Introduction
In recent years, political science literature has increasingly focused on voters who fall behind as societies transform through globalization and de-industrialization, and the growth of the knowledge and service sectors. In addition to working-class voters, the rise of right-wing populism has been connected to dissatisfied voters in peripheral areas (Oesch and Rennwald Reference Oesch and Rennwald2018; Rodríguez-Pose Reference Rodríguez-Pose2018). Findings show that these voter groups, who find themselves in more exposed positions in knowledge economies, hold more conservative cultural preferences (Bornschier et al. Reference Bornschier, Häusermann, Zollinger and Colombo2021; Borwein and Lucas Reference Borwein and Lucas2023; Kenny and Luca Reference Kenny and Luca2021; Kriesi et al. Reference Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey2008; Oesch and Rennwald Reference Oesch and Rennwald2018). Although this cultural divide has been widely researched, it remains less clear whether left-behind voter groups share views or diverge in their preferences for redistribution—the central economic conflict in politics. This research gap limits our understanding of the political potential of these left-behind voter groups.
From extant literature, we know that a core grievance for rural voters is the perception of unfair distribution of resources (Cramer Reference Cramer2016; Lyons and Utych Reference Lyons and Utych2021). According to Cramer’s (Reference Cramer2016) findings in the US, these voters are even dismissive of the welfare state, as they perceive themselves to receive too little of its benefits. Evidence shows that working-class voters favor vertical economic redistribution between the rich and the poor (Häusermann and Kriesi Reference Häusermann, Kriesi, Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt and Kriesi2015; Häusermann et al. Reference Häusermann, Pinggera, Ares and Enggist2022), but we know less about how they view horizontal redistribution between places.Footnote 1 If these groups follow narrow group interests, with rural voters guided by rural grievance and skepticism towards the welfare state, the rural and working class views could be in conflict. Political parties might then struggle to mobilize both groups with regard to redistributive policies. On the other hand, if they share views, there is potential to mobilize them with a redistributive program.
Based on previous literature, it remains an open question whether there is consensus or conflict among rural and working-class voters on the issue of redistribution. This article seeks to answer this question. Using a group-based perspective on attitudes towards redistribution, guided by theories on deservingness and group attitudes, I report on a series of three empirical tests of the main question, all of which are based on survey experiments conducted in Norway. This case allows us to examine whether there is conflict or consensus in a context with comparatively low inequality and high political trust, where rural voters’ grievances have remained politically salient in recent years. The first two tests examine experimentally how both rural voters and working-class voters perceive that public resources are distributed between places and people, investigating whether the working class aligns with the rural perception of society, and whether rural and working-class voters prioritize their own groups or find both deserving of more government redistribution. The third test examines the support for vertical redistribution compared to horizontal redistribution.
This article contributes new insights to the literature on left-behind voter groups. Scholarship has most often investigated the views of rural and working-class voters separately and focused on cultural issues. This article, by contrast, highlights the redistributive preferences of both groups, and, based on empirical tests, it builds a cumulative case for the existence of an economic consensus between these groups. It shows how both rural and working-class voters are more likely to believe that cities and the people living there receive too large a share of public resources, and that they favor rural and working people equally as recipients of government resources. Moreover, these voter groups are supportive of redistribution, most strongly between the rich and the poor. In other words, there appears to be consensus between these left-behind voter groups regarding who is deserving of redistribution. As these voters’ views are not irreconcilable, and are not resisted by voters in general, the article points to a potential for political parties to garner support by focusing on redistribution across both class and place.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I review previous literature on left-behind voters, before presenting the theoretical framework, which draws on a group-based perspective on redistribution. The paper then introduces the case of Norway and outlines the design of the study. Next, I present the experimental setup and report findings from each experiment separately. The paper concludes by discussing the implications and limitations of the findings.
Left-behind voters and economic grievances
Broadly speaking, structural developments in the knowledge economy are described as creating two outlooks: one from the losers of modernization, globalization and technological change, and one from the winners (Bornschier et al. Reference Bornschier, Häusermann, Zollinger and Colombo2021; Kriesi et al. Reference Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey2008). There is a clustering of the winners of these structural developments in cities, that is, people with higher education who are less vulnerable to global competition. They move to or live in urban areas that thrive with the rise of service, knowledge, and tech sectors, the growth in the housing markets, and are surrounded by a host of services, job opportunities, and public institutions. The losers—often members of the working class, with lower levels of education and employment in exposed sectors—are, on the other hand, concentrated in peripheral and rural areas (Florida Reference Florida2021). These areas are more likely to struggle, with population decline and deindustrialization, which in turn affect governments’ ability to deliver public services (OECD 2018). The working class is seen as being left behind because rising mobility and automation result in increased competition for jobs and fears that their skills will lose relevance (Ford and Goodwin Reference Ford and Goodwin2014). Rural voters are described as left behind not only because they are more likely to belong to the working class; they are also referred to as left behind as processes of urbanization move resources, such as young people and work opportunities, to cities (Rodríguez-Pose Reference Rodríguez-Pose2018).
While these structural trends tend to affect these groups disproportionately, not all inhabitants of rural areas live in dire conditions, nor do all urban dwellers live in booming regions. Peripheral urban areas can also experience decline (De Lange, Van Der Brug, and Harteveld Reference De Lange, Van Der Brug and Harteveld2023), and there is a substantial semi-urban and urban working class (see Table 2 later in this article). Still, belonging to either group can foster feelings of being left behind, as these structural transformations may be perceived as threats to their social status and communities, and can give rise to political grievances.
In the wake of these transformations, literature has given considerable attention to the political behavior of left-behind voter groups. Political dissatisfaction and support for the populist radical right have been linked to local structural disparities such as declining services and opportunities, and housing market loss (Adler and Ansell Reference Adler and Ansell2020; Ansell et al. Reference Ansell, Hjorth, Nyrup and Martin Vinæs2022; Bolet Reference Bolet2021; Cremaschi et al. Reference Cremaschi, Rettl, Cappelluti and De Vries2022; McKay Reference McKay2019; Patana Reference Patana2022). The working class is often identified as a core constituency of the populist radical right, driven by attitudes toward immigration and political dissatisfaction (Ivarsflaten Reference Ivarsflaten2005; Oesch and Rennwald Reference Oesch and Rennwald2018; Rydgren Reference Rydgren2013). Emerging research also associates rural voters with support for the populist radical right, conservative attitudes, political distrust, and resentment toward urban elites (Borwein and Lucas Reference Borwein and Lucas2023; Hegewald Reference Hegewald2024; Huijsmans et al. Reference Huijsmans, Harteveld, van der Brug and Lancee2021; Jennings and Stoker Reference Jennings and Stoker2016; Jennings, McKay, and Stoker Reference Jennings, McKay and Stoker2021; Kenny and Luca Reference Kenny and Luca2021; Lago Reference Lago2021; Rodríguez-Pose Reference Rodríguez-Pose2018). This pattern is found not only in the United States, but also in European countries including the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden (Guilluy Reference Guilluy2019; Jennings and Stoker Reference Jennings and Stoker2016; Rickardsson Reference Rickardsson2021). While cultural preferences align these groups with the right, the potential for left-wing mobilization is less explored, as their views on different types of redistribution across both place and class are only covered to a limited extent by the existing scholarship.
Traditionally, the working class has favored state intervention in the economy through vertical redistribution, as they stand to gain from such arrangements, in line with economic self-interest (Meltzer and Richard Reference Meltzer and Richard1981). This has been the foundation of the class cleavage, influencing most Western party systems (Lipset and Rokkan Reference Lipset, Rokkan, Lipset and Rokkan1967). Recent studies confirm that the working class is more supportive of redistribution than the middle class (e.g., Brooks and Svallfors Reference Brooks and Svallfors2010; Häusermann and Kriesi Reference Häusermann, Kriesi, Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt and Kriesi2015; Oesch and Rennwald Reference Oesch and Rennwald2018). There is, however, limited research on this voter group’s views on what this article refers to as horizontal redistribution, that is, the allocation of resources between places.
With regard to rural voters, structural developments appear to have been translated into specific political grievances. The urban-rural divide was once shaped by economic interests tied to agriculture (Lipset and Rokkan Reference Lipset, Rokkan, Lipset and Rokkan1967). Today, scholarship looks beyond the agricultural market and highlights a core rural grievance: the perception that rural communities are treated unfairly compared to urban centers (Cramer Reference Cramer2016; Lyons and Utych Reference Lyons and Utych2021; Munis Reference Munis2020). This sentiment parallels the center-periphery cleavage also identified by Lipset and Rokkan (Reference Lipset, Rokkan, Lipset and Rokkan1967), revolving around the periphery’s resistance against standards and cultures imposed by the center. Cramer (Reference Cramer2012; Reference Cramer2016) advances a rural identity rooted in animosity toward cities, founded on a perceived lack of respect, political power, and public resources. Rural voters believe that they do not receive a fair share of government resources compared to urban areas (Cramer Reference Cramer2016; Lyons and Utych Reference Lyons and Utych2021). This is echoed in research from Sweden, where people from areas in decline are more prone to resent the capital’s perceived absorption of resources (Rickardsson, Mellander, and Bjerke Reference Rickardsson, Mellander and Bjerke2021). Similar perceptions about injustice between rural and urban areas are also found in Norway and Switzerland (Auerbach, Eidheim, and Fimreite Reference Auerbach, Eidheim and Fimreite2024; Zumbrunn Reference Zumbrunn2024). In Wisconsin, Cramer (Reference Cramer2012; Reference Cramer2016) suggests that, as rural voters believe that they do not benefit from government intervention, they turn away from welfare and public institutions. Yet, a comparative study of 30 European countries finds no significant difference in welfare state support between rural and urban residents (Kenny and Luca Reference Kenny and Luca2021). Still, little is known about how rural voters view vertical compared to horizontal redistribution. Do their spatial grievances make them more likely to favor redistribution between places over economic redistribution between income groups?
The economic hardship of rural areas has been advanced as one of the reasons behind their political unrest (Huijsmans Reference Huijsmans2023; McKay Reference McKay2019; Rodríguez-Pose, Terrero-Dávila, and Lee Reference Rodríguez-Pose, Terrero-Dávila and Lee2023). At the individual level, Cramer (Reference Cramer2016) finds indications that place and economic class are intertwined in the political reasoning of rural voters—for example, in remarks from rural residents about rural economic distress, the wealth of city dwellers, and how rural life entails hard work. These grievances resemble a traditional class conflict. Viewed this way, one might ask whether this rural grievance aligns with working-class grievances over wealth distribution, leading both left-behind voter groups to pull in the same direction on these issues.
Views on redistribution: A group-based approach
To investigate conflict or consensus among left-behind voter groups, a group-based approach is suggested to better understand their priorities. Recent research indicates that the political behavior of rural and working-class voters is influenced by their social group affiliations (Bornschier et al. Reference Bornschier, Häusermann, Zollinger and Colombo2021; Cramer Reference Cramer2016; Haffert, Palmtag, and Schraff Reference Haffert, Palmtag and Schraff2024; Munis Reference Munis2021; Zollinger Reference Zollinger2024). Voters tend to navigate politics based on who gets what, and whether that distribution is deserved (Conover Reference Conover1988; Miller et al. Reference Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk1981). In making these judgments, they consider the status of the group they belong to, and what has caused this status. This is in keeping with the concept of deservingness, which shapes views on public policies (Gilens Reference Gilens2009; Petersen et al. Reference Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager and Togeby2011; Van Oorschot Reference Van Oorschot2000, Reference Van Oorschot2006). Deservingness revolves around which groups are seen as worthy of receiving government welfare. Research shows that certain groups are deemed to be more deserving than others, such as the elderly and the sick compared to the unemployed and immigrants (Van Oorschot Reference Van Oorschot2006). An important rationale behind this judgment about who is deserving comes from perceptions of whether people can be blamed for their own situation or if it is caused by circumstances beyond their control (Van Oorschot Reference Van Oorschot2000). Perceiving a group as lazy or unfortunate is therefore highly influential in shaping the level of support for welfare state policies (Gilens Reference Gilens2009). Other criteria include the level of need, identification with the group, the attitude of the recipient (favoring those who are more grateful), and whether the group has earned the support through contributing to the welfare state (reciprocity) (Van Oorschot Reference Van Oorschot2000).
Applying this lens to voters’ perceptions of rural dwellers, there is little reason to believe that they are blamed for the societal transformations leading to rural decline. It is likely that many view development in these areas as necessary—both because this is a policy area that governments care about (OECD 2018) and because we know that rural voters in particular feel that they are at a disadvantage (Cramer Reference Cramer2016). Given the sentiment that people in rural areas work hard, at least in the eyes of rural voters themselves, the criterion of reciprocity may be fulfilled.
Research highlights structural variation in views of deservingness, with lower-educated and working-class individuals more likely to impose conditions on who they view as deserving (Häusermann and Kriesi Reference Häusermann, Kriesi, Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt and Kriesi2015; Van Oorschot Reference Van Oorschot2006). There is opinion asymmetry concerning the divisions explored in this article. Rural voters are more resentful about place-based grievances (Cramer Reference Cramer2016; Munis Reference Munis2020), and the working class is more affected by appeals that target their group identity (Robison et al. Reference Robison, Stubager, Thau and Tilley2021). Together, these findings imply that rural and working-class voters have more conditional views about who is deserving of government redistribution across class and place.
Pursuing the group-based approach further, in-group attachments guide the ways in which voters interpret the world and their place within society, favoring the interests of those who belong to their in-groups (Tajfel and Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1979; Tajfel Reference Tajfel1981). This aligns with the deservingness criterion related to shared identities. Social identity theory also highlights that people relate more forcefully to identities that are salient (Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013). In recent years, the heightened tension between rural and urban areas described by academic literature and news media points to such salience. Based on the assumption that voters view the world through a narrow group interest and that rural grievances are salient, we can expect that rural voters will be more concerned about rural people and spatial redistribution compared to the working class, and that they would find rural people to be more deserving of redistribution.
However, political views about what is fair and who is deserving are not always driven by narrow self-interest (Mutz and Mondak Reference Mutz and Mondak1997). Voters can take a broader perspective, and also use the evaluations of other groups, known as reference groups, for guidance (Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth Reference Miller, Wlezien and Hildreth1991; Miller and Wlezien Reference Miller and Wlezien1993; Wlezien and Miller Reference Wlezien and Miller1997). Citizens can form general notions about which groups share similar interests, and which are more distant from their concerns, favoring the former in their evaluations.
For rural and working-class voters, both place and class can serve as frames of reference for comparing their own group to others. Compared to their out-groups—people who live in cities, or the middle class, or upper middle class—these voters are likely to think of groups that have more status, power and resources than they have (Cramer Reference Cramer2016; Lyons and Utych Reference Lyons and Utych2021; Munis Reference Munis2020; Robison and Stubager Reference Robison and Stubager2018). Rural and working-class individuals may share a disadvantaged outlook—the in-group perspective of the left-behind in the knowledge economy. Comparative evidence demonstrates that urban dwellers are more likely to be perceived as upper middle class and highly educated, whereas rural dwellers are more often seen as working class and less educated (Hegewald Reference Hegewald2024). Their exposed positions are described in the literature as the result of societal transformations; these grievances are often seen as stemming from circumstances beyond their control. The interaction of skills and place, more pronounced in the knowledge economy, could contribute to a perception that privilege and resources are concentrated in cities, while their sympathies lie with working people, who are more likely to be found outside big cities, and who, due to their exposed positions, are more deserving of government resources.
A broader approach could suggest that rural voters are also supportive of welfare. Groups that are typically net beneficiaries of welfare policies, such as the sick, poor, and retired, are overrepresented in rural areas (Frisvoll Reference Frisvoll2020). Evidence from Germany shows that support for social policies is greater in declining regions (Pinggera Reference Pinggera2023). Similarly, recent rural protests over the merging, closure, and relocation of public services indicate that rural voters, at least in Norway, perceive public welfare state services as important to them. The closure or relocation of public services in a rural area may be more noticeable and affect a larger proportion of people than if similar changes occurred in an urban area.
Combining the broader view of who is deserving with a wider interest approach, a competing expectation to narrow self-interest is that rural and working people share views on who is deserving and what types of redistribution are favored, finding both groups to be more deserving of government resources.
The case of Norway
The empirical focus of this study is on Norway. This is a context with low economic inequality, including between rural and urban areas (Aaberge et al. Reference Aaberge, Mogstad, Vestad and Vestre2021; OECD 2023), and comparatively high levels of political trust (Bengtsson et al. Reference Bengtsson, Hansen, Harõarson, Narud and Oscarsson2013). Despite this, Norway has experienced political upheaval among rural voters (Vik, Fuglestad, and Øversveen Reference Vik, Fuglestad and Øversveen2022), which makes this a highly relevant case.
The Norwegian welfare state is a social democratic system characterized by the principle of universalism (Esping-Andersen Reference Esping-Andersen1990), providing residents equal access regardless of where in the country one is located. Municipalities are responsible for delivering essential welfare services, such as elderly care, primary healthcare, schools, kindergartens, and social security benefits. The central government ensures equivalent services to all areas of the territory through a scheme that redistributes income between rich and poor municipalities and compensates the municipalities for the composition of local populations, such as a high proportion of elderly inhabitants and greater driving distances (NOU 2020: 15). The scheme also includes grants and reduced employer tax for regionally disadvantaged areas. Most rural municipalities end up with a higher level of income per capita, compared to the national average in this scheme (NOU 2020: 15).
The Norwegian electoral system, with its fairly proportional distribution of seats between parties, creates a multiparty parliament, which allows several interests to be represented including the mainstream left and right parties, new left parties, a green party, and the populist radical right-wing party. There is also a party representing rural interests—the agrarian Centre Party—a type of party that has been common throughout Scandinavia (Knutsen Reference Knutsen and Knutsen2017). This contrasts with other systems where the rural-urban conflict is absorbed into the left-right divide (Lipset and Rokkan Reference Lipset, Rokkan, Lipset and Rokkan1967).
There is a connection between the left and rural and peripheral areas in Norway. The social democratic Labour Party’s mobilization of the rural proletariat in Northern Norway strengthened its position during the 1900s (Rokkan Reference Rokkan, Lipset and Rokkan1967). The party built a voter coalition between urban and rural parts of the country and implemented several measures to counteract centralization in the period following WWII, such as regionally differentiated employer contributions and the establishment of regional colleges (Almås, Fuglestad, and Mahlum Melås Reference Almås, Fuglestad, Melås, Almås and Fuglestad2020). Even so, researchers noted a tendency for the populist radical right to gain support in peripheral regions in Norway during the 2000s (Baldersheim and Fimreite Reference Baldersheim and Fimreite2005).
The post-industrial urbanization inevitably contributes to population decline and ageing in rural areas, as well as to reduced industrial employment opportunities, leading to challenges in delivering equivalent public services. To address these, the center-right government (2013-2021) initiated several public service reforms, including municipal and regional amalgamations and police unit mergers. This was the backdrop for the wave of rural protests which helped the agrarian Center Party achieve its highest vote share since 1993 in the 2021 parliamentary election (Vik, Fuglestad, and Øversveen Reference Vik, Fuglestad and Øversveen2022). The protests emphasized the presence of and proximity to public services as key rural concerns. The center-left bloc won the majority of the seats in the 2021 parliamentary election, partly due to the Center Party’s mobilization of rural voters (Aardal and Bergh Reference Aardal and Bergh2022). The Norwegian case, therefore, constitutes a rare example of a recent coalition between rural and working-class interests in government.
In summary, the Norwegian case provides insights into left-behind voters by investigating them in a context with modest economic distress, high trust, and multiple parties.
Data and measurement
The data used in this study were collected by the Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP) (Ivarsflaten et al. Reference Ivarsflaten2020-2022).Footnote 2 The NCP is a general population survey panel that recruits respondents based on a random draw from the National Population Register in Norway. More information on recruitment and representativeness can be found in the various methodology reports of the survey (Skjervheim et al. Reference Skjervheim, Høgestøl, Eikrem and Wettergreen2020; Reference Skjervheim, Høgestøl, Bjørnebekk, Eikrem and Wettergreen2021; Reference Skjervheim, Høgestøl, Bjørnebekk and Wettergreen2022).Footnote 3
The empirical strategy is to assess the competing expectations laid out in the theoretical framework by employing three empirical tests. These tests examine perceptions about who is deserving of government resources and support for different types of redistribution. The tests are based on experiments that randomly assign treatments between subjects, varying only the group that is referenced in relation to government redistribution. These experiments aim to capture existing sentiments rather than to change opinions (Sniderman Reference Sniderman2023). The approach isolates and compares the effect of mentioning a group, which is suitable when we want to uncover the role of class and place considerations in views on redistribution. It provides an immediate reaction to the question, and the randomization prevents consistency pressures on the respondents.
Table 1 gives an overview of the tests included in this article. The first two experiments focus on who is perceived as deserving of government resources. The third experiment measures support for different types of redistribution. The experiments were conducted in sequence across three waves of the survey, similar to the strategy employed by Ivarsflaten and Sniderman (Reference Ivarsflaten and Sniderman2022), to learn something new about these voters at each step. They are analyzed using OLS regressions, with results reported graphically. Full models are available in the online Supplementary Material, including the results of the main effects of each experiment. The dependent variables are recoded into a range from 0 (least support) to 1 (most support).
Overview of experiments
Measuring group belonging
The analyses rely on the measurement of two central concepts: whether a respondent is rural or urban, and their economic class. These concepts can be captured in several ways, and in order to provide robust evidence, both subjective and objective measures are employed.
The subjective measure of place is based on respondents reporting the type of area they live in. They can select one of the five following options: city, suburb/outskirt of a city, small city/town, village, or sparsely populated area. In the analyses, the first two options are treated as urban, and the last two as rural.
The objective measure of place derives from Statistics Norway’s measure of centrality. Research from the United States implies that objective location and self-reported location are not fully congruent, and the use of an objective measure gives more control over what is being measured (Nemerever and Rogers Reference Nemerever and Rogers2021). The measure is originally an index that captures the average number of workplaces and services within a proximity of 90 minutes on the municipality level (Høydahl Reference Høydahl2020). Statistics Norway further divides the index into six ordinal categories, whereby category 1 refers to the most-central municipalities and category 6 refers to the least-central municipalities. In the analyses, the categories have been merged into three for the sake of presentation: most-central (1 and 2), medium-central (3 and 4) and least-central (5 and 6). In the results, the most-central category is labeled as urban, and the least-central as rural.Footnote 4
To gauge the economic position of voters, a subjective measure explicitly asking about perceived social class is used. Respondents are asked to place themselves in either the working class, the lower middle class, the middle class or the upper middle class. The lower middle class and the middle class options are combined, and grouped together as ‘middle class’ in the following analyses.Footnote 5
The objective measure of economic class is based on a survey question about personal income, where respondents choose between interval categories.Footnote 6 These are recoded into three categories: low, medium and high income. Lower incomes include options up to NOK 400,000.Footnote 7 Medium incomes include options up to NOK 700,000, while those earning more are included in the higher income category.Footnote 8
Table 2 shows the tabulation of these measures. Footnote 9 The models reported in this article include the group that is not part of the interaction as a control variable, accounting for systematic class or place differences between groups. This design allows us to assess whether either group belonging matters net of the other.Footnote 10
Relationship between place and class
Note: Cells show row %, followed by column %. Total rows and column show N.
Table 2 illustrates the relationship between place and class. While there is some overlap between the working class and rural voters, the groups are not fully interchangeable. A larger share of people in urban areas identify as upper middle class, and report higher incomes. However, the proportion of low-income individuals is similar in both rural and urban areas. Notably, the subjective working class is not exclusively rural; a significant share resides in semi-urban and urban areas.
Results
Test 1: Place deservingness
The first test examines whether these voter groups share perceptions of who is deserving of resources, and specifically whether working-class voters believe that cities receive more than their fair share, which we know from previous studies is a common sentiment among rural voters. The experiment is designed as a 1x2 between-subjects set-up that asks a randomly assigned half of the respondents about cities, and the other half about rural areas, following the group-based approach.Footnote 11 The experiment used the following wording: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Generally speaking, people [in cities/in rural areas] receive more than their fair share of public resources.” Responses were provided on a six-point scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.
Figure 1 shows the support for the two experimental conditions across subjective place and class. The predicted values derive from two separate OLS regression models that include an interaction between the treatment conditions and the voter group, while controlling for the other voter group. As expected, results show that rural voters more than urban voters perceive that cities receive more than a fair share of public resources. Importantly, we also observe that those belonging to the working class, more than those in the upper middle class, believe that cities enjoy a greater share of public resources. Notably, both urban voters and upper-middle-class voters are, on average, more likely to agree that cities, compared to rural areas, receive more resources than what is fair. The pattern is still, however, more prominent for rural and working-class voters.
Markers show predicted agreement with 95 percent confidence intervals. Figures are based on OLS regression models. (a). Subjective place-based voters (b). Subjective class-based voters.
I further include objective measures to single out the voter groups in question, as illustrated in Figure 2. The results for place-based voters are similar to those using the subjective measure of place. When class is measured by income, people with lower income are somewhat more likely to perceive that cities are receiving more resources than they believe is fair. For this question, the subjective understanding appears to have more impact for class than for place, as measured in this article.
Markers show predicted agreement with 95 percent confidence intervals. Figures are based on OLS regression models. (a). Objective place-based voters (b). Objective class-based voters.
In summary, the first test shows that the perception of cities receiving more than they deserve is clearly stronger among both working-class voters and rural voters. This lends support to the alternative expectation that there is consensus among the left-behind voter groups with regard to this notion of distribution of resources between places.
Test 2: Place and class deservingness
The next test adds a new layer to the perception of who is deserving by also including working people in the evaluation that the voters must make. This is assessed using a 1x5 experimental design, with the following wording:
“Imagine that, in the election campaign, a politician made the following statement: ‘It is time that [those who live rural areas/those who live in cities/working people who live in cities/working people who live in rural areas/working people] get more for their tax money.’ How much do you agree or disagree with this politician?”Footnote 12 Responses were given on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.
Figures 3 and 4 display the results from OLS regression analyses, where treatment conditions are moderated by either place or class, including the other group as a control variable, as shown in the Supplementary Material. In Figure 3a, displaying agreement among subjective place-based voters, there is a clear difference between urban and rural respondents across all treatments except the “working people” treatment. Rural voters are again less likely to agree that people in urban areas should be prioritized, while they are more likely to prioritize working people, rural people and rural working people. These groups receive the same priority. Urban voters appear to distinguish less between the groups than rural voters, showing that there is more potential for division over place among rural voters. Urban voters are most positive towards working people, in fact, they are as positive as rural voters. We also observe that, among rural voters, the “urban working people” condition is not favored in the same way as working people in general or rural working people, indicating that this group is viewed differently.
Markers show predicted agreement with 95 percent confidence intervals. Figures are based on OLS regression models. (a). Subjective place-based voters (b). Subjective class-based voters.
Markers show predicted agreement with 95 percent confidence intervals. Figures are based on OLS regression models. (a). Objective place-based voters (b). Objective class-based voters.
In Figure 3b, showing the agreement among class-based voters, we observe that the working class is also more likely to find rural working people, rural people and working people deserving. The working class is also less supportive of urban residents receiving more in return for what they pay in taxes compared to the other social groups, even when the urban group consists of working people. The upper middle class shows a less distinct pattern of support. For the “rural people” and the “urban working people” conditions, the confidence intervals between the two class groups overlap. Still, the working class is more supportive in the “working people” and “rural working people” treatment conditions.
Observing the pattern using objective measures of place and class in Figure 4, the perceptions of economic deservingness do not appear to be dependent on a subjective understanding of where a person lives. Analyses using the objective measure of place yield a similar pattern to that found with the subjective measure. The results based on the objective class measure, on the other hand, are less distinct than those based on the subjective measure. The direction of the pattern is similar to that of the analyses using subjective measures, but the differences are smaller. There are significant differences between people with higher and lower incomes in two of the treatments, with the lower-income group believing that rural working people should be favored more than those with higher income. In addition, lower-income respondents are more negative toward urban residents receiving more public resources.
To summarize, the test reveals that rural voters clearly feel that working people, rural people and rural working people are deserving of more public resources. Working-class voters are also more likely to find rural groups deserving, even when controlling for where people live. They consider working people, rural people and rural working people to be equally deserving and are less positive towards the idea of allocating more resources to urban residents.Footnote 13 The results point to a consensus between the left-behind voter groups with regard to who they find deserving. The results suggest that urban areas are associated with more privileges than rural areas, as urban groups are prioritized less, even when it is stated that the group consists of working people.Footnote 14
Test 3: Contrasting place and class redistribution
While the previous tests show that the voter groups in question share views on who deserves government resources, this third test directly examines support for redistribution and compares different types of redistribution with another.
A 1x3 experiment was conducted to asses attitudes towards redistribution. Respondents were asked: “How good or bad do you think the following proposal is: Government has to do more to reduce economic inequalities between [people/people in rural areas and people in urban areas/rich and poor], even if it means increasing taxes a bit.” The respondents answered on a 7-point scale, ranging from “Very bad” to “Very good”. The first condition is meant to represent a baseline, reflecting general support for redistribution, while the second and third conditions represent horizontal and vertical forms of economic redistribution.
The contrasting redistribution experiment is analyzed by singling out the voter groups while controlling for the other.Footnote 15 The results are presented in Figures 5 and 6 as coefficient plots. Observing working-class voters, we find that they are less likely to support place redistribution compared to class redistribution. A similar pattern is found among rural voters, who also favor vertical economic redistribution over redistribution between places.
Coefficient plots using “rich-poor” condition as a baseline. 95 percent confidence intervals. Figures are based on OLS regression models. (a). Subjective class-based voters (b). Subjective place-based voters.
Coefficient plots using “rich-poor” condition as a baseline. 95 percent confidence intervals. Figures are based on OLS regression models. (a). Objective class-based voters (b). Objective place-based voters.
Similar patterns emerge using objective measures. Using income as a measure of class, we find that lower-income voters are less likely to support place redistribution compared to class redistribution, and the same is true for rural voters, defined as those living in the least-central municipalities.
In summary, although there are no stark divisions in support of different types of redistribution, rural voters are not more supportive of place redistribution compared to vertical class redistribution. Since the working class also favors vertical redistribution, these groups do not diverge on this issue. Ultimately, when comparing place and class redistribution, rural voters are more inclined to support the latter. This again suggests that there is consensus between rural and working-class voters with regard to redistribution between people and places. They share views of who is deserving and both groups favor vertical redistribution above horizontal redistribution.
Discussion and conclusion
This article has examined if there is consensus or conflict with regard to redistribution among rural and working-class voters, groups described as left behind in knowledge-economy societies. It contributes to the burgeoning literature about the political thinking of these groups. While much existing research emphasizes rural resentment and populist radical right political orientations, this article has focused on views of redistribution—the core economic conflict in politics. A key contribution of this article is that ideas about redistributive deservingness could unify left-behind voter groups, meaning that there is a potential consensus. It thus offers an alternative perspective on what might engage and align the left-behind voter groups. Overall, the findings indicate that there is potential for political parties to mobilize both rural voters and working-class voters around their shared preferences for redistribution across place and class.
This implies that parties, especially those on the left, which traditionally promote redistribution more strongly, can gain support from these voter groups by signaling that they will prioritize both working and rural people. Given that a large share of voters live in urban areas, it is not obvious that all parties on the left will choose such a path. However, it is worth noting that many urban voters also believe that cities receive more than their fair share, suggesting this perception is not highly contested. What this study shows is that this view is clearly stronger among rural and working-class voters. As urban voters do not, on average, reject the idea that urban areas benefit disproportionately, and are not polarized by place the same way as rural voters, this suggests that they would not, at least immediately, respond with resistance to such a policy program.
Overall, the results indicate that rural and working-class voters perceive a mismatch between demand and supply, as they support greater distribution of resources to rural areas, yet perceive that cities end up with more than what is fair, and believe that rural people and working people should receive more in return for their tax contributions. This aligns with the disappointment and resentment among left-behind voters that has been described in previous literature. A central idea from Cramer (Reference Cramer2016; Reference Cramer2012) is that this kind of discrepancy leads to a rejection of the welfare state, as rural voters are more likely to think that it does not benefit them anyway. However, this does not appear to be the case in Norway. Rural voters favor redistribution between rich and poor more than spatial redistribution. A relevant question for further comparative research is whether variations in how left-behind voters relate to state intervention are moderated by institutional trust, that is, whether it matters that they have confidence that their tax contributions will be used to benefit all inhabitants.
The views on deservingness among these voters may seem puzzling, as rural areas in Norway receive substantial public resources through the redistributive system. Why, then, do they perceive that rural areas receive less than their fair share? This could be related to a lack of knowledge about the redistributive effects of the system or simply a belief that rural areas deserve even more. Findings from the second test, which show that working people in rural areas are viewed by left-behind voter groups as being more deserving than working people in urban areas, contribute new insight into perceptions of place and class among voters. The theoretical framework suggests that the interaction of place and class in knowledge-economy societies could strengthen the perception that wealth and resources are soaked up by cities, affecting how voters view urban residents. If that is the case, this poses a challenge for political parties seeking support from left-behind voters, as cities require substantial public resources, not only to cater to large public institutions (such as government agencies, cultural and educational institutions), but also to provide essential services to urban citizens. Parties may need to strike a fine and perhaps costly balance between these considerations. However, the results show that there is support for class-based redistribution among left-behind voters, which could address the needs of less well-off urban residents.
Cities and their inhabitants are perceived as less deserving. In this article, this is attributed to the idea that cities are more likely to thrive and their residents are associated with more advantageous economic conditions, such as higher levels of education (Hegewald Reference Hegewald2024). Another suggestion is that cities are viewed negatively due to their association with immigration, overlapping the urban–rural divide with a cultural conflict. Analyses placed in the online Supplementary Material show that immigration skepticism does not drive the unfavorable view of cities (see Supplementary Material B.6), suggesting no clear overlap in this context. Still, this relationship should be investigated further in comparative studies.
An key question is whether these findings can be generalized. Party competition will likely influence the probability of forming a program based on the two types of redistribution in other contexts. One factor that could set Norway apart is the presence of the Center Party in the political landscape, which has ownership of rural issues (Hesstvedt, Bergh, and Karlsen Reference Hesstvedt, Bergh and Karlsen2021) and advances state interventions in the economy as solutions to many of these challenges. Certain areas of the periphery have traditionally been aligned with the left. This formed the basis for the Labor/Center alliance that joined forces in government in 2005-2013, and 2021-2025.Footnote 16 Additionally, the populist radical right party, with its foundation in economic liberalism (Jungar and Jupskås Reference Jungar and Jupskås2014), was in government during a period of rural protest against the political center. These circumstances differ from those contexts often studied in the literature, namely, the US and the UK, where fewer parties compete and rural areas are more clearly aligned with the political right (Jennings and Stoker Reference Jennings and Stoker2016; Mettler and Brown Reference Mettler and Brown2022). In these majoritarian systems, the electoral urban-rural divide has risen in recent years (Huijsmans and Rodden Reference Huijsmans and Rodden2025), which reduces the chances of a coalition between class-based and rural economic interests even further.
The limitations of this paper suggest directions for further research. Extending this analysis to other settings is necessary to gain more insight into the patterns identified. While this article concentrated on general notions of deservingness and preferences for redistribution, further research could explore specific schemes and subsidies designed to redistribute resources across place and class. This could help to clarify whether there are limits to the identified consensus. Future studies should also leverage larger data sets to explore the intersection of different group belongings to examine whether the redistributive preferences of the rural working class differ from those of the urban working class. Identifying with different groups could create cross-pressure that generates more ambivalence in political preferences (Dassonneville Reference Dassonneville2022), for example, on who is deserving. Moreover, research shows that preferences are strongest when multiple identities align (Mason Reference Mason2018). Based on this, we could expect that further studies will show that the rural working class holds the most forceful views on the deservingness of left-behind voter groups. Additionally, this study did not allow voters to weigh cultural and economic issues against each other, and it does not test which issues these voters place weight on when casting a vote. A conjoint design, in which respondents select party programs based on both types of issues, could provide further insights into the priorities of rural and working-class voters.
Supplementary material
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S1475676525100339.
Data Availability Statement
The survey data used in this study are available for research purposes via Sikt (Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research). However, due to the integration of municipality size data and the use of secure infrastructure, the analyses cannot be directly replicated using the publicly available dataset. Researchers interested in replicating the analyses must contact the author and DIGSSCORE to request access via UiB SAFE (Secure Access to Research Data and e-Infrastructure).
Funding statement
The research was supported by the European Research Council (grant agreement n° INCLUDE – 101001133).
Compting interests
None
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