Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-8wtlm Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-04-22T03:09:09.901Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Allen S. Whiting
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

As the Deng era approaches its end, concern abroad, particularly in East Asia, focuses on how the People's Republic of China (PRC) will cope with territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and India, and the continued quest for Taiwan. Meanwhile Chinese military modernization steadily increases the People's Liberation Army (PLA) air and sea power projection. The question arises: might a beleaguered post-Deng leadership seek to strengthen its legitimacy through exploitation of Chinese nationalism and if so, how would this manifest itself in foreign relations?

Information

Type
Chinese Foreign Policy
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 142 , June 1995 , pp. 295 - 316
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

1. Shambaugh, David, “Growing strong: China's challenge to Asian security,” Survival, Summer 1994, pp. 43–59Google Scholar; also Lin, Chong-Pin, “Chinese military modernization: perceptions, progress, and prospects,” Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 718–753.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. For a systematic critique see Townsend, James, “Chinese nationalism,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 27 (1992), pp. 97–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Pye, Lucian W., “How China's nationalism was Shanghaied,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29 (January 1993), pp. 107–133.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Zuguo is translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (hereafter FBIS-CHI) as “motherland” although it is more precisely “ancestors’ land,” with somewhat different connotations. Similarly minzu evokes the ethnic “nation” as differentiated from guo as the state referent, both terms being translated in FBIS as “nation” or “national.” Comparison of FBIS with the original text during 1989–90 showed sufficient correlation to justify reliance on the translated material, except as noted below. I am indebted to Kristina Mao for calling these aspects to my attention.

4. See Lowell, Dittmer and Kim, Samuel S. (eds.), China's Quest For National Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993)Google Scholar, in particular the editors’ essay, “In search of a theory of national identity,” pp. 1–32.

5. This combines elements from Peter Van Ness, “China as a Third World state,” in ibid. p. 196 and Robert A. Scalapino, “China's multiple identities in East Asia: China as a regional force,” ibid. p. 215.

6. I am indebted to Kristina Mao and Yong Deng for research assistance.

7. Deng Xiaoping speech of 9 June 1989, Jiefangjun bao, 28 June 1989, p. 1. Emphasis added by author.

8. “Only socialism can save China,” editorial, Renmin ribao, 22 July 1989, p. 1.

9. Michael H. Hunt, “Chinese national identity and the strong state,” in Dittmer and Kim, China's Quest for National Identity, pp. 62–79, analyses aiguo as state-centred in the late Qing and Republican periods and therefore he substitutes the term patriotism for nationalism.

10. Li, Ji, “A great spiritual pillar and lofty moral obligation,” Shanghai Wenhui bao, 19 August 1989, p. 4.Google Scholar

11. Foreign Minister Chen Yi made a similar statement in May 1962, spuming President John F. Kennedy's implied offer of wheat. See Whiting, Allen S., The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Vietnam (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1976), p. 71.Google Scholar

12. Folian, Lin, “Beware of ‘soft sell’ from outside,” Jiefangjun bao, 2 November 1989, p. 2.Google Scholar

13. Quanshen, Qu, “Beware of the ‘peaceful evolution’ scheme by hostile international forces,” Jiefangjun bao, 7 November 1989, p. 3.Google Scholar

14. Keming, Bai, “Questions and answers on studying Jiang Zemin's National Day speech,” Jiefangjun bao, 9 November 1989, p. 2.Google Scholar

15. Yaoting, Wan and Guangwu, Ma, “Beware the glint and flash of cold steel in the ‘halo of peace',” Jiefangjun bao, 1 December 1989.Google Scholar

16. “Deng Xiaoping sees the future for the CCP,” Zhengming, Hong Kong, No. 151(1 May 1990) as cited by Yahuda, Michael, “Deng Xiaoping: the statesman,” The China Quarterly, No. 135 (September 1993), p. 564.Google Scholar

17. “Patriotism and the mission of the Chinese intellectuals – speech by Jiang Zemin at a meeting held by youth in the capital to commemorate ‘May 4th’ (3 May 1990),” Xinhua Domestic Service, 3 May 1990, in FBIS-CHI, 4 May 1990, pp. 8–13.

18. Xinhua in English, 3 June 1990, in FBIS-CHI, 4 June 1990, p. 44.

19. Editorial, “Hold even higher the great banner of patriotism – in commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the Opium War,” Renmin ribao, 3 June 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, 4 June 1990, p. 13.

20. Hu Sheng, President of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, at Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee Forum on the 150th anniversary of the Opium War, Renmin ribao, 4 June 1990, in FBIS-CHI, 5 June 1990, pp. 24–27.

21. Tao, Lu, “Inside story about major screening in Renmin ribao after 4 June,” Hong KongJiushi niandai, No. 4 (1 April 1992), pp. 80–83Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 17 April 1992, pp. 32–35.

22. “Independence – a foundation for the prosperity and strength of the motherland,” Ban yue tan, No. 9 (15 May 1990), pp. 19–21 in FBIS-CHI, 9 July 1990, pp. 34–36. This was the 14th of a lecture series on patriotism by the Ban yue tan editorial department. The next paragraph also comes from this article.

23. Zongxian, Zhang, “Carry forward patriotic spirit, keep firm conviction in socialism – commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Opium War,” Jiefangjun bao, 5 June 1990, p. 3Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 5 June 1990, pp. 18–21.

24. Tianjin, Niu and Shijiang, Zhang, “Rambling talk on military threat,” Jiefangjun bao, 21 September 1990, p. 3Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 11 October 1990, pp. 4–6; also Shambaugh, David, “The insecurity of security: the People's Liberation Army's evolving doctrine and threat perceptions towards 2000,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 3–25Google Scholar; Glaser, Bonnie, “China's security perceptions: interests and ambitions,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3 (March 1993) pp. 252–271.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25. Yen, Shih, “He Xin submits written statement to CPC leadership to expose U.S. ‘vigorous attempt to turn China into chaos, subjugate and dissect China',” Baixing, No. 244 (16 July 1991), pp. 3–4Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 24 July 1991, pp. 9–11; also South China Morning Post, 27 February 1991, p. 15, in ibid, pp. 5–6.

26. Xinhua in English, 18 April 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 18 April 1991, pp. 12–13.

27. Hong Kong Jing bao, No. 172 (5 November 1991), pp. 84–86, in FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1991, pp. 28–30. This text was widely reported in other Hong Kong media as well.

28. “Why must we unremittingly oppose bourgeois liberalization?” Dangdai sichao commentator article abridged from Dangdai sichao. No. 2 (1991), in Renmin ribao, 24 April 1991, p. 5, in FBIS-CHI, 26 April 1991, pp. 18–21.

29. Baojuan, Luan, “Rambling talk on ideological, political work,” Qiushi, No. 14 (16 July 1991), pp. 22–25Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 15 August 1991, pp. 20–21.

30. Lin, Meng, “Hu Qiaomu criticizes pro-American faction inside CCP,” Jing bao, No. 169 (5 August 1991), pp. 54–55Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 7 August 1991, pp.17–18. The internal quotation purportedly comes from a text of Hu's remarks that were otherwise paraphrased.

31. Xi, Xiao (pseud.), “Mr James Lilley’ s statement and behaviour merit attention,” Renmin ribao, 15 August 1991, p. 7Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 15 August 1991, pp. 1–2. The quotations in this paragraph and the following one are translated from mainland media because the focus of analysis is the treatment of this material by Beijing.

32. “Long delay in reunification of Taiwan, mainland means many hitches; U.S. intervention is becoming more and more open,” Taiwan, Shijie luntan bao, reprinted in Renmin ribao, overseas edition, 10 August 1991, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, 14 August 1991, pp. 3–4.

33. Ibid. Bellocchi spoke at the University of Pennsylvania, 18 July 1991.

34. Li Wen, Yu, “No one should interfere in China's internal affairs – commenting on remarks made on Taiwan issue by James Lilley and others,” Guangming ribao, 31 July 1991, p. 4Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 13 August 1991, pp. 4–5.

35. Ibid.

36. Renmin ribao, 10 October 1991, pp. 1, 3 in FBIS-CHI, 15 October 1991, pp. 31–34. The rally was in the Beijing Olympic Centre.

37. See Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, ch. VI.

38. Zhao, Suisheng, “Deng Xiaoping's southern tour: elite politics in post-Tiananmen China,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 8 (1993), p. 743.Google Scholar

39. For a detailed analysis see Garver, John W., “The Chinese Communist Party and the collapse of Soviet Communism,” The China Quarterly, No. 133 (March 1993), pp. 1–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

40. In addition to materials cited in this section, see Suisheng Zhao, “Deng Xiaoping's southern tour,” p. 744.

41. Renmin ribao, 26 August 1991, p.l, in FBIS-CHI, 29 August 1991, pp. 21–22.

42. Zhongguo tongxun she, 28 August 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 29 August 1991, p. 22; the article originally appeared in Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu.

43. See, for example, Yang, Lu, “Imperialism compels China to take socialist road,” Guangzhou Yangcheng wanbao, 21 August 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 29 August 1991, pp. 25–30Google Scholar; Zhun, Li, “Heighten consciousness to oppose evolution,” Renmin ribao, 22 August 1991Google Scholar, in ibid. pp. 22–23; Zhaozhu, Yan, “No allowing wholesale Westernization – studying Jiang Zemin's ‘Speech at the Conference to Celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the CCP',” Guangming ribao, 26 September 1991Google Scholar; Shiyi, Jiang, “A good text for adhering steadfastly to socialism – some thoughts after watching the political educational TV series ‘Moving toward internationalism',” Jiefangjun bao, 2 October 1991, p. 3.Google Scholar

44. Yeping, Chen, “Having political integrity and ability, with stress on political integrity,” Renmin ribao, 31 August 1991Google Scholar as reported by Hong Kong Agence France Press, 1 September 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 3 September 1991, pp. 26–27.

45. Meng, Chuang, “Deng puts forward new 12-character guiding principle for internal and foreign policies,” Jing bao, No. 172 (5 November 1991), pp. 84–86Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1991, pp. 28–30.

46. See Hong Kong Ming bao, 8 October 1991, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, 9 October 1991 p. 19; also Jing bao, 5 November 1991, pp. 84–86, in FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1991, pp. 28–30.

47. Ping, Lo, “Salvation meeting between Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping,” Zhengming, 11 November 1991Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 15 November 1991, pp. 24–27.

48. Hong Kong Jing bao, 5 December 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 19 December 1991, pp. 21–26; this differs from the previous translation of Jing bao, 5 November 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1991, pp. 28–30: “Enemy troops are outside the city wall. They are stronger than we. We should be mainly on the defensive.” The later version accords more with the classical allusions.

49. Jing bao, 5 November 1991

50. Pai-Niao, Lin, “CCP formulates new policy towards United States,” Zhengming, No. 170, 1 December 1991, pp. 17–19Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 2 December 1991, pp. 6–9.

51. Shan, Yueh, “Wang Zhen takes advantage of winning to curse Deng Xiaoping,” Zhengming, No. 171 (1 January 1992), pp. 20–21Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 10 January 1992, pp. 23–24; remarks reportedly were made on 4 November 1991. The remainder of this paragraph is from this same article.

52. Statement by Secretary Baker at farewell press conference, Ming bao, 18 November 1991, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, 20 November 1991, pp. 8–9.

53. Rujun, Wang, “Li Peng meets with Baker,” Renmin ribao, 18 November 1991, pp. 1Google Scholar, 4, in FBIS-CHI, 20 November 1991, p. 4.

54. Chien-Ping, Chen, “Baker held 18 hours of talks with Chinese side during his two-anda-half day visit,” Hong Kong Wenhui bao, 18 November 1991, p. 1Google Scholar, FBIS-CHI, 18 November 1991, pp. 23–24.

55. Renmin ribao, overseas edition, 18 November 1991, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, 20 November 1991, p. 7.

56. For a detailed but unconfirmable account of Deng’s purported advice to the participants in discussion with Baker, including Deng's own rationale for not joining in, see Lin Pai-niao, “CCP formulates new policy.”

57. Luan Baojun, “Rambling talk.”

58. Yihua, Lang, “The practice of human rights in socialist society and the international human rights struggle,” Qiushi, No. 1 (1 January 1992), pp. 10–15Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 27 February 1991, pp. 31–36.

59. For a detailed recapitulation of media treatment of Deng's tour, see Suisheng Zhao, “Deng Xiaoping's southern tour,” p. 741 and pp. 749–750.

60. CCP Central Document No. 2 (1992), Hong Kong Jingji ribao, 12 March 1992, p. 3, in FBIS-CHI, 13 March 1992, pp. 20–21. This version corresponds with that released officially by Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 5 November 1993, in FBIS-CHI 8 November 1993, pp. 21–26 except for expansion of various points in the later version.

61. This passage is longer and stronger in the subsequent official version, with “leftist” ideas “particularly deep-rooted” and “the ‘leftist’ things have done terrible harm to our Party in the past.” Therefore while guarding against “rightism,” “China should mainly guard against ‘leftism’.”

62. The later version read “imperialism” instead of “hostile forces.”

63. Hong Kong Dagong bao, 20 March 1992, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, 10 March 1992, pp. 19–20.

64. Compare Beijing Central People's Radio Network in Mandarin, 20 March 1992 in FBIS-CHI, Supplement, 20 March 1992, p. 12 with Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 3 April 1992, in FBIS-CHI, Supplement, 8 April 1992, p. 12.

65. Te-Lin, Cheng, “Deng says China will neither seek hegemony nor ally itself with the north,” Jing bao, No. 177, 5 April 1992, p. 48, in FBIS-CHI, 6 April 1992, pp. 1–2.Google Scholar The remainder of this paragraph comes from this source.

66. South China Morning Post, 28 March 1992, p. 11, in FBIS-CHI, 30 March 1992, p.

2. The report was filed from Beijing.

67. See, for instance, Zhongguo qingnian bao cited in Hong Kong Agence France Press, 3 May 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 6 May 1991, p.l.

68. Shan, Yueh, “Central Advisory Commission submits letter to CCP Central Committee opposing ‘rightist tendency’ Zhengming, No. 175 (1 May 1992), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar The petition was titled “Our views and opinions on certain questions.” The following paragraph also comes from this source.

69. Cheng, Li and White, Lynn, “The Army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping,” Asian Survey Vol. XXXIII, No. 8 (1993), pp. 758–59.Google Scholar

70. Ping, Lo, “Deng tours South China again to boost opening,” Zhengming, 1 February 1993, pp. 6–8Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 27 January 1993, pp. 5–7. The first meeting reportedly occurred in Suzhou prior to the larger session of 19–20 December at Dongshan.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ping, Lo and Tzu-Ching, Li, “One hundred and sixteen generals write to Deng Xiaoping on policy toward United States,” Zhengming, No. 188, 1 June 1993, pp. 14—16Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 2 June 1993, pp. 33–36. The letter was reportedly signed by Zhang Wannian, Director of the General Staff Headquarters, Yu Yongbo, Director of the General Political Department, and Fu Quanyou, Director of the General logistics Department, together with officers at various levels of different military regions, group armies and military academies. For a comprehensive study of the PLA see Swaine, Michael D., The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992).Google Scholar

74. The four reportedly were Song Renqiong, Qin Jiwei, Wang Enmao and Zhang Aiping, who “shed tears while they appealed to Deng.” Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. For details see Xinhua in English, 5 September 1993, in FBIS-CHI, 7 September 1993, pp. 1–2 and Renmin ribao, 5 September 1993, p. 1, in ibid. pp. 2–3.

80. Chinese Foreign Ministry statement, Renmin ribao, 5 September 1993, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, 7 September 1993, pp. 2–3.

81. Hui-Wen, Jen, “Background to China's ‘four nots’ policy towards the United States,” Hong Kong Xin bao, 17 September 1993, p. 24Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 17 September 1993, pp. 1–3; also Lin, Meng, “Generals jointly sign petition on Yinhe incident,” Jing bao. No. 10 (5 October 1993), p. 54Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 13 October 1993, pp. 41–42.

82. Ibid.

83. Ming bao, 24 September 1993, in FBIS-CHI, 24 September 1993, p. 1.

84. Li Tieying in Beijing China Daily, 24 September 1993, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, 24 September 1993, p. 2. Li is State Councillor and member of the CCP Political Bureau.

85. Zhengming, 1 November 1993, pp. 18–19, in FBIS-CHI, 8 November 1993, pp. 40–42.

86. Lan-Hai, Tsung, “CCP decides on its international archenemy,” Zhengming, No. 195 (1 January 1994), pp. 16–18Google Scholar in FBIS-CHI, 25 January 1994, pp. 4–6.

87. Ping, Lo, “When I am no longer around, will China plunge into great chaos?” Zhengming, No. 196 (1 February 1994), pp. 6–8Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 3 February 1994, pp. 26–29. The meeting was on 3 January.

88. Ibid.

89. Cheung, Tai Ming, “Looking beyond the Party: the PLA and the changing domestic order to the year 2000,” in James, Lilley (ed.), Fifth Annual American Enterprise Institute Conference on the PLA (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1994)Google Scholar, hereafter AEI Conference.

90. Ibid.

91. Ping, Lo, “Deng and Chen have a secret talk in Hangzhou,” Zhengming, No. 210 (1 July 1994), pp. 11–12Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 26 July 1994, pp. 14–15.

92. Ping, Lo, “CCP military attacks Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Zhengming, No. 210 (1 July 1994), pp. 6–8Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 26 July 1994, pp. 33–36.

93. Ibid.

94. Hong Kong Xin bao, 8 July 1994, p. 23, in FBIS-CHI, 13 July 1994, pp. 1–2.

95. South China Morning Post, 25 June 1994, p. 10, in FBIS-CHI, 27June 1994, pp. 40–41.

96. For details see Garver, John W., “China's push through the South China Sea: the interaction of bureaucratic and national interests,” The China Quarterly, No. 132 (December 1992), pp. 999–1102CrossRefGoogle Scholar; John Caldwell and Paul Godwin, “China's force projection potential: an assessment of the PLA's conventional military capability, 1994–2005,” AEI Conference.

97. Beijing Central People's Radio Network, 6 June 1994, in FBIS-CH1, 21 June 1994, p. 9.

98. Oksenberg, Michel, “China's confident nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 3 (1986–87), pp. 501–523.CrossRefGoogle Scholar