacy also plays a significant role through the activities of diasporas supporting or opposing the processes of reconciliation. In Serbian policy, Serbs in RS are described as the ones living in the region (in the post-Yugoslav area, Romania and Hungary) and the Serbian diaspora is related to those who live further away.

It seems that memory is seen as an emotional approach to reality. Yet, creating memory is a rational activity conducive to the united functioning of societies and conducting politics. Thus, emotions are used to conduct real politics. However, the danger may be its deliberate distortion, leading to populism and aggression. These, in turn, lead to the escalation of conflicts between groups. Emotions such as fear, anxiety, shame, humiliation, guilt but also hope, dignity, [and pride] are important in motivating the state to maintain unity (Giddens Reference Giddens2002, 54–91, Moisi Reference Moisi2012) and care about their security. In The Geopolitics of Emotions, Dominique Moisi indicates that we cannot understand the world without analyzing emotions. He proposes a model of emotion cartography that combines several elements: a public opinion poll, what people think about their future and present (you can also add the past -A.J-S), statements by political leaders, and cultural products (for example, films, books, and monuments) (Moisi Reference Moisi2012, 37). The aforementioned cartography of emotions determines the behavior of states and national interests. Moisi believes that emotions are important, and neither historians nor politicians can ignore them. Emotions “shape human attitudes, relations between cultures and the behaviour of nations” (Moisi Reference Moisi2012, 57), and determine the issues of sovereignty, security, identity, and the struggle for resources or territory. Hence, the policy of memory in the public debate (journalists, leaders, and institutions) is constructed by exaggerating positive and negative features. Positive categories include national identity (cultural and religious) and the glorification of patriotism associated with such emotions as pride, honor, dignity, and hope. The negative category is related to the exaggeration of negative events in the history of the nation (national features) related to emotions, such as honor, fear, humiliation, anxiety, and shame. Also, groups cultivating their own interests, which F. Fukuyama calls the politics of resentment, where political leaders mobilize their followers and indicate that their dignity, has been violated, diminished, or disregarded (Fukuyama Reference Fukuyama2018, 24).

Goals of foreign and security policy of Serbia and BiH

The instability of the Balkan region and the issue of bilateral relations between Serbia and BiH are caused by past events from the period in the 1990s and the ethnopolitical situation in BiH. The policy of remembrance in BiH gained special importance in building the identity of both countries after the end of the war and has also become an important element in bilateral relations. In the case of BiH, the strategic documents show the creation of an image of a civic state with general priorities and policy directions. In the analyzed documents, there is a clear lack of emphasis on the real ethnic divisions in BiH and no indication of an identity that could unite the country. The documents fulfil international community demands regarding the multinational shape of the state. The Security Policy of BiH, adopted in 2006, despite the fact that it defines the long-term strategy and the framework and directions of security policy, has still not been updated and does not show the actual picture of its threats, “enemies,” and identity. Serbia, in turn, strongly points to the challenges to its national interest, identity, and security, all of which are based on the consolidation of a specific national identity, as well as identifying the “enemy” and threats that come from the past. The newest National Security Strategy of Serbia was adopted in 2021. The goals and directions of BiH’s foreign and security policy, according to its main documents from 2003 and 2018, are oriented towards the preservation and protection of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Equally important are the full implementation of the Dayton Agreement and multilateral relations, especially with the EU, NATO, OSCE, the UN, and the Council of Europe, which is to keep security and stability in the region. Therefore, after Joe Biden was elected president of the United States, there was hope for cooperation with the US in BiH, as well as a revision of the Dayton Agreement (reforming BiH’s constitution). Moreover, the US wants to minimize the influence of Russia in the BiH area. In bilateral relations, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro are listed as priority countries. Among the challenges, the animosities caused by the war in 1992–1995 and the related nationalist extremism were laconically mentioned (MoDBA 2006; MVPBiH 2003; MoDBA 1 2018). Serbia supports the Dayton Agreement and wants to maintain the current position of the Serbs in the region. This is indicated by two documents, the National Security Strategy of Serbia (NSS) and the Defence Strategy. Also, the debate, or actually lack of it, about the memory of war crimes and the transfer of individual victories to the community creates tensions and a lack of response to reconciliation. In the NSS, attention is paid to the destabilization of political relations due to the strengthening of nationalist and extremist groups (MoD1 2019, 5). Moreover, the Defence Strategy of Serbia and the National Security Strategy indicate that the strategy of Serbia’s foreign policy is to strive for survival and protect RS. “The preservation of RS as an entity in BiH in line with the Dayton Agreement, and strengthening the Serbs’ position in the region and [ ] the world” are of particular importance for the security and defense of the Republic of Serbia (MoD 2019, 12–13; MoD 2021, 32). It is also connected to “developing parallel relations with Republika Srpska” in line with the Dayton Accords, as well as maintaining peace and stability in the region (MoD 2019, 23; MoD 2021, 50).

Serbia and BiH relations

BIH’s relations with the Republic of Serbia were established in 2000. In the 1990s, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and BiH did not maintain formal relations, which was the result of the conflict in the BiH area in the period 1992–1995. Already, in 2003 and 2004, Serbian presidents Predrag Marković and B. Tadić apologized to the BiH community for the crimes committed during the war. However, in 2006, the ICJ opened a trial on the crimes of genocide committed by the Serbs. However, the court cleared the Serbian government of direct responsibility for the Srebrenica genocide, which left BiH unable to seek reparations. Also, the United Nations war crimes tribunal and the International Court of Justice in The Hague recognized the crimes in Srebrenica as genocide.

Affairs between the Republic of Serbia and BiH seem to be good but volatile. It should be noted that relations between RS and Serbia also reflect the relations between two entities: RS and the Federation of BiH. RS and Serbia have “exceptional” relations, which is visible in documents (Agreement on Special Parallel Relations) as well as in political declarations accompanying the cooperation of political elites. In 2015, Vučić, who was the prime minister at that time, began large-scale diplomatic activities in order to repair its image and rebuild its regional and international position. In 2015, Vučić’s visit to BiH took place in connection with the war and the 20^th anniversary of the events in Srebrenica, which received wide publicity and sparked protests among Bosniaks. Vučić himself is still associated with the regime of Slobodan Milošević, during which he was the Minister of Information in the Serbian government. Symbolic gestures by Serbian leaders related to the issue of Srebrenica such as Vučić’s attendance at the 20^th anniversary commemoration of the genocide failed, and he was attacked with stones. Bosnian politicians, OSCE, and OHR condemned the incident but it seems Vučić’s visit to Srebrenica, despite not recognizing the genocide, had a “stabilizing character.” The relations between Serbia and BiH in the context of commemorating the events in Srebrenica are overly politicized. In 2015, the Serbian government provided 2 million euros to the municipality of Srebrenica for infrastructure development and a further 3 million was reserved for joint projects. Vučić expressed the will to build a good and happy future for both sides: “Serbia has done everything it could really, wholeheartedly, and we want good, sincere and fraternal relations with Srebrenica, just as the Serbs want them with Bosniaks” (B92 2015). A question arises here whether investment is a form of responsibility (at least partial) for the events of the 1990s in Srebrenica and whether it is compensation for not using the word genocide, which the Serbian side sees as embarrassing, offensive, and hurting its pride. Therefore, financial investments could have been related to the above circumstances.

Similarly, in 2021, during the meeting of the BiH presidency with the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, solidarity with BiH, development of infrastructure, implementation of economic projects, and a joint fight against the COVID pandemic were emphasized. Besides, Serbia donated vaccines against COVID-19 to BiH (The Government of the Republic of Serbia 2021). The Serbian side emphasized the importance of stable relations in the region, preserving the integrity and the Dayton resolutions. In the context of a potential secession of RS from BiH, Tanja Topić points out that: “We live in constant fear of the referendum in RS since 2011. […] It is an obvious example of a frozen conflict that is good for blackmailing political partners at home and in the international community. […] When the referendum in Republika Srpska is mentioned, there is panic in the international community, as it is seen as a kind of litmus test for a possible declaration of independence” (Kožul Reference Kožul2015). In June 2023, Dodik once again announced a referendum on the secession of the RS, which provoked reactions from the EU, the USA, and the UK (in 2022, the US and the UK imposed sanctions on Dodik). In addition, OHR used the so-called Bonn’s rights against the RS Act of June 2023 on non-enforcement of judgments of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Due to Serbia’s road to the EU and no international support for RS secession, it does not seem to be a real obstacle. However, the “frozen conflict” can be seen as reparation for Serbia’s loss of Kosovo. And Dodik is seen as a defender of Serbian interests and identity in BiH.

Additionally, Serbian political, socio-economic, cultural, and religious influence in the Balkan region, often called the “Serbian world,” has also raised discussion since 2020.Footnote ² On the one hand, it is treated as a policy relating to the protection of the interests of Serbia and the Serb population. Moreover, it refers to traditional symbols of Serbian culture (religion, language, flag). The last parliamentary, local, and provincial elections in Serbia in December 2023 highlighted the continued cooperation of Serbian political elites with other countries in the region, and consolidated the image of Belgrade as the political and cultural center of the “Serbian world.” On the other hand, this idea would strive to unite the Serbian element but raises concerns about stability in Serbia’s neighboring countries, especially in BiH and Herzegovina and Montenegro, where the Serbs constitute about 30 percent of the population. This concern about Serbia’s historical revisionism towards its neighbors breeds distrust in the region and adversely affects Serbia’s bilateral relations with its neighbors.

The contemporary narration of Srebrenica and its perception by Serbia and Bosnian Serbs

Serbia’s identity and its perception during the Yugoslav wars were strictly related to the Milosević regime, which was blamed for the atrocities and fanning the flame of nationalism in those parts of Yugoslavia where the Serbian population had to leave. The Serbian side, both in the Republic of Serbia and in RS (an entity of BiH) most often describes the Srebrenica tragedy as a terrible crime, incident, or massacre. Even though Serbia apologized for the crime, it still refuses to accept Srebrenica as genocide. The denial of Srebrenica is called a negation, historical revisionism, and denialism. In 2009, Sonja Biserko and Edina Becirević described it as a “culture of denial” that is seen in the political narrative and media (Biserko, Becirević Reference Biserko and Edina2009). In the Srebrenica Denial Report 2020, the authors stated that “Denying the historical collective trauma of marginalized groups emboldens their oppressors and reinforces their marginalization, putting them at greater risk of future discrimination and violence” (Hanson Green Reference Hanson Green2020).

In 2010, the Declaration of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia condemning the Crime in Srebrenica committed against the Bosniak population in 1995, was adopted (Parlament RS Reference Parlament2010).Footnote ³ The word genocide was not used in the declaration either. At the same time, a Declaration condemning the crimes committed against members of the Serbian people and citizens of Serbia (Deklaracija RS Reference Deklaracija2010) was created, which expresses regret and solidarity with the victims of the NATO bombing. In the second declaration, the Assembly of Serbia strongly condemns the crimes against Serbs in Croatia, BiH, Kosovo, and Metohija, and calls on the parliaments of other countries, especially the former Yugoslavia, to condemn these crimes. It should be noted that Serbian historians published a declaration against historical revisionism entitled “Defend History”, signed by regional historians and a number of influential figures from academic, public, political, and cultural life. The authors wrote: “Historical revisionism is an abuse of history, an intentional and tendentious distortion of past events. [‥] Historical revisionism aims to maintain old myths and create new ones, reinforce stereotypes, cultivate prejudice and hatred towards neighbours. ‘We’ are always the victims, ‘they’ are always to blame. […] Today, history is a platform for continuing the Yugoslav Wars by other means” (KROKODIL 2021). Despite the fact that Serbia recognized the Srebrenica massacre, but not as a genocide, there may also be detrimental consequences for (for example) the transitional justice period and the advancement of its own vision of history.

The last two Serbian presidents, Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić, did not describe Srebrenica as genocide, and the second politician, the current president of Serbia, kept repeating that Serbia is not responsible for what happened there. Nikolić indicated that “In Srebrenica, serious war crimes were committed by some Serbs who should be found and punished”, and “I kneel and ask forgiveness for Serbia for the crime committed in Srebrenica. […] I apologize for the crimes committed by any person on behalf of our country and our people” (BBC 2012). Jelena Subotić stated that Serbia’s responsibility for Srebrenica ended in 2007.Footnote ⁴ She goes on to indicate that “Srebrenica is not an important determinant of memory in modern Serbia.” In the public memory, the Serbs feel unfairly treated by the international community (ICTY), claiming that not only the Serbs committed war crimes. In the case of ontological security and the preservation of Serbia’s internal and external identity, Subotić pointed to this “difference between Serbia’s view of itself and its role in the 1990s war - and its assessment of the rest of the world” (Subotić Reference Subotić2018). In Serbia, the issue of the Srebrenica events seems to be an unspoken topic and absent from the public sphere. Only non-governmental organizations some opositional political parties (i.e. the Green Left Front (Zeleno-levi front) and The Free Citizens Movement (Pokret slobodnih građana) remind one of the tragic events. An example is the exhibition of photographer Midhat Poturović entitled “The Soul of Srebrenica,” organized in July 2021 at the ENJo Hub in Belgrade. In addition, the NGO Women in Black carried out an action in the center of Belgrade to commemorate the victims of Srebrenica. In opposition to both events, groups of radicals chanted the slogans “Srebrenica is not genocide” and “Ratko Mladić.”

Reconciliation by way of mutual relations is a difficult and lengthy process, and such incidents hinder it, especially when it comes to Serbs and Bosniaks living in BiH. Vučić's aforementioned visit to Srebrenica in 2015 was seen as “positive” and “great unexpected PR” for Vučić. However, the unlucky incident was also described as stoning “the hand of reconciliation.” The Muslim mayor of Srebrenica, Camil Duraković, described Vučić as “a brave man” in 2015. The Prime Minister himself mentioned tightening ties between Serbs and Muslims, and the possibility of Serbia’s investment in development projects in Srebrenica. At the international level, however, the Serbian government sought Russia’s support in the UN in order to veto the United Nations that declared the event in Srebrenica genocide (Džidić and Panic Reference Džidić and Panic2015; BBCa. 2015). The change of the mayor of Srebrenica, from Bosniak to Bosnian Serb, in 2016 is seen as an increase in Serbian nationalist tendencies. In particular, Mladen Grujičić denies genocide and claims that Serbs from Srebrenica face discrimination as to the truth about the tragedy. Conversely, Bosniaks fear humiliation and discrimination (Reuters 2016). The actions and statements of the Serbian state tend to be exclusive in nature. If there is anything that can be considered a positive development, it is usually followed shortly thereafter by a negative action (endorsement of denial or outright denial), thus canceling out any potential perception of “progress” in mutual relations. This generates strong emotions that may affect the stability of the region.

Srebrenica’s perception of the Bosnian Serb leader and Bosniak identity

The issue of Srebrenica is part of a political battle in BiH. Undoubtedly, the politicization of the commemoration of Srebrenica does not lead to peacebuilding. There has been a shift in the perception of the Srebrenica genocide, but for many Serbs, it remains a myth. A hope that Bosnian Serbs would recognize the event appeared when Dragan Čović, a former Croat member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and M. Dodik, the president of the Bosnian Serb entity (in 2004 and 2007, respectively) admitted that genocide took place in Srebrenica (Face HD TV 2021; Sadiković Reference Sadiković2019; Karčić Reference Karčić2020). However, the second politician later changed the discourse and called Srebrenica a myth that was fabricated by the Bosniaks, something that does not exist (SkyNews 2019; Rahim Reference Rahim2019); a fraud by the Bosniaks and part of the international community; the attack on Srebrenica was provoked by the Bosniaks’ side. He also claimed that the number of victims murdered in Srebrenica was as low as 2,000, instead of the judicially affirmed death toll of 8,372 (Hanson Green Reference Hanson Green2020). The Serb leader wants to strengthen his position and protect the Serb population living in BiH and argues for the autonomy, and complete independence of the RS and its incorporation into Serbia. In his opinion, BiH is “an artificial creation that is not a state.” It is also visible that Vučić is trying to ease tensions and is conservative about the ideas of independence and secession proposed by Dodik. A lack of specific support may indicate a reluctance to exacerbate relations in the region and cause potential destabilization (Dragojlović Reference Dragojlović2020). The crime in Srebrenica is also denied by Milorad Kojić, director of the Center for War Investigations, War Crimes and Missing Persons of Republika Srpska (RCiRZ 2021): “This is not genocide, full stop” (Maksimović Reference Maksimović2020). In the public space of BiH, there are several tendencies such as talks about Srebrenica do not cease; talks continue with the conclusion that it should never happen again; and there is “a conspiracy of silence” among people who are not ready to face the problem of Srebrenica and their model of hesitating about genocide, which was passed on to its citizens (Kožul Reference Kožul2015).

The form of preserving and consolidating identity and national interest is by creating parallel commissions that acknowledge the suffering of not only the Bosniaks but also the Serbs. The Commission for the Suffering of Serbs in Sarajevo and the Commission for the Study of the Suffering of All Nations of the Srebrenica Region was established in BiH in 2019.Footnote ⁵ The commissions are claimed to be international and their task is to establish the truth about the events of 1991–1995. However, their creation met with international and BiH criticism due to biased people participating in them, who questioned the genocide in Srebrenica, which is conducive to relativizing crimes and glorifying criminals. The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) also notes that the establishment of the commission cannot affect the established historical fact—confirmed by the Hague Tribunal and the International Court of Justice—that genocide was committed in Srebrenica (Sorguc Reference Sorguč2019). The identity confidence of Serbs seems to be growing stronger. At the beginning of 2021, a series entitled “Sarajevo Serbs - Missing People” was broadcast on Radio Television of Republika Srpska (Radio Televizija Republika Srpske, RTRS), in which members of the Commission for Investigating the Sufferings of Serbs in Sarajevo present their views (Muslimović Reference Muslimović2021).

The question of Bosniaks’ identity from the very beginning of its existence encounters many difficulties. Although a military conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rather impossible, its internal matters, ethnic divisions, political quarrels, state dysfunction, unemployment, unfinished reforms, and corruption cause poor identification with the state of BiH ( Kasapović Reference Kasapović2007; Zdeb Reference Zdeb and Ratuva2019; Rawski Reference Rawski2018). All these factors cause the continuation of the aforementioned ethnic and “frozen conflict” of three entities: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. Both internal reforms and international support are key issues for further stabilization of the state. From the Bosniaks’ point of view, the identity of BiH may be based on the multiethnic and unitary state, but the shaping of the general Bosnian national identity cannot be separated from the identity of the Bosniak Muslim community (Szilagyi Reference Szilagyi2008, 46). Bosnian Croats and Serbs rejected this concept, justifying a desire to dominate the Bosniaks who threatened their identity. Nevertheless, the USA, the UK, and some EU countries uphold the “civic” concession of the state. Serbian identity, but also memory politics of Serbia and RS, are also supported by Russia. Their close relations could be observed when Dodik paid several visits to the Russian president (Tanjug 2011; Bryś Reference Bryś2018) or when Vučić visited Moscow prior to the presidential elections in 2017. Moreover, Russia points to the liquidation of OHR in BiH. In turn, Turkey, who supported the Bosniaks, seemed to be hesitant about the concept of BiH and the fate of the Dayton Agreement (Latal Reference Latal2020). In turn, a denial of the genocide in Srebrenica hampers post-war reconciliation and exacerbates the climate of political instability.

Šefik Džaferović, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, called on the High Representative to BiH (OHR), Valentin Inzko, to prevent the denial of the genocide in BiH by adopting a relevant law. On July 23, 2021, the High Representative announced amendments to the criminal code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus, as of July 28, denial of the Srebrenica genocide and other war crimes in BiH and the glorification of war criminals is prohibited. Violators of the law are punishable by imprisonment from three months up to five years. The amendment to the law provoked strong opposition from the Serbian side in BiH. Political representatives of RS announced a boycott of central institutions and suspension of participation in the work of the Presidium, Parliament, and the Council of Ministers of BiH until the disputed issue was resolved. Milorad Dodik, a member of the Presidium of BiH, expressed his opposition to the changes in the law, threatened the secession of RS, and reiterated that there was no genocide in Srebrenica. In turn, the Serbian president, Vučić, described the changes to the penal code in BiH as imposed, emphasizing that they may generate further divisions. At the same time, he pointed to the need to show respect to the victims of Srebrenica and to build friendly relations between Serbs and Bosniaks.

The new identity of Bosnian Muslims is built on the basis of Islamic values, references to Muslim heritage, and Turkey, which helps to rebuild this heritage (Kujawa Reference Kujawa2020, 94). Turkey is also on the side of the remembrance of the Srebrenica genocide (not recognized in the Turkish parliament). But the most important role in historical politics was played by Srebrenica, which was to build a sense of threat from the Serbs and become the center of the spiritual life of Bosnian Muslims (Kujawa Reference Kujawa2020, 99–100). As T. Rawski notes, commemorating Srebrenica has its resonance in the moderate and radical approach of Bosniak leaders. At one point, the moderate party placed the responsibility for the genocide on the entire community—the Serbian nation and the international community—instead of identifying individual perpetrators of the genocide. “Apart from politicians, the dominant memory-forming role was played by the Islamic Community, whose representatives were to provide the celebration with a religious background devoid of political references. The actions of the Islamic Community made it possible to meet the expectations of the international community.” However, radicals lobbied for a gradual return of the military-religious symbolism of the 1990s; for example, by developing the heroic figure of šehid (martyr) and the symbolism of death. Thus, the religious criterion of belonging to the Bosniak nation was strengthened, linking it with the postulate of the nation-state and the demand for the liquidation of RS (Rawski Reference Rawski2018, 194–198).

Srebrenica – narration on the global level

In the international space, Srebrenica is defined as a universal symbol, a shameful act, an emblem with no space to contradict the tragedy (No Room For Denial, UN) (ICTY 2021), and as a symbol of the defeat of the West. Srebrenica is also a reason behind the “fight” for the good names of the victims and the preservation of memory in the international arena. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague (2001) and The International Court of Justice (2007) ruled that the Srebrenica killings were genocide. The European Parliament in 2009 declared 11^th July the Day of Remembrance of Genocide in Srebrenica for the entire European Union (EURLEX 2015). Additionally, the symbolic acknowledgment of the guilt of the Dutch UN mission, which did not prevent the events in Srebrenica, demonstrates efforts against undermining the “good name” of the victims. In 2019, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld a ruling that the Netherlands was partially responsible for 350 deaths in Srebrenica.

According to ICTY representatives, Srebrenica was a “terrible event” that had an impact, especially on Europe. In this way, it is similar to the memory of the Holocaust, which has a universal message and became a world commemoration event. The EU rejected the denial of the Srebrenica genocide and called it “one of the darkest chapters of modern European history” (Szucs Reference Szucs2021).Footnote ⁶ There is also faith in overcoming divisions and hope for an opportunity for reconciliation. During the 22^nd commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide, held at the Potočari Memorial in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICTY President Carmel Agius said that “the denial or distortion of history is an intentional assault on truth. […] History and time, as well as the international community, stand with you on the side of the truth” […] ( ICTY 2017).Footnote ⁷

However, denying the genocide in Srebrenica also has international resonance. The Srebrenica issue evoked enormous emotions in the context of the awarding of the Nobel Prize for Literature to Peter Handke, who denies genocide and openly supports the Milošević regime. The Serbian side congratulated and respected the Nobel Prize winner, and the representative of Bosnian Serbs was thankful for understanding Serbian interests. However, the representatives of Bosniaks and Croats criticized the decision of the committee of the Swedish Academy of Sciences. Šefik Džaferović (former representative of the Bosniak presidency) described the award as “a scandal and a shame.” Z. Komšić (representative of the Croatian presidency) pointed out that “genocide in Srebrenica was awarded today.” Regarding the international treatment of Srebrenica, envoys from Turkey, Albania, Kosovo, and Croatia were not sent to Sweden in 2019. Edi Rama, Prime Minister of Albania, said that it was a “shameful decision” and that “shame has become a new value,” adding that “we must not become indifferent to racism and genocide”(Ozturk Reference Ozturk2019; Wasiak Reference Wasiak2019).Footnote ⁸

On the side of denial stands the Russian Federation, which uses the denial of the Srebrenica genocide as a political tactic to draw Serbian nationalists in both BiH and Serbia away from Euro-Atlantic integration, in what was seen after the outbreak of war in Ukraine. The Serb and Bosnian Serb attitude towards the NATO interventions in 1999 during the war in Kosovo is another way in which historical memory is directly impacting security policy—obstructing BiH’s very real chances of NATO membership.

The topic of Serbian and Bosniak identity is strongly seen in mutual relation, of which Srebrenica is continuously one of the markers of narration. The latest works at the United Nations forum on the draft resolution regarding the establishment of July 11 as the International Day of Remembrance of the Srebrenica Genocide and the meeting of Bosniaks from the Western Balkans region in Sarajevo, both in April 2024, caused strong reactions and opposition from both RS and the Republic of Serbia. In the public space, a controversy was caused by the meeting of representatives of Bosniaks from BiH, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Kosova, aimed at protecting the identity of Bosniaks and creating a community of political representatives of Bosniaks in order to solve their problems in the region. These meetings were criticized by the Serbian side in BiH, which accused the creation of new national divisions and deepening the crisis in the functioning of political institutions in BiH. Moreover, political representatives of Serbia noted that the President of Serbia repeated that they would not allow the adoption of a resolution on the genocide in Srebrenica because it would mean that the Serbian nation was genocidal. Ana Brnabić, former Prime Minister, stated that after the adoption of the resolution by the UN, the next goal would be the liquidation of RS. In turn, Dodik strengthened the secessionist rhetoric and relativized the number of genocide victims.

Official Srebrenica commemoration – local/national level

Local and global levels of Srebrenica narration intertwine with each other. The most important official event of Srebrenica memorialization is held in the Srebrenica Memorial Centre whose mission is “to protect the truth about genocide.” Secondly, Srebrenica Genocide Memorial (Figure 1), officially known as the Srebrenica–Potočari Memorial, and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide were opened in 2003 by US President Bill Clinton: “We remember this terrible crime because we dare not forget, because we must pay tribute to the innocent lives, many of them children, snuffed out in what must be called genocidal madness” (US Embassy 2003).

Figure 1.

Srebrenica–Potočari Memorial and Cementary for the victims of the 1995 genocide.

Source: The author. The photo made in 2021.

The USA, the UK, and the EU memorialization support is constant, and the narrative of “lessons should be learned” and “never forget [the] Srebrenica genocide” is repeated. During the 25^th anniversary of Srebrenica during Srebrenica Memorial Day (11 July), experts from the UN mentioned that the hatred fracturing the pillars of mutual trust and tolerance was what caused the devastation of relations (OHCHR 2020) at the local level. Whereas Charles Michel stated: “All Europeans should be humbled, and furious, at what was allowed to happen in Srebrenica. It is one of the darkest chapters of modern European history. By remembering, we renew our commitment to never let such atrocities happen again,” thereby confirming the mechanism of the lessons to remember (European Council, Council of the European Union 2020).

Another example is Remembering Srebrenica, founded in 2013, which is a British organization raising awareness about the Bosniak genocide (Remembering Srebrenica 2020). On the 25^th anniversary of Srebrenica, Š. Džaferović supported its work. He pointed out that the Bosniak society should reaffirm its determination, and ensure that hatred and prejudice which had caused ethnic cleansing and genocide in BiH will never happen again. Between 2013 and 2020, the clear engagement of the UK in the issue was also visible as the country organized commemorations of the genocide of Srebrenica outside of BiH (Džaferović Reference Džaferović2018). In turn, Komšić hoped for the conviction of Bosnian citizen Husein Mujanović by the Serbian court for war crimes in the month that marks the 25th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide. When it did not happen, he pointed out that the Serbian side was unable to demonstrate even a hint of moral responsibility for the genocide (RS n1 info 2020). But the statement of President Zoran Milanović concerning the 25^th anniversary was conciliatory. He pointed out that the world knows who is responsible for the crime and stressed that the entire Serb nation cannot be blamed for genocide. Milanović also referred to the universal concept of “the responsibility of all of us and a lesson from which to draw conclusions: The sacrifice of Srebrenica must be one of the key and well-learned lessons for European mankind for the sake of dignity and sincerity” (Milanović Reference Milanović2020).

According to the Srebrenica Denial Report 2020, there are many negations and incidents regarding the commemoration of Srebrenica events. In 2016, Mladen Grujičić, the first Serb mayor of Srebrenica, refused to accept the rulings of genocide given by international courts and he stated that many of the graves in the Memorial Cemetery in Potočari were fake. In 2019, during the 24^th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, an activist from the Eastern Alternative Association installed a plaque in Srebrenica with the inscription “in memory of the innocently killed Serbs of the Podrinje and Birac area in the period 1992–1995 by Muslim hordes.” The association put up posters around Srebrenica featuring the image of General Ratko Mladić alongside the words, “There was no genocide,” at the same time glorifying him as a hero. Both Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić are frequently encountered in and around Srebrenica on flags, banners, and T-shirts, which the town’s Bosnian Serb inhabitants display (Hanson Green Reference Hanson Green2020). There are many examples of narratives that are shared in RS, such as a claim about the Bosnian Muslim Serbs whose ancestors betrayed the Orthodox Church by converting to Islam; a claim that many of the names listed on the cemetery’s Memorial Wall are in fact people who emigrated from Bosnia and are alive; and another claim that many of the bodies buried in the Memorial Cemetery belong to Serbs killed by Bosniaks in Srebrenica (Hanson Green Reference Hanson Green2020).

Simultaneously, on the Bosniaks’ side, it should be mentioned that its, hero Naser Orić, caused an element of the conflict discourse about victims. Orić was the commander in Srebrenica, then a Muslim enclave in BiH, during the Serbian siege in 1990. In the eyes of the Bosniaks, he became a hero and was called the “defender of Srebrenica” or “Hero, not war criminal.” Naser Orić was accused of committing war crimes against Serb civilians during the war in BiH between 1992 and 1995 in the municipality of Srebrenica and Bratunac, in the region of Podrinje. He was finally acquitted of all charges in 2018 by the ICTY. In turn, the court’s decision showed strong opposition from the authorities in the Republic of Serbia, who emphasized that no one was held accountable for the people who were killed. The commemoration of killed Serbian civilians is held at cemeteries in Bratunac, parallel to the Srebrenica genocide commemoration in Potočari. This kind of situation has a strong impact on the attitude of Bosniaks and Serbs living in the Srebrenica area, as well as influence on narration over humiliated or forgotten victims (NARS 2023; N1 Sarajevo 2022).

It is also said in the media that most of the monuments commemorating military and civilian victims in the war in Bosnia refer to the predominant ethnic groups in the region, which does not contribute to building peace and stable relations. Indeed, memorialization and the construction of monuments in BiH are not regulated by any specific law.Footnote ⁹ The main problems with commemoration in BiH include difficulties in putting up monuments devoted to a given ethnic group; most of the monuments in recent years have been to military, not civilian victims; such (military) commemoration is burdened with nationalist rhetoric; inscriptions on monuments erected by one ethnic group are often perceived as offensive by other ethnic groups; war criminals are commemorated and treated as heroes (Brkanić, Grebo Reference Brkanić and Lamija2020). On the one hand, nationalistic and perpetrators-glorifying monuments for Bosniaks might be commemorating heroes for Serbs. These include a monument-mural to Ratko MladicFootnote ¹⁰ in Kalinovnik in 2018 or a commemorative plaque in honor of Ratko Mladic’s battalion on the East Novo Sarajevo side (the RS part) (Radio Sarajevo 2021). On the other hand, memorials are also devoted to ordinary Serbian people killed in Bradina, or places like Memorial Complex in Kravica.

The process of stabilization, peacebuilding, and reconciliation is difficult and burdened with misunderstanding, often not recognizing one’s own faults in order to maintain the identity. In 2020, the symbolic “Monument to Peace” was unveiled in Srebrenica (Figure 2). It was located in the place from which Ratko Mladić spoke to the population of Bosnia in 1995. In his speech, he called for “revenge on the Turks.” The perception of the monument carries two completely different symbols with a high emotional charge. Arguments of the Serbian side, as indicated by the mayor of Srebrenica, refer to the memory. He argues that it is a universal symbol of peace, coexistence, and looking into the future, a monument “which will not be associated with war at all, and will not be used to lay wreaths, or commemorate anything.”

Figure 2.

“Monument to Peace” in Srebrenica in 2021.

Source: The author

A completely different narrative comes from the Bosniaks. Munira Subašić, the president of the association “Mothers of the enclave of Srebrenica and Žepa” (Karabegović and Salimović Reference Karabegović and Sadik2020), points out that the monument reminds mothers of the words uttered by a war criminal. It also insults both the living and the victims, generating additional anxiety in a fragmented society. The monument was unveiled on the International Day of Peace, and de facto sparked controversy.