Mobilising concessions in hybrid regimes: strategic framing and threats to structural power

Hybrid regimes rarely concede to civic mobilisation. Their typical strategy is to ignore public pressure or outlast it through attritional delay, expecting public interest to dissipate (Bishara Reference Bishara2015; Frantz and Kendall–Taylor Reference Frantz and Kendall-Taylor2017; Tilly Reference Tilly2010; Yuen and Cheng Reference Yuen and Cheng2017). When repression is applied, it is usually less violent than in fully authoritarian systems. Nevertheless, concessions do occur (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2016; de Vogel Reference de Vogel2024; Heurlin Reference Heurlin2016; Leuschner and Hellmeier Reference Leuschner and Hellmeier2023; Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2002; Musil and Yardımcı-Geyikçi Reference Musil and Yardımcı-Geyikçi2024; Li Reference Li2019; Spasojević and Lončar Reference Spasojević and Lončar2023; Trantidis Reference Trantidis2022). Even fully authoritarian regimes may occasionally yield to civic mobilisation when legitimacy is at stake (Acemoglu and Robinson Reference Acemoglu and Robinson2006; Bishara Reference Bishara2015). However, such concessions tend to be partial, symbolic or reversible – carefully calibrated to manage dissent while safeguarding the regime’s core power structures (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2016; Leuschner and Hellmeier Reference Leuschner and Hellmeier2024; Lührmann and Rooney Reference Lührmann and Rooney2021; Pierskalla Reference Pierskalla2009). This behaviour closely resembles what Christine Oliver (Reference Oliver1991) terms ‘acquiescence’: appearing responsive while protecting the foundational pillars of power.

We argue that understanding when and how concessions are granted requires analysing two variables in tandem. The first is structural threat: whether meeting the demand would undermine one or more of the regime’s core pillars of power. The second is issue resonance: the extent to which the particular cause gains traction across diverse social groups, raising legitimacy costs if the regime refuses to act. Consequently, it is possible to predict the regime’s response depending on where an issue is positioned across the two dimensions (Table 1). Concessions are most likely when structural threat is low but resonance is high. When structural threat is high, even increased emotional resonance produces only limited, strategic or reversible concessions.

Table 1.

Predicted Regime Responses

Note: The table shows predicted regime responses depending on where an issue is positioned across the two dimensions: the level of threat to regime power and the emotional resonance of the cause.

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

Structural threat refers to the risk that conceding to the demand would erode key institutional, economic or narrative levers essential for the regime’s survival. Demands that threaten these pillars – such as control over key industries, the media, patronage networks, state resources, elite alliances or international links – are met with maximum resistance. In Serbia, for instance, foreign partnerships (especially with Western actors) have enabled the Vučić regime to escape any meaningful external pressure over its domestic abuses (Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2010; Pavlović Reference Pavlović2023).

Issue resonance describes how broadly a grievance connects people across different parts of society. Demands confined to core opposition groups rarely force concessions, whereas those which mobilise neutral or regime-leaning citizens sharply increase the regime’s legitimacy costs (Lührmann Reference Lührmann2021; Lust and Waldner Reference Lust and Waldner2015). In hybrid regimes, opposition actors often employ liberal-democratic frames such as individual freedoms or the rule of law, but these tend to resonate only with small, engaged minorities (Börzel and Schimmelfennig Reference Börzel and Schimmelfennig2017; Ekiert Reference Ekiert2021).

In Serbia, such values are not deeply embedded, and the regime’s propaganda often dismisses them as elitist or foreign-imposed (Vachudova Reference Vachudova2020). In contrast, frames rooted in traditional values such as sovereignty, conservatism or distrust of international actors have far wider appeal, drawing on historical experiences – for example, the NATO bombing, the experience of privatisation and perceived exploitation by foreign elites (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2025). Campaigns that tap into these sentiments can bridge ideological divides and erode regime legitimacy, even among its base.

Issue framing: anchoring issues in shared identities

Issue framing – defined as emphasising selected facets of a given issue (Anspach and Draguljić Reference Anspach and Draguljić2019: 617; Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000) – can be a powerful tool that shapes how audiences interpret and assess that issue (Anspach and Draguljić Reference Anspach and Draguljić2019; Hart and Nisbet Reference Hart and Nisbet2012; Iyengar and Kinder Reference Iyengar and Kinder1987). One issue can garner markedly different levels of public backing depending on the frame through which it is presented (van Lit et al. Reference van Lit, van Ham and Meijers2023: 8). Effective framing connects an issue with the values people already hold deeply, thereby enhancing how legitimate and urgent that issue appears (Brewer Reference Brewer2002; Lakoff Reference Lakoff2010; Nelson et al. Reference Nelson, Oxley and Clawson1997). In doing so, it creates new psychological associations between the specific issue and more fundamental, enduring values (Domke et al. Reference Domke, Shah and Wackman1998). Well-crafted frames restructure familiar information within interpretive contexts that individuals may not previously have considered, and these novel vantage points can correspond with and activate existing beliefs (Brewer Reference Brewer2002; Domke et al. Reference Domke, Shah and Wackman1998; Nelson et al. Reference Nelson, Oxley and Clawson1997). Through this process, the perceived legitimacy and moral urgency of an issue are heightened via the activation of pre-existing, deeply rooted values (Brewer Reference Brewer2002; Lakoff Reference Lakoff2010).

From a cognitive standpoint, framing alters which mental heuristics are most salient, thereby shaping both public attitudes and subsequent behaviour (Chong and Druckman Reference Chong and Druckman2007). In contexts of political mobilisation, strategic framing can turn an ostensibly low-salience or low-mobilisation concern into a strong focal point for resistance, invoking broadly shared values that it is believed will be threatened by the contested policy. This increases citizens’ perception about the gravity of harm that the contested regime’s actions pose (van Lit et al. Reference van Lit, van Ham and Meijers2023: 9).

Frames that align with shared identities and cultural values, rather than solely liberal-democratic ones, can dramatically expand an issue’s resonance (Drury and Reicher Reference Reicher, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell1987, Reference Drury and Reicher1999,  Reference Drury and Reicher2000,  Reference Reicher2001,  Reference Drury and Reicher2005; Simon et al. Reference Simon, Loewy, Stürmer, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier and Spahlinger1998; Stürmer and Simon Reference Stürmer and Simon2004; Tajfel Reference Tajfel1978; Tajfel and Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1979; Yabanci Reference Yabanci2025). This reduces psychological distance and makes the issue more relatable (Newell et al. Reference Newell, McDonald, Brewer and Hayes2014). Framing can blend unifying narratives – rooted in widely shared identity values – with a set of tailored frames for specific audiences, as long as they are mutually compatible. This is not about finding the lowest common denominator, but about creating a synergy between different frames. The most effective strategy is to combine a broad, unifying frame that appeals to shared identity values with a collection of more specific frames that speak to distinct values in different social groups, each activated as appropriate.

Further techniques include personalisation (highlighting concrete victims or heroes), invoking shared dangers, and motivational framing, such as appeals to anger, empathy or moral solidarity (Hart and Nisbet Reference Hart and Nisbet2012; Smith and Ellsworth Reference Smith and Ellsworth1985; van Zomeren et al. Reference van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears2008). In contexts of deep distrust towards elites, frames that evoke betrayal or threats to communal dignity can be especially powerful (Hooghe and Marien Reference Hooghe and Marien2013).

Regime-aligned media dominate mass communication in most hybrid regimes, limiting the spread of dissenting frames (for Serbia, see e.g. Atlagić and Vučićević Reference Atlagić, Vučićević, Gregor, Eibl and Newman2024). While independent media and social networks offer alternative channels, their reach is often limited (Pearce and Kendzior Reference Pearce and Kendzior2012). Nevertheless, online mobilisation can help set the agenda and facilitate offline action, especially when supported by strong organisational capacity (Edgell et al. Reference Edgell, Lachapelle, Lührmann and Maerz2021; Ganz et al. Reference Ganz, Nohria, Khurana, Nohria and Khurana2010; Tufekci Reference Tufekci2017). Move, Change typically begins its campaigns with digital petitions, moving to offline protest and direct engagement as the issue gains traction.

Analytical context

Serbia is a transitional country in South-Eastern Europe that has experienced more than a decade of democratic backsliding. Once an unconsolidated democracy, it is now classified as a competitive, semi-authoritarian regime (V-Dem Institute 2024). While legal guarantees for political and media freedoms exist, they are routinely undermined in practice (Atlagić and Vučićević Reference Atlagić, Vučićević, Gregor, Eibl and Newman2024). Independent media reach only a minority of mainly urban and younger populations (CRTA 2023; Vladisavljević Reference Vladisavljević2020), and while the internet remains uncensored, its reach is similarly limited and insufficient to challenge the regime’s dominance over public discourse (Matović et al. Reference Matović, Milin Perković and Josifović2022). Political contestation has been further constrained by the appointment of loyalists to leadership positions in key oversight bodies (Tomić and Pavlović Reference Tomić and Pavlović2023).

Within this restricted civic space, dissent is possible but constrained by concentrated executive control (Damnjanović Reference Damnjanović2020) and the regime’s tight grip on national broadcast media. Activism in Belgrade carries fewer risks to personal security than in more repressive systems; while some activists face intimidation, such as so-called SLAPP lawsuits (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) or short-term detentions, there remains relative safety for mobilisation, especially in the capital.Footnote ¹ Independent television and online portals reach about one-third of the electorate (CRTA 2023), providing some space for debate but not enough to shift majority opinion without broader engagement strategies.

It is in this environment that the NGO Kreni-Promeni (Move, Change) emerged in 2019, aiming to promote social justice and broader political change through grassroots mobilisation. Move, Change has led campaigns on a variety of issues, from environmental protection and social justice to anti-corruption and support for vulnerable groups (Kreni-Promeni n.d.). Campaigns typically begin with a strategically framed online petition and, if successful, escalate to offline actions such as rallies and protest walks. Over three years, Move, Change has grown from a small initiative into a leading force in civic mobilisation against the increasingly authoritarian regime of Aleksandar Vučić.

Case studies and methods

This section examines six mobilisation campaigns led or co-led by Move, Change. Each case summary describes the issue’s origin, the ensuing campaign and the regime’s response. The analysis draws on media reports and first-hand organiser accounts. Cases were selected to maximise variation along the two key framework dimensions: (1) the degree of threat posed to one of the regime’s structural pillars; and (2) the breadth of resonance of the campaign’s cause beyond the core ‘issue losers’. The expectation is that regime responses will correspond to the campaign’s position in the framework’s 3 × 2 matrix (see Table 1).

All six campaigns were conducted within a broadly similar political and social context. This provides control over the key mediating variables identified in the literature, whether linked to the broader social and political environment (Skocpol Reference Skocpol1979), economic structures (Lachapelle et al. Reference Lachapelle, Hellmeier and Lührmann2021) or organisational and resource factors highlighted as critical for campaign success, including organisational capacity, structural conditions, tactical choices and credibility (Chenoweth Reference Chenoweth2023; de Vogel Reference de Vogel2024: 189; Ganz et al. Reference Ganz, Nohria, Khurana, Nohria and Khurana2010; Sutton et al. Reference Sutton, Devine, Lamont and Holmes2021; van Lit et al. Reference van Lit, van Ham and Meijers2023). In all the selected cases, the variation in these factors is minimal or absent, allowing us to put them aside as primary explanations for differences in outcomes. Therefore, the observed variation in the responses of the regime can be attributed to the specific nature of each issue and the way it was framed during the campaign.

Analysis and discussion

This paper has introduced a framework to explain and predict when a hybrid regime will concede to demands generated by social mobilisation. The framework comprises two key dimensions: (1) structural power threat – the degree to which meeting a demand would undermine one or more of the regime’s foundational pillars (e.g. elite alliances, control of the media, strategic resources); and (2) emotional resonance – whether the campaign achieves broad emotional appeal, including among the regime’s own supporters. Six cases led by the Serbian NGO Move, Change, were selected to cover the full range of these dimensions and to rigorously test the framework’s explanatory and predictive value.

Across all cases, the observed regime behaviour aligned closely with the expected patterns across the threat–resonance matrix, as summarised below and presented in Table 2:

Table 2.

Issue Trajectories during Mobilisation

Note: Arrows indicate changes in symbolic/emotional resonance (shown in binary form: low/high), with horizontal distance reflecting the approximate variation within each cell.

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

Low structural threat, high emotional resonance. The regime showed the least resistance and conceded most readily. In the Čikić Award case, where no core power resources were at stake, the demand was met quickly once societal sympathy became evident.

Moderate structural threat, high emotional resonance. Initial resistance was followed by concessions once the campaigns gained visibility and legitimacy costs rose. Save the Park disrupted clientelistic profit streams but succeeded through emotionally resonant framing, as did the Save the Natural History Museum campaign – protecting children’s spaces or safeguarding national heritage.

High structural threat, with one case achieving and the other not achieving wider resonance. The regime resisted strongly, relying on institutional manipulation, intimidation and selective repression. The Rio Tinto campaign and the case of Pink TV and Happy TV threatened strategic foreign investment and media control – both central levers of regime power – and therefore met with sustained resistance.

Throughout, the regime’s responses followed a consistent pattern marked by initial avoidance of the issue (Conrad Reference Conrad2011; O’Donnell and Schmitter Reference O’Donnell and Schmitter1986), shifting to graduated concessions proportional to the structural threat as the emotional resonance increased. When demands touched the core pillars of power, however, even mass mobilisation produced only temporary or tactical retreats, which were quickly reversed once the pressure ebbed, as in the case of Rio Tinto. The Pink TV case showed the same logic, in that the announcement of a partial concession (pausing the reality show) was later abandoned entirely as the regime’s counterframing and entrenched viewership enabled it to reject both the partial concession and the wider demand to revoke the TV licence. Table 3 sets out the relationship between the regime’s response, structural threat and issue salience in each of the six campaigns.

Table 3.

Observed versus Predicted Regime Responses

Note: The table shows the observed versus predicted regime responses across the six possible constellations of threat to regime power and symbolic resonance.

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

We also observed, however, that as certain issues achieved broader resonance, the regime became more inclined to consider concessions. When structural threat was low, concessions were made quickly and with minimal resistance, as seen in the Čikić case, which carried strong emotional weight but posed no risk to regime power. When the structural threat was moderate – still short of undermining core pillars of power – the regime eventually yielded, typically after initial inaction and attempts at damage control through rhetorical reframing or, in some cases, limited suppression (e.g. the Park case). Sustained mobilisation and expanded resonance ultimately compelled concessions in these instances. In contrast, when a demand threatened a fundamental pillar of regime power, the regime resisted most strongly.

This was evident in the Rio Tinto and Pink TV/Happy TV cases. Halting the Rio Tinto project temporarily appeased public outrage but was soon followed by efforts to revive it, reflecting a broader authoritarian pattern of making apparent concessions under pressure, only to reverse them later. Here, the regime is caught between high legitimacy costs (and potential electoral losses) and the risk of weakening its core power structures. Similarly, in the Pink TV case, the regime initially offered a partial concession – ending a controversial reality show but retaining the channel’s licence – to reduce public pressure without undermining its media control. However, even this was short-lived, as the regime soon reversed its position. Despite large-scale mobilisation, the issue failed to resonate beyond the opposition and did not shift opinion among the broader public, especially regime supporters. The government’s counterframing, which portrayed the incidents as unforeseeable and unrelated to regime or media responsibility, prevailed. The continued popularity of the TV station and its shows illustrates how the imperative to safeguard structural power can outweigh substantial – but insufficiently widespread – public pressure.

The cases show that emotional resonance is not automatic but is often achieved through deliberate strategic framing. Move, Change’s most successful campaigns aligned their messaging with widely shared values, identity markers and emotional appeals, broadening support and raising the legitimacy costs of regime inaction. For instance, the Rio Tinto campaign combined themes of ancestral land, environmental protection and national sovereignty to mobilise across political divides; Save the Park framed the struggle as ordinary citizens defending children’s spaces from corrupt developers; the Čikić Award campaign drew on collective grief; and the Save the Clinic effort tapped into longstanding positive sentiment towards students. In contrast, the Pink TV/Happy TV campaign failed to resonate with the regime’s base despite large-scale protests, as revoking the stations’ licences threatened a core pillar of regime control and the framing did not break through to neutral or pro-regime audiences.

Across all cases, once a campaign began to gain traction, persistent regime refusal became increasingly costly, often prompting signals of a willingness to concede. Where structural power threat was low, concessions were rapid and complete; as threat levels rose, however, concessions became more limited, delayed or absent altogether.

The case studies analysed here underscore the crucial role of issue framing in social mobilisation (Anspach and Draguljić Reference Anspach and Draguljić2019; Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000). Effective framing, especially when anchored in widely shared values and identity markers, enables campaigns to extend their reach beyond narrow constituencies and unify diverse segments of the public (Drury and Reicher Reference Drury and Reicher1999, Reference Drury and Reicher2000, Reference Drury and Reicher2005; Tajfel Reference Tajfel1978; Tajfel and Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1979). Successful campaigns often combined liberal-democratic appeals with traditional or symbolic values, showing that resonance can be constructed, not taken for granted.

Two key points emerge from this analysis: first, framing is a powerful tool for broadening support and increasing mobilisation; second, unifying frames that appeal to shared identities are particularly effective. Additionally, incorporating motivational (Smith and Ellsworth Reference Smith and Ellsworth1985; van Zomeren et al. Reference van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears2008) and personalised (Hart and Nisbet Reference Hart and Nisbet2012) narratives further amplifies mobilisation, as seen in cases like that of Rio Tinto, where campaigners humanised the issue and directed moral urgency and anger at the regime and its collaborators. Such strategies not only deepened engagement but also reached new audiences.

These findings depart from much of the dominant literature on mobilisation and authoritarian concessions in two main ways. The cases highlight how legitimacy pressures are actively constructed through strategic issue selection and framing (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000; Entman Reference Entman1993), adding nuance to mobilisation accounts that emphasise organisational resources (Ganz et al. Reference Ganz, Nohria, Khurana, Nohria and Khurana2010; Sutton et al. Reference Sutton, Devine, Lamont and Holmes2021) and underscoring the role of value-based framing in shaping outcomes. Although organisational factors (such as communication style, coordination and sustained visibility) were important in Move, Change’s campaigns, it was the interplay of these elements with deliberate, value-based framing that was most decisive in generating the regime’s response (Gamson and Modigliani Reference Gamson and Modigliani1989; Snow and Benford Reference Snow and Benford1988).

The framework also helps to explain the process of partial concessions and subsequent reversals in (semi)authoritarian regimes (Leuschner and Hellmeier Reference Leuschner and Hellmeier2023). In the Rio Tinto case, the regime initially repealed the expropriation law under intense public pressure but later sought to revive the project – employing narrative reframing, continued land clearance, and a favourable Constitutional Court ruling to relegitimise it. This behaviour reflects a broader pattern observed in other hybrid regimes, which may ‘back off’ temporarily when legitimacy costs peak, only to reintroduce contested policies or projects once mobilisation subsides (Acemoglu and Robinson Reference Acemoglu and Robinson2006; Brancati Reference Brancati2014; Leuschner and Hellmeier Reference Leuschner and Hellmeier2023).

By mapping issues according to both structural power threat and issue resonance, the proposed framework offers not only explanatory insight but also practical guidance for civic strategists and activists. First, issues with strong potential for identity- and value-based framing should be prioritised to maximise emotional resonance. Second, mobilisation efforts should be designed to extend resonance beyond the directly affected group, especially in cases where structural stakes for the regime are high. Third, even after concessions are secured, sustained monitoring is essential to guard against backtracking or reversal – an outcome frequently observed in (semi)authoritarian contexts, where regimes often rescind or dilute concessions once mobilisation pressure subsides (Leuschner and Hellmeier Reference Leuschner and Hellmeier2024; Meng et al. Reference Meng, Paine and Powell2023: 159).