There is a broad scholarly consensus that, as the twenty-first century began, Latin American countries experienced an inclusionary turn. Marking a significant – and in many ways unexpected – break with the past, the region implemented a series of reforms aimed at better incorporating historically marginalized groups. As Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (Reference Kapiszewski, Levitsky and Yashar2021, p. 3) aptly observe, “politics and policies became more inclusive, allowing for the more effective practice of citizenship by individuals who previously had been excluded on the basis of class, race, ethnicity, gender or sexual preferences.”
Unlike the earlier episode of popular inclusion that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century – meticulously documented in the seminal work of Collier and Collier (Reference Collier and Collier1991) – this more recent wave of incorporation, often referred to as the “second incorporation period” (e.g., Roberts, Reference Roberts2008; Rossi & Silva, Reference Rossi and Silva2018), has benefited a more diffuse and less organized set of actors. It also brought increased recognition to cross-cutting issues such as gender and sexual orientation, creating fertile ground for “culture wars” to gain traction and potentially trigger a process of electoral realignment (Smith & Boas, Reference Smith and Boas2024). In this sense, the inclusionary turn encompassed not only socioeconomic but also sociocultural dimensions.
Importantly, this inclusionary shift both predates and transcends Latin America’s “pink tide” (Kapiszewski et al., Reference Kapiszewski, Levitsky and Yashar2021). While left-leaning administrations undoubtedly gave momentum to many of these reforms, several initiatives began prior to their rise to power. Moreover, what is particularly noteworthy is that many of these reforms were not reversed by subsequent right-leaning governments, such as those led by Mauricio Macri in Argentina and Sebastián Piñera in Chile (Niedzwiecki & Pribble, Reference Niedzwiecki and Pribble2017; Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Rovira Kaltwasser2020). This suggests that, at the start of the millennium, there was a broader consensus on inclusionary policies that spanned the ideological spectrum.
Today, the situation is markedly different, with far-right leaders dominating headlines through fierce rhetoric that targets not only economic issues but also cultural ones, thereby promoting an exclusionary agenda. This wave of extreme right-wing actors, previously observed in Europe and more recently in the US, now seems to be gaining traction in Latin America as well. The first signs were the presidential elections of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil in 2018 and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador in 2019, with Bukele being reelected by a landslide in 2024. To the surprise of many academics and pundits, despite his incendiary rhetoric and behavior, Javier Milei became the president of Argentina in 2023. Furthermore, the far right has been gaining electoral ground in other countries, such as Chile (Partido Republicano), Peru (Renovación Popular), and Uruguay (Cabildo Abierto). Interestingly, in the presidential election in Mexico in 2024, no clear far-right candidate was present on the ballot, and the incumbent candidate, Claudia Scheinbaum, won the contest. In summary, while there is evidence that far-right forces are establishing themselves across the Latin American context, their level of electoral success varies. Additionally, it is not immediately clear what ideological traits are shared by figures like Bolsonaro in Brazil, Bukele in El Salvador, Kast in Chile, and Milei in Argentina.
How can we understand the rapid and uneven rise of the far right across Latin America? What are the similarities and differences between the emerging far-right forces in the region? To what extent does their agenda align with that of the populist radical right in Europe, Donald Trump’s Republican Party in the US, and other extreme right-wing instances worldwide? These pressing questions have received limited academic attention so far. There are at least two reasons for this oversight. First, far-right forces are relatively new in Latin America, resulting in a lack of comparative research on the subject.Footnote 1 Second, despite growing academic and public interest in the far right, most research has focused predominantly on Europe and, more recently, the US, especially with the rise of Donald Trump. Consequently, there are few cross-regional studies on the far right, and most existing research on Latin America tends to concentrate on individual cases – such as Bolsonaro in Brazil – rather than offering a cross-national and cross-regional comparative perspective. This edited volume seeks to address that gap in a systematic way, and the purpose of this introductory chapter is to set the agenda for the broader academic effort. The remainder of the chapter is structured into three main sections.
We begin by presenting a conceptual framework that not only summarizes the academic debate on the notion of the far right but also provides practical guidelines for its study. By employing this framework, the contributors to this edited volume demonstrate its utility. However, as we will argue here – as well as in various country cases and in the concluding Chapter 10 – conceptualizations developed for studying the far right in Europe and beyond should be applied to the Latin American context with caution. In other words, the aim of this section lies in offering a conceptualization of the far right that fosters cross-national and cross-regional dialogue while allowing for the discovery of specific national and regional developments. As we will explain in more detail, we believe that using a broader concept (far right) is more useful than narrower definitions (e.g., populist radical right or extreme right). As Pirro (Reference Pirro2023) has convincingly argued, this approach enables a more comprehensive understanding of the diverse manifestations of the far right in different contexts.
Following this, we provide a summary of the case studies included in the edited volume. Given the impossibility of discussing all Latin American countries, we focus on a selection that allows us to identify different patterns across the region. As we will explain in more detail, we look at countries where the far right is strong enough to win executive office independently (Argentina, Brazil, and El Salvador), where the far right has managed to enter the electoral arena and influence the public agenda (Chile, Peru, and Uruguay), and where the far right is – at least until now – almost absent from the political scene (Colombia and Mexico). By covering countries with varying levels of far-right electoral strength, the research design of this project aims to distinguish the factors driving the success and failure of these forces across the region. Additionally, we offer preliminary observations on the diverse organizational trajectories of the far right in Latin America – an aspect that differs markedly from the European context.
The third and final part systematizes existing explanations for the rise of the far right in Latin America. While it is no coincidence that far-right forces with diverse ideological and organizational backgrounds are gaining electoral traction across various Latin American countries, there is currently no single theory that can fully explain this development. In fact, there is an ongoing scholarly debate about the rise of the far right in Europe and beyond, characterized by significant skepticism about the feasibility of developing a general theoretical model applicable across different times and places (e.g., Berman, Reference Berman2021; Mudde, Reference Mudde2019; Noury & Roland, Reference Noury and Roland2020). Taking this into consideration, the final section aims to identify contextual changes in Latin America that may help us understand why far-right forces are gaining momentum in several countries. In line with existing research on the far right in comparative perspective, we map these contextual changes by examining demand-side and supply-side arguments as well as national and international factors.
1.1 Defining the Far Right in Latin America and Beyond
Despite an ongoing debate about the utility of the left–right axis, scholars, pundits, and citizens alike continue to use it as a framework to understand the political landscape. The left–right concept is well-entrenched in how we typically analyze politics in the Western world and beyond. While we do not aim to provide a detailed analysis of the origins, evolution, and application of this terminology here, we believe it is important to offer a brief conceptual clarification. This is particularly necessary to arrive at a shared understanding of the far right that can be applied both within and outside of Latin America.
As it is well-known, the origins of the left–right axis can be traced back to the French Revolution, when the assembly that convened after the decapitation of the king divided into two camps: defenders of the ancien régime positioned themselves on the right side, while supporters of the revolution seated themselves on the left (Laponce, Reference Laponce1981; Ziblatt, Reference Ziblatt2017). Since then, the notion of left and right has been associated with contrasting political positions. While the specific issues at stake vary across time and place, a common denominator can be identified at an abstract level: the dispute over (in)equality. As Norberto Bobbio (Reference Bobbio1996) famously noted, the left–right distinction is structured around the idea of equality. The right views most inequalities as natural and difficult or unwise to eradicate, whereas the left sees most inequalities as socially constructed and thus amenable to progressive governmental action.
This conceptualization of the left–right axis is commonly employed in comparative politics, as scholars often operationalize this ideological distinction into a debate over the role of the state in the economy. The right typically argues that most inequalities are natural and that the free market should prevail over an interventionist state. Conversely, the left contends that inequalities are socially constructed and advocates for active state intervention to regulate the economy and counter these disparities. However, the notion that the left–right distinction centers on (in)equality extends beyond socioeconomic issues to encompass sociocultural issues as well. Fascism provides a pertinent example. Scholars classify German National Socialism (Nazism) as right-wing not because of its stance on state involvement in the economy but due to its strong defense of perceived natural hierarchies, such as the existence of “inferior races” (Untermenschen) and “superior races” (Übermenschen) (Eatwell, Reference Eatwell2003, Reference Eatwell, Freeden, Sargent and Stears2014). In summary, the left–right distinction is anchored in different standards of equality, encompassing both socioeconomic and sociocultural dimensions. The relative importance of these dimensions varies across time and place, but existing research suggests that contemporary far-right forces typically place greater emphasis on the sociocultural dimension than the socioeconomic one (Bustikova, Reference Bustikova2020; Ignazi, Reference Ignazi1992; Minkenberg, Reference Minkenberg2000; Mudde, Reference Mudde2007, Reference Mudde2019; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2013; Rydgren, Reference Rydgren2007).Footnote 2
However, how can we specifically define far-right politics? To answer this question, it is essential to distinguish between two camps within the right-wing bloc: the mainstream right and the far right. The academic literature on this topic typically combines spatial attributes and attitudes toward democracy to clarify this conceptual distinction (e.g., Akkerman et al., Reference Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn2016; Ignazi, Reference Ignazi1992, Reference Ignazi2003; Mudde, Reference Mudde2007; Bale & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2021). In this context, the difference between the mainstream right and the far right lies not only in the intensity of their right-wing positions (moderate versus hardcore) but also, and more importantly, in their relationship with democracy (acceptance versus rejection). The far right is characterized by adopting hardcore right-wing positions and maintaining either a semi-loyal or disloyal stance toward the democratic system.
Taking this distinction into account, it becomes clear that the consolidation of democratic regimes cannot be fully understood without considering the crucial role played by mainstream right-wing parties (Ziblatt, Reference Ziblatt2017). These parties have been instrumental in establishing democracy as “the only game in town” and in promoting a gradual adaptation to increasingly progressive cultural norms. However, this process of adaptation has also left segments of society feeling unrepresented, thereby fueling a backlash against progressive values (Bale & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Rovira Kaltwasser, Zanotti and Greve2021; Ignazi, Reference Ignazi1992, Reference Ignazi2003; Norris & Inglehart, Reference Norris and Inglehart2019). The contemporary far right should thus be understood as a political project primarily aimed at resisting the social advancement of historically marginalized groups. It is no coincidence that classic modernization theories (Inglehart Reference Inglehart1971, Reference Inglehart1977; Lipset & Raab, Reference Lipset and Raab1971; Scheuch & Klingemann, Reference Scheuch and Klingemann1967) view the far right as a reactionary response to social change. Rather than adapting to ongoing economic and cultural transformations, far-right actors seek a return to an idealized national past, constructing a radically homogeneous community through ethnic, cultural, or political exclusion (Minkenberg, Reference Minkenberg2000; Mudde, Reference Mudde2010).
To paraphrase Bustikova’s (Reference Bustikova2020, p. 36) geological metaphor, the far right’s “magma” is “the historically entrenched hierarchy of groups that forms the state’s agenda vis-à-vis minority group accommodation. The volcano’s eruption is triggered by a sudden adverse shift in the status quo that undermines the dominant group’s control over majority–minority relations and its status.” This shift provokes resentment, which far-right actors articulate through nostalgia for a past marked by the dominance of a particular group. As the chapters of this book demonstrate, in Latin America, the shift in the status quo concerning majority–minority relations is closely linked to issues of gender and sexual identity, whereas migration appears to be a more significant factor in Europe.Footnote 3 One of the central arguments we advance in this book is that the inclusionary turn experienced in Latin America at the beginning of the twenty-first century has helped lay the groundwork for a conservative counter-reaction. The resilience of democracy, combined with a favorable international environment that promoted liberal values (Levitsky & Ziblatt, Reference Levitsky and Ziblatt2018; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, Reference Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán2014), created unprecedented and sustained opportunities for the incorporation of historically marginalized groups. In other words, the very success of these cumulative inclusionary efforts has sown the seeds for a backlash – one that is now being articulated by the far right. Because inclusionary reforms tend to produce, or at least generate the perception of, “winners and losers,” they are particularly prone to triggering opposition. As Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (Reference Kapiszewski, Levitsky and Yashar2021, p. 31) observe, “this is particularly true in societies marked by extreme inequality, where inclusionary reforms may challenge long-standing social hierarchies and thus catalyse intense resistance among historically privileged groups, who wield power both behind the scenes and through democratic institutions.”
It is important to note that the far right is not a homogeneous political bloc. The scholarly literature identifies two main variants within this camp. On the one hand, there is the extreme right, characterized by its clear antidemocratic positions. These political forces do not support a democratic system and are quite outspoken about their authoritarian tendencies. In other words, the extreme right defends antidemocratic ideas and behaviors, such as the use of violence against political opponents or the abolition of elections. On the other hand, there is the populist radical right, which is nominally democratic. This means that while it presents itself as supportive of the democratic system, it promotes ideas and behaviors that are at odds with the liberal component of democracy. Notably, the populist radical right often criticizes the judiciary for its alleged partiality and targets civil society organizations that defend historically marginalized groups or progressive values.
Given that democracy generally holds a positive connotation in the contemporary world, it is more common to see the rise of populist radical-right forces rather than extreme-right ones. It is challenging for openly authoritarian actors to secure a majority in free and fair elections. This has significant implications for the impact of the far right on democracy. Since the populist radical right primarily attacks the liberal dimension of the democratic system, it leads to a gradual and often subtle process of democratic erosion rather than an abrupt collapse of the regime (Levitsky & Ziblatt, Reference Levitsky and Ziblatt2018). Indeed, scholars emphasize that the main democratic challenge today is the gradual weakening of key institutions and norms due to increasing public support for political forces with illiberal tendencies (Bermeo, Reference Bermeo2016; Merkel & Lührmann, Reference Merkel and Lührmann2021; Minkenberg et al., Reference Minkenberg, Florian, Végh and Zobel2021).
As the populist radical right is the most significant force within the far right, it has garnered substantial academic attention, particularly in Europe. The populist radical right is now an integral part of party systems in almost all European countries and has been in government in several, including Austria, Italy, Hungary, Norway, and Poland. The concept of the populist radical right originates from European academic literature, notably Mudde’s (Reference Mudde2007) framework, which identifies three main defining attributes: authoritarianism, nativism, and populism.
First, authoritarianism within the populist radical-right framework refers to the advocacy of a hierarchical society where any form of deviant behavior is severely punished. While the definition of “deviant behavior” varies, most populist radical-right forces argue that traditional values should be upheld and depict “aliens” as not only misbehaving but also being incompatible with national culture. This promotion of authoritarian ideas leads the populist radical right to favor restrictive measures to maintain control and punish what they consider abnormal. Consequently, the populist radical right often endorses harsh policies against crime and holds strong conservative positions on moral issues. By criticizing abnormality, the populist radical right implicitly or explicitly calls for the restoration of natural hierarchies to properly structure society.
Second, nativism is commonly understood as a form of xenophobic nationalism that asserts the political system should primarily serve the interests of native inhabitants. This ideology posits that both foreign ideas and people pose a significant threat to the cultural homogeneity of the nation-state (Betz, Reference Betz2017). In Europe, most contemporary populist radical-right forces commonly depict immigrants in general – and Muslims and Roma in particular – as “aliens”: non-natives perceived as threats to the cultural fabric of the nation. However, outside of Europe, the population targeted by populist radical-right forces isn’t exclusively immigrants, Muslims, and/or Roma. For instance, in societies shaped by settler colonialism, populist radical-right actors often advocate for a mono-culturalist view that supports the dominance of one nation, thereby rejecting the coexistence of diverse national or ethno-racial identities and populations (Rovira Kaltwasser & Zanotti, Reference Rovira Kaltwasser and Zanotti2023).
Third, and finally, populism is defined as a set of ideas that not only divides society into two antagonistic groups – “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite” – but also asserts that politics should prioritize popular sovereignty above all else (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2017). While not all populist radical-right forces characterize “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” in identical terms, they typically depict “the establishment” as a coalition of powerful entities who promote progressive values perceived to be at odds with the interests and beliefs of the silent majority. Given that populist radical-right discourse often emphasizes nationalist markers to distinguish between insiders and outsiders, cosmopolitan ideas and figures are frequently portrayed as malevolent forces that undermine the values and integrity of “the heartland” (Taggart, Reference Taggart2000).
This conceptualization of the populist radical right, centered on three ideological pillars – authoritarianism, nativism, and populism – has gained prominence in comparative politics. However, empirical evidence indicates that these components do not always receive equal emphasis. Research on Western Europe has shown that the populist element can sometimes be marginalized (Art, Reference Art2022). Moreover, depending on the context, populist radical-right forces may incorporate additional ideological elements to craft a compelling discourse for broader segments of the electorate. For example, as highlighted in several chapters of this edited volume, far-right actors in Latin America often capitalize on negative partisanship toward the left (e.g., adopting anti-Communist/anti-Chavista rhetoric) to depict a malevolent adversary supposedly undermining the democratic system from within. Concurrently, driven by their strong opposition to the left – particularly to radical left-wing projects such as Chavismo – they frequently advocate neoliberal economic policies.
As previously mentioned, the far right is a relatively new phenomenon in Latin America, resulting in limited scholarly studies on the topic, with some adopting the concepts discussed here (e.g., Campos, Reference Campos2021; Díaz et al., Reference Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser and Zanotti2023; Kestler, Reference Kestler2022; Tanscheit, Reference Tanscheit2023). Moreover, scholars focusing on the mobilization rather than electoral strategies of emerging right-wing actors in the region have developed a similar conceptual framework. For example, Escoffier, Payne, and Zulver (Reference Payne, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023) argue in their book The Right against Rights in Latin America that this phenomenon represents a new political project aimed at restraining and reversing gains made by historically marginalized groups (e.g., gender, sexuality, ethnic and racial minorities, environmental concerns, and accountability for human rights abuses), seeking to restore traditional hierarchical structures. Similarly, Mayka and Smith (Reference Mayka and Smith2021, p. 3) examine the “grassroots right” as “a diverse array of individuals and organizations seeking to uphold social hierarchies perceived as traditional or natural … including patriarchy, the economic dominance of large corporations or landowners, and the subordination of LGBTQ+ individuals, Black, and Indigenous Latin Americans.”
As previously mentioned, the primary goal of this edited volume is to advance cross-national research on the far right in Latin America and analyze it from a cross-regional perspective. To achieve this objective, it is essential to adopt an analytical framework that is applicable across countries and regions. This reflects a longstanding challenge in comparative politics: crafting concepts that “travel” across contexts while preserving analytical clarity (Collier & Mahon, Reference Collier and Mahon1993; Sartori, Reference Sartori1970). To this end, Figure 1.1 summarizes the definitions discussed here and utilized throughout the chapters of the book. Following a Sartorian approach, the diagram begins with the most abstract distinction (left versus right), which revolves around the perception of whether most (socioeconomic/sociocultural) inequalities are considered natural and challenging to eliminate (first question in the figure). Moving down the hierarchy of abstraction, the second distinction allows us to differentiate between the mainstream right and the far right. This is achieved by examining the strength of defense of right-wing ideas (moderate versus hardcore) and the stance toward democracy (loyal, semi-loyal, or disloyal) (second question in the figure). Finally, we become more specific by distinguishing between the populist radical right and the extreme right. This distinction hinges on whether there is a conflict with liberal democracy or with democracy itself (third question in the figure).
Subtypes of right-wing forces.
Figure 1.1 Long description
The diagram titled “Subtypes of right-wing forces” presents a hierarchical classification distinguishing political orientations. At the top, a box labeled 1 splits into Left and Right. From Right, a second box labeled 2 branches into Mainstream Right and Far Right. The Far Right connects to a third box labeled 3, which further divides into Populist Radical Right and Extreme Right. Below the diagram, three questions guide interpretation: (1) how inequalities are viewed as natural or erasable; (2) the strength of right-wing ideological defense and its relation to democracy; and (3) whether tensions arise with liberal democracy or democracy in general. It ends with the note: “Source: own elaboration.”
Before proceeding to the next section, it is pertinent to highlight that scholars argue that the distinction between the populist radical right and the extreme right has become increasingly blurred in recent times (e.g., Mudde, Reference Mudde2019; Pirro, Reference Pirro2023). Part of this challenge stems from the observation that the populist radical right, particularly in Europe, has not moderated over time but has instead become more radical on certain issues (e.g., Akkerman, Reference Akkerman2015; Akkerman et al., Reference Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn2016; Twist, Reference Twist2019; Wagner & Meyer, Reference Wagner and Meyer2017). This trend is also evident in the United States, most notably in the January 2021 Capitol attack, where supporters of Donald Trump – claiming electoral fraud – attempted to prevent Congress from certifying Joe Biden’s victory.Footnote 4 Similar patterns can be observed in parts of Latin America. For instance, research on the 2023 attack on the Brazilian Congress has uncovered the existence of an “insurrectionist playbook” (Bastos & Recuero, Reference Bastos and Recuero2023) and suggests that members of Jair Bolsonaro’s inner circle were involved in planning the uprising (Melo & Pereira, Reference Melo and Pereira2024).Footnote 5 Consequently, we anticipate that distinguishing between these two subtypes of far-right forces may also prove challenging in the Latin American context. Therefore, in this book, we prefer to conceptualize the far right as an “umbrella concept” (Pirro, Reference Pirro2023). It remains an open question to what extent populist radical-right and extreme-right forces can be identified in Latin America. Different chapters in this volume address this issue comprehensively.
1.2 Case Studies
Our analysis of various far-right case studies across Latin America seeks to generate cumulative knowledge and comparative evidence that highlights both regional similarities and differences, as well as contrasts with far-right forces in other parts of the world. As previously noted, systematic comparative studies on the far right in Latin America remain notably scarce. To address that gap, this book employs a case selection focusing on the varying levels of political power held by far-right forces across countries in the region. Measuring political power is no simple task, and research on Europe has shown that even when populist radical-right parties are formally in opposition, they can exert significant influence by shifting the political agenda toward issues they “own,” thereby triggering a verrechtsing – or “right turn” – in European politics, with important consequences for liberal democracy (Abou-Chadi, Reference Abou-Chadi2016; de Lange & Böckmann, Reference De Lange and Böckmann2025; Minkenberg, Reference Minkenberg2013; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2018; Wagner & Meyer, Reference Wagner and Meyer2017). This influence is further amplified when mainstream competitors – particularly those on the right – are willing to adopt their policy goals, public rhetoric, and political attitudes (Abou-Chadi & Krause, Reference Abou-Chadi and Krause2020; Bale & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Rovira Kaltwasser, Zanotti and Greve2021; Minkenberg et al., Reference Minkenberg, Florian, Végh and Zobel2021). While we acknowledge that far-right forces often shape the political system in subtle and cumulative ways, one practical approach to assessing their power is to examine their electoral strength. In the European context, scholars have pursued this by analyzing the vote shares that populist radical-right parties receive in parliamentary elections over time (e.g., Art, Reference Art2011; Bale & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Rovira Kaltwasser, Zanotti and Greve2021; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2013).
However, Latin America differs significantly in that it is characterized by fluid rather than institutionalized party systems (Mainwaring, Reference Mainwaring2018) and by presidential rather than parliamentary regimes. As a result, we argue that a more appropriate proxy for assessing the electoral strength of the far right in Latin America is its ability to reach executive office. It is worth noting that most Latin American countries hold presidential elections with a runoff system (ballotage), meaning the two candidates who receive the most votes in the first round compete in a second round. As a result, voters are often faced with a choice between two candidates they may not fully support, leading many to vote for the “lesser evil” (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., Reference Rovira Kaltwasser, Salas-Lewin and Zanotti2024b). We will return to this point in Chapter 10, as far-right figures often win runoffs not because the electorate fully endorses their programmatic proposals, but rather as a reaction to dissatisfaction with incumbents – whether due to economic mismanagement (e.g., Argentina) or involvement in corruption scandals (e.g., Brazil).
Table 1.1 outlines scenarios ranging from low electoral strength (no presence of the far right in the electoral arena) to intermediate electoral strength (the far right exists but remains in opposition or participates in government as a junior partner and/or at the local level), and finally to significant electoral strength (where the far right has secured executive office independently). Below, we briefly discuss the countries included in each of these three scenarios. As we will see, the current landscape we outline here may shift in the near future. In upcoming elections, far-right forces could either gain or lose electoral ground, underscoring the need for further research to better understand these potential fluctuations. We will return to this point in Chapter 10.
Table 1.1 Long description
The table has two columns titled Level of electoral strength and Countries.
Row 1 column 1 reads. Significant electoral strength, the far right has the capacity to conquer executive office by itself.
Row 1 column 2 reads. Argentina. Brazil. El Salvador.
Row 2 column 1 reads. Intermediate electoral strength, the far right is present but only in opposition or participates in government as a junior partner and/or at the local level.
Row 2 column 2 reads. Chile. Peru. Uruguay.
Row 3 column 1 reads. Low electoral strength, the far right is not present in the electoral arena yet.
Row 3 column 2 reads. Colombia. Mexico.
The source below reads: own elaboration.
In the context of significant electoral power, three prominent case studies emerge in contemporary Latin America: the presidencies of Javier Milei in Argentina (elected in 2023), Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (elected in 2018, not reelected in 2022), and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador (elected in 2019, reelected in 2024). Gabriel Vommaro provides a compelling analysis of Javier Milei in Argentina in Chapter 2, highlighting his ideological blend of libertarianism and populism intertwined with conservative stances on moral issues and attacks on some of the norms of liberal democracy. Milei shares similarities with the populist radical right in Europe but also displays distinct features shaped by the Argentine context, particularly his emphasis on libertarian rhetoric. Chapter 3, by Lucio Rennó, delves into Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency in Brazil. Bolsonaro’s rhetoric was marked by staunch advocacy for conservative moral values, robust law-and-order policies against crime, and neoliberal economic prescriptions. Rennó’s analysis reveals that Bolsonaro’s tenure saw an escalation in criticisms of the democratic regime, prompting a nuanced classification that oscillates between the populist radical right and elements of the extreme right. Therefore, categorizing Bolsonaro’s leadership as an instance of the far right appears more apt. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez examines Nayib Bukele’s presidency in El Salvador in Chapter 4. Notably, Bukele began his political career as a left-wing figure but gradually embraced far-right ideas, particularly regarding crime and moral issues. Meléndez-Sánchez posits that Bukele represents a form of opportunistic far-right leadership, aligning well with the notion of the populist radical right. However, during his second term, authoritarian tendencies have become more pronounced, suggesting that the label “far right” may be more appropriate for describing this case.
The second scenario is characterized by intermediate electoral strength, where the far right operates within the electoral arena but remains in opposition or participates in government as a junior partner and/or at the local level. This category includes three countries: Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. In Chapter 5, Lisa Zanotti focuses on Chile, examining José Antonio Kast and the Partido Republicano. Her analysis reveals that this case employs authoritarian, nativist, and populist ideologies, marking it as a manifestation of the populist radical right. Despite its opposition status, this far-right force played a pivotal role in the failed 2023 constitutional reform process and maintains significant ties with the mainstream right. At the time of writing, Kast remains highly popular, and polls indicate a strong likelihood that he will be the most voted-for candidate in the first round of the presidential election scheduled for November 2024. However, it remains an open question whether public rejection of him will remain as high as it was during the runoff election he lost to Boric in December 2021 (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., Reference Rovira Kaltwasser, Espinoza, Meléndez, Tanscheit and Zanotti2024a). Carlos Meléndez analyzes the Peruvian case in Chapter 6, spotlighting Rafael López Aliaga and Renovación Popular. Meléndez illustrates that this far-right political project distinguishes itself from other right-wing actors by emphasizing conservative moral positions and employing populist rhetoric. Notably, López Aliaga’s position as Lima’s mayor highlights the potential subnational impact of the far right. In Chapter 7, Talita Tanscheit discusses Uruguay, where a novel far-right force, Cabildo Abierto led by Guido Rios Manini, articulates nationalist and traditionalist discourses to defend conservative values and penal punitivism. Despite being in opposition, this far-right entity collaborated with the executive at the parliamentary level to pass legislation during the presidency of Luis Lacalle Pou (2020–2025) yet secured only 2.6 percent of the vote in the 2024 parliamentary elections. As Tanscheit argues, this case highlights the risks that a newly formed far-right party may face when choosing to support a sitting government.
Lastly, the third scenario encompasses countries where the far right holds very low electoral strength, as it is not yet present in the electoral arena. This category includes Colombia and Mexico, both currently considered negative case studies. In Chapter 8, Sandra Botero and José Miguel Jaimes Prada examine the situation in Colombia, presenting two significant arguments. Firstly, despite the historical dominance of the right-wing bloc, clear instances of far-right forces have not emerged up until now. Consequently, figures such as former President Álvaro Uribe or the 2022 presidential candidate Rodolfo Hernández should not be classified as examples of the far right. Secondly, the rise of left-wing President Gustavo Petro, advocating a progressive agenda in socioeconomic and sociocultural terms, may set the stage for the emergence of far-right ideas, possibly from within the mainstream right. Mexico, another case study in this category, is analyzed by Rodrigo Castro Cornejo in Chapter 9. He reveals that the relative insignificance of far-right actors can be explained by Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s capacity to advance a leftist rhetoric while avoiding endorsement of progressive sociocultural positions. This unique ideological stance has attracted voters who might otherwise support the populist radical right in other contexts.
These case studies provide valuable insights into the far right across various Latin American countries, with a particular focus on the ideological perspectives they promote. In essence, the chapters in this edited volume predominantly explore the “supply side”: the array of ideas articulated by far-right forces. However, examining these case studies also allows us to discern diverse organizational trajectories among the far-right entities currently active in the region. In contrast to Europe – where populist radical-right parties tend to be relatively well-institutionalized organizations with ties to various sectors of society (e.g., labor unions and youth groups), internal factions, and, in some cases, distinct regional branches (Akkerman et al., Reference Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn2016; Heinisch & Mazzoleni, Reference Heinisch and Mazzoleni2016; Mudde, Reference Mudde2007) – far-right entities in Latin America are generally more fluid and highly reliant on personalist leadership. Part of this divergence can be attributed to institutional differences: Europe is largely characterized by parliamentary systems, whereas Latin America predominantly features presidential systems, which create different incentives regarding the development and maintenance of party organizations. Additionally, structural social conditions play a key role. In most Latin American countries, particularly following the implementation of Washington Consensus policies in the 1980s and 1990s, the popular sector has become highly fragmented. This is reflected in the prevalence of informal labor, low union membership, and, in some countries, the significant presence of Indigenous communities – all of which pose challenges for building stable, broad-based party organizations (Roberts, Reference Roberts, Kapiszewski, Levitsky and Yashar2021). To conclude this section, we turn to a brief discussion about this topic, which is summarized in Figure 1.2.
Organizational trajectories of the far right in contemporary Latin America.
Figure 1.2 Long description
The flowchart titled “Organizational trajectories of the far right in contemporary Latin America,” starts with the question “Does the far right compete in the electoral arena?” Two main paths follow. The NO path leads to Old/traditional far right, which forms New (personalist) electoral vehicles in Argentina (La Libertad Avanza), El Salvador (Nuevas Ideas), and Uruguay (Cabildo Abierto). The YES path leads to New/contemporary far right, branching into three forms: Appropriation of an existing political party in Brazil (Partido Liberal) and Peru (Renovación Popular), Split of the mainstream right in Chile (Partido Republicano), and Transformation of the mainstream right in Colombia (Senator Cabal’s agenda). The figure ends with the note: “Source: Author’s own elaboration."
One key aspect to consider is distinguishing between old/traditional and new/contemporary instances of the far right in Latin America. The primary criterion for differentiation lies in their willingness to engage in electoral competition. Historically, far-right actors in the region have wielded direct political influence without entering the electoral arena, as exemplified by the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s. As Weyland (Reference Weyland2019) aptly notes, although the insurgencies inspired by the Cuban Revolution were largely unsuccessful, elites – driven by acute loss aversion – nonetheless pushed for the establishment of dictatorships across the region. In contrast, contemporary far-right forces are defined by their active participation in elections and pursuit of executive office. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 3 by Rennó, on the case of Bolsonaro in Brazil, it remains an open question whether these contemporary actors are prepared to accept electoral defeat.
However, examining the organizational ties that current far-right actors rely on across Latin America reveals a variety of options. The most common strategy is the creation of new personalist electoral vehicles, characterized by weak organizational structures heavily controlled by a charismatic figure who either convincingly presents himself as an outsider or genuinely lacks prior political ties. Javier Milei in Argentina (discussed in Chapter 2) and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador (examined in Chapter 4) exemplify this pattern. Interestingly, in Uruguay, we also encounter a new electoral vehicle, Cabildo Abierto (analyzed in Chapter 7), which is more structured and less reliant on personalism. A second observed pattern involves the appropriation of existing political parties. In this scenario, a new leader assumes control of an established political entity and steers its agenda toward the far right. Two notable examples include Bolsonaro’s influence within the Partido Liberal in BrazilFootnote 6 (discussed in Chapter 3) and López Aliaga’s impact on Renovación Popular in Peru (examined in Chapter 6).
The third organizational pattern involves the establishment of a new far-right party, stemming from close ties to former mainstream parties, indicating a split from the latter. This trajectory mirrors developments seen in Europe, where figures like Nigel Farage had a career within the Conservative Party before founding various far-right parties in the UK, and Santiago Abascal, after working within Spain’s Partido Popular at the subnational level, co-founded a populist radical-right party (VOX) with like-minded officials seeking to establish a new right-wing project unafraid of political correctness. In Latin America, as detailed in Chapter 5 on Chile, the example of José Antonio Kast and the Partido Republicano vividly illustrates this pattern.
Finally, another trend involves the transformation of an existing mainstream party into a far-right political entity. Emblematic instances include the Republican Party in the United States (Roberts, Reference Roberts, Weyland and Madrid2019), and the potential for a similar evolution within the Conservative Party in the UK remains an ongoing topic of discussion (Bale, Reference Bale2023). Hungary is another case in point, as Viktor Orbán gradually transformed Fidesz from a mainstream conservative party into a populist radical-right force that has significantly undermined the country’s liberal-democratic system (Bánkuti et al., Reference Bánkuti, Halmai and Scheppele2012). In the Latin American context, the current political landscape in Colombia – analyzed in Chapter 8 by Botero and Prada – suggests a potential trajectory toward the transformation of the mainstream right into a far-right political force. Senator María Fernanda Cabal, for example, is actively seeking to steer the Partido de Centro Democrático in this direction. However, the success of these efforts remains uncertain, and the outcome of the 2026 elections will likely shed light on which pattern ultimately takes shape in Colombia.
1.3 Why Is the Far Right Gaining Traction across Latin America and Beyond?
While it is undeniable that far-right forces in Latin America exhibit varying degrees of electoral strength, their overall ascendance in the region remains evident. However, existing scholarship has yet to provide a comprehensive explanation for this political phenomenon. Pundits and academics alike have written extensively about this topic, often relying on the so-called losers of modernization thesis, which posits that individuals unable to adapt to ongoing economic transformations form the core base of far-right support (Kriesi et al., Reference Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey2008). However, empirical evidence suggests that this interpretation should be treated with caution. Indicators such as absolute or relative deprivation and unemployment do not consistently associate with far-right support (Arzheimer, Reference Arzheimer2009; Golder, Reference Golder2003; Rooduijn & Burgoon, Reference Rooduijn and Burgoon2018). This does not imply that economic factors are irrelevant; rather, their explanatory power may be context-dependent and not easily generalizable across cases.
To offer a more nuanced explanation, scholars have proposed a reinterpretation of the “losers of modernization” thesis. According to this perspective, far-right supporters are not necessarily (economic) “losers” in objective terms, but rather individuals who perceive themselves as being left behind by broader societal changes (Gidron & Hall, Reference Gidron and Hall2017; Hochschild, Reference Hochschild2018; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2018). In this view, the electoral rise of the far right is tied to the formation of a constituency – predominantly male – that experiences economic and/or cultural transformations as threats to their social status and sense of identity (Abou-Chadi, Reference Abou-Chadi2024; Anduiza & Rico, Reference Anduiza and Rico2024; Givens, Reference Givens2004; Mudde, Reference Mudde2007). It is no coincidence that Piero Ignazi (Reference Ignazi1992) famously described the rise of populist radical-right parties in Europe as a “silent counter-revolution.” During the 1970s and 1980s, sustained economic growth supported a gradual shift toward more progressive cultural values – what Ronald Inglehart (Reference Inglehart1977, Reference Inglehart1990) termed the “silent revolution.” According to this interpretation, these cultural changes have the potential to provoke an authoritarian backlash among socially conservative sectors. As Norris and Inglehart (Reference Norris and Inglehart2019, p. 87) put it, “the once-dominant cultural majority has gradually become a minority, endorsing views and norms that were considered normal during earlier eras but are no longer widely respected by the rest of society.”
Immigration in Europe provides a paradigmatic example of how cultural transformation can drive political realignment. As European societies have become increasingly multicultural and gradually adapted to this reality, far-right parties have mobilized segments of the electorate who perceive these changes as a threat. Notably, research indicates that the relationship between immigration levels and support for the far right is not straightforward (Bustikova, Reference Bustikova2014; Norris, Reference Norris2005; Rydgren, Reference Rydgren2007). Instead, the salience of immigration – how prominently the issue features in public discourse – tends to have a greater impact on far-right support than actual immigration figures (Abou-Chadi, Reference Abou-Chadi2016; Dennison & Geddes, Reference Dennison and Geddes2019). There is indeed broad scholarly consensus that xenophobia is one of the central – if not the most significant – factors explaining individual-level support for populist radical-right parties across Europe (Ivarsflaten, Reference Ivarsflaten2008; Van der Brug et al., 2000; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, Reference Van Hauwaert and van Kessel2018).
From a cross-regional perspective, however, it is not evident that immigration plays a similarly central role in explaining far-right support outside of Europe, particularly in Latin America. This highlights the need to examine additional factors that may account for individual-level support for the far right in different regional contexts. It is especially important to assess whether certain attitudinal drivers – such as support for free-market policies, environmental concerns, law-and-order preferences, moral conservatism, or xenophobia – operate consistently across countries and regions, or whether their explanatory power is more context-dependent. To our knowledge, no empirical study to date has systematically explored these dynamics at a cross-regional level. Nevertheless, at a more abstract level, a broader argument can be formulated and applied to the Latin American context. Drawing on the idea that the far right represents a radical reaction against processes of social change (Lipset & Raab, Reference Lipset and Raab1971; Minkenberg, Reference Minkenberg2000; Mudde, Reference Mudde2010; Scheuch & Klingemann, Reference Scheuch and Klingemann1967), a plausible explanation for the emergence of far-right forces in Latin America lies in the region’s inclusionary turn at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Despite the many challenges Latin American democracies have faced since the onset of the third wave, they have demonstrated remarkable resilience, enabling the gradual implementation of reforms aimed at better incorporating historically marginalized groups (Kapiszewski et al., Reference Kapiszewski, Levitsky and Yashar2021). While a detailed analysis of the factors behind this democratic stability – particularly the institutionalization of electoral competition – is beyond the scope of this book, existing research highlights two key elements worth noting. First, the 1990s and 2000s unfolded within a highly favorable international context: the collapse of the Soviet Union diminished fears associated with leftist governments, transnational organizations actively promoted democratic norms, and rising global commodity prices boosted revenue flows to Latin American governments (Levitsky & Way, Reference Levitsky and Way2010; Weyland et al., Reference Weyland, Madrid and Hunter2012). Second, the economic reforms adopted during this period largely avoided antagonizing business elites. With the partial exception of the so-called radical-left governments in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, most countries implemented moderate policies – such as conditional cash transfer programs – that posed neither a significant fiscal burden nor a direct threat to elite interests (Roberts, Reference Roberts, Kapiszewski, Levitsky and Yashar2021, pp. 532–533). These initiatives largely fall under what Holland and Schneider (Reference Holland and Schneider2017) describe as “easy” redistribution: policies that are not fiscally onerous and do not challenge the economic status quo.
While it is true that recent economic transformations have not triggered major conflict – unlike what might have occurred with more contentious initiatives such as genuine progressive tax reforms – one should not underestimate the extent to which the broader incorporation of historically marginalized groups beyond the economic sphere can provoke resentment. In fact, the central argument we advance is that Latin America’s inclusionary turn carries the potential to generate a counterreaction, particularly in the sociocultural domain. Although greater inclusion of Indigenous peoples, LGBTQ+ individuals, and women does not automatically lead to electoral mobilization, it can activate segments of society that perceive these changes as a threat to the status quo and that seek a return to a previous social order. In contrast to the incorporation period Latin America experienced in the twentieth century, the current inclusionary turn is not centered on unionized workers or corporatist modes of interest representation. Instead, it is far more pluralistic, extending recognition, access, and resources to a broader range of historically marginalized groups – including urban unemployed and informal sector workers, rural peasants and landless laborers, as well as Indigenous peoples, women, and racial minorities facing various forms of discrimination (Roberts, Reference Roberts, Kapiszewski, Levitsky and Yashar2021, p. 519).
Interestingly, contrary to popular belief, existing research suggests that the rise of the far right is not primarily driven by a widespread shift toward extremist right-wing positions among the electorate. On the contrary, recent studies indicate that public opinion in Latin America has, in many respects, become more progressive. For example, Abreu Maia, Chiu, and Desposato (Reference Abreu Maia, Chiu and Desposato2023) present groundbreaking findings using public opinion data that refute claims of growing opposition to marriage equality or the political participation of LGBTQ+ individuals across the region. Similarly, a recent study analyzing public data from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Mexico (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., Reference Rovira Kaltwasser, Arriaza and Tanscheit2025) shows that only a minority of the electorate in these countries holds strong anti-feminist views, with the majority expressing relatively low levels of anti-feminism. Indeed, many Latin American countries have made significant progress in advancing gender equality and securing rights for LGBTQ+ individuals and Indigenous peoples (Corrales, Reference Corrales2022; Díez, Reference Díez2015; Encarnación, Reference Encarnación2017; Schwindt-Bayer, Reference Schwindt-Bayer2010; Yashar, Reference Yashar2005). This absence of a strong cultural backlash at the mass level mirrors findings from scholars studying similar dynamics elsewhere (e.g., Bartels, Reference Bartels2023; Walter, Reference Walter2021).
To illustrate the argument that there is no widespread shift toward increasingly right-wing positions among the general populace in contemporary Latin America, we present three straightforward empirical pieces of evidence from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which provides comparative data across the region over time.Footnote 7 Firstly, consider the evolution between 2012 and 2023 regarding attitudes toward abortion when the mother’s health is at risk. Figure 1.3 illustrates this trend for all Latin America, showing a clear increase in support for this position. While this falls short of endorsing free abortion, it underscores a notable shift toward more progressive viewpoints. Furthermore, Figure 1.4 further substantiates this trend. It shows that approval rates for same-sex marriage have increased by just over ten percentage points between 2012 and 2023. Despite the fact that a majority of Latin American citizens still express opposition to this issue, there is a discernible pattern of movement toward more progressive stances over time.
Approval of abortion when the mother’s health is in danger (in percentages for Latin America).
Note: Given the available comparative data from LAPOP, countries included in the analysis are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (not in years 2018 and 2023).
Figure 1.3 Long description
The bar chart presents five bars representing survey years from 2012 to 2023. Approval rates rise steadily across the years: 56% in 2012, 57.2% in 2014, 60.9% in 2016, 65.9% in 2018, and 68.6% in 2023. The chart indicates increasing public support in Latin America for permitting abortion when the mother’s health is at risk. The source note reads: “Author’s own elaboration based on LAPOP data.”
Approval of equal marriage (in percentages for Latin America).
Note: Given the available comparative data from LAPOP, countries included in the analysis are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua (not years 2018 and 2023), Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (not in year 2023).
Figure 1.4 Long description
The bar chart plots data from 2010 to 2023. Approval levels rise over time: 27.5% in 2010, 30.9% in 2012, 30.2% in 2014, 37.2% in 2016, 38.7% in 2018, and 42.6% in 2023. The chart shows growing public acceptance of same-sex marriage across Latin America during this period. The figure caption reads: “Source: Author’s own elaboration based on LAPOP data.”
Lastly, the third piece of evidence pertains to responses regarding ideological self-positioning on the classic left-wing (1) to right-wing (10) scale. As depicted in Figure 1.5, the Latin American population exhibits practically a Gaussian distribution, indicating that few voters occupy the extremes (either strongly left-wing or right-wing), with a majority positioning themselves toward the center. Interestingly, there has been no significant shift over time; if any movement exists, it tends toward less support for the ideological extremes.
Ideological positioning on the left (1) versus right (10) scale (in percentage for Latin America).
Note: Given the available comparative data from LAPOP, countries included in the analysis are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (not in years 2018 and 2023).
Figure 1.5 Long description
The line graph plots four trend lines for the years 2004, 2010, 2018, and 2023. The x-axis ranges from 1 (left) to 10 (right), and the y-axis shows percentages. All lines peak sharply at 5, indicating that most respondents place themselves at the ideological center. The 2004 line reaches the highest peak, followed by 2010, 2018, and 2023, all showing similar shapes with slight decreases over time. The source note reads: “Author’s own elaboration based on LAPOP data.”
Therefore, examining this evidence presents us with a paradox: if Latin American citizens are not increasingly leaning right, how can we explain the electoral successes of figures like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, and Javier Milei in Argentina, as well as the emergence of far-right parties such as the Partido Republicano in Chile, Renovación Popular in Peru, and Cabildo Abierto in Uruguay? At an abstract level, one of the main arguments advanced in this book is that the rise of the far right in Latin America represents a reactionary response to the progress made by democratic regimes in integrating historically marginalized groups. Despite various shortcomings, Latin American democracies have gradually weakened the control of dominant groups over majority–minority relations and their status. This is particularly evident in countries that experienced a leftward shift during the 2000s, where left-of-center governments implemented a range of socioeconomic and sociocultural reforms. These reforms have enabled subordinate groups to gain material and symbolic recognition through accommodating policies of various kinds (e.g., Abreu Maia et al., Reference Abreu Maia, Chiu and Desposato2023; Friedman, Reference Friedman2019; Huber & Stephens, Reference Huber and Stephens2012; Silva & Rossi, Reference Silva and Rossi2018). In this light, the rise of the far right in Latin America – and beyond – can be seen as a reactionary response to the success of democratic regimes in effectively integrating historically marginalized groups.
Despite the validity of this general argument, addressing the rise of the far right in Latin America requires a more detailed examination through two dimensions commonly used in academic literature on this topic (e.g., Mudde, Reference Mudde2007; Norris, Reference Norris2005; Rydgren, Reference Rydgren2007). The first dimension pertains to the distinction between demand-side and supply-side factors: demand-side factors encompass both occasional and structural changes that influence voter preferences, while supply-side factors encompass internal and external conditions determining the electoral performance of political actors. The second dimension involves distinguishing between national and international perspectives: national factors are those within a country that affect far-right forces, while international factors refer to global developments impacting the far right. Based on these dimensions, Figure 1.6 summarizes key contextual changes in Latin America that may shed light on the rise of the far right.
Figure 1.6 Long description
The quadrant diagram has intersecting horizontal and vertical axes. The top quadrant is labeled International factors, including End of the commodities boom and Transnational (advocacy) networks. The bottom quadrant is labeled National factors, divided between Demand-side factors on the left—Corruption scandals affecting “the establishment” and Demand for penal punitivism—and Supply-side factors on the right—Crisis of the mainstream right and Politicization of minority rights by progressive forces. The figure source reads: “Author’s own elaboration.”
Before discussing each of the elements in the figure, it is worth noting that, in line with some existing research on this topic (e.g., Berman, Reference Berman2021; Mudde, Reference Mudde2019; Noury & Roland, Reference Noury and Roland2020), we are skeptical about the feasibility of developing a general theoretical model that is universally applicable across different times and places. Therefore, our aim is not to advance a single theory that can fully explain the rise of far-right forces in Latin America and beyond. Instead, we seek to highlight contextual changes that can help elucidate why these political actors are gaining traction across the region. Some of the arguments presented might hold more validity in certain countries than in others, but collectively they offer a preliminary diagnosis of the rise of the far right in Latin America.
We begin by discussing the first box in the lower-left quadrant, which represents the intersection of national and demand-side factors. One key contextual development here is the uncovering of major corruption scandals that have shaken governments across the region, leading to widespread anger against the establishment. Literature on populism has shown that such situations facilitate the activation of populist sentiments at the mass level (e.g., Busby et al., Reference Busby, Doyle, Hawkins, Wiesehomeier, Hawkins, Carlin, Littvay and Rovira Kaltwasser2018; Hawkins et al., Reference Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser and Andreadis2020). During the 2000s, most Latin American countries were governed by left-of-center forces, and the exposure of corruption scandals significantly damaged their credibility. Far-right forces have adeptly exploited this situation, depicting the left as a “corrupt establishment” that seeks to protect itself rather than govern for “the people.” A prime example is Brazil’s mammoth Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) and Odebrecht scandals, which exposed the corrupt relationships between state-owned companies, politicians, and private construction companies. Jair Bolsonaro capitalized on these scandals, portraying Lula da Silva, his Workers’ Party, and the political class in general as the main culprits behind these massive corruption schemes (Hunter & Power, Reference Hunter and Power2019; Lapper, Reference Lapper2021). Empirical research has shown that the politicization of these corruption scandals triggered negative sentiments against both the Workers’ Party and established political parties, facilitating public support for Bolsonaro (Fuks et al., Reference Fuks, Ribeiro and Borba2021; Rennó, Reference Rennó2020).
Another factor situated in the lower-left quadrant is increasing public support for penal punitivism. Over the past decades, Latin American societies have become significantly more violent. Paradoxically, while democracies in the region have better incorporated historically marginalized groups, they are struggling with patterns of criminal governance, where state officials, political authorities, and organized crime actors co-govern (Arias, Reference Arias2017; Feldman & Luna, Reference Feldman and Luna2022). As a result, significant segments of the population favor iron-fist policies against crime, even at the cost of eroding basic democratic norms. This popular demand aligns well with far-right rhetoric, which capitalizes on it by claiming that both the left and mainstream right are overly tolerant, and that harsh measures are necessary. Unsurprisingly, all the far-right forces analyzed in this book support penal punitivism, seeing it as an effective way to appeal to the electorate.
Now, we turn our attention to the upper-left quadrant. A key contextual change in this area related to political economy, namely the end of the commodity boom. Academic literature on Latin America’s “pink tide” has demonstrated that the rise and endurance of left-of-center governments during the 2000s were partly due to a significant increase in the international prices of natural resources, which allowed for increased public spending (Flores-Macías, Reference Flores-Macías2012; Huber & Stephens, Reference Huber and Stephens2012). However, this boom cycle ended with the Great Recession of the late 2000s. In this new economic context, it is reasonable for voters to become disillusioned with the ability of left-of-center governments to deliver on their promises. Thus, part of the far right’s success can be attributed to the electorate’s desire to punish incumbents, who have struggled to secure economic growth due to the changing international economic situation (Luna & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Rovira Kaltwasser, Zanotti and Greve2021). This suggests that support for the far right in Latin America is not solely based on its ideological appeal; many voters are motivated by a desire to penalize the existing administrations.
Moving to the upper-right quadrant, we examine the interaction between international and supply-side factors. A significant contextual change here is the global presence of far-right forces engaged in diffusion. Previously, populist radical-right parties were mainly successful in Western and Eastern Europe. However, the rise of figures such as Erdoğan in Turkey, Modi in India, and Trump in the US indicates that the far right has become a worldwide phenomenon. Research on the global diffusion of the far right is still in its early stages,Footnote 8 but it is plausible that far-right forces in Latin America are learning from their counterparts elsewhere. One might even argue that transnational advocacy networks are promoting far-right frames and policies. Preliminary research has indeed shown that the Spanish populist radical-right party VOX is playing a crucial role in establishing an alliance between far-right forces in Europe, Latin America, and the United States (Palestini & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Rovira Kaltwasser, Arriaza and Tanscheit2025). Therefore, the international environment plays an important role in the expansion of far-right forces in Latin America, which are willing to learn and emulate frames, policies, and strategies from their brethren across the world.
Finally, we close by discussing the lower-right quadrant, which highlights that part of the success of the far right is linked to the crisis of mainstream right-wing parties. When these parties fail to advance programmatic proposals that are attractive to their voters or cannot deliver once in government, voters become disillusioned and can easily turn to the far right. Contemporary Chile serves as a prime example. Mainstream right-wing parties in Chile have undergone significant programmatic moderation over time, leading to disillusionment among some voters and party officials due to an alleged over-adaptation (Madariaga & Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Rovira Kaltwasser2020; Rovira Kaltwasser, Reference Rovira Kaltwasser2019). Additionally, the second government of Sebastián Piñera (2018–2022), a key leader of the mainstream right, faced extreme unpopularity due to the social unrest of late 2019 and the pandemic. Under these circumstances, as shown in Chapter 5, it is no surprise that the far right has experienced a meteoric rise.
Another factor worth highlighting is the role that left-wing actors play in modifying the electoral opportunity structure. When left-wing parties politicize minority rights, they create fertile ground for the far right to advance a backlash narrative. Conversely, when leftist forces downplay cultural issues while advocating for the inclusion of historically marginalized groups, it becomes more difficult for far-right actors to gain traction. The chapters on Colombia and Mexico reveal that a significant part of the explanation for the absence of far-right actors in these countries lies in the left’s approach. In Mexico, the left is almost completely silent on progressive sociocultural issues, while in Colombia, until recently the left has been virtually irrelevant in the electoral sphere. By contrast, when the left decides to politicize sociocultural issues, the far right can gain political traction by advocating a return to the status quo ante. Chile provides an interesting example of this dynamic. The emergence of Gabriel Boric as the president, with his marked progressive agenda on issues like feminism, has facilitated the rise of far-right forces that claim it is time to defend traditional values and push back against “wokeness” (Reyes-Housholder et al., 2025).
The country chapters of this edited volume demonstrate that many of the arguments presented here are instrumental in understanding why far-right forces are gaining traction across the region. Additionally, as we will discuss in the concluding chapter, the contributions reveal additional insights that we did not anticipate, further enriching our understanding of the far right’s emergence in Latin America. In summary, we hope that this introductory chapter and the book as a whole will stimulate academic debate about the rise and impact of the far right in Latin America within a broader comparative perspective. Whether the inclusionary turn experienced in Latin America – and in many other parts of the world – will consolidate and expand remains an open question. Much will depend on the electoral strength of the far right and its broader impact on democratic institutions. With this volume, we aim to contribute to and help advance the growing scholarly debate on the far right in Latin America and beyond.
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