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Coalition government and the electoral consequences of legislative organization – ADDENDUM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 December 2025

Lasse Aaskoven  and
Shane Martin

Abstract

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Information

Type
Addendum
Information
European Journal of Political Research , First View , pp. 1
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of European Consortium for Political Research

This article was originally published without a Competing Interests statement. This should have been as follows:

Competing interests: Co-author Shane Martin serves as a member of the ECPR Publications Subcommittee. The editorial and review process followed the journal’s standard independent peer review procedures to ensure fairness and transparency.

References

Aaskoven, L, Martin, S. Coalition government and the electoral consequences of legislative organization. European Journal of Political Research. Published online 2025:1–12. doi: 10.1017/S1475676525100315 CrossRefGoogle Scholar