Introduction
Sovereignty referendums, as defined by Mendez and Germann (Reference Mendez and Germann2018, 145), are direct popular votes on the reallocation of sovereign authority between at least two territorial centers. When pursued unilaterally by a state-like entity — meaning without a valid legal basis or the consent of all sovereignty claimants — such referendums are unlikely to gain external recognition and, as a result, fail to effect or prevent any de jure change in sovereignty (Walker-Nolan Reference Walker-Nolan2023). This limitation must be evident to the leadership of state-like entities from the outset, raising the question: what drives their decision to pursue such referendums despite these constraints?
The general literature — which focuses broadly on unilateral sovereignty referendums, regardless of the specific type of state-like entity pursuing them — identifies several motivations behind such referendums (Cortés Rivera Reference Cortés Rivera2023; Germann Reference Germann2017, 51–54; Kelle and Sienknecht Reference Kelle and Sienknecht2020; López and Sanjaume-Calvet Reference López and Sanjaume-Calvet2020, 511–513; Qvortrup Reference Qvortrup2014; Şen Reference Şen2015, 42–44; Walker Reference Walker2003; Wheatley Reference Wheatley and Marxer2012, 65–72). However, it often overlooks motivations that are specific to particular types of state-like entities. This limitation was highlighted by Kosienkowski (Reference Kosienkowski2022), who focused on de facto states — entities that resemble states but lack international recognition as such — and identified additional motivations. While recent developments in the general literature have modestly expanded the set of motivations (Goers, Cunningham, and Balcells Reference Goers, Cunningham and Balcells2025a), significant gaps remain in understanding those tailored to specific categories of entities. To address this gap, this article focuses on motivations specific to territorial autonomies, which Mendez and Germann also designate as state-like entities (Aubert, Germann, and Mendez Reference Aubert, Germann and Mendez2015b).
Territorial autonomies are demographically distinctive entities that exercise asymmetrical, legally entrenched self-governing powers within sovereign (parent) states. Examples include Catalonia in Spain, Crimea prior to its annexation by Russia in 2014, Gagauzia in Moldova, Gibraltar in the UK, Quebec in Canada, South Tyrol in Italy, and Tatarstan in Russia (Fong Reference Fong, Fong and Ichijo2022). Building on this focus, the article aims to propose a set of possible motivations for pursuing unilateral sovereignty referendums by territorial autonomies and to examine these motivations through an empirical case, offering new insights into this underexplored phenomenon.
When proposing a set of motivations for pursuing unilateral sovereignty referendums by territorial autonomies, this study builds on a framework originally developed for de facto states. The premise is that territorial autonomies share significant similarities with de facto states: they exhibit a developed sovereignty awareness and often pursue a sovereignty cause, maintain robust internal political life, and engage in active external relations. Some of these similarities become especially notable during unilateral sovereignty referendums. However, important differences exist, including more diverse sovereignty aspirations, stronger political ties to the parent state, and differing structures and dynamics in external activities. These differences also contextualize and inform the adapted framework proposed in this study.
This article applies the framework of motivations to the case of Gagauzia’s February 2014 sovereignty referendums, which addressed two issues: Moldova’s foreign vector and Gagauzia’s deferred independence. Specifically, it investigates the motivations of the Gagauz leadership for pursuing the referendums across three distinct stages: the proposal stage (November 2012–October 2013), the initiation stage (November 2013), and the implementation stage (December 2013–January 2014). These stages reflect the dynamic interplay between Gagauzia’s divided leadership, with the executive led by Bashkan Mihail Formuzal and his political movement, United Gagauzia, and the legislative branch dominated by Nicolai Dudoglo’s supporters and his New Gagauzia movement. Both branches engaged in proactive initiatives as well as reactive moves in response to each other and to initiatives from other regional actors. While the primary focus remains on the Gagauz leadership, the study also identifies the motivations of these additional actors. At each stage, the referendums were met with consistent assurances from Moldova’s central government that they would not be recognized — confirming their unilateral character.
With two referendums, three stages, and the interplay of diverse regional actors — primarily the dual authorities — Gagauzia’s 2014 sovereignty referendums provide a robust case for examining the proposed framework of motivations for unilateral sovereignty referendums by territorial autonomies. The point is that this provides many microcases for such inquiry. The empirical analysis primarily draws on newspapers affiliated with the two branches of Gagauzia’s authorities, supplemented by additional relevant sources. Overall, this study employs a plausibility-probe design (Levy Reference Levy2008, 6–7), focused on evaluating whether the proposed framework captures the motivations at play in the case of Gagauzia.
This article makes a twofold contribution. First, it offers a framework of possible motivations for pursuing unilateral sovereignty referendums specifically by territorial autonomies, which is more comprehensive than the one existing in the general literature for all kinds of state-like entities. It also broadens the dominant focus on the initiation stage of such referendums to include the preceding proposal stage and the subsequent implementation stage, where motivations may differ. Importantly, examining the framework across all these stages enhances the general understanding of motivations for unilateral sovereignty referendums by territorial autonomies. Second, it provides a systematic, theory-guided analysis of Gagauzia’s 2014 sovereignty referendums, covering every stage of the process and examining both the active and reactive strategies pursued by Gagauzia’s authorities — divided between the executive and legislative branches — drawing on newspapers affiliated with each. This distinguishes the article from previous analyses of the 2014 referendums (Berbeca Reference Berbeca2014; Całus Reference Całus2014; Cantir Reference Cantir2015; Minzarari Reference Minzarari2014; Tudoroiu Reference Tudoroiu2016), offering a comprehensive account of an event widely regarded by Gagauzia’s elites and population as one of the most significant in the region’s history (Guboglo Reference Guboglo2014). As such, this article also adds to the research on Gagauzia, which is still relatively limited (see, for example, Holsapple Reference Holsapple2023; İnan and Dağdeviren-Kırmızı Reference İnan, Dağdeviren-Kırmızı, Wei and Schnell2025; Kosienkowski Reference Kosienkowski2021).
The article begins by outlining the concept of sovereignty referendums, including their typologies and underlying motivations. It then builds on existing frameworks related to de facto states to propose a set of potential motivations for territorial autonomies to pursue unilateral sovereignty referendums. Before applying this framework, the article provides the political and geopolitical background of the Gagauz case and elaborates on the methodology. It proceeds to examine the framework through Gagauzia’s 2014 referendums, analyzing three phases: proposal, initiation, and implementation. Finally, the article assesses the framework’s applicability.
Sovereignty Referendums: Typologies and Motivations
Mendez and Germann describe a sovereignty referendum as “a direct popular vote on a reallocation of sovereignty between at least two territorial centers,” interpreting sovereignty broadly as “the right to make authoritative political decisions within a territorial unit.” They note that sovereignty referendums may be pursued by states or state-like entities (entities acting in ways that resemble state behavior), embodied by their leadership. They also propose a classification system with 12 types of sovereignty referendums, determined by two criteria: the scope of the sovereignty shift (partial, full, and pooled) and the logic of the sovereignty reallocation (integrative and disintegrative). These types are organized into six pairs: incorporation and sub-state merger, autonomy and sub-state secession, unification and transfer, independence and irredentist separation, supranational accession and supranational delegation, and supranational withdrawal and supranational repatriation (Mendez and Germann Reference Mendez and Germann2018, 145–148; see also Aubert, Germann, and Mendez Reference Aubert, Germann and Mendez2015a, 11–13 for further details).
Mendez and Germann (Reference Mendez and Germann2018, 144) also recall a typology that distinguishes between official (consensual/legal) and unofficial (unilateral/illegal) referendums, based on whether they have a valid legal foundation or formal acceptance from all involved sovereignty claimants. Although they apply this typology only to referendums that have already taken place, it can equally be extended to polls that are proposed, initiated, or implemented, as it is often evident during these stages whether they possess or lack a valid legal basis or formal acceptance. This article focuses on unilateral sovereignty referendums — those lacking a valid legal foundation or formal acceptance, and primarily, if not exclusively, pursued by state-like entities — and their motivations.
Consensual sovereignty referendums are generally intended to be universally respected and to bring about de jure sovereignty changes, either outright or as part of a process they are designed to trigger. This is typically their primary objective. By contrast, unilateral sovereignty referendums are unlikely to secure external recognition, making it virtually impossible for them to achieve or prevent de jure sovereignty changes (Walker-Nolan Reference Walker-Nolan2023). Nevertheless, such referendums are still pursued, suggesting that their purpose extends beyond securing legally binding resolutions — whether outright or through a process established at the time of the referendum. The general literature — which takes a broad approach to unilateral sovereignty referendums, examining them irrespective of the specific type of state-like entity pursuing them — identifies three key motivations: producing legitimacy for the sovereignty cause internationally, empowering entities pursuing polls vis-à-vis external opponents of their sovereignty cause, and ensuring unity for the sovereignty cause internally (Cortés Rivera Reference Cortés Rivera2023; Germann Reference Germann2017, 51–54; Kelle and Sienknecht Reference Kelle and Sienknecht2020; López and Sanjaume-Calvet Reference López and Sanjaume-Calvet2020, 511–513; Qvortrup Reference Qvortrup2014; Şen Reference Şen2015, 42–44; Walker Reference Walker2003; Wheatley Reference Wheatley and Marxer2012, 65–72).
Focusing on a specific type of entities — de facto states, which are entities that resemble states but lack international recognition as such — Kosienkowski (Reference Kosienkowski2022) identified four additional motivations for unilaterally pursuing sovereignty referendums. These motivations include meeting a patron’s demands, boosting relations with a patron, facilitating de facto integration with a patron, and empowering actors behind referendums domestically (see also Kosienkowski Reference Kosienkowski2024; Scheindlin Reference Scheindlin2012). While recent contributions to the general literature have modestly expanded the set of motivations by emphasizing domestic empowerment (Goers, Cunningham, and Balcells Reference Goers, Cunningham and Balcells2025a), Kosienkowski’s work underscores significant gaps in understanding motivations specific to distinct categories of state-like entities. To address this gap, this article examines the unique motivations for pursuing unilateral sovereignty referendums by territorial autonomies — demographically distinctive entities with asymmetrical, legally entrenched self-governing powers within sovereign (parent) states (Fong Reference Fong, Fong and Ichijo2022) — that Mendez and Germann also designate as state-like entities (Aubert, Germann, and Mendez Reference Aubert, Germann and Mendez2015b).
Motivations Behind Unilateral Sovereignty Referendums by Territorial Autonomies
Adapting a Framework for Territorial Autonomies
In developing a set of motivations for pursuing unilateral sovereignty referendums by territorial autonomies, this study draws on a framework of motivations originally proposed by Kosienkowski (Reference Kosienkowski2022) for de facto states. These motivations center on sovereignty, internal political dynamics, and external interactions. This approach is based on the premise that territorial autonomies exhibit notable parallels with de facto states in these areas, while some of these similarities become particularly evident during unilateral sovereignty referendums. However, there are also critical distinctions between these entities that must further inform and contextualize the adapted framework. Overall, this adaptation is informed by deductive reasoning and supported by insights from the literature on territorial autonomies.
First, like de facto states, territorial autonomies demonstrate a well-developed sovereignty awareness and, particularly when pursuing sovereignty referendums, sovereignty cause. However, while de facto states typically aspire for independence or irredentist separation, territorial autonomies have a broader range of sovereignty aspirations, as reflected in examples of both de facto states and territorial autonomies’ unilateral referendums (Aubert, Germann, and Mendez Reference Aubert, Germann and Mendez2015b; Goers, Cunningham, and Balcells Reference Goers, Cunningham and Balcells2025b). This broader range is due to the more integrated status of territorial autonomies within their parent states. Using the terminology of Mendez and Germann (Reference Mendez and Germann2018, 146–148) and drawing on these examples, these aspirations may include retaining, confirming, or expanding autonomy (for example, the referendum in Tatarstan in 1992 was in favor of confirming and expanding autonomy), transferring certain sovereign rights over a territorial autonomy from the parent state to another state (for example, the referendum in Gibraltar in 2002 was against joint sovereignty of the UK with Spain), achieving independence (for example, the referendum in Catalonia in 2017 was in favor of independence), seeking irredentist separation (for example, the referendum in Crimea in 2014 supported union with Russia), or pursuing the supranational accession of their parent states (for example, the referendum in Crimea on Ukraine’s NATO accession in 2006 opposed NATO membership).
This broader range of sovereignty aspirations, among others, would result in the involvement of a greater number of actors in the sovereignty reallocation process. For de facto states, sovereignty transfer would typically involve the parent state and a patron. By contrast, for territorial autonomies, it would often include additional actors directly involved in the sovereignty reallocation process alongside the parent state, such as international organizations the parent state seeks to join, or those negotiating shared sovereignty arrangements with the parent state over territorial autonomy. They can be referred to as tandemized external actors, reflecting their role in coordinating sovereignty arrangements alongside the parent state. Another effect of the broader range of sovereignty aspirations is that claims of internal self-determination by territorial autonomies are more likely to find parent states and international actors more receptive than in the case of external self-determination. These claims may also attract stronger support from the autonomy’s population, as they are often perceived as less radical and more feasible than external self-determination, reflecting a broader range of possibilities in scale than is typically available in de facto states.
Second, like de facto states, territorial autonomies exhibit robust internal political life, characterized by regional self-governing institutions, including executives and legislatures, which serve as arenas for competition among the autonomy’s political actors (Detterbeck Reference Detterbeck, Fong and Ichijo2022). However, unlike de facto states, territorial autonomies maintain much stronger political ties to their parent states, even when they defy the parent state’s authority by unilaterally pursuing sovereignty referendums. For the autonomy’s political actors, this interconnectedness creates opportunities to advance their political influence not only within the autonomy’s institutions but also in the politics of the center. At the same time, central actors may aim to exert their influence within the autonomy’s political sphere to promote their own interests.
Third, like de facto states, territorial autonomies are usually actively involved in external relations, including with their parent states. While territorial autonomies typically operate within a legal framework established by central governments (Suksi Reference Suksi, Fong and Ichijo2022), they at least partially step beyond this framework when defying the parent state’s authority by unilaterally pursuing sovereignty referendums. In doing so, they temporarily alter their status, achieving a degree of de facto parity with their parent states, more closely resembling the dynamic between de facto states and their parent states. This gives their interaction with parent states a stronger external dimension.
External relations may also involve patrons who provide valuable support, including political, diplomatic, and economic (Cantir Reference Cantir2020; Klyszcz Reference Klyszcz2023). While patrons can include international organizations or diasporas, this article focuses primarily on states due to their significant role in shaping sovereignty-related outcomes and geopolitical dynamics for territorial autonomies, just like in the case of de facto states. However, the relationship with patrons tends to be weaker for territorial autonomies than for de facto states, as territorial autonomies typically do not rely on patrons for survival. This weaker relationship often results in less support from patrons and reduced pressure for reciprocity.
Based on the above considerations regarding similarities and differences between de facto states and territorial autonomies, this study adapts the framework of motivations for pursuing unilateral sovereignty referendums originally developed for de facto states to the specific context of territorial autonomies. It includes seven motivations: (1) procuring legitimacy of the sovereignty cause internationally, (2) empowering territorial autonomies vis-à-vis parent states and tandemized external actors, (3) ensuring unity for the sovereignty cause internally, (4) meeting patrons’ demands, (5) boosting relations with patrons, (6) facilitating de facto reallocation of sovereignty, and (7) advancing individual or group interests by the autonomy leadership. The framework is designed for territorial autonomies generally, but the motivations it identifies should be understood as a set of potential drivers, only some of which may be at play in a given case. Depending on contextual factors — for example, whether a territorial autonomy has, or seeks to have, a patron — certain motivations can be ruled out in advance, while others may be supported or dismissed in the course of empirical investigation.
Similarities justify borrowing from the de facto state framework, but differences in both scale and kind suggest that territorial autonomies cannot be adequately analyzed through a simple extension or refinement of that framework, making a tailored approach more appropriate. Four motivations — related to international legitimacy, internal unity, and patrons — exist in both de facto states and territorial autonomies, but in the case of territorial autonomies, they operate at different intensities due to the presence of both external and internal self-determination aspirations and weaker external patronage. Three motivations take forms that are structurally unavailable to de facto states: empowerment directed against external actors tandemized with parent states, not only against the parent state; de facto reallocation of sovereignty through a transition to de facto statehood, not only through integration with a patron; and the advancement of leadership interests in the politics of the parent state, not only within the state-like entity.
Procuring Legitimacy of the Sovereignty Cause Internationally
Unilateral sovereignty referendums in territorial autonomies may be pursued by their authorities to demonstrate strong public support for their sovereignty cause, targeting international actors other than parent states, external actors tandemized with parent states in the sovereignty reallocation process, or patrons. By invoking widely recognized norms of democracy and self-determination, these efforts aim to gain international legitimacy and attract attention and support. Such support may take the form of pressuring parent states to address the autonomy’s interests, potentially resulting in concessions, compromises, or adjustments — whether directly related to the referendum’s demands or other priorities related to sovereignty or governance. Alternatively, support may involve direct backing of territorial autonomies, strengthening their position vis-à-vis parent states in sovereignty-related negotiations.
Empowering Territorial Autonomies vis-à-vis Parent States and Tandemized External Actors
Sovereignty referendums in territorial autonomies may be pursued unilaterally to empower these autonomies vis-à-vis parent states — the legitimate holders of sovereignty — and their tandemized partners when they deny or ignore sovereignty aspirations expressed in the referendum or other sovereignty-related demands. Empowerment is understood broadly here, encompassing processual, formal, and material elements. As regards sovereignty aspirations expressed in the referendum, autonomy authorities can claim a strong popular mandate and therefore insist on being involved in discussions of related sovereignty matters as equal parties. In such talks, they may invoke the people’s will defensively as a “red line,” reinforcing their stance and resisting concessions, or offensively to impress and pressure other parties into making concessions. As regards other sovereignty-related demands, autonomy authorities can also use a referendum to press parent states and their tandemized partners into concessions, compromises, or adjustments not directly mentioned in the vote. For example, an independence referendum may be intended to push the parent state to broaden the autonomy’s competences, since the parent state is likely to regard this outcome as far more acceptable than outright independence. In such situations, parent states and their external partners are expected to respond with measures designed to prevent the referendum, mitigate its implementation, or soothe tensions after it has taken place. These measures may involve processual inclusion, expanded formal authority, or material support that strengthens the autonomy’s capacity to exercise it effectively.
Ensuring Unity for the Sovereignty Cause Internally
Unilateral sovereignty referendums in territorial autonomies may be pursued by their authorities to foster cohesion within the population around a shared sovereignty goal, reflecting the autonomy’s collective good. Referendum campaigns provide an opportunity to align diverse groups within the autonomy, mobilizing supporters, persuading the undecided, and minimizing opposition. The people’s will, anticipated to be expressed through the referendum, may then be portrayed as a collective mandate that all should respect or at least not openly challenge. The greater the unity achieved around the sovereignty cause, the more effectively the authorities can advance shared aspirations during sovereignty-related negotiations with parent states.
Meeting Patrons’ Demands
Territorial autonomies may pursue unilateral sovereignty referendums at the request of patrons aiming to further their strategic interests. Among these patrons are states, whose goals often include maintaining or expanding geopolitical influence, with referendums serving as tools to facilitate these aims. By showcasing public support or creating political leverage, referendums may be used to legitimize their involvement, assert their influence, and discourage or destabilize adversaries. These effects can extend beyond the autonomy, shaping the parent state’s trajectory and influencing broader geopolitical dynamics. In turn, the authorities of territorial autonomies may respond positively to such requests to maintain patrons’ backing, prevent losing essential support, or facilitate additional assistance for the autonomy.
Boosting Relations with Patrons
Unilateral sovereignty referendums may be pursued by territorial autonomies to strengthen beneficial relations with existing patrons. Such polls emphasize alignment — cultural, geopolitical, or otherwise — with the patrons’ values and interests. By highlighting shared affinities or creating political leverage for patrons, referendums are expected to attract their attention, impress them, and persuade them to deepen engagement with territorial autonomies. This could result in increased assistance to the autonomies. Additionally, such referendums may serve as a means to attract potential patrons by signaling alignment and readiness for closer cooperation.
Facilitating De Facto Reallocation of Sovereignty
Unilateral sovereignty referendums may be pursued by the leadership of territorial autonomies to facilitate the de facto reallocation of sovereignty from their parent states, typically either to the territorial autonomy itself — transforming it into a de facto state — or to a patron. These polls are intended to pave the way for unilateral secession or annexation — both widely considered illegal under international law — by justifying such moves through alignment with the people’s will, framed as an expression of self-determination for both domestic and international audiences. Unlike previous motivations in the framework, this one focuses on facilitating a direct and tangible reallocation of sovereignty, albeit limited to de facto outcomes.
Advancing Individual or Group Interests by Autonomy Leadership
Finally, unilateral sovereignty referendums may be pursued by autonomy leadership to advance their political interests. In this context, autonomy leadership instrumentalizes the sovereignty cause, prioritizing individual or group gains over collective objectives, unlike in the case of all previous motivations. Within the autonomy, leadership can leverage referendums to consolidate power, address legitimacy crises, or improve its chances in imminent elections. Referendums can be used offensively — either to position leadership as the primary champion of the sovereignty cause, directly enhancing its image and securing public support, or to expose political adversaries’ lack of commitment to the sovereignty cause, indirectly boosting leadership’s standing. Referendums can also be used defensively to align with the sovereignty movement, avoiding a loss of popular backing and political relevance. Outside the autonomy, leadership can also leverage referendums to strengthen its influence in the parent state’s central politics, using its role in promoting the sovereignty cause to enhance its visibility and stature within the national political arena. In a similar way, referendums may also be used to advance the broader partisan or factional interests of allied central actors, with whom autonomy leaders are politically affiliated, and from whose success they also benefit.
Having outlined the possible motivations for pursuing unilateral sovereignty referendums by territorial autonomies, the next section provides the political and geopolitical background of one such case — Gagauzia. This context is essential for grasping the specific features of autonomy, identifying which of the motivations from the framework were likely to be activated in the 2014 Gagauz referendums, and laying the ground for their subsequent empirical investigation.
Gagauzia’s Political and Geopolitical Context
Established in 1994, Gagauzia’s territorial autonomy marked the resolution of the conflict between the Moldovan central government and the Gagauz national movement, which had declared a separatist Gagauz Republic in 1990 and operated outside Moldova’s control. Although the autonomy agreement formally ended the conflict, relations between Gagauzia and Moldova’s central authorities remained unstable, oscillating between cooperation and disagreement. Disputes frequently arose over the scope of Gagauzia’s competences, occasionally reigniting separatist sentiments. The Gagauz authorities enjoyed popular support and appealed to international actors for backing (Walsh Reference Walsh2018, 141–177).
The autonomy covered an area of 1.8 thousand km2, comprised four non-contiguous parts with its capital in Comrat, and had a population of 134500, according to the 2014 census. This accounted for approximately 6.2% of Moldova’s territory and 4.8% of its population. Regarding the ethnic composition of Gagauzia, the Gagauz — an Orthodox Christian, Turkic-speaking people — made up 83.8% of the population, followed by Bulgarians (4.9%), Moldovans (4.7%), Russians (3.2%), Ukrainians (2.5%), and others (0.9%).
The autonomy framework provided the Gagauz with a mechanism for internal self-determination. Gagauzia was granted self-governance in regional political, economic, and cultural affairs, alongside the right to participate in Moldova’s domestic and foreign policies on matters affecting its interests. The region’s executive authority was vested in the Bashkan (governor) and the Bashkan-headed Executive Committee, while legislative functions were carried out by the National Assembly. Gagauz political actors engaged in intra-regional power struggles — centered on the popularly elected Bashkan and the National Assembly — and broader political interactions at the national level (Walsh Reference Walsh2018, 141–177).
Gagauzia’s population and elites, shaped by a history of Russification and Sovietization, maintained a strong alignment with Russia. Additionally, over time, the Gagauz began rediscovering their ethnic and cultural ties with Turkey. This dual orientation positioned Gagauzia within two imagined transnational communities: one strongly anchored around Russia (Russian World) and the other around Turkey (Turkic World). Importantly, both Russia and Turkey acknowledged these ties and engaged with Gagauzia to varying degrees. Accordingly, they could be considered Gagauzia’s external patrons (Cantir Reference Cantir2015; Kvilinkova Reference Kvilinkova2023).
When it comes specifically to the analyzed period between November 2012 and January 2014, three primary political forces shaped Gagauzia’s internal landscape. First, the executive branch, led by Bashkan Mihail Formuzal, who was re-elected for a second and final term in December 2010. As his tenure neared its end, Formuzal sought opportunities for a representative from his regional United Gagauzia movement to succeed him as Bashkan and for himself to gain influence in national politics through his Party of Regions (PRM). Both the regional Bashkan and national parliamentary elections were scheduled for late 2014. Second, the legislative branch, dominated by members and supporters of the regional New Gagauzia movement, headed by Nicolai Dudoglo, which gained control of the National Assembly in the September 2012 elections. Dudoglo, also mayor of Comrat, was already a key rival to Formuzal and his political camp within Gagauzia and continued to challenge them, including as a candidate for Bashkan. Third, the Gagauz Communist faction, representing the regional branch of the Party of Communists (PCRM), which had governed Moldova from 2001 to 2009 and retained declining but still notable influence, including in Gagauzia (Berbeca Reference Berbeca2014).
At the same time, each of these political forces maintained ties with national parties: Formuzal cooperated with the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM), particularly during Vlad Filat’s premiership until April 2013; New Gagauzia aligned with the Democratic Party (PDM) in late November 2012, with its members forming the party’s regional branch (both PLDM and PDM were part of the ruling Alliance for European Integration); and the Gagauz Communists remained affiliated with the PCRM (opposition). Despite these links, tensions persisted between Gagauzia and the Moldovan central government. Along with disputes over Gagauzia’s competences, there were also diverging perspectives on Moldova’s geopolitical trajectory. Since coming to power in 2009, Moldova’s ruling coalition had been successfully advancing European integration with EU support. This pro-EU shift was met with discontent and resistance from pro-Russian Gagauz population and elites, pro-Russian opposition parties at the national level, and Russia, which viewed Moldova’s Western alignment as an encroachment on its traditional sphere of influence (Berbeca Reference Berbeca2014).
One of such resistance steps was when, in December 2011, the marginal Social Democratic Party (SDPM) proposed a nationwide referendum on Moldova’s accession to the Russia-led Customs Union, which included Belarus and Kazakhstan. Despite support from like-minded political forces, including all political factions in Gagauzia, the Moldovan Central Electoral Committee rejected the initiative in August 2012, citing issues with the validity of the collected signatures required to initiate the referendum. The initiative was then taken up by the PCRM, which stated in September 2012 that they would promote it in parliament, and later that month, announced a plan for a large-scale protest movement to mobilize public support for the referendum. Ultimately, both initiatives failed to materialize (Ava.md 2013).
Then, the idea of a referendum on Moldova’s accession to the Customs Union resurfaced in Gagauzia in November 2012, later complemented by the idea of another referendum about Gagauzia’s deferred independence. When it comes to technicalities, according to Law No. 47-XLII/I, dated May 19, 1999, a referendum in Gagauzia could be initiated by the National Assembly following a proposal from at least 15,000 eligible residents representing at least half of the region’s settlements, one-third of the 35-seat Assembly deputies, the Bashkan, or the Executive Committee. Yet, in Gagauz political practice, it was sufficient for even a single member of the National Assembly or a smaller group of residents to propose a referendum, so that the Assembly could subsequently support the initiative. Additionally, the Gagauz elites believed that referendums on the above-mentioned issues fell within Gagauzia’s competences, while the Moldovan elites (at least the ruling ones) did not, arguing that matters of the country’s foreign alignment and territorial integrity fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the central authorities. As a result, referendum initiatives became a unilateral endeavor, and Gagauz political actors were undoubtedly aware of this.
This political and geopolitical context suggests that six of the seven motivations from the framework were likely to be activated in Gagauzia’s case. Intra-elite competition, engagement in parent-state politics, recurrent disputes with the Moldovan government, appeals to international actors, and the presence of external patrons — above all, Russia, given that one referendum directly addressed integration with a Russia-led organization — made multiple motivations plausible. The only motivation that appears irrelevant is ensuring internal unity, as Gagauz sovereignty aspirations already enjoyed broad popular support. The next sections turn to the empirical investigation of the motivations behind the 2014 Gagauz referendums.
Methodology
This article employs a qualitative case study approach to analyze the motivations of territorial autonomy authorities for pursuing unilateral sovereignty referendums, focusing on Gagauzia’s 2014 referendums. Using a framework of motivations originally developed for de facto states and adapted to the specific context of territorial autonomies, the analysis centers on Gagauzia’s executive and legislative branches in their active and reactive pursuit of the referendums across three distinct stages: the proposal stage (November 2012–October 2013), the initiation stage (November 2013), and the implementation stage (December 2013–January 2014). While the primary focus remains on the Gagauz leadership, the study also identifies the motivations of other involved actors. Although several motivations appeared plausible in Gagauzia’s context, the empirical analysis considers only those that became evident during the referendum process, applying the framework chronologically to reveal how specific motivations shaped decisions.
The sources used for the subsequent empirical analysis pertain to the dual Gagauz leadership and, additionally, to the regional Communist faction, which was another political force that shaped Gagauzia’s internal landscape. As such, these sources provide the most direct insight into their rhetoric and activities related to the analyzed referendums — essential for inferring motivations. First, Edinaia Gagauziia, the newspaper of the United Gagauzia movement led by Bashkan Formuzal from the executive branch, served as a key source. Second, Novaia Gagauziia, the newspaper of the New Gagauzia movement, which controlled the legislative body (the National Assembly), was another important source. It was complemented by Ekspres-Kanon, the official publication where the National Assembly’s decisions were recorded, and Vesti Gagauzii, a newspaper that reported on its activities and broader events in Gagauzia. Third, the news portal Gagauzinfo (now accessible via www.archive.org and www.ksmm.ucoz.net) was another key source due to its control by the Communists. Additionally, it provided detailed coverage of events in Gagauzia and was particularly useful for reconstructing the chronology of events related to the referendums.
In the case of Edinaia Gagauziia, Novaia Gagauziia, and Vesti Gagauzii, the author reviewed all issues published between November 2012 and January 2014, as the majority of materials were relevant to understanding the referendums. By contrast, Ekspres-Kanon and Gagauzinfo contained a substantial amount of unrelated content. While Ekspres-Kanon was consulted only for legislative decisions, Gagauzinfo proved particularly rich in information, requiring careful selection of relevant news items. These items were identified using the search engine with the term “referendum.” To maintain focus, the article refers only to the most informative and representative materials from these sources.
Stage 1: Proposing the Referendums in Gagauzia (November 2012–October 2013)
The November 2012 Communists’ Proposals and United Gagauzia’s December Idea
When the PCRM’s September 2012 national-level attempt to organize a referendum on Moldova’s accession to the Russia-led Customs Union failed, its regional faction in Gagauzia unexpectedly revived the initiative. On November 30, 2012, the seven-member Communist faction in the National Assembly proposed holding a referendum in the autonomous region on February 3, 2013, regarding Moldova’s accession to the Customs Union. Additionally, they suggested that the National Assembly introduce a legislative initiative in the Moldovan parliament to organize a nationwide referendum on the same issue. The National Assembly, dominated by New Gagauzia, approved these proposals in the first stage. The initiatives passed their first reading and were referred to a specialized parliamentary commission for further consideration (Gagauzinfo 2012a).
The PCRM regional faction proposed these referendums to bolster their declining political standing in Gagauzia and that of the party in Moldova, where support for closer ties with Russia was substantial. This aligns with the motivation category of advancing individual or group interests within the framework of motivations, where a referendum serves as an offensive tool to portray initiators as champions of the sovereignty cause, directly boosting their image and securing public support. As a representative of the Gagauz Communists stated, the referendums “will provide a positive impetus for resolving the issue and will meet the expectations of the majority of the population” (Edinaia Gagauziia 2012b), reflecting an assertive effort to align with public sentiment, steer the agenda, and reclaim political relevance.
A similar rationale applied to New Gagauzia, whose backing ensured the referendum proposals passed the first stage in the National Assembly. However, in their case, the motivation was primarily defensive, rooted in the region’s predominantly pro-Russian orientation. Opposing the initiatives could have triggered political backlash — eroding popular support and inviting intensified attacks from Formuzal and his United Gagauzia, New Gagauzia’s main political rivals. As Dmitrii Konstantinov, the Speaker of the National Assembly, explained, “We know the aspirations of the Gagauz people, and we will not take a different path.” He further emphasized that New Gagauzia had consistently supported Moldova’s accession to the Customs Union and was even prepared to defy its newly aligned PDM, a member of Moldova’s pro-European ruling coalition (Gagauzinfo 2012b).
However, despite initial support for the referendum proposals, the situation changed rapidly. On December 1, the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly denied that the initiatives had passed the first reading. It was explained that the proposals had only been referred to a relevant parliamentary commission for further examination (Vesti Gagauzii 2012). Konstantinov further argued that the referendums on Moldova joining the Customs Union were not a priority for the autonomy and, additionally, that there was no justification for spending money on the regional referendum with limited or no impact. Instead, he proposed organizing consultations with the local population and sending a declaration with their conclusions to the Moldovan authorities, applying an evasive maneuver (Gagauzinfo 2012c). This abrupt shift was most likely the result of significant pressure from the PDM on New Gagauzia’s leadership. The fear of losing institutional and financial support from this party, important for Dudoglo’s candidacy in the 2014 Bashkan elections, apparently outweighed concerns about voter dissatisfaction and potential political pressure from Formuzal and his United Gagauzia, perhaps seen as only temporary.
Meanwhile, Formuzal seized the opportunity to criticize New Gagauzia for its retreat. He positioned himself as a strong supporter of the referendums, particularly the regional one, expressing hope that the National Assembly would resist pressure from Moldova’s ruling coalition and initiate the regional referendum (Edinaia Gagauziia 2012a). His United Gagauzia intensified its criticism, accusing New Gagauzia of subordinating itself to the PDM and disregarding the region’s interests. Importantly, United Gagauzia also floated the idea of holding a referendum in Gagauzia against Moldova’s potential unification with Romania, alongside the related concept of deferred independence, under which Gagauzia would declare independence if such a merger occurred (Edinaia Gagauziia 2012c). The prospect of unification resonated strongly with the Gagauz population, given their negative collective memories of Moldova’s interwar period under Romanian rule and the perceived revival of reunification efforts after the pro-European coalition took power in 2009. Thus, Formuzal and his United Gagauzia used referendums offensively to indirectly and directly advance their interests in Gagauzia, aiming to expose political adversaries’ lack of commitment to the original sovereignty cause and to position themselves as the primary champions of the new one.
Regarding the fate of these referendum initiatives, in January 2013, the National Assembly’s profile commission rejected the regional referendum proposal on Moldova’s accession to the Customs Union, citing financial constraints. While the proposal to lobby for a national referendum was upheld, it was effectively frozen and never returned to the plenary session, despite further inquiries and complaints from the Communist faction throughout the winter and spring of 2013 (Gagauzinfo 2013a). Although Formuzal initially supported both referendums, he later abandoned them, shifting his focus to backing a nationally initiated consensual poll (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013a). Moreover, he quickly refrained from promoting the referendum against Moldova’s unification with Romania and the related concept of Gagauzia’s deferred independence. He probably acknowledged that pursuing any of these referendums no longer provided significant political benefits. The situation remained unresolved until June 2013, when new proposals emerged, prompting all political actors to reengage with the issues.
It needs to be added that, in autumn 2013, an official account appeared stating that the New Gagauzia deputies had proposed polls on Moldova’s foreign vector and Gagauzia’s deferred independence to the National Assembly in May 2013 (Novaia Gagauziia 2013c). However, as this claim does not appear in any of the sources used and was neither publicly announced nor debated at the time, it is assumed that it lacked the clear strategic purpose seen in other cases. Therefore, it is not analyzed here.
The June 2013 Popular Proposals
The next two proposals for regional referendums were of popular origin, allegedly signed by 5,000 people, and presented to the National Assembly on June 25, 2013. The first of them and primary was related to the concept of Gagauzia’s deferred independence, while the second and additional concerned Moldova’s foreign vector — specifically, the choice between the Customs Union and the European Union (Vesti Gagauzii 2013a).
The stated reason for the first and primary referendum proposal was the conviction that the central authorities had failed to respect Gagauzia’s autonomy, sought to limit it, and even aimed to dismantle it. This perception was fueled by the negative reception of the results, announced in May, from a working group established by the Moldovan government, tasked with proposing amendments to the national legislation related to Gagauzia’s legal status and competences. Specifically, in their proposal, the group of people demanded that Gagauzia’s National Assembly adopt a regional law presenting an ultimatum to the central authorities. This ultimatum stipulated that if Moldova’s legislation was not aligned with the 1994 law on Gagauzia’s autonomous status within one year, a regional referendum would be held by December 2015. This referendum would determine whether Gagauzia should secede from Moldova and re-establish the separatist Gagauz Republic, which was outside the control of Moldova between 1990 and 1994 (Vesti Gagauzii 2013a).
The stated reason for the second and additional referendum proposal regarding Moldova’s foreign vector was that the pro-European central authorities were ignoring the views of Gagauzia’s residents, who favored the Customs Union as the country’s strategic direction (Gagauzinfo 2013b). While it was likely clear to those who proposed the referendum that a minority could not change this direction, it may have been designed to amplify the goal of the first and primary proposal — pushing the central authorities toward favorable actions for Gagauzia regarding the status and competences of the autonomy. As such, both referendum proposals fall within the framework of empowering territorial autonomy vis-à-vis the parent state, reflecting a strategic use of pressure to advance demands that extended beyond the referendums themselves.
Regarding the first proposal related to Gagauzia’s deferred independence, the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly initially organized public hearings in July to discuss holding the referendum (Gagauzinfo 2013c). This was likely a delaying maneuver, driven by the desire to advance New Gagauzia’s and its leadership’s interests defensively. Openly opposing these popular initiatives could have triggered political backlash and eroded popular support, given the civic origin of the proposal. However, by September, the leader of New Gagauzia, Dudoglo, overtly opposed the referendum, arguing that issues related to autonomy status and competences should be resolved through dialogue with the central authorities. He suggested that he and New Gagauzia could facilitate such discussions, given their alignment with the PDM, one of the ruling parties (Gagauzinfo 2013d; Novaia Gagauziia 2013a).
Regarding the proposal on the regional referendum on Moldova’s foreign vector, Dudoglo dismissed it as well, asserting that a region comprising just about 5% of Moldova’s population could not dictate the country’s foreign policy or act like a separatist region. This stance was likely influenced, as in November 2012, by the ongoing negative opinion from the PDM, a member of Moldova’s pro-European ruling coalition. To defend against criticism from regional actors, Dudoglo emphasized that New Gagauzia had actively supported organizing a nationwide referendum in 2012 on Moldova joining the Customs Union — though it was never executed — and suggested repeating this initiative (Novaia Gagauziia 2013b).
For his part, Bashkan Formuzal opposed the referendum related to the concept of Gagauzia’s deferred independence from the outset. His United Gagauzia’s newspaper quoted a political commentator who described the initiative as “desperate blackmail against Chișinău, which could lead to significant trouble for the Gagauz people” (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013b). Like Dudoglo, Formuzal favored dialogue with the central authorities to resolve issues related to the status and competences of Gagauz autonomy. However, United Gagauzia’s newspaper, alongside the Communist-affiliated Gagauzinfo news portal, suggested that the idea of a separatist referendum — which they considered harmful to Gagauzia — originated in the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013c). Regarding the regional referendum on Moldova’s foreign vector, Formuzal initially remained silent, likely favoring a nationwide poll instead, as previously. However, by September, his United Gagauzia unexpectedly began actively promoting it.
The October 2013 Formuzal’s Proposal
In mid-September 2013, Gagauzia’s deputy Bashkan, Valerii Ianioglo, proposed consulting Gagauzia’s population on Moldova’s foreign policy vector — whether to pursue integration with the European Union, join the Russia-led Customs Union, or adopt a third path balancing cooperation with both (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013d). Then, on September 30, United Gagauzia urged Bashkan Formuzal to propose the referendum to the National Assembly (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013f), which he did the next day, on October 1 (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013e). Clearly, the referendum was expected to express strong support for Moldova’s integration with the Customs Union.
The timing of this referendum proposal was influenced by both external and domestic events. Externally, in November 2013, Moldova was set to initial the Association Agreement with the EU, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, at the Vilnius summit — a major step in Moldova’s European integration. This move met with widespread disapproval in Gagauzia, Russia, and among segments of the Moldovan population. In response, Russia imposed import restrictions on Moldovan wine, a key industry for Gagauzia’s economy, and hinted at the possibility of further restrictions. Domestically, nationwide parliamentary and Bashkan elections were approaching, with only a year remaining before they were to be held.
Against this background, Formuzal used the referendum offensively to directly advance his own and United Gagauzia’s interests within the autonomy. They positioned themselves as the main driver of the sovereignty cause, seeking to directly boost their image and gain public backing by leveraging the Gagauz population’s strong pro-Russian sentiments. As stated in Edinaia Gagauziia (2013g): “Thus, an end was put to nearly a year of speculation. Political forces had been deceiving citizens for too long — parliamentary groups in the National Assembly would initiate a referendum one moment and abandon it the next. Now, evasion is no longer possible.” This statement also suggests that the referendum served an additional purpose: exposing both past and anticipated failures in the commitment of their rival, New Gagauzia, which controlled the National Assembly. By doing so, United Gagauzia sought to indirectly strengthen its own political standing.
Formuzal also used the referendum to advance both his own and the Party of Regions’ interests beyond Gagauzia. The referendum was not merely a regional initiative but also an opportunity for political promotion among Moldova’s broader electorate, which favored accession to the Customs Union and, at the time, made up more than half of the country’s population but had not been consulted by the central government on the country’s strategic alignment. Additionally, by proposing the referendum, Formuzal likely aimed to attract Russian attention and secure support for his Party of Regions, capitalizing on Russia’s active opposition to Moldova’s EU integration. As emphasized by Edinaia Gagauziia (2013g), “Gagauzia could become the first Moldovan region where people would formally express their support for the Customs Union.” This, in turn, could inspire other regions to organize similar referendums — an outcome that would undoubtedly be welcomed by Russia, with those initiating the first referendum likely to be rewarded.
Beyond this, by proposing the regional referendum — where support for Moldova’s integration with the Customs Union was expected — Formuzal likely sought Russian rewards for Gagauzia in recognition of its pro-Russian stance. Precedents existed, as Russia had previously provided economic incentives to Transnistria, Moldova’s breakaway region, in response to its opposition to European integration. A similar approach toward Gagauzia could have included enhanced economic cooperation with Russian regions and the potential lifting of the wine embargo — both of which Formuzal explicitly promoted (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013i). This marked the first time that the motivation of strengthening ties with a patron explicitly appeared in Gagauzia’s sovereignty referendum process. Additionally, his mention of a possible referendum on Gagauzia’s independence — should Moldova join the EU, which he linked to a likely unification with Romania — in an interview with the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013h) likely served the same purpose: to appeal to Russia as a geopolitical ally inclined toward actions that could undermine the stability of pro-European Moldova.
Despite Formuzal’s push, the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly stalled the referendum process on Moldova’s foreign policy vector. Speaker Konstantinov stated that the poll would be held but provided no details on its timing (Novaia Gagauziia 2013c). The National Assembly’s delaying maneuver stemmed from competing pressures: rejecting the referendum outright risked alienating the electorate, while approving it could jeopardize New Gagauzia’s ties to the PDM — a member of Moldova’s pro-European ruling coalition. These ties were crucial for New Gagauzia’s leader, Dudoglo, who aspired to become Bashkan. However, the situation shifted in November, clearing the way for the referendum to move forward.
Stage 2: Initiating the Referendums in Gagauzia (November 2013)
Nullified Initiation
On November 15, 2013, the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly adopted Decision No. 199-XVI/V to organize two referendums in Gagauzia, scheduling them for February 2, 2014. The decision did not include specific questions, but media reports indicated that one concerned Moldova’s foreign orientation (while the other addressed the adoption of a new regional constitution called Ulozhenie) (Gagauzinfo 2013e). The initiation of this referendum was unexpected, most likely linked to the impeachment of the Bashkan by the National Assembly, which took place on the same day. The Bashkan was primarily accused of misappropriating Russian humanitarian aid in 2008 and 2010. His opponents had frequently used this argument against him, leading to several previous impeachment attempts. However, this was the first time such a vote had actually taken place, and according to the New Gagauzia majority in the National Assembly, it was successful (Vesti Gagauzii 2013b).
Against this backdrop, it can be said that the referendum was used to advance both the individual interests of its leader, Dudoglo, and the collective interests of New Gagauzia in the autonomy. It was a defensive move, aligning with the sovereignty referendum movement to prevent a loss of political support and counter opposition narratives. More specifically, it aimed to contain anti-impeachment discontent by granting dissatisfied and concerned groups the widely supported referendum that Formuzal had proposed in October. It also served to neutralize Formuzal’s argument that the National Assembly was ignoring his referendum initiative due to New Gagauzia’s alleged subordination to the PDM. This argument was particularly likely to gain traction amid the impeachment-driven escalation of tensions with New Gagauzia and the expected initialing of the Moldova–EU Association Agreement in late November. As stated in Novaia Gagauziia (2013e), an end has been put to the numerous speculations by the Communists and Formuzal’s supporters that only they are the “great friends of Russia” and that only they advocate for the autonomy’s rapprochement with the Eastern space.
This time, New Gagauzia decided to either defy or neutralize the anti-referendum stance of its ally, the PDM — a member of Moldova’s pro-European ruling coalition — because an extraordinary opportunity arose for Dudoglo to replace the impeached Formuzal as Bashkan. Officially, Dudoglo suggested that his position did not contradict the PDM’s, arguing that the PDM was the only party in Moldova supporting cooperation not only with the EU but also with Russia (Novaia Gagauziia 2013d). In the context of the upcoming Bashkan elections, Dudoglo could have considered using the referendum initiated by his New Gagauzia offensively to directly advance his position within the autonomy. As he stated, “We went to the people, we always do this, we studied their opinion, and then we made a decision. Since the people of Gagauzia support the Customs Union, we support it — our people” (Novaia Gagauziia 2013d). By presenting himself as a leader attuned to the public will, he could hope that this alignment would translate into electoral support in the Bashkan race. Additionally, by promoting the referendum, Dudoglo may have also aimed to secure personal electoral support from Russia.
Regarding Formuzal’s camp, United Gagauzia’s newspaper expressed satisfaction with the National Assembly’s decision to hold a referendum on Moldova’s foreign orientation, viewing it as an endorsement of Formuzal’s October proposal. This remained consistent with their previous position and motivations: advancing both their individual and group interests within and beyond the autonomy, and strengthening Gagauzia’s ties with Russia. However, Edinaia Gagauziia (2013j) also stated: “It would be appropriate to hold another referendum on the same day regarding the deferred status of Gagauzia as an independent state — in the hypothetical event that Moldova loses its sovereignty.” This could be seen as an attempt to offensively and directly advance Formuzal’s and United Gagauzia’s interests in the autonomy by positioning themselves as the primary champions of an additional sovereignty cause, particularly since ownership of the previous one had suddenly expanded to include New Gagauzia.
Despite this effort, the National Assembly nullified its own decision to initiate the referendum on Moldova’s foreign orientation less than two weeks later by adopting Decision No. 206-СЗ/V. The move was justified by the lack of specific questions, which violated the 1999 regional law on referendums. However, on that same day, a properly formulated decision was adopted, approving this referendum along with another one.
Finalized Initiation
The New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly session, whose agenda was kept secret until the last moment, took place on November 27, 2013. During this session, the Assembly adopted Decision No. 208-СЗ/V, initiating a referendum asking Gagauzia’s population whether they approved Moldova’s foreign policy course toward joining either the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union or the European Union. In an unexpected move, the Assembly also initiated a second referendum — covered by Decision No. 207-СЗ/V — on adopting a regional law that would grant Gagauzia a deferred right to external self-determination if Moldova’s status as an independent state were to change, framed by its initiators as establishing a legally binding mechanism for its implementation.
The stated reason for initiating the first referendum was that major decisions, including Moldova’s foreign direction, should be made with public consultation, and Gagauzia’s National Assembly needed to know the will of the region’s population before taking a position on the matter (Ekspres-Kanon 2013b, 5–6). Thus, the referendum could serve to empower Gagauzia vis-à-vis Moldova, with the people’s will being used strategically to pressure the pro-European central government into addressing its diverging position.
The stated reason for initiating the second referendum was the fear of Moldova’s potential unification with Romania and the lack of trust in the 1994 law on Gagauzia’s autonomous status, which stipulated its right to external self-determination if Moldova’s status as an independent state changed. While the law did not explicitly mention unification with Romania, it was widely understood in this context. Specifically, the regional law, which was put to a referendum, went beyond merely granting this right by ensuring its automatic execution in such a scenario. This is why the referendum was described as being on Gagauzia’s deferred independence. A related stated reason for initiating this poll was to signal to both Moldova, as the parent state, and its tandemized external partner, Romania, that their unification would trigger Gagauzia’s declaration of independence, creating pressure on them to avoid such a scenario — thus serving as a tool for Gagauzia’s empowerment in its dealings with both actors (Ekspres-Kanon 2013a, 3–4).
However, it is unlikely that the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly initiated these referendums solely based on the stated motivations. The pro-Russian stance of Gagauzia’s population was well known, and given its small size, it had little chance of influencing Moldova’s European trajectory. Likewise, the unification of Moldova with Romania remained improbable, despite being promoted by some elites and segments of their populations. These factors cast doubt on the official justifications for the referendums, a view also echoed by political circles in Gagauzia, as reported to the author in December 2013 by an interlocutor from the OSCE field mission to Moldova.
The real motives were most likely linked to the failure of Formuzal’s impeachment, initiated by the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly on November 15, as ruled by the court on November 25 (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013l). It can be said that, just as in the impeachment context, the referendum was used to advance both the individual interests of its leader, Dudoglo, and the collective interests of New Gagauzia within the autonomy. It was a defensive move, aligning with the sovereignty movement to safeguard political support and counter opposition narratives. More specifically, it sought to shift public attention away from the failed impeachment by offering something substantial — not just one, but two sovereignty referendums. Additionally, it served to neutralize Formuzal’s intensified criticism, fueled by the impeachment attempt, that New Gagauzia was unwilling to hold these referendums due to its alleged pro-European and pro-Romanian stance, supposedly dictated by its alignment with the PDM (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013k).
Regarding Formuzal’s camp, Edinaia Gagauziia (2013m) welcomed the National Assembly’s decision to hold the referendums, aligning with their previous position. Accordingly, while the newspaper cited the National Assembly’s official justifications, their motivations were consistent with previous efforts to exploit proposed referendums. Specifically, supporting both referendums was intended to offensively advance their individual and group interests within the autonomy, both directly and indirectly, just as in previous instances — particularly given the uncertainty, as noted in the newspaper, over whether the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly would actually pursue them further. However, in this instance, a defensive element may have also come into play, as New Gagauzia accused Formuzal of intending to abandon the referendums in exchange for institutional support from the LDPM, a member of Moldova’s pro-European ruling coalition, to bolster his efforts to contest the impeachment in court (Novaia Gagauziia 2013d). Furthermore, as before, these referendums also functioned as tools to reinforce Gagauzia’s ties with Russia, as both aligned with Russia’s interests in Moldova. In the case of the poll on Moldova’s foreign vector, it additionally aimed, as previously, to promote Formuzal and his Party of Regions’ interests beyond Gagauzia.
Stage 3: Implementing the Referendums in Gagauzia (December 2013–January 2014)
Proceeding with the Suspended Referendums
If previous referendum proposals had been deemed illegitimate by representatives of the Moldovan government, the decision to initiate the referendums by the National Assembly was legally challenged in court on December 4, 2013. The court suspended the decision the next day (IPN 2014).
The formal head of Formuzal’s United Gagauzia, Fedor Gagauz, suggested that New Gagauzia might have been behind the court’s decision — likely due to its ally PDM’s alleged political influence on the judiciary. According to him, the ruling gave New Gagauzia an excuse to abandon the organization of the referendums. He further explained that he doubted New Gagauzia’s sincerity in initiating the referendums, as they were aligned with PDM, a member of the pro-European Moldovan ruling coalition. However, he insisted that the Gagauz people must proceed with the referendums (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013n). Formuzal expressed a similar position, arguing that one referendum would support Moldova’s cooperation with Russia, benefiting Gagauzia as well (especially in the context of Moldova’s initialing the Association Agreement with the EU on November 29, 2013), while the other would reinforce Moldova’s statehood, reducing the likelihood of unification with Romania (Edinaia Gagauziia 2013p). This approach resonated well in Gagauzia and Russia, and among portions of the Moldovan population.
Therefore, it can be said that Formuzal’s camp remained fully consistent with its previous motivations — offensively advancing individual and group interests within and beyond the autonomy while strengthening Gagauzia’s ties with Russia. The motivation of advancing the interests of Formuzal’s Party of Regions in the context of the Moldovan parliamentary elections scheduled for autumn 2014 seemed to be at the forefront, given that Edinaia Gagauziia (2013o) portrayed Formuzal as the only truly pro-Russian politician in Moldova, expressing hope that this stance could secure Russia’s support for his party.
Meanwhile, New Gagauzia organized a rally in support of the referendums and called on the population to participate, while the National Assembly under its control continued organizing them — including attempts to bypass the court’s suspension (Vesti Gagauzii 2013c). As before, under pressure from Formuzal’s camp and public expectations, and despite still being aligned with the PDM, New Gagauzia backed the referendums as a defensive move to advance both its own interests and those of its leader in Gagauzia.
Proceeding with the Banned Referendums
On January 3, 2014, the court ruled the National Assembly’s decision on referendums illegal based on three key justifications. First, the decision violated the Moldovan Election Code, which took precedence over regional laws and stipulated a different timeline for their organization. Second, the referendum on Moldova’s foreign vector should have been decided through a nationwide referendum, not a regional one. It also exceeded the competence of Gagauz authorities, as foreign policy was a matter of national significance and fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the central government. Third, the referendum on Gagauzia’s deferred independence lacked the necessary preconditions. Under the legal framework, the right to external self-determination could only be exercised if Moldova’s status changed through a nationwide constitutional referendum. Since this had not happened, the referendum was considered premature and legally unfounded. Additionally, the court noted that if a self-determination referendum were to be held in the future, it should present multiple possible outcomes, rather than focusing solely on independence (Administrativnyi sud Komrat 2014).
In relation to the court’s decision, on January 9, Moldova’s General Prosecutor opened a case against members of Gagauzia’s National Assembly who initiated the referendums on the grounds of abuse of power. Additionally, the central authorities blocked regional funds for organizing the polls and continued to heavily criticize them (Gagauzinfo 2014c). Despite all these obstacles, including the possibility of being included in the criminal case as a person responsible for implementing the referendums, Formuzal strongly pushed for them to be held, presenting himself as one of their most ardent supporters.
By doing so, Formuzal again remained fully consistent with his previous motivations — offensively advancing individual and group interests within and beyond the autonomy, and strengthening Gagauzia’s ties with Russia. Crucially, the context was even more favorable to him than before. First, people were outraged by the counter-referendum measures taken by the central authorities and became even more convinced of their necessity. This was exploited by Formuzal and his camp, including during direct contact with voters at pro-referendum meetings, where they emphatically argued that people could not be deprived of their democratic right to express themselves in the polls on matters that concerned them and convey their position to the central authorities (Edinaia Gagauziia 2014a). This rhetorical framing could enhance the political standing of Formuzal’s United Gagauzia within the autonomy.
Second, for the first time, albeit indirectly, Russia officially expressed its interest in the referendums. The Russian ambassador stated in early January that in 2014 the embassy would pay special attention to Gagauzia and adjacent Taraclia (Gagauzinfo 2014b), inhabited by Bulgarians, which, following Gagauzia’s example, expressed its will to hold consultations on February 2 regarding Moldova’s foreign vector (Gagauzinfo 2014a). Such pro-Russian moves were undoubtedly welcomed by Russia, especially in the context of the pro-European Moldovan authorities planning to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in June 2014 and the Euromaidan movement in neighboring Ukraine protesting the Ukrainian government’s pro-Russian policy. This suggested that Russia could, in some way, reward Formuzal, his nationwide Party of Regions, and Gagauzia as a whole for their pro-Russian stance.
Along with using the stick mentioned above, the Moldovan central authorities also attempted to dissuade the regional authorities from organizing the referendums by offering a carrot. Their representatives began visiting Gagauzia and, aside from addressing the polls, discussed the rights and economic development of the autonomy. Officials from the EU and EU member states also visited Gagauzia with similar objectives. This was welcomed by Formuzal, who associated these discussions with potential future improvements in the scope of competences of autonomy and in its economic development, meant to enhance the autonomy’s capacity to exercise its competences effectively. Formuzal’s camp emphasized that the external attention — expected to bring tangible benefits to Gagauzia — was drawn precisely because of the referendums (Edinaia Gagauziia 2014b, 2014c), providing additional motivation to pursue them. More specifically, this aligns with the broader motivation of empowering the territorial autonomy vis-à-vis its parent state and its tandemized external actor.
In turn, New Gagauzia also supported the implementation of the referendums, despite its ongoing alignment with the PDM, which was part of the pro-European Moldovan ruling coalition. New Gagauzia’s leader, Dudoglo, justified this position by stating: “If the people want to express their opinion, no one has the right to forbid it. We are obliged to support it — and we do support it.” He added that, since the referendums would be held at the will of the entire Gagauz people, no one should claim sole credit for organizing them. He also labeled as provocateurs those who claimed that New Gagauzia opposed the referendums and reminded them that it was the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly that had initiated the process (Novaia Gagauziia 2014).
Support for the referendums, therefore, can be seen as a move to advance both Dudoglo’s personal interests and those of New Gagauzia within the autonomy. Aligning with the sovereignty movement was largely a defensive strategy to avoid losing public support and political relevance. This interpretation was confirmed by Dmitri Diakov, honorary chairman of the PDM, who criticized New Gagauzia for insincerely supporting the referendums. However, he also acknowledged that opposing the will of the regional majority would be unwise — particularly in the lead-up to both the regional Bashkan elections (which Dudoglo aimed to win) and the national parliamentary elections (in which New Gagauzia, as the PDM’s regional branch, sought strong results in the Gagauz constituency) (Gagauzinfo 2014d).
It should be noted that, on January 31, 2014, the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly issued new Decisions Nos. 250-СЗ/V and 251-СЗ/V to hold the referendums. In addition to reaffirming its November 25, 2013, decisions, it specified that funds for the referendums would come from private individuals (primarily a Gagauz businessman living in Russia, according to media reports), and that the National Assembly rejected the court’s decision banning the referendums as politically motivated and would appeal it. This move was likely intended to avoid accusations of misappropriating public funds and to uphold the legitimacy of the banned referendums. The referendums took place as planned on February 2, 2014. As expected, nearly all voters supported Moldova joining the Customs Union instead of the European Union, as well as Gagauzia’s deferred independence (Ekspres-Kanon 2014, 5–7).
Conclusions
This study examined the plausibility of a framework of seven possible motivations for pursuing unilateral sovereignty referendums by territorial autonomies, using the case of Gagauzia’s 2014 polls on Moldova’s foreign vector (that is, the Russia-led Customs Union vs. the European Union) and Gagauzia’s deferred independence. The analysis was structured across three stages (proposal, initiation, and implementation), dual leadership (the executive led by Bashkan Mihail Formuzal and his political movement, United Gagauzia, and the legislature dominated by Nicolai Dudoglo’s New Gagauzia movement), their proactive initiatives and reactive responses, and additional relevant actors. The study primarily drew on newspapers associated with United Gagauzia (executive) and New Gagauzia (legislative), supplemented by additional relevant sources.
The findings indicate that only three of the seven potential motivations were actively at play — and not consistently — given that the referendum process was uneven and marked by shifting approaches among the involved actors. Among the three, advancing individual and group interests by the autonomy leadership was identified as the most frequently reflected and most impactful motivation. Formuzal used this motivation offensively, leveraging the referendums to bolster both his personal political standing and the influence of his regional United Gagauzia movement and nationwide Party of Regions. He positioned himself and his political structures as the leading advocates of the sovereignty aspirations invoked, a stance that resonated strongly in Gagauzia, Russia, and among segments of the Moldovan population. In contrast, the New Gagauzia movement, which controlled the National Assembly and competed with Formuzal for political influence in Gagauzia, applied this motivation defensively. It aligned with the referendum movement to avoid political losses. Additionally, the regional Communist faction invoked this motivation in the early stages, proposing a referendum to regain both its declining influence in Gagauzia and that of the party in Moldova.
The second motivation, boosting relations between the territorial autonomy and its patron, was employed by Formuzal to strengthen Gagauzia’s ties with Russia. The referendums signaled Gagauzia’s geopolitical alignment with Russia’s opposition to Moldova’s European integration and were intended to position the region as a reliable partner for Moscow. This, in turn, was expected to earn Gagauzia potential economic or political benefits from Russia.
The third motivation, empowering the territorial autonomy vis-à-vis the parent state and tandemized external actors, played a more limited role. It was employed by Formuzal during the implementation stage when the referendums attracted the attention of Moldova’s central authorities and the EU, prompting both to express readiness to discuss broadening the autonomy’s competences and supporting its economic development, thereby addressing broader concerns beyond the referendum itself. This motivation also surfaced earlier when a group of citizens proposed the referendums in response to perceived central government encroachments on Gagauzia’s self-governing powers. It is worth mentioning that empowerment — framed specifically in relation to the referendum topic — was the official justification provided when the New Gagauzia-controlled National Assembly initiated the referendums; however, this official justification was downplayed in the study.
While these three motivations align with expert and scholarly accounts of the 2014 Gagauz referendums (Berbeca Reference Berbeca2014; Całus Reference Całus2014; Cantir Reference Cantir2015; Minzarari Reference Minzarari2014; Tudoroiu Reference Tudoroiu2016), additional motivations can be inferred from the literature. One interpretation is that the referendums were pursued to meet a patron’s demands, with Russia allegedly encouraging them to legitimize its involvement in Moldova, destabilize the pro-European Moldovan government, and discourage deeper EU-Moldova cooperation (Minzarari Reference Minzarari2014). Another is that the referendums were intended to facilitate a de facto reallocation of sovereignty — specifically, the emergence of Gagauzia as a de facto independent entity (Tudoroiu Reference Tudoroiu2016). While this study did not find direct evidence supporting these motivations, they fit within the proposed framework and lend additional plausibility to it.
Overall, while the proposed framework requires further application across additional cases to assess its broader applicability and refine its explanatory power, this study illustrates that territorial autonomies may pursue unilateral sovereignty referendums for various strategic reasons in the context of internal and nationwide political competition, center-periphery tensions, and external alignments — conditions not uncommon among such entities. The Gagauzia case suggests that the framework is especially useful in contexts marked by intra-autonomy competition. Importantly, the literature notes that similar dynamics, taking place in different institutional settings, have influenced unilateral sovereignty referendums (Goers, Cunningham, and Balcells Reference Goers, Cunningham and Balcells2025a), including in Catalonia in 2017 (Goers, Cunningham, and Balcells Reference Goers, Cunningham and Balcells2025a, 319–321) and in South Tyrol in 2013 (Scantamburlo and Pallaver Reference Scantamburlo and Pallaver2014; Lancellotti Reference Lancellotti2014).
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their support in improving this article. The author also wishes to thank Igor Cașu and Valentina Popușoi for their support in accessing the newspaper Novaia Gagauziia, which was used in the empirical analysis.
Disclosure
AI tools (ChatGPT) were used for language editing and improving the clarity of expression.
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