1. The principles and rules applicable to the different situations that arose during the conflict

73. The Parties disagree about the scope of Uganda's obligation to make reparation for the injury suffered in two different situations: in the district of Ituri, under Ugandan occupation, and in other areas of the DRC outside Ituri, including Kisangani where Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces were operating simultaneously.

2. The causal nexus between the internationally wrongful acts and the injury suffered

85. The Parties differ on whether reparation should be limited to the injury directly linked to an internationally wrongful act or should also cover the indirect consequences of that act.

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86. The DRC argues that the Respondent must make good any damage demonstrated to be a consequence of its internationally wrongful conduct. It adds that Uganda is obliged to make reparation for the entire injury, whether it resulted directly from its internationally wrongful conduct or was caused by an uninterrupted chain of events. In the Applicant's view, the perpetrator of the internationally wrongful act is bound to make reparation for any damage that would not have occurred had the internationally wrongful act not been committed, regardless of the existence of intervening causes between the internationally wrongful act and the damage. It holds Uganda responsible for all the damage inflicted, including that resulting from acts committed by irregular forces such as the MLC. According to the DRC, whatever the location of the armed rebel groups, they would not have been able to commit acts of looting, destruction and other atrocities without support from Uganda.

87. The Applicant considers that the foreseeability of the damage should be taken into account. In its view, Uganda could not have failed to foresee that its acts would produce damage, and it should therefore be required to make reparation. The DRC adds that this reparation is owed even if certain intervening causes attributable to third parties occurred between the internationally wrongful act and the damage.

88. Uganda contends that the causal nexus must be assessed differently depending on the internationally wrongful act at issue.

89. As regards the principle of non-intervention, Uganda draws attention to the imputability of the acts committed by irregular armed groups. It points out that the Court, in its 2005 Judgment, ruled that the wrongful acts committed by various armed groups supported by Uganda could not be attributed to it. It further asserts that the DRC has failed to establish that Uganda's support for those groups was the direct and certain cause of a specific injury attributable to them. Although the Respondent admits that the political or financial support provided to certain groups, to the extent that it was established, could be characterized as wrongful, it contends that this does not automatically and without further proof make such support the direct and certain cause of the wrongful acts committed by these groups. Uganda relies on the 2005 Judgment to argue that it has in no way been established that it created those armed groups or controlled their operations, nor has it been established that those groups were acting on its instructions or under its direction or control. The Respondent adds that it did not have a duty of vigilance on Congolese territory outside Ituri and, consequently, that the damage inflicted by other forces on that territory could not be connected to an alleged lack of vigilance on the part of Uganda.

90. As regards the régime of occupation in the district of Ituri, the Respondent insists that it falls to the DRC to demonstrate a causal nexus between Uganda's breach of its obligations as an occupying Power and the damage inflicted in that district by individuals or groups. It adds that the DRC has failed to show that certain measures were not taken by Uganda to prevent damage by third parties.

91. With respect to the principle of non-use of force, the Respondent argues that it falls to the DRC to demonstrate a direct and certain causal nexus between the internationally wrongful act and the injury. It considers unfounded the DRC's position that a causal nexus can be established simply by the fact that the damage would not have occurred “but for” Uganda's violation of the jus ad bellum.

92. Finally, relying on the Judgment rendered by the Court on 26 February 2007 in.the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 234, para. 462), Uganda claims that even if it had taken the necessary measures, the damage caused by third parties in Ituri would still have occurred.

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93. The Court may award compensation only when an injury is caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State. As a general rule, it falls to the party seeking compensation to prove the existence of a causal nexus between the internationally wrongful act and the injury suffered. In accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court, compensation can be awarded only if there is “a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act . . . and the injury suffered by the Applicant, consisting of all damage of any type, material or moral” (ibid., pp. 233-234, para. 462). The Court applied this same criterion in two other cases in which the question of reparation arose (Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 26, para. 32; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 332, para. 14). However, it should be noted that the causal nexus required may vary depending on the primary rule violated and the nature and extent of the injury.

94. In particular, in the case of damage resulting from war, the question of the causal nexus can raise certain difficulties. In a situation of a long-standing and large-scale armed conflict, as in this case, the causal nexus between the wrongful conduct and certain injuries for which an applicant seeks reparation may be readily established. For some other injuries, the link between the internationally wrongful act and the alleged injury may be insufficiently direct and certain to call for reparation. It may be that the damage is attributable to several concurrent causes, including the actions or omissions of the respondent. It is also possible that several internationally wrongful acts of the same nature, but attributable to different actors, may result in a single injury or in several distinct injuries. The Court will consider these questions as they arise, in light of the facts of this case and the evidence available. Ultimately, it is for the Court to decide if there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between Uganda's internationally wrongful acts and the various forms of damage allegedly suffered by the DRC (see Part II, Section A above).

95. The Court is of the opinion that, in analysing the causal nexus, it must make a distinction between the alleged actions and omissions that took place in Ituri, which was under the occupation and effective control of Uganda, and those that occurred in other areas of the DRC, where Uganda did not necessarily have effective control, notwithstanding the support it provided to several rebel groups whose actions gave rise to damage. The Court recalls that Uganda is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage resulting from the conflict in Ituri, even that resulting from the conduct of third parties, unless it has established, with respect to a particular injury, that it was not caused by Uganda's failure to meet its obligations as an occupying Power (see paragraph 78 above).

96. Lastly, the Court cannot accept the Respondent's argument based on an analogy with the 2007 Judgment in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 234, para. 462, in which the Court expressly “confine[d] itself to determining the specific scope of the duty to prevent in the Genocide Convention” and did not “purport to establish a general jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a treaty instrument, or other binding legal norm, includes an obligation for States to prevent certain acts” (ibid., pp. 220-221, para. 429). The Court considers that the legal régimes and factual circumstances in question are not comparable, given that, unlike the above-mentioned Genocide case, the present case concerns a situation of occupation.

97. As regards the injury suffered outside Ituri, the Court must take account of the fact that some of this damage occurred as a result of a combination of actions and omissions attributable to other States and to rebel groups operating on Congolese territory. The Court cannot accept the Applicant's assessment that Uganda is obliged to make reparation for 45 per cent of all the damage that occurred during the armed conflict on Congolese territory. This assessment, which purports to correspond to the proportion of Congolese territory under Ugandan influence, has no basis in law or in fact. However, the fact that the damage was the result of concurrent causes is not sufficient to exempt the Respondent from any obligation to make reparation.

98. The Parties have also addressed the applicable law in situations in which multiple actors engage in conduct that gives rise to injury, which has particular relevance to the events in Kisangani, where the damage alleged by the DRC arose out of conflict between the forces of Uganda and those of Rwanda. The Court recalls that, in certain situations in which multiple causes attributable to two or more actors have resulted in injury, a single actor may be required to make full reparation for the damage suffered (Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 22-23; see commentary to Article 31 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 91, and particularly pp. 93-94, paras. 12-13, as well as the commentary to Article 47, ibid., pp. 124-125, paras. 1-8). In other situations, in which the conduct of multiple actors has given rise to injury, responsibility for part of such injury should instead be allocated among those actors (see commentary to Article 31, ibid., p. 93, para. 13, and to Article 47, ibid., p. 125, para. 5). The Court will return to this issue in assessing the DRC's claims for compensation in relation to Kisangani (see paragraphs 177, 221 and 253 below).

3. The nature, form and amount of reparation

99. The Court will recall certain international legal principles that inform the determination of the nature, form and amount of reparation under the law on the international responsibility of States in general and in situations of mass violations in the context of armed conflict in particular.

100. It is well established in international law that “the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form” (Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 21). This is an obligation to make full reparation for the damage caused by an internationally wrongful act (Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 26, para. 30; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 691, para. 161; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 59, para. 119; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 80, para. 150).

101. As stated in Article 34 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, “[f]ull reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination”. Thus, compensation may be an appropriate form of reparation, particularly in those cases where restitution is materially impossible (Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 26, para. 31; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), pp. 103-104, para. 273).

102. In view of the circumstances of the present case, the Court emphasizes that it is well established in international law that reparation due to a State is compensatory in nature and should not have a punitive character (Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 26, para. 31). The Court observes, moreover, that any reparation is intended, as far as possible, to benefit all those who suffered injury resulting from internationally wrongful acts (see Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 344, para. 57).

103. The Court notes that the Parties do not agree on the principles and methodologies applicable to the assessment of damage resulting from an armed conflict or to the quantification of compensation due.

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104. The DRC contends that it reached an estimate, in good faith, of the damage caused, by applying a well-defined method and taking account of the circumstances of the case, where the damage suffered was on a massive scale. Thus, in such circumstances, according to the DRC, the Court's jurisprudence does not require a precise assessment of the damage caused. The Applicant contests the Respondent's claim that every injury suffered by every victim has to be specifically demonstrated in order to calculate the quantum. The DRC relies on the standard of proof applicable to mass claims. According to the Applicant, consistent international jurisprudence supports the proposition that international law does not require the specific injuries caused to each victim or group of victims to be established in order to calculate compensation in the context of mass claims. The Applicant also draws attention to the difficulties involved in gathering evidence. The DRC thus argues that it will be necessary to mitigate the effects of the general rule that it is for the party that alleges a fact to prove its existence, in order to take account of situations where the respondent is in a better position to provide evidence of the facts at issue. The Applicant contends that international jurisprudence, particularly in the context of mass injury, has introduced a certain amount of flexibility as regards the establishment of detailed and precise evidence. The DRC relies in this regard on the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (hereinafter the “EECC”) and the ICC.

105. Uganda, for its part, contends that the Court must demand a high degree of certainty to establish the damage caused. The Respondent thus argues that the DRC must prove the damage, by stating precisely which persons or property, in specific places and at specific times, incurred loss, damage or injury. In addition, Uganda claims that the fact that Ituri was occupied does not relieve the DRC of the obligation to submit some evidence.

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106. The Court recalls that “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act” (Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47). The Court has recognized in other cases that the absence of adequate evidence of the extent of material damage will not, in all situations, preclude an award of compensation for that damage (Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 26, para. 35). While the Court recognizes that there is some uncertainty about the exact extent of the damage caused, this does not preclude it from determining the amount of compensation. The Court may, on an exceptional basis, award compensation in the form of a global sum, within the range of possibilities indicated by the evidence and taking account of equitable considerations. Such an approach may be called for where the evidence leaves no doubt that an internationally wrongful act has caused a substantiated injury, but does not allow a precise evaluation of the extent or scale of such injury (see Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), pp. 26-27, para. 35; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 334, para. 21, pp. 334-335, para. 24, and p. 337, para. 33).

107. The Court observes that, in most instances, when compensation has been granted in cases involving a large group of victims who have suffered serious injury in situations of armed conflict, the judicial or other bodies concerned have awarded a global sum, for certain categories of injury, on the basis of the evidence at their disposal. The EECC, for example, noted the intrinsic difficulties faced by judicial bodies in such situations. It acknowledged that the compensation it awarded reflected “the damage that could be established with sufficient certainty through the available evidence” (Final Award, Eritrea's Damages Claims, Decision of 17 August 2009, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XXVI, p. 516, para. 2), even though the awards “probably d[id] not reflect the totality of damage that either Party suffered in violation of international law” (ibid.). It also recognized that, in the context of proceedings aimed at providing compensation for injuries affecting large numbers of victims, the relevant institutions have adopted less rigorous standards of proof. They have accordingly reduced the levels of compensation awarded in order to account for the uncertainties that flow from applying a lower standard of proof (ibid., pp. 528-529, para. 38).

108. The Court is convinced that it should proceed in this manner in the present case. It will take due account of the above-mentioned conclusions regarding the nature, form and amount of reparation when considering the different forms of damage claimed by the DRC.

109. Uganda submits that the relevant principles of international law concerning compensation preclude requiring a responsible State to pay compensation that exceeds its financial capacity. The DRC, however, considers that “the amounts awarded should not be influenced by . . . the situation of the perpetrator of the wrongful act” and that they should depend on the injury alone.

110. The Court recalls in this regard that the EECC raised the question whether, in determining the amount of compensation, account should be taken of the financial burden imposed on the responsible State, given its economic condition, in particular if there is any doubt about the State's capacity to pay without compromising its ability to meet its people's basic needs (Final Award, Eritrea's Damages Claims, Decision of 17 August 2009, RIAA, Vol. XXVI, pp. 522-524, paras. 19-22). The Court will further address the question of the respondent State's financial capacity below (see paragraph 407).

1. The burden of proof

115. The Court will begin by recalling the rules governing the burden of proof. In accordance with its well-established jurisprudence on the matter, “as a general rule, it is for the party which alleges a fact in support of its claims to prove the existence of that fact” (Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 26, para. 33; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 660, para. 54). In principle, therefore, it falls to the party alleging a fact to “submit the relevant evidence to substantiate its claims” (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 71, para. 163).

116. However, the Court considers that this is not an absolute rule applicable in all circumstances. There are situations where “this general rule would have to be applied flexibly . . . and, in particular, [where] the Respondent may be in a better position to establish certain facts” (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 332, para. 15). The Court “cannot however apply a presumption that evidence which is unavailable would, if produced, have supported a particular party's case; still less a presumption of the existence of evidence which has not been produced” (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 399, para. 63).

117. The Court has thus underlined that “[t]he determination of the burden of proof is in reality dependent on the subject-matter and the nature of each dispute brought before the Court; it varies according to the type of facts which it is necessary to establish for the purposes of the decision of the case” (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 660, para. 54). It is for the Court to evaluate all the evidence produced by the parties and which has been duly subjected to their scrutiny, with a view to forming its conclusions. Depending on the circumstances of the case, it may be that “neither party is alone in bearing the burden of proof” (ibid., p. 661, para. 56).

118. As regards the damage that occurred in the district of Ituri, which was under Ugandan occupation, the Court recalls the conclusion it reached in paragraph 78 above. In this phase of the proceedings, it is for Uganda to establish that a particular injury suffered by the DRC in Ituri was not caused by its failure to meet its obligations as an occupying Power.

119. However, as regards damage that occurred on Congolese territory outside Ituri, and although the existence of armed conflict may make it more difficult to establish the facts, the Court is of the view that “[u]ltimately . . . it is the litigant seeking to establish a fact who bears the burden of proving it; and in cases where evidence may not be forthcoming, a submission may in the judgment be rejected as unproved” (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 319, para. 101; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 437, para. 101).

2. The standard of proof and degree of certainty

120. In practice, the Court has applied various criteria to assess evidence (see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 129-130, paras. 209-210; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 17). The Court considers that the standard of proof may vary from case to case and may depend on the gravity of the acts alleged (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 130, para. 210). The Court has also recognized that a State that is not in a position to provide direct proof of certain facts “should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence” (Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 18).

121. The Court has previously addressed the question of the weight to be given to certain kinds of evidence. The Court recalls, as noted in its 2005 Judgment, that it

122. The Court stated that the value of reports from official or independent bodies

123. The Court considers it helpful to refer to the practice of other international bodies that have addressed the determination of reparation concerning mass violations in the context of armed conflict. The EECC recognized the difficulties associated with questions of proof in its examination of compensation claims for violations of obligations under the jus in bello and jus ad bellum committed in the context of an international armed conflict. While it required “clear and convincing evidence to establish that damage occurred”, the EECC noted that if the same high standard were required for quantification of the damage, it would thwart any reparation. It therefore required “less rigorous proof” for the purposes of quantification (Final Award, Eritrea's Damages Claims, Decision of 17 August 2009, RIAA, Vol. XXVI, p. 528, para. 36). Moreover, in its Order for Reparations in the Katanga case, which concerns acts that took place in the course of the same armed conflict as in the present case, the ICC was mindful of the fact that “the Applicants were not always in a position to furnish documentary evidence in support of all of the harm alleged, given the circumstances in the DRC” (The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Trial Chamber II, Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, 24 March 2017, p. 38, para. 84).

124. In light of the foregoing and given that a large amount of evidence has been destroyed or rendered inaccessible over the years since the armed conflict, the Court is of the view that the standard of proof required to establish responsibility is higher than in the present phase on reparation, which calls for some flexibility.

125. The Court notes that the evidence included in the case file by the DRC is, for the most part, insufficient to reach a precise determination of the amount of compensation due. However, given the context of armed conflict in this case, the Court must take account of other evidence, such as the various investigative reports in the case file, in particular those from United Nations organs. The Court already examined much of this evidence in its 2005 Judgment and took the view that some of the United Nations reports, as well as the final report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC established in 2001 (hereinafter the “Porter Commission Report”), had probative value when corroborated by other reliable sources (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 249, para. 237). Although the Court noted in 2005 that it was not necessary for it to make findings of fact for each individual incident, these documents nevertheless record a considerable number of incidents on which the Court can now rely in evaluating the damage and the amount of compensation due. The Court will also take more recent evidence into account, notably the “Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003”, which was published in 2010 by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (hereinafter the “Mapping Report”). The Court will also take account of the reports by the Court-appointed experts, where it considers them to be relevant.

126. In the circumstances of the case and given the context and the time that has elapsed since the facts in question occurred, the Court considers that it must assess the existence and extent of the damage within the range of possibilities indicated by the evidence. This may be evidence included in the case file by the Parties, in the reports submitted by the Court-appointed experts or in reports of the United Nations and other national or international bodies. Finally, the Court considers that, in such circumstances, an assessment of the existence and extent of the damage must be based on reasonable estimates, taking into account whether a particular finding of fact is supported by more than one source of evidence (“a number of concordant indications”) (see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 83, para. 152).

1. Loss of life

135. The DRC claims compensation for the loss of 180,000 civilian lives. To this, the DRC adds a claim for the loss of the lives of 2,000 members of the Congolese armed forces who were allegedly killed in fighting with the Ugandan army or Ugandan-backed armed groups. To substantiate the number of 180,000 civilian lives lost, the DRC relies on mortality surveys and other estimates produced by non-governmental organizations, in particular a report by the International Rescue Committee (hereinafter the “IRC”) and a study conducted by the Association pour le développement de la recherche appliquée en sciences sociales (hereinafter “ADRASS”). These studies aim to quantify “excess mortality” by comparing the overall observed or calculated deaths during the conflict period with the mortality rate of previous years. While the IRC report estimates that 3.9 million “excess deaths” occurred during the relevant period, between 1998 and 2003, the ADRASS study arrives at a number of 200,000 “excess deaths”.

136. The DRC proceeds from the estimate of the IRC, which it rounds up to 4 million lives lost. It then divides this number by ten, “[g]iven the caution which should be observed within judicial proceedings”, to arrive at a “minimum estimate” of 400,000 civilian victims. Recognizing that Uganda should not be held responsible for every civilian death caused by the armed conflict, the DRC subsequently applies a multiplier of 0.45 to reflect the share of responsibility it attributes to Uganda. The DRC thereby arrives at a number of 180,000 civilian lives lost attributable to Uganda. The DRC considers that this approach finds support in the report of the Court-appointed expert Ms Guha-Sapir, who, based on data from 38 mortality surveys in the public domain, estimates the “excess civilian deaths” due to the conflict in the DRC between 1998 and 2003 to be 4,958,775. Dividing this number by ten and applying the 0.45 multiplier put forward by the DRC, Ms Guha-Sapir arrives at an estimate of 224,449 “excess civilian deaths”.

137. The DRC submits that 60,000 of those deaths occurred in Ituri, that 920 resulted from the fighting in Kisangani, and that 119,080 occurred in other parts of the country. The DRC further divides the number of civilian lives lost into those resulting from violence that was deliberately targeted at the civilian population (40,000 in.Ituri), and those which resulted from other breaches of Uganda's international obligations in the context of the invasion and occupation of parts of the DRC (20,000 collateral civilian deaths in Ituri; 920 in.Kisangani; and 119,080 civilian deaths in other areas of the DRC).

138. In response to a question posed by the Court under Article 62 of the Rules of Court, the DRC submitted “victim identification form[s]”, which had been collected by an expert commission established by the Government of the DRC (hereinafter the “Congolese Commission of Inquiry”). These forms record 5,440 individual lives allegedly lost due to Uganda's unlawful conduct.

139. The DRC proposes that the Court use fixed sums to determine the compensation for each life lost. With respect to lives lost as a result of acts of violence deliberately targeted at the civilian population, the DRC requests US$34,000 in.compensation per person. This figure allegedly corresponds to the average amount awarded by Congolese courts to the families of victims of war crimes. Regarding civilian deaths not resulting from direct violence against the civilian population and deaths among members of the Congolese armed forces, the DRC proposes that the Court use fixed amounts based on an estimation of the average age of the victims, average life expectancy and average anticipated yearly income, resulting in a figure of US$18,913 per person. With respect to the first category, the DRC notes that one of the Court-appointed experts, Mr. Senogles, did not analyse the prevailing practice of Congolese courts, as stipulated in the Court's terms of reference, and considers that his proposal to award US$30,000 per person is unsubstantiated and too low. The DRC is of the view that the expert failed to explain why the Court should have recourse to the practice of the United Nations Compensation Commission (hereinafter the “UNCC”) instead of the case law of international courts and tribunals, especially those operating on the African continent.

140. In total, the DRC requests the Court to award US$4,045,646,000 in.compensation for the loss of life which, it alleges, was caused by Uganda.

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141. Uganda submits that demographic studies estimating excess mortality do not prove “the exact injury that was suffered as a result of specific actions of Uganda”, as required by the Court in its 2005 Judgment (I.C.J Reports 2005, p. 257, para. 260). Uganda also maintains that the IRC study, as well as the report by the Court-appointed expert Ms Guha-Sapir, is unreliable and methodologically flawed. In particular, Uganda argues that both studies are based on outdated data. It asserts that if Ms Guha-Sapir's methodology were to be applied to the more recent data for the period 1998-2003 published by the United Nations Population Division, no significant “excess deaths” would have been detected. Uganda also notes that the authors of the ADRASS study considered that their figure of 200,000 lives lost is probably significantly overstated. Uganda further claims that the DRC's use of a multiplier of 0.45 to determine Uganda's share of responsibility is arbitrary and does not adequately take the role of other actors into account.

142. Uganda also refers to other independent sources, including the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (hereinafter the “UCDP”) housed at Uppsala University and used by the Court-appointed expert Mr. Urdal, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (hereinafter the “ACLED”) housed at the University of Sussex, and the Mapping Report. Uganda points out that these “neutral sources” arrive at figures which are far lower than those put forward by the DRC. It also maintains that, under the Court's jurisprudence and for various reasons, the reports by third parties on which the DRC relies, including United Nations reports and reports by non-governmental organizations, must be treated with caution. Finally, Uganda argues that the practice of international courts and tribunals requires an applicant to provide evidence that proves the identity of persons who were allegedly killed, including the person's name and the date, location and cause of death. Uganda asserts that the DRC has thus failed to meet its burden of proof as to the exact injury that was suffered as a result of specific actions of Uganda. The DRC's request for compensation should therefore be rejected.

143. Regarding the claim concerning the deaths of Congolese soldiers, Uganda contends that the Court made no finding in the 2005 Judgment that Uganda was responsible for such deaths and that, even if the DRC were entitled to seek reparation for these alleged deaths, the claim is unsupported by evidence.

144. Concerning the valuation of lives lost as a result of deliberate violence against the civilian population, Uganda disputes that the appropriate average amount of compensation should be determined by reference to decisions of the DRC's domestic courts. It also asserts that the figure put forward by the DRC in this regard is not corroborated by the documents the DRC has submitted. Moreover, Uganda maintains that in recent reparation decisions relating to the same conflict, the ICC has awarded amounts that are substantially lower than those allegedly awarded by Congolese courts. Uganda also considers that the variables used by the DRC to determine the average amount of compensation for civilian deaths that were not the result of deliberate violence are not supported by evidence. In particular, Uganda notes that, in calculating the average annual income of the deceased victims, the actual average income in the DRC should be used instead of gross domestic product per capita. Concerning the report of the Court-appointed expert Mr. Senogles, Uganda argues that the valuation practice of the UNCC cannot be transposed to inter-State judicial proceedings. Moreover, Uganda maintains that Mr. Senogles applied the UNCC's methodology incorrectly by recommending fixed amounts based on the Commission's Category C claims, which required more detailed evidence of individual losses than is available in the present proceedings.

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145. The Court recalls that, in its 2005 Judgment, it found, inter alia, that Uganda had committed acts of killing among the civilian population, had failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets, had not protected the civilian population in fighting with other combatants and, as an occupying Power, had failed to take measures to respect and ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in Ituri (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 241, para. 211, and p. 280, para. 345, subpara. (3) of the operative part). Furthermore, the Court found that Uganda, through its unlawful military intervention in the DRC, had violated the prohibition of the use of force as expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter (ibid., p. 227, para. 165). The Court reaffirms that, as a matter of principle, the loss of life caused by these internationally wrongful acts gives rise to the obligation of Uganda to make full reparation. To award compensation, the Court must determine the existence and extent of the injury suffered by the Applicant and satisfy itself that there exists a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the Respondent's internationally wrongful act and the injury suffered.

146. The victim identification forms submitted by the DRC (see paragraph 138 above) are few in number in comparison to the number of lives lost claimed by the DRC, and thus do not support the claim that Uganda owes reparation for 180,000 civilian deaths.

147. Moreover, a large majority of the victim identification forms do not indicate the name of the deceased. Although, given the extraordinary circumstances of the present case, the Court is not persuaded by Uganda's contention that the identity of the persons allegedly killed must be established for these forms to have any evidentiary value (see paragraph 114 above), the victim identification forms also suffer from other defects, in particular the fact that they are not accompanied by corroborating documentation. Furthermore, many of the forms do not show a sufficient causal nexus between any internationally wrongful conduct by Uganda and the alleged harm, but rather refer to other actors as the presumed perpetrators of such harm, including Rwanda or armed groups operating outside Ituri, for whose actions Uganda was not responsible. The Court has observed in previous cases that witness statements which are collected many years after the relevant events, especially when not supported by corroborating documentation, must be treated with caution (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (I), pp. 78-79, paras. 197 and 199; Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 731, para. 244). Consequently, the victim identification forms submitted by the DRC can be accorded only very limited probative value in arriving at an appreciation of the number of deaths for which Uganda owes reparation.

148. The scientific studies relied on by the DRC to calculate the number of “excess deaths”, namely the IRC report and the ADRASS study, do not substantiate the existence of a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus. The Court considers that, irrespective of the scientific and methodological quality of the surveys, they were not intended to, and do not, identify the number of deaths that have a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus to the unlawful acts of Uganda. In her report, Ms Guha-Sapir estimates “with 95% confidence that a minimum of 3.2 million excess deaths may have resulted in this period due to armed conflict”, but the Court was not convinced by her explanation for this estimate. During the hearing, Ms Guha-Sapir acknowledged that it was impossible to attribute the “excess deaths” identified in her report to a single cause. Even if the number of 3.2 million lives lost were accepted as an indication of the number of lives lost during the armed conflict, the Court would be left without any plausible basis to determine for which of these lives lost “there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act . . . and the injury suffered by the Applicant” (Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 26, para. 32; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 332, para. 14, citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 232-233, para. 462). Some of the lives lost during the conflict (the number of which cannot be determined) may be regarded as having a cause that is too remote from the internationally wrongful acts of Uganda to be a basis for a claim of reparation against it (see commentary to Article 31 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 93, para. 10). Consequently, the Court considers that the mortality surveys presented cannot contribute to the determination of the number of lives lost that are attributable to Uganda.

149. The Court also takes note of the report on “conflict deaths”, that is “lives lost as a direct result of the armed conflict”, prepared by the Court-appointed expert Mr. Urdal. Mr. Urdal's report is based on the UCDP database, an academic database which he uses to identify “direct conflict deaths” based on individual incidents. Using the UCDP database, Mr. Urdal arrives at an estimate of 14,663 direct civilian deaths that occurred in the entire DRC during the relevant period, between August 1998 and June 2003, including 5,769 in.Ituri. This number includes civilians who “were killed as a result of deliberately targeted violence”, as well as “civilian collateral victims”. Mr. Urdal notes in his report that only 32 civilian deaths are coded in the UCDP database as having occurred in the DRC in clashes involving Ugandan troops. However, the Court recalls that, in its 2005 Judgment, it also held Uganda responsible for failing to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri in respect of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the occupied territory (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 245, para. 220). On this basis, and unless Uganda establishes that particular deaths alleged by the DRC in Ituri were not caused by Uganda's failure to meet its obligations as an occupying Power, Uganda owes reparation for the loss of life resulting from the conflict in Ituri, irrespective of whether those deaths resulted from clashes involving Ugandan troops (see paragraph 78 above). With respect to lives lost outside Ituri, the UCDP database is less helpful, since, according to the expert, it is “not designed to determine the legal attribution of deaths”.

150. Moreover, the Court notes the inherent limitations of the UCDP database as evidence in a judicial proceeding. The UCDP database is based mainly on press reports and reports by non-governmental organizations. The Court accords to such documents, if they are submitted directly in its proceedings, only limited probative value when they are not corroborated by other forms of evidence (2005 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 204, para. 68; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 190, para. 60; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 40-41, paras. 62-63; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, pp. 9-10, paras. 12-13). Moreover, the numbers resulting from the UCDP database represent very conservative estimates and, in all likelihood, undercount the overall number of direct civilian deaths. This was confirmed by Mr. Urdal at the hearing, when he stated that the figure of 14,663 civilian deaths (that occurred in the entire DRC from August 1998 until June 2003 based on the UCDP database, including 5,769 in.Ituri) was “almost certainly an underestimate” and that it would be impossible to determine the “margin of error”. His assessment regarding an undercount is to a certain extent substantiated by indications on the ACLED database for an overall number of 23,791 (civilian and military) deaths resulting from the conflict.

151. Although the information supplied by Mr. Urdal may provide an indication of an approximate number of direct civilian victims, the Court cannot base its assessment of the number of lives lost solely on the report of Mr. Urdal and the UCDP database. It is thus necessary to consider additional forms of evidence.

152. The Court has considered reports produced under the auspices of the United Nations and other documents prepared by independent third parties. In its 2005 Judgment, the Court relied on United Nations reports as “sufficient evidence of a reliable quality”, but only “to the extent that they [were] of probative value and [were] corroborated, if necessary, by other credible sources” (I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 239-240, paras. 205-208, and p. 249, para. 237). The precise evidentiary value accorded to any report, including those produced by United Nations entities, also depends on the methodology and amount of research underlying its preparation (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (I), p. 76, paras. 189-190; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 135-137, paras. 227-230). For that reason, the Court attaches particular credibility to the Mapping Report (see paragraph 125 above). Notably, all the information contained in the Mapping Report is corroborated by at least two independent sources, including witness interviews, and thus constitutes reliable evidence (Mapping Report, para. 10). However, even the Mapping Report

153. The Court has also taken into account other United Nations documents, such as the Secretary-General's reports on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter “MONUC”), bearing in mind that those reports do not always provide sufficient information as to the methodology adopted and are for the most part less rigorously verified than the Mapping Report.

154. The Court is of the view that the various reports of United Nations bodies, including the Mapping Report, provide a certain amount of information about specific incidents during the conflict, but do not provide a sufficient basis for the Court to arrive at an overall estimate of the number of deaths attributable to Uganda. The individual instances of persons killed that are listed in the Mapping Report are often described in imprecise terms (e.g. “several” or “numerous”). In other cases, the Mapping Report at least provides a range of the number of possible casualties. This is exemplified by the situation in Kisangani, which is documented comparatively well. The Mapping Report states that the fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani resulted in the death of “over 30” civilians in August 1999, “over 24 civilians” in May 2000, and “between 244 and 760” civilians in June 2000 (Mapping Report, paras. 361-363). While these numbers may suffice to cast doubt on the number of 920 civilian casualties claimed by the DRC in relation to these events, they provide the Court with certain ranges that inform its overall appreciation of the scale of loss of life. Moreover, since the Mapping Report was not designed to assign responsibility to particular actors, the numbers provided therein do not necessarily enable the Court to conclude that there was a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the internationally wrongful acts of Uganda and the instances of loss of life reported (see paragraphs 93 and 148 above).

155. The Court takes note of Uganda's estimate that the Mapping Report identifies a total number of 2,291 lives lost with respect to which there can be a “reasonable suspicion” that they resulted from conduct that is attributable to Uganda. However, this assessment does not take into account the number of lives that were lost as a result of Uganda's failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri, nor does it recognize that Uganda may owe reparation for certain deaths outside Ituri, even if the Mapping Report does not make specific reference to Uganda's role in a particular incident.

156. The Court further considers that, even when adding together the civilian lives lost that were recorded by the Mapping Report as having occurred in Ituri and the lives lost in other parts of the DRC in which Uganda is implicated, the total number will probably not reflect the full extent of loss of life for which Uganda is responsible. The Mapping Report aims solely to document serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The United Nations Secretary- General's Second special report on MONUC dated 27 May 2003, for example, estimates that “more than 60,000” deaths occurred between 1999 and 2003 in.Ituri alone (United Nations, doc. S/2003/566 of 27 May 2003, para. 10). While the Court cannot simply adopt a figure that appears, without supporting analysis, in a single report, the MONUC report nevertheless suggests that reliance solely on the Mapping Report would lead to an undercount of the number of lives lost.

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157. In considering the deficiencies in the evidence presented by the DRC, the Court takes into account the extraordinary circumstances of the present case, which have restricted the ability of the DRC to produce evidence with greater probative value (see paragraphs 125-126 above). The Court recalls that from 1998 to 2003, the DRC did not exercise effective control over Ituri, due to belligerent occupation by Uganda. In the Corfu Channel case, the Court found that the exclusive territorial control that is normally exercised by a State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the methods of proof available to other States, which may be allowed to have a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence (Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 18, see paragraph 120 above). This general principle also applies to situations in which a State that would normally bear the burden of proof has lost effective control over the territory where crucial evidence is located on account of the belligerent occupation of its territory by another State.

158. Moreover, the DRC rightly emphasizes that the kind of evidence that is usually provided in cases concerning damage to persons, such as death certificates and hospital records, is often not available in remote areas lacking basic civilian infrastructure, and that this reality has also been recognized by the ICC. The Court recalls the finding of the ICC according to which victims of the same conflict were not always in a position to furnish documentary evidence (see paragraph 123 above). In those proceedings, however, many such victims did in fact provide death certificates and medical reports (The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Trial Chamber II, Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, 24 March 2017, paras. 111-112). While it would not have been impossible for the DRC to produce such documentation for a certain number of persons in the present case, the Court recognizes the difficulties in obtaining such documentation for tens of thousands of alleged victims.

159. The Court is aware that detailed proof of specific events that have occurred in a devastating war, in remote areas, and almost two decades ago, is often not available. At the same time, the Court considers that notwithstanding the difficult situation in which the DRC found itself, more evidence relating to loss of life could be expected to have been collected since the Court delivered its 2005 Judgment (see paragraph 66 above).

160. The Court observes that the evidence before it, notably the Mapping Report, demonstrates that a large number of civilian casualties occurred in the DRC between 1998 and 2003 and that a significant part of these casualties can be linked to internationally wrongful acts of Uganda. However, there is insufficient evidence to support the DRC's claim of 180,000 civilian deaths for which Uganda owes reparation. Nor can the Court base its conclusions on reparation on the 32 deaths that are coded in the UCDP database as having occurred in clashes involving Ugandan forces, if only because that figure does not cover deaths caused by armed groups in Ituri (see paragraph 78 above).

161. The Court considers that the analysis by Mr. Urdal, taken together with reports of various United Nations bodies, provides a more substantiated basis for assessing the number of lives lost for which Uganda owes reparation. According to Mr. Urdal, the UCDP database arrives at an estimate of 14,663 direct civilian deaths in the entire DRC, of which 5,769 occurred in Ituri and 8,894 occurred in areas outside of Ituri. In respect of deaths in Ituri, the Court has not been presented with evidence suggesting that those civilian deaths were due to a cause other than Uganda's failure to meet its obligations as an occupying Power. Moreover, Mr. Urdal has indicated that the UCDP database likely undercounted the total number of civilian deaths in Ituri. It follows that the number of civilian deaths in Ituri for which Uganda owes reparation likely exceeds the figure of 5,769 that Mr. Urdal derived from the UCDP database. Outside Ituri, the Court may not simply assume that the number of civilian deaths for which Uganda owes reparation corresponds to the 8,894 conflict-related deaths calculated by Mr. Urdal as having occurred in that area. On the one hand, given the involvement of many actors in the armed conflict outside Ituri, it cannot be presumed that all such deaths were caused by Uganda's wrongful conduct. On the other hand, Mr. Urdal has observed that the UCDP database likely also undercounted civilian deaths outside Ituri.

162. Neither the materials presented by the DRC, nor the reports provided by the Court-appointed experts or prepared by United Nations bodies contain sufficient evidence to determine a precise or even an approximate number of civilian deaths for which Uganda owes reparation. Bearing these limitations in mind, the Court considers that the evidence presented to it suggests that the number of deaths for which Uganda owes reparation falls in the range of 10,000 to 15,000 persons.

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163. Turning to valuation, the Court considers that the DRC has not presented convincing evidence for its claim that the average amount awarded by Congolese courts to the families of victims of war crimes amounts to US$34,000. Expert reports submitted in the context of cases before the ICC that are related to the situation in the DRC suggest that this figure is too high (The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Chamber VI, Reparations Order, 8 March 2021, para. 237; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Trial Chamber II, Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, 24 March 2017, para. 230). Therefore, the Court will not rely on the average amount proposed by the DRC for the loss of a life as a result of deliberate acts of violence against the civilian population, irrespective of whether judgments of domestic courts may generally serve as an appropriate guide in a case such as the present one. The Court also does not consider that the alternative fixed-sum rates suggested by the Court-appointed expert Mr. Senogles are suitable for the present proceedings. The expert derives these rates from the practice of the UNCC but does not provide a satisfactory rationale for applying those rates in the present case. The rate he suggests for loss of life is based on the UNCC's Category C claims, which allowed individuals to claim actual losses up to US$100,000 on condition that they were documented by appropriate evidence of the circumstances and of the valuation of the claimed loss. The Court notes that, under the UNCC's Category B claims, claimants could seek fixed amounts, ranging from US$2,500 per individual who suffered serious personal injury or whose spouse, child or parent died, to US$10,000 per family of a victim, in an expedited process where the standard of proof was lower.

164. The methodology that the DRC proposes for the valuation of deaths that did not result from direct attacks on the civilian population is similar to that based on expected future life-time earnings. The Court notes that claims in respect of loss of life are usually based on an evaluation of the losses of the surviving heirs or successors, in addition to administrative expenses such as medical and burial costs (see Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Assessment of Amount of Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 249-250; Opinion in the Lusitania Cases, 1 November 1923, RIAA, Vol. VII, p. 35). This approach was considered by the EECC to be “a useful reference for assessing compensation in inter-State claims, if properly applied in appropriate cases”, which “may provide a rough measure of a State's injury where a group of its nationals of known size has suffered similar injuries” (Final Award, Ethiopia's Damages Claims, Decision of 17 August 2009, RIAA, Vol. XXVI, p. 669, para. 83). In addition to this material element of injury, the Court may award compensation for non-material (“moral” or “non-pecuniary”) elements of the injury caused to individuals and their surviving relatives as a result of the psychological harm they have suffered (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 333, para. 18). In the Diallo case, the Court found that non-material injury can be established without specific evidence and that any quantification of compensation for such injury necessarily rests on equitable considerations (ibid., pp. 334-335, paras. 21 and 24). However, for the purposes of the present proceedings, the Court does not consider that it would be appropriate to assign a higher value to lives lost in a deliberate attack on civilians, as the DRC proposes. It notes in this regard that the EECC considered that, in the situation before it, large per capita awards for non-material damage, which may be justified in individual cases, would be inappropriate in a situation involving significant numbers of unidentified and hypothetical victims (Final Award, Ethiopia's Damages Claims, Decision of 17 August 2009, RIAA, Vol. XXVI, pp. 664-665, paras. 61 and 64).

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165. Concerning the DRC's request for compensation for 2,000 lives allegedly lost among members of its armed forces, the Court notes that the DRC has provided very little evidence in support of this claim. The Mapping Report gives a very limited indication in this regard, referring generally to losses suffered by the Congolese armed forces in 1999 and noting one incident in August 2000 (Mapping Report, paras. 385 and 392). The Court does not consider that other material submitted by the DRC, including the memoir of MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, constitutes reliable evidence. The Court emphasizes that the more lenient evidentiary standard employed in view of the difficulty of obtaining documentary evidence in the DRC (see paragraphs 123-126 above) does not apply with equal force to the loss of life of military personnel, since a State can be expected to possess at least minimal records regarding its own armed forces, including those killed in action. The Court dismisses this claim of the DRC for lack of evidence, and therefore does not address any other question in relation to it.

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166. The Court recalls that it may, under the exceptional circumstances of the present case, award compensation in the form of a global sum, within the range of possibilities indicated by the evidence and taking into account equitable considerations (see paragraph 106 above). The Court notes that, while the available evidence is not sufficient to determine a reasonably precise or even an approximate number of civilian lives lost that are attributable to Uganda, it is nevertheless possible to identify a range of possibilities with respect to the number of such civilian lives lost (see paragraph 162 above). Taking into account all the available evidence (see paragraphs 135-156 above), the various methodologies proposed to determine the amount of compensation for a human life lost (see paragraphs 163-164 above), as well as its jurisprudence and the pronouncements of other international bodies (see paragraphs 69-126, 157-158 and 163-164 above), the Court will award compensation for the loss of civilian lives as part of a global sum for all damage to persons (see paragraph 226 below).

2. Injuries to persons

167. The DRC also requests the Court to award US$54,464,000 in.compensation for injuries and mutilations among the civilian population.

168. This claim includes injuries due to deliberate attacks on the civilian population, such as direct targeting, mutilation or torture, as well as injuries suffered as collateral damage resulting from military operations. The DRC submits that Uganda is responsible for 30,000 injured or mutilated civilians in Ituri. The DRC arrives at this number by dividing the 60,000 deaths which it claims to have occurred in Ituri by two. It claims that, of the 30,000 individuals injured in Ituri, 20,000 were harmed as a result of deliberate violence against civilians, while the remaining 10,000 were injured as a result of “other circumstances related to the conflicts”. The DRC further states that the alleged 20,000 individuals injured as a result of deliberate violence against civilians include 15,000 who were seriously injured or mutilated and 5,000 who suffered minor injuries. In other areas, the DRC maintains that 1,937 civilians were injured as a consequence of the fighting between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani, in addition to 203 civilians injured as a result of Uganda's internationally wrongful acts in Beni, Butembo and Gemena. Thus, the overall number of injured victims put forward by the DRC is 32,140. To support this claim, the DRC invokes United Nations reports, particularly the Mapping Report, the Secretary-General's Second special report on MONUC, the MONUC special report on the events in Ituri, as well as the victim identification forms submitted by the DRC. However, the DRC also notes the “absence of more precise data on this point”.

169. In terms of valuation, the DRC submits that a distinction must be made between injuries resulting from deliberate attacks on civilians and those suffered “as collateral damage” resulting from military operations. The DRC requests the Court to award compensation to victims in the first category on the basis of the average sums allegedly awarded by Congolese courts to victims injured or mutilated in the context of the perpetration of serious international crimes, namely US$3,500 for serious injuries or mutilations and US$150 for minor injuries. With regard to “collateral” injuries, the DRC argues that the Court should award a minimum of US$100 per person.

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170. Uganda asserts that the DRC has not produced adequate evidence to sustain its claim for compensation for injuries and mutilations among the civilian population.

171. Uganda argues that the DRC has derived the number of 30,000 injured persons in Ituri by arbitrarily dividing by two an uncorroborated mortality estimate included in a single United Nations report. Moreover, Uganda notes that the DRC has not established the identity of the persons alleged to have been injured and has failed to provide details such as the location, date or nature of the injury. In addition, Uganda maintains that the DRC has not demonstrated a sufficiently direct causal nexus between the personal injuries claimed and Uganda's unlawful acts. In this regard, Uganda reiterates its criticism of the victim identification forms submitted by the DRC and notes that, in proceedings before the ICC, victims of the same conflict submitted corroborative documentation such as hospital records and forensic reports.

172. Uganda further submits that the DRC's proposed valuation of damage for personal injuries is unsupported by evidence. Uganda argues that the DRC has provided only a handful of domestic judgments, mostly relating to rape and sexual violence, which do not corroborate the figures allegedly awarded by Congolese courts in relation to other injuries or mutilations.

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173. In its 2005 Judgment, the Court found Uganda responsible for torture and other forms of inhuman treatment of the civilian population, as well as for failing to distinguish between civilian and military targets and to protect the civilian population in fighting with other combatants, as well as for failing, as an occupying Power, to take measures to respect and ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in Ituri district (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 280, para. 345, subpara. (3) of the operative part). Therefore, injuries among the civilian population which arise from these acts, as well as from the violation of the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention (ibid., p. 280, para. 345, subpara. (1) of the operative part), fall within the scope of the 2005 Judgment and are, as a matter of principle, subject to the obligation to make reparation.

174. With regard to Ituri, the DRC puts forward a figure of 30,000 injured civilians. Taking its claim of 60,000 civilian lives lost in Ituri as a point of departure, the DRC estimates that the number of persons injured must amount to at least half that number. The Court notes that, during an armed conflict, the number of persons injured normally surpasses the number of lives lost and, on that basis, it is not excessive to estimate the number of injured persons as half of the number of deaths. However, the DRC has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that the number of lives lost in Ituri does in fact amount to 60,000 (see paragraphs 156 and 160 above). Therefore, the Court has no basis for using the number of 60,000 lives allegedly lost in Ituri as a reference even for an approximation of the number of civilians injured. The DRC acknowledges that its approach is due to the “absence of more precise data on this point”.

175. The Court has already noted that the victim identification forms submitted by the DRC cannot be considered reliable evidence and do not demonstrate the full extent of injuries claimed (see paragraphs 146-147 above). By the DRC's own count, no more than 1,353 of those forms record alleged injuries, including sexual violence. Apart from their minimal evidentiary value, the forms thus represent only a fraction of the injuries claimed by the DRC.

176. Furthermore, the Court observes that none of the relevant United Nations reports includes an overall estimate of the number of injured civilians. The United Nations Secretary-General's Second special report on MONUC gives a broad estimate of lives lost and persons displaced in Ituri but notes in relation to other personal injuries only that “countless others have been left maimed or severely mutilated” (United Nations, doc. S/2003/566 of 27 May 2003, para. 10). Similarly, the MONUC special report on the events in Ituri contains some examples of instances where civilians were left injured, but does not provide a basis for the Court to reach an overall estimate (United Nations, doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004, paras. 74-75 and 93). The Mapping Report also contains examples of incidents involving injuries resulting from deliberate attacks on the civilian population, including through torture and mutilation (Mapping Report, paras. 369, 407-408, 413-414 and 422). However, the Mapping Report acknowledges that “most effort had to be focused on incidents involving the deaths of a large number of victims” (ibid., para. 535). The sum of the instances identified in the Mapping Report amounts to hundreds of injured civilians, a number which the Court finds implausibly low, particularly given the protracted and pervasive violence in Ituri.

177. More reliable estimates exist with regard to the magnitude of injuries resulting from the fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani. The Mapping Report states that the fighting between UPDF and Rwandan troops in Kisangani in August 1999 resulted in over 100 wounded civilians (ibid., para. 361). The report of the United Nations inter-agency assessment mission to Kisangani (hereinafter the “Inter-Agency Report”) notes that an estimated 1,700 people were injured in clashes between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in the period from 5 to 10 June 2000 (United Nations, doc. S/2000/1153 of 4 December 2000, para. 57). This figure is broadly corroborated by the Mapping Report, which states that “over 1,000” civilians were wounded in Kisangani during this encounter (Mapping Report, para. 363). The Court can therefore conclude that the number of 1,937 injured civilians put forward by the DRC in relation to Kisangani falls within a plausible range. The Court is not in a position to apportion to Uganda a specific share of the total damage related to persons injured in Kisangani.

178. The Mapping Report also refers to relevant events in other areas of the DRC. For example, the Mapping Report indicates that Ugandan troops in Beni were “arbitrarily detain[ing] large numbers of people and subject[ing] them to torture and various other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments” (ibid., para. 349). In addition, the Report mentions the torture of civilians and a human rights activist in the town of Buta (ibid., para. 402). However, while these examples indicate that deliberate attacks against and mistreatment of civilians by Ugandan forces, sometimes amounting to torture, were not confined to Ituri or Kisangani, the Mapping Report cannot serve as a reliable basis to determine the extent of such acts in other locations for the purpose of awarding compensation.

179. On the basis of the evidence reviewed, the Court is unable to determine, with a sufficient level of certainty, even an approximate estimate of the number of civilians injured by internationally wrongful acts of Uganda. The Court notes that the DRC has failed to produce appropriate evidence to corroborate its claim that 30,000 civilians were injured in Ituri. However, the Court reiterates its conclusions with regard to the difficult circumstances prevailing in the DRC and their effect on the ability of the Applicant to furnish the kind of evidence normally expected in claims relating to personal injuries (see paragraphs 120-126 above). The Court considers that the available evidence at least confirms the occurrence of a significant number of injuries in many localities.

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180. Regarding valuation, the Court notes that the DRC claims fixed amounts of US$3,500 per person for injuries resulting from deliberate attacks on civilians, and US$150 for minor deliberate injuries. With regard to “collateral” injuries, the DRC seeks a minimum of US$100 per person. The DRC does not provide convincing evidence that these figures are derived from the average amounts awarded by Congolese courts in the context of the perpetration of serious international crimes. The Court is mindful of the fact that the proposed sum for “collateral” injuries is intended to cover medical costs and loss of income and only to a lesser extent compensation for non-material harm, whereas injuries and mutilation from direct attacks on civilians would justify higher awards because of the associated trauma and psychological harm. However, large awards for non-material harm may be inappropriate in situations involving significant numbers of unidentified and hypothetical victims (see paragraph 164 above). Furthermore, the Court notes that it is difficult to draw any distinction between serious and minor injuries since there is no basis to determine their respective proportions.

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181. The Court recalls that it may, under the exceptional circumstances of the present case, award compensation in the form of a global sum, within the range of possibilities indicated by the evidence and taking into account equitable considerations (see paragraph 106 above). The Court notes that the available evidence for personal injuries is less substantial than that for loss of life, and that it is impossible to determine, even approximately, the number of persons injured as to whom Uganda owes reparation. The Court can only find that a significant number of such injuries occurred and that local patterns can be detected (see paragraph 179 above). Taking into account all the available evidence (see paragraphs 168-178 above), the methodologies proposed to assign a value to personal injuries (see paragraph 180 above), as well as its jurisprudence and the pronouncements of other international bodies (see paragraphs 69-126 above), the Court will award compensation for personal injuries as part of a global sum for all damage to persons (see paragraph 226 below).

3. Rape and sexual violence

182. The DRC seeks US$33,458,000 in.compensation for 1,710 victims of rape and sexual violence in Ituri and for 30 victims of such acts in other parts of the DRC, including Kisangani.

183. The DRC acknowledges that the Congolese Commission of Inquiry was able to identify no more than 342 cases of rape in Ituri, as recorded by the victim identification forms. The DRC categorizes these cases into 122 cases of rape (which the DRC refers to as “viol simple”) and 220 cases of “aggravated rape”. The DRC then multiplies the number of 342 by five and arrives at 1,710 victims (610 cases of rape and 1,100 cases of “aggravated rape”). The DRC justifies this method of calculation by arguing that sexual violence was a widespread weapon of war in Ituri and that it is commonly underreported because of the social stigma attached to it. To this figure, the DRC adds 18 cases of rape in Kisangani, 10 in.Butembo, and two in Beni, as reported by the Congolese Commission of Inquiry.

184. With respect to valuation, the DRC claims that, in the context of serious international crimes, Congolese courts have on average awarded sums of US$12,600 in.cases of rape and US$23,200 in.cases of “aggravated rape”. The DRC further submits that the non-material injury suffered by the victims of sexual violence is particularly significant and that it is aggravated by the frequent ostracization of the victims by their family members or society in general.

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185. Uganda argues that instances of rape and sexual violence are not mentioned in the 2005 Judgment, and that, therefore, the DRC should be precluded from claiming compensation for such acts.

186. Uganda also maintains that the DRC has failed to produce evidence to support the number of rapes alleged to have occurred in Ituri or elsewhere. In this regard, Uganda reiterates its criticism of the victim identification forms and the use of multipliers.

187. Uganda states that the DRC provides no authority for the proposition that compensation for sexual violence should be determined by reference to decisions rendered by Congolese courts. Moreover, Uganda is of the view that the decisions of those courts do not support the average figures put forward by the DRC.

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188. The Court notes that, in its 2005 Judgment, Uganda was found to be responsible for violations of its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including by acts of torture and other forms of inhuman treatment (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 241, para. 211). International criminal tribunals as well as human rights courts and bodies have recognized that rape and other acts of sexual violence committed in the context of armed conflict may amount to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or violations of the laws and customs of war, and that they may also constitute a form of torture and inhuman treatment (The Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23 & IT-966-23/1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Judgement of 12 June 2002, pp. 46-47, paras. 149-151; Mrs. A. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (United Nations, Committee against Torture, Communication No. 854/2017, decision of 2 August 2019, UN doc. CAT/C/67/D/854/2017), para. 7.3; as to regional practice, see e.g. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, General Comment No. 4 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Redress for Victims of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment (Article 5), pp. 17-18, paras. 57-58). The Court therefore considers that Uganda can be required to pay compensation for acts of rape and sexual violence, to the extent substantiated by the relevant evidence, even though such acts were not mentioned specifically in the 2005 Judgment (see paragraph 131 above).

189. Concerning the evidentiary basis of the DRC's claim, the Court reiterates that the victim identification forms provided by the DRC are of little probative value (see paragraphs 146-147 above). The Court is mindful that victims of sexual violence often experience psychological trauma and social stigma, and that, therefore, such violence is frequently underreported and notoriously difficult to document (see EECC, Final Award, Ethiopia's Damages Claims, Decision of 17 August 2009, RIAA, Vol. XXVI, pp. 675-676, paras. 104-105). However, the Court does not find it appropriate to overcome such evidentiary challenges by using unsubstantiated multipliers. Therefore, even if the 342 cases of sexual violence which are, according to the DRC, supported by the victim identification forms were deemed to be adequately substantiated, the Court could not accept the number of 1,740 such cases claimed by the DRC as being sufficiently proven.

190. The Court considers that it is impossible to derive even a broad estimate of the number of victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence from the reports and other data available to it. This absence of adequate documentation has also been recognized by various United Nations reports. The MONUC special report on the events in Ituri, for example, notes that “[t]he exact number of female victims of rape or sexual slavery is impossible to estimate at this time” (United Nations, doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004, para. 1). Similarly, the Mapping Report acknowledges its own shortcomings with regard to sexual violence:

191. However, the Court finds that it is beyond doubt that rape and other forms of sexual violence were committed in the DRC on a large and widespread scale. The Mapping Report notes the “widespread use of this form of violence by all armed groups” and reiterates that the victims were “numerous” (Mapping Report, see also paras. 35 and 530). It provides various examples of rape in Ituri during the period of occupation involving members of the UPDF and other armed groups (ibid., paras. 405, 408, 409, 416, 419) and outside Ituri by members of the UPDF (ibid., paras. 330, 443). The MONUC special report on the events in Ituri observes that in that area “[c]ountless women were abducted and became ‘war wives’, while others were raped or sexually abused before being released” (United Nations, doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004, para. 1). The ICC has found that rape and sexual violence occurred in Ituri during the period in which the district was occupied by Uganda, and that they amounted to a “common practice” (The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Chamber VI, Judgment of 8 July 2019, paras. 293, 940-948, 1196 and 1199).

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192. Regarding the valuation of the harm suffered by victims of rape and sexual violence, the Court finds that the DRC has not provided sufficient evidence that would corroborate the alleged average amounts awarded by Congolese courts of US$23,200 per victim for “aggravated rape” and US$12,600 for rape. The Court takes note of an expert report submitted to the ICC relating to the situation in the DRC, which indicates that there is an emerging standard in Congolese courts of US$5,000 per victim being awarded in cases of rape (The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Chamber VI, Reparations Order, 8 March 2021, para. 238).

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193. The Court recalls that it may, under the exceptional circumstances of the present case, award compensation in the form of a global sum, within the range of possibilities indicated by the evidence and taking into account equitable considerations (see paragraph 106 above). The Court notes that the available evidence for rape and sexual violence is less substantial than that for loss of life, and that it is not possible to determine even an approximate number of cases of rape and sexual violence attributable to Uganda. The Court can only find that a significant number of such injuries occurred (see paragraphs 190-191 above). Taking into account all the available evidence (see paragraphs 183-189 above), the methodologies proposed to assign a value to rape and sexual violence (see paragraph 192 above), as well as its jurisprudence and the pronouncements of other international bodies (see paragraphs 69-126 above), the Court will award compensation for rape and sexual violence as part of a global sum for all damage to persons (see paragraph 226 below).

4. Recruitment and deployment of child soldiers

194. The DRC claims US$30,000,000 as compensation for the recruitment of 2,500 child soldiers by Uganda and by armed groups supported by Uganda.

195. The DRC's claim is based on two specific instances of alleged recruitment of child soldiers, which it supports with three distinct pieces of evidence. First, the DRC refers to the United Nations Secretary-General's Sixth report on MONUC which indicates that, in 2000, “a considerable number” of children had been taken for military training to Uganda, about 600 of whom were about to be transferred to the custody of UNICEF or non-governmental organizations (United Nations, doc. S/2001/128 of 12 February 2001, para. 66). Second, the DRC relies on witness testimony before the ICC in the Lubanga case, allegedly referring to the same incident and putting the number of transferred children at 700. Third, the DRC invokes the Mapping Report, which notes that the MLC was engaged in the recruitment of child soldiers with “the backing of the Ugandan army”, that the MLC “admitted to having 1,800 [child soldiers] within its ranks” (Mapping Report, para. 697) and that “all the armed groups in Ituri (UPC, FNI, FRPI, FAPC and PUSIC) are alleged to have recruited thousands of children along ethnic lines” (ibid., para. 429).

196. The DRC requests a fixed sum of US$12,000 per child soldier, deriving this figure from the alleged practice of Congolese courts.

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197. Uganda asserts that the number of 600 children indicated in the Secretary-General's Sixth report on MONUC is contradicted by the Mapping Report. Moreover, Uganda argues that the same witness in the Lubanga case on whom the DRC relies indicated that a significant percentage of the children involved in this incident were over the age of 15 and could therefore not be classified as child soldiers.

198. Uganda also submits that the Mapping Report refers only to the recruitment of child soldiers by the MLC and that there is no evidence either in the Mapping Report or otherwise presented by the DRC demonstrating that the child soldiers in question were recruited by Uganda or trained in UPDF training camps. According to Uganda, the DRC claims compensation for the recruitment of child soldiers only with respect to Ituri. Uganda points out that the MLC had almost no presence in Ituri. In addition, Uganda maintains that it cannot be held responsible for acts of the MLC outside occupied Ituri and that the Court, in its 2005 Judgment, held that the MLC was neither created nor controlled by Uganda. Moreover, Uganda highlights that the DRC did not list the MLC among the armed groups for whose acts it claims reparation. With regard to valuation, Uganda objects to the DRC's method of assessing the injury suffered by child soldiers by reference to the amount awarded by Congolese courts for acts that the DRC considers have caused similar harm.

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199. In its 2005 Judgment, the Court found that “there [was] convincing evidence of the training in UPDF training camps of child soldiers and of the UPDF's failure to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers in areas under its control” (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 241, para. 210). The DRC's claim is thus encompassed by the 2005 Judgment.

200. The Court finds that there is limited evidence supporting the DRC's claims regarding the number of child soldiers recruited or deployed. The Court notes that the Secretary-General's Sixth report on MONUC found that, in the year 2000, 600 children who had apparently been transferred for military training to Uganda were soon to be repatriated by humanitarian organizations. In particular, the report recalls:

Furthermore, the Court takes note of the MONUC special report on the events in Ituri, according to which “[t]housands of children aged from 7 to 17 were drawn forcibly or voluntarily into armed groups” (United Nations, doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004, para. 1). This report contains various indications which confirm that a significant number of children were recruited or deployed as child soldiers in Ituri (ibid., paras. 39, 147 and 148). The Mapping Report also indicates that “[a]ccording to child protection agencies working in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of children, at least 30,000 children were recruited or used by the armed forces or groups during the conflict” (Mapping Report, para. 673).

201. The Court takes note of Uganda's reliance on the Mapping Report, according to which, ultimately, only 163 children were repatriated (ibid., para. 429). However, the relevant section of the Mapping Report notes that in 2000 “at least 163 of these children were sent to Uganda to undergo military training at a UPDF camp in Kyankwanzi before finally being repatriated to Ituri by UNICEF in February 2001” (ibid.). The Court reads the Mapping Report to mean that 163 out of a larger number of children were ultimately repatriated by UNICEF to Ituri in 2001.

202. This reading of the Mapping Report is supported by witness testimony concerning the same events in the Lubanga trial at the ICC. In this case, witness P-0116 recalled that, in 2000, the accused had sent children to Uganda:

203. The Court notes Uganda's point that P-0116 was not an eyewitness and recalls that it affords limited evidentiary weight to hearsay testimony (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 42, para. 68; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 16-17). However, the Court is also mindful of the fact that the witness was assessed as credible by an ICC Trial Chamber and that his or her description of the events matches the one set out in the Mapping Report.

204. Regarding the alleged support provided by Uganda for the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers by the MLC, the Mapping Report notes that “[t]he MLC's army, the ALC, with the backing of the Ugandan Army, the UPDF, allegedly also recruited children, primarily in Mbandaka, Equateur Province” (Mapping Report, para. 697). This report also mentions that, in 2001, the MLC admitted to having 1,800 child soldiers within its ranks (ibid.). The Court is not convinced by Uganda's argument that the DRC has limited its claim geographically to Ituri. While it is true that some parts of the DRC's Memorial give the impression that all 2,500 instances of the recruitment of child soldiers are claimed to have occurred in Ituri, other sections note that “such practices were also reported in other regions, including the province of Equateur”.

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205. Concerning the valuation of the harm caused with respect to child soldiers, the Court observes that the DRC did not provide evidence for the sums allegedly awarded by Congolese courts. The Court further notes that the Court-appointed expert suggested basing the valuation of the injury suffered by child soldiers on an analogy with the UNCC Category E claims. However, this category pertained to individuals who had been taken as hostages or were illegally detained, and did not, therefore, reflect the material injury and psychological trauma sustained by child soldiers in the DRC. The Court further observes that, in the Lubanga case, the ICC Trial Chamber set the amount of compensation for such a victim ex aequo et bono at US$8,000, taking into account, inter alia, decisions of Congolese courts (The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber II, Decision Setting the Size of the Reparations Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable, 21 December 2017, para. 259). In the framework of the present reparation proceedings, these methodologies do not provide a sufficient basis for assigning a specific valuation of damage in respect of a child soldier.

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206. The Court recalls that it may, under the exceptional circumstances of the present case, award compensation in the form of a global sum, within the range of possibilities indicated by the evidence and taking into account equitable considerations (see paragraph 106 above). The Court notes that the available evidence for the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers provides a range of the possible number of victims in relation to whom Uganda owes reparation (see paragraphs 200-204 above). Taking into account all the available evidence (see paragraphs 195-204 above), the methodologies proposed to assign a value to the damage caused by the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers (see paragraph 205 above), as well as its jurisprudence and the pronouncements of other international bodies (see paragraphs 69-126 above), the Court will award compensation for the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers as part of a global sum for all damage to persons (see paragraph 226 below).

5. Displacement of populations

207. The DRC claims US$186,853,800 in.compensation for the flight and displacement of parts of the population in Ituri and elsewhere in the DRC.

208. The DRC estimates that 600,000 persons were forced to flee their town or village as a consequence of Uganda's failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri between 1998 and 2003. To substantiate its claim, the DRC refers, in particular, to the Secretary- General's Second special report on MONUC, the MONUC special report on the events in Ituri, and the Mapping Report.

209. The DRC further submits that many people were forced to flee in order to escape the impact of the war in other parts of the DRC. However, the DRC also asserts that since it would “not [be] possible to derive any exact figures from” the records, it has limited its claim to 433 cases of displacement in Beni, 93 in.Butembo and 12 in.Gemena. These instances are allegedly identified and recorded in the victim identification forms collected by the Congolese Commission of Inquiry. In addition, relying on the Inter-Agency Report, the DRC asserts that 68,000 persons were internally displaced as a result of the confrontations between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani. The DRC thus claims compensation for a total of 668,538 displaced persons.

210. Regarding the valuation of these cases of flight and displacement, the DRC submits that a distinction must be made between the situation of persons who fled their homes in order to escape deliberate acts of violence against civilian populations and the situation of those who were driven from their homes by the fighting. According to the DRC, the first of these scenarios mainly occurred in Ituri and should be compensated by a sum of US$300 per person, amounting to a total of US$180,000,000. The second scenario allegedly applies to those who fled their homes for shorter periods in areas outside Ituri, mainly in Kisangani, and the ensuing damage should be valued at US$100 per person, amounting to a total of US$6,853,800. The DRC explains that these sums are meant to reflect the material harm ([days of displacement]×[daily cost of living]) combined with a lump sum for moral injury suffered.

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211. Uganda criticizes the DRC's claim for being based on broad estimates and not on a case-by-case analysis relating to specific groups of persons displaced in identifiable locations on specific dates. Uganda asserts that the DRC derives the number of allegedly displaced persons in Ituri from an unsubstantiated estimate in a single United Nations report. Furthermore, Uganda submits that there is no evidence indicating that such displacements occurred as a result of deliberate efforts by Uganda to make civilians flee or were a direct result of Uganda's violation of the jus ad bellum. According to Uganda, with respect to Ituri, the DRC has also failed to show that Uganda's exercise of due diligence obligations would have sufficed to prevent the alleged displacement.

212. Regarding the situation in Kisangani, Uganda highlights that the Mapping Report did not adopt the estimate of 68,000 displaced persons contained in the Inter-Agency Report, stating merely that “thousands of people” had been displaced. With respect to displacement in other parts of the DRC, Uganda reiterates that the victim identification forms are not credible evidence.

213. With regard to the valuation of the injury resulting from the displacement of persons, Uganda submits that the DRC has not explained, other than by asserting that they are reasonable, why the amounts of US$300 and US$100 should, respectively, be the measure of damage for persons displaced as a result of deliberate violence and for other displaced persons.

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214. The Court reiterates that, in its 2005 Judgment, it held Uganda responsible for indiscriminate and deliberate attacks on the civilian population and for its failure to protect the civilian population in the course of fighting against other troops (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 241, para. 211). In addition, the Court found that Uganda did not comply with its obligations as an occupying Power and incited ethnic conflict in Ituri (ibid.). Uganda is under an obligation to make reparation for any displacement of civilians that was caused in a sufficiently direct and certain way by these acts (see paragraphs 78 and 93 above). This includes cases of displacement that have a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus to Uganda's violation of the jus ad bellum, even if they were not accompanied by violations of international humanitarian law or human rights obligations (EECC, Final Award, Ethiopia's Damages Claims, Decision of 17 August 2009, RIAA, Vol. XXVI, p. 731, para. 322).

215. The Court recognizes that a large majority of cases of displacement for which the DRC seeks compensation occurred in Ituri. In this regard, the Court takes note of the Secretary-General's Second special report on MONUC which states that, “[a]ccording to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, between 500,000 and 600,000 internally displaced persons” were dispersed throughout Ituri as at May 2003 (United Nations, doc. S/2003/566 of 27 May 2003, para. 10). While this number appears plausible given the magnitude of the conflict and its impact on Ituri, the Court recalls that, in its 2005 Judgment, it decided not to take into account elements of United Nations reports which rely only on second-hand sources (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 225, para. 159). Moreover, the Court cannot confirm such a large number based on an estimate from a single report. The Court reiterates that, in the present context, it considers United Nations reports as reliable evidence only “to the extent that they are of probative value and are corroborated, if necessary, by other credible sources” (2005 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 239, para. 205).

216. The Court observes that the number of displaced persons claimed by the DRC finds support in the MONUC special report on the events in Ituri, which notes that “[m]ore than 600,000 [were] forced to flee from their homes” between January 2002 and December 2003 (United Nations, doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004, para. 40). However, the MONUC special report does not indicate the source for its estimate. In addition, the Court points out that the period covered by the report extends to December 2003 and thus a few months beyond the temporal scope of Uganda's occupation of Ituri and the 2005 Judgment. An earlier report prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC, to which the Court also referred in its 2005 Judgment (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 240, para. 209), notes that ethnic tensions fuelled by Uganda had displaced 50,000 persons by August 2000 (United Nations, docs. A/55/403 of 20 September 2000, para. 26, and E/CN.4/2001/40 of 1 February 2001, para. 31). While this report gives a useful indication of how the situation in Ituri evolved during the early stages of the conflict, it does not provide data for subsequent years and can, as such, neither corroborate nor disprove the figure claimed by the DRC.

217. A report prepared in July 2003 by the non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch (hereinafter “HRW”), which the Court referred to in its 2005 Judgment, also adopts the figure of 500,000 displaced civilians (HRW, “Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo”, p. 50). However, the Court notes that the source used for this figure is cited as “Estimates of the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), January 2003” and is thus likely the same as the one relied on by the Secretary-General's Second special report on MONUC. Consequently, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that all three reports indicating a number of more than 500,000 displaced persons were based on the same source, whose methodology, accuracy and probative value the Court is unable to ascertain.

218. The Court acknowledges, however, that additional evidence has been presented with regard to specific instances of large-scale displacement in Ituri. The MONUC special report on the events in Ituri describes, in detail, large-scale operations against Lendu villages by UPDF soldiers and allied militias from February to April 2002 in.the Irumu region, resulting in 40,000 displaced persons (United Nations, doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004, para. 42). Moreover, the special report recalls how 2,000 individuals were displaced as a result of UPDF troops failing to stop an attack on the town of Mabanga by local Hema and Gegere militias in August 2002 (ibid., para. 45). According to the same report, the subsequent fighting in Bunia, in which the UPDF was involved, and particularly the massacres conducted by the Union des patriotes congolais (hereinafter the “UPC”), resulted in the displacement of 10,000 families (ibid., para. 49). Finally, the special report describes the large-scale “Chikana Namukono” military operation that was conducted by the UPC between January and May 2003 in.the Lipri, Bambu and Kobu area, and which forced 60,000 civilians to flee into the surrounding bush (ibid., para. 70). The Court notes that the description of these events is not based on third-party estimates but on eyewitness testimony collected by MONUC human rights investigators. In addition, the Court observes that the Mapping Report mentions a further instance in the Irumu region in September 2002, where the killing of Hema by troops of the Forces de résistance patriotique en Ituri (hereinafter the “FRPI”) resulted in “several thousand” displaced persons (Mapping Report, para. 413).

219. More specific evidence is also available concerning the displacement of persons in locations outside Ituri, particularly from the city of Kisangani. In its 2005 Judgment, the Court recognized that

220. The Court referred to this section of the Inter-Agency Report to establish that Uganda had breached various obligations under international law, and not to establish the precise extent of the damage caused by these violations. In this regard, notwithstanding the Court's earlier observations regarding the Inter-Agency Report, it cannot ignore new evidence that has since emerged. The Mapping Report adopts a more rigorous methodology than the Inter-Agency Report (see paragraph 152 above). In particular, the Mapping Report did not adopt the number of 68,000 displaced persons in relation to the “Six-Day War” of June 2000 in.Kisangani but more cautiously noted that the encounter caused “thousands of people to be displaced” (Mapping Report, para. 363). In the absence of further evidence, the Court cannot therefore adopt the number of 68,000 persons displaced in Kisangani, as claimed by the DRC.

221. The Court recalls that the displacements in Kisangani were the result of the fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops. Having considered the available evidence, the Court attaches particular weight to the conclusion in the Mapping Report that “thousands” of persons were displaced from Kisangani as a result of these confrontations. In the view of the DRC, Uganda owes reparation for all the damage in Kisangani, because that damage had both cumulative and complementary causes. Uganda, on the other hand, maintains that the two States separately committed internationally wrongful acts and that each is responsible only for the damage caused by its own action. The Court considers that each State is responsible for damage in Kisangani that was caused by its own armed forces acting independently. However, based on the very limited evidence available to it, the Court can form only a general appreciation of the total number of persons displaced by the conflict in Kisangani. Under these circumstances, the Court is not in a position to apportion to Uganda a specific share of the total number of displaced persons. It has taken into account the available evidence on the displacement of persons from Kisangani in arriving at the global sum awarded for all injuries to persons (see paragraph 106 above and paragraph 226 below).

222. Regarding displacements that have allegedly occurred in other parts of the DRC, the Court notes that the only evidence submitted by the DRC consists of the victim identification forms. These forms can be accorded only very limited probative value (see paragraphs 146-147 above).

223. In conclusion, the Court finds that the evidence presented by the DRC does not establish a sufficiently certain number of displaced persons for whom compensation could be awarded separately. The evidence does, however, indicate a range of possibilities resulting from substantiated estimates. The Court is convinced that Uganda owes reparation in relation to a significant number of displaced persons, taking into account that displacements in Ituri alone appear to have been in the range of 100,000 to 500,000 persons (see paragraphs 215-218 above).

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224. Regarding the valuation of loss resulting from displacement, the Court sees no basis to draw a distinction between two types of displacement, as suggested by the DRC, based on whether the victims fled their homes in order to escape deliberate acts of violence against civilian populations or were driven from their homes by the fighting. Considerations more relevant to the valuation of damage caused by displacement would include the length of time that an individual was displaced and the difficulty of the circumstances endured during displacement. These are matters as to which the DRC did not offer evidence. The Court also notes that the DRC does not sufficiently explain the basis for the figures of US$300 and US$100 sought for the two types of displacement that it identifies.

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225. The Court recalls that it may, under the exceptional circumstances of the present case, award compensation in the form of a global sum, within the range of possibilities indicated by the evidence and taking into account equitable considerations (see paragraph 106 above). The Court notes that the available evidence for the displacement of persons provides a range of the possible number of victims attributable to Uganda (see paragraph 223 above). Taking into account all the available evidence (see paragraphs 208-222 above), possible methodologies to assign a value to the displacement of a person (see paragraph 224 above), as well as its jurisprudence and the pronouncements of other international bodies (see paragraphs 69-126 above), the Court will award compensation for the displacement of persons as part of a global sum for all damage to persons (see paragraph 226 below).

6. Conclusion

226. On the basis of all the preceding considerations (see paragraphs 133-225 above, specifically 166, 181, 193, 206 and 225), and given that Uganda has not established that particular injuries alleged by the DRC in Ituri were not caused by its failure to meet its obligations as an occupying Power, the Court finds it appropriate to award a single global sum of US$225,000,000 for the loss of life and other damage to persons.

1. General aspects

240. The Court recalls that, in its 2005 Judgment, it found that Uganda was responsible for damage to property, both inside and outside Ituri. The Court concluded that UPDF troops “destroyed villages and civilian buildings” and “failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets” (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 241, para. 211).

241. In the same Judgment, the Court also determined that Uganda “fail[ed], as an occupying Power, to take measures to respect and ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in Ituri district” (ibid., p. 280, para. 345, subpara. (3) of the operative part). The Court recalls that, in this phase of the proceedings, it is for Uganda to establish that the damage to particular property in Ituri alleged by the DRC was not caused by its failure to meet its obligations as an occupying Power. In the absence of evidence to that effect, it may be concluded that Uganda owes reparation in relation to such damage (see paragraph 78 above).

242. The Court emphasizes that, given the extraordinary character of the conflict and the ensuing difficulty of gathering detailed evidence for most forms of property damage, the DRC cannot be expected to provide specific documentation for each individual building destroyed or seriously damaged during the five years of Uganda's unlawful military involvement in the DRC (see paragraph 114 above). At the same time, the Court considers that, notwithstanding the difficult situation in which the DRC found itself, more evidence could be expected to have been collected by the DRC since the Court delivered its 2005 Judgment, particularly in relation to assets and infrastructure owned by the DRC itself and of which it was in possession and control. The Court will bear these considerations in mind when assessing the evidence tendered by the DRC.

2. Ituri

243. In the Court's view, the DRC offers no convincing evidence for the number of 8,693 private dwellings that it claims have been destroyed in Ituri. Some of the victim identification forms provide a certain impression of the different types of property lost by individuals. These forms do not, however, contain information to substantiate the alleged extent of the damage and the nature and value of the property affected (see paragraphs 146-147 above). Therefore, the victim identification forms submitted — and the aggregate tables allegedly prepared on the basis of such forms — do not contribute to identifying the scale of damage even within a possible range. There are also substantial inconsistencies with respect to the claim for damage to private dwellings in Ituri. For instance, in its Memorial, the DRC states that 80 per cent of the private dwellings destroyed were “basic” (habitations légères). However, the aggregate table presented by the DRC for Ituri indicates that 98 per cent of them were “basic”.

244. The DRC has based its claim that 200 schools were destroyed in Ituri on an unsubstantiated estimate in the Secretary-General's Second special report on MONUC which is not corroborated by the Mapping Report. Uganda has pointed out that the document in which the DRC lists lost properties only refers to 18 schools and 12 kindergartens.

245. Nor does the DRC substantiate the number of 50 administrative buildings and 50 health facilities that it alleges have been destroyed in Ituri. The DRC merely considers it “reasonable to assume” that 50 clinics and hospitals and 50 administrative buildings were destroyed as a consequence of Uganda's failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri, without providing any further evidence. The DRC's claim with respect to looting of property in Ituri is based on general references in international reports and on victim identification forms whose probative value is limited and which often do not identify the specific property that was looted. Finally, the DRC does not substantiate its assessment regarding the average valuations of the buildings and other forms of property destroyed or looted in Ituri.

246. The evidence presented by the DRC does not permit the Court to even approximate the extent of the damage, and the report of the Court-appointed expert does not provide any relevant additional information. The Court must therefore base its own assessment on United Nations reports, particularly on the Mapping Report. The Court considers that this report contains several credible findings on the destruction of “dwellings”, “buildings”, “villages”, “hospitals” and “schools” in Ituri. For example, it states with respect to Ituri that, on 31 August 2002, elements of the UPC, which had received logistical support from the UPDF, set “1,000 houses” on fire in Walendu Bindi in the Irumu region (Mapping Report, para. 413). The Mapping Report also states that, on 15 October 2002, UPC militiamen destroyed “more than 500 buildings” in Zumbe in the Walendu Tasi community (ibid., para. 414) and that, on 6 March 2003, elements of the UPDF, the Front national intégrationiste and the FRPI, in the course of a joint military operation, “destroyed numerous buildings, private homes and premises used by local and international NGOs” (ibid., para. 421). Furthermore, the Mapping Report identifies at least ten occasions where entire villages were set on fire by the UPDF or armed groups operating in Ituri (ibid., paras. 366, 370, 414 and 422), and other incidents where hundreds of buildings were burned or destroyed during attacks (ibid., paras. 409 and 413-414). The Court also takes into consideration that the MONUC special report on the events in Ituri contains various descriptions of entire villages and buildings that were burned down or otherwise destroyed by armed groups in Ituri (United Nations, doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004, paras. 47 and 63).

247. The Court further notes that the Mapping Report and other United Nations reports establish a convincing record of large-scale pillaging in Ituri, both by Uganda's armed forces and by other actors (Mapping Report, paras. 366, 369-370, 405, 407-408, 413-414, 416, 419-421 and 428; MONUC special report on the events in Ituri, United Nations, doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004, paras. 42, 49, 51, 73-74, 100 and 114).

248. With regard to the valuation of the property lost, the Court considers that the DRC has not provided convincing evidence supporting the alleged average value of private dwellings, public buildings and property looted. This is acknowledged in the report of the Court-appointed expert Mr. Senogles. The expert nevertheless recommends that the Court adopt the figures proposed by the DRC with regard to private dwellings, based on their “reasonableness”. With regard to different forms of property damage, the expert applies unexplained “evidentiary discount factor[s]”, i.e. 25 per cent for public buildings and 50 per cent for looting in Ituri. The Court does not consider that the expert has sufficiently substantiated the variable “evidentiary discount factors” he proposes to apply.

249. The Court considers that proceedings before the ICC relating to the same conflict are relevant for the purposes of valuation. In the Katanga case, Trial Chamber II assessed the harm connected to the destruction of each house in the village of Bogoro (Ituri) in February 2003, at US$600 (The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, No. ICC-01/04/01/07, Trial Chamber II, Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, 24 March 2017, para. 195). As to the valuation of schools and health care centres, the ICC's Trust Fund for Victims has provided an estimate, not addressed by the Trial Chamber, that it would cost US$50,000 to rebuild a school or health care centre in Ituri as at February 2020 (The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Chamber VI, Reparations Order, 8 March 2021, para. 236 (iv); The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Chamber VI, Trust Fund for Victims’ observations relevant to reparations, 28 February 2020, para. 130 (d)).

3. Outside Ituri

250. As to damage outside Ituri (see in general paragraphs 82-84 above), the DRC relies primarily on aggregate tables allegedly prepared on the basis of victim identification forms and on the Inter-Agency Report, which provides a list of incidents that resulted in damage to private dwellings, schools and administrative buildings in Kisangani during June 2000. The DRC has not satisfactorily responded to the Court's request to explain its methodology for the calculation of property damage claimed in Kisangani, Beni and Butembo, locations where the UPDF is known to have operated. The Court also notes that, by extending the claim to all damage to property that would not have occurred “but for” the unlawful use of force by Uganda, the DRC disregards the fact that the Court decided, in its 2005 Judgment, that armed groups operating outside Ituri were not under the control of Uganda (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 226, para. 160, pp. 230-231, para. 177, and p. 253, para. 247). Therefore, even if the Court were able to determine the extent of damage to property outside Ituri, it has not been provided with sufficient evidence regarding the question of which property damage was caused by Uganda. Concerning the operations of the UPDF in Beni and Butembo, the Mapping Report confirms several incidents that resulted in substantial destruction of property without, however, indicating the extent of such destruction (Mapping Report, paras. 330, 347, 348, 349, 361 and 443).

251. The evidence presented by the DRC does not permit the Court to assess the extent of the damage even approximately, and the report of the Court-appointed expert does not provide any relevant additional information. Mr. Senogles simply applies unexplained “discount factors” of 25 per cent to the DRC's claims with respect to Beni, Butembo and Gemena, and 40 per cent to the claim relating to Kisangani.

252. The Court notes that, with respect to Kisangani, the Mapping Report refers to the destruction of “over 400 private homes and . . . serious damage to public and commercial properties, places of worship . . . educational institutions and healthcare facilities, including hospitals” during indiscriminate attacks with heavy weapons between the Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces from 5 to 10 June 2000 (Mapping Report, para. 363). The Mapping Report thus corroborates the findings of the Inter-Agency Report (United Nations, doc. S/2000/1153 of 4 December 2000, paras. 15-16, 57 and tables 1 and 2), which the Court considered to be a reliable source in its 2005 Judgment (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 240, para. 208).

253. The Court considers that the Mapping Report and the Inter-Agency Report contain sufficient evidence to conclude that Uganda caused extensive property damage in Kisangani. In the view of the DRC, Uganda owes reparation for all the damage in Kisangani, because that damage had both cumulative and complementary causes. Uganda, on the other hand, maintains that the two States, Uganda and Rwanda, separately committed internationally wrongful acts and that each is responsible only for the damage caused by its own wrongful actions. The Court considers that each State is responsible for damage in Kisangani that was caused by its own armed forces acting independently. However, based on the very limited evidence available to it, the Court is not in a position to apportion a specific share of the damage to Uganda. It has taken into account the available evidence on damage to property in Kisangani in arriving at the global sum awarded for all damage to property (see paragraph 258 below).

4. Société nationale d’électricité (SNEL)

254. The claim of the DRC for damage caused to SNEL forms a large part (US$97,412,090) of the overall claim for damage to property (US$239,971,970). It is possible that, given the character of the conflict and the scale of the hostilities, the company suffered at least some damage (Inter-Agency Report, para. 57). However, the brief and rudimentary report on which the DRC relies was prepared by SNEL in 2016, shortly before the filing of the Memorial on the question of reparation. In this connection, the Court recalls that it “will treat with caution evidentiary materials specially prepared for this case” (2005 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 201, para. 61). The report by SNEL does not contain evidence that would substantiate the extent and valuation of damage claimed, or the responsibility of Uganda for any damage, nor is it corroborated by other evidence before the Court. The report of the Court-appointed expert is unhelpful in this respect, as his recommendation is based on the amounts claimed by the DRC and merely applies an unexplained 40 per cent “discount factor”.

255. The Court notes that SNEL is a public entity which, as a national service provider, is subject to specific supervision by the Government of the DRC. Given the Government's close relationship with SNEL, in particular the fact that it likely has relevant documents in its possession, the DRC could have been expected to provide some evidence substantiating its claim to the Court. Under these circumstances, the Court considers that the DRC has not discharged its burden of proof regarding its claim for damage to SNEL.

5. Military property

256. Similar considerations apply to the DRC's claim for damage to certain property of its armed forces (US$69,417,192). The DRC substantiates this claim only by way of a brief and rudimentary report that was prepared by DRC officials shortly before the filing of its Memorial on the question of reparation. This report does not provide a sufficient basis for the Court to determine the existence of the damage claimed, the responsibility of Uganda for such damage or its valuation. Given the direct authority of the Government over its armed forces, the DRC could have been expected to substantiate its claims more fully, which it has not done. The Court dismisses this claim of the DRC for lack of evidence, and therefore does not address any other question in relation to this claim.

6. Conclusion

257. The Court finds that the evidence presented by the DRC regarding damage to property is particularly limited. The Court is nevertheless persuaded that a significant amount of damage to property was caused by Uganda's unlawful conduct, as the Court found in its 2005 Judgment (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 241, para. 211). The Mapping Report, in particular, provides reliable and corroborated information about many instances of damage to property caused by Uganda, and also by other actors in Ituri (see paragraphs 246, 247, 252 and 253 above). The Court also concludes that Uganda has not established that the particular damage to property alleged by the DRC in Ituri was not caused by Uganda's failure to meet its obligations as an occupying Power.

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258. The Court recalls that it may, under the exceptional circumstances of the present case, award compensation in the form of a global sum, within the range of possibilities indicated by the evidence and taking into account equitable considerations (see paragraph 106 above). The Court notes that the available evidence in relation to damage to property caused by Uganda is limited, but the Mapping Report at least substantiates many instances of damage to property caused by Uganda. Taking into account all the available evidence (see paragraphs 230-253 above), the proposals regarding the assignment of value to damage to property (see paragraphs 234-235 and 239 above), as well as its jurisprudence and the pronouncements of other international bodies (see paragraphs 69-126 above), the Court will award compensation for damage to property as a global sum of US$40,000,000 (see paragraph 106 above).

1. General aspects

273. In its 2005 Judgment, the Court stated that “[i]n reaching its decision on the DRC's claim [regarding natural resources], it was not necessary for the Court to make findings of fact with regard to each individual incident alleged” (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 249, para. 237). The Court then found that “it d[id] not have at its disposal credible evidence to prove that there [had been] a governmental policy of Uganda directed at the exploitation of natural resources of the DRC or that Uganda's military intervention [had been] carried out in order to obtain access to Congolese resources” (ibid., p. 251, para. 242). However, it “consider[ed] that it ha[d] ample credible and persuasive evidence to conclude that officers and soldiers of the UPDF, including the most high-ranking officers, [had been] involved in the looting, plundering and exploitation of the DRC's natural resources and that the military authorities [had] not take[n] any measures to put an end to these acts” (ibid.).

274. With respect to the natural resources located outside Ituri, the Court established that Uganda bears responsibility for looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources “whenever” members of the UPDF were involved (ibid., p. 252, para. 245), but not for any such acts committed by members of “rebel groups” that were not under Uganda's control (ibid., p. 253, para. 247). The 2005 Judgment did not specify which acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources the Court considered to be attributable to Uganda. That decision was left to the reparations phase, in which the DRC would have to provide evidence regarding the extent of damage to natural resources outside Ituri, as well as its attribution to Uganda.

275. With respect to natural resources located in Ituri, the Court found “sufficient credible evidence” to establish that Uganda had violated “its obligations under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 as an occupying Power in Ituri in respect of all acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory” (2005 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 253, para. 250). This means Uganda is liable to make reparation for all acts of looting, plundering or exploitation of natural resources in Ituri, even if the persons who engaged in such acts were members of armed groups or other third parties (ibid., p. 253, para. 248). It remains for the Court in the reparations phase to satisfy itself that the available evidence establishes the existence of the alleged injury from looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources and, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, to identify at least a range of possibilities regarding its extent.

276. The Court recalls that it is limited to deciding on the amount of compensation due for the injuries resulting from the internationally wrongful acts that the Court identified in its 2005 Judgment (ibid., p. 257, para. 260), in which it specifically addressed reports regarding the exploitation of gold (ibid., pp. 249-250, para. 238, and pp. 250-251, paras. 240-242), diamonds (ibid., p. 250, para. 240, p. 251, para. 242, and p. 253, para. 248), and coffee (ibid., p. 250, para. 240). The Court did not mention coltan, tin, tungsten, timber or damage to fauna and flora. Coltan, tin, tungsten and timber are nonetheless raw materials which are encompassed by the generic term “natural resources”. Furthermore, the Court is of the view that claims relating to fauna are covered by the scope of the 2005 Judgment, in which the “hunting and plundering of protected species” was referred to as part of the DRC's allegations regarding natural resources (ibid., p. 246, para. 223). To the extent that damage to flora represents a direct consequence of the plundering of timber through deforestation, the Court considers that such damage falls within the scope of the 2005 Judgment. The Court must nevertheless satisfy itself in the present reparations phase that the alleged exploitation of resources which were not mentioned explicitly in the 2005 Judgment actually occurred and that Uganda is liable to make reparation for the ensuing damage.

277. The Court is of the view that the methodological approach taken by the expert report is convincing overall. The Court notes that the methodology adopted by the expert appropriately differs slightly depending on the resource in question and on the respective degree of reliability of the data on which he bases his estimates. The expert report is also transparent about its own limitations, acknowledging that

Despite these limitations, Mr. Nest's methodology informs the Court's conclusions on the extent of damage for which Uganda owes reparation. Given the nature of the unlawful exploitation of natural resources, including the conflict situation and the lack of documentation in the relevant sector of the economy that is predominantly informal, the Court is of the view that the “proxy tax” (see paragraph 271 above) methodology used by Mr. Nest is appropriate, in the circumstances of the present case, to estimate the loss with a suitable degree of approximation. The Court is not convinced by the standard suggested by Uganda, according to which the DRC has to prove the specific time, place, and damage relating to each incident of exploitation (see paragraph 114 above). Given the pattern of widespread exploitation and the evidentiary challenges in this case, the approach suggested by Uganda does not appear appropriate. Instead, the Court considers that the approach taken in the expert's report, which is based on estimates derived from reliable economic data, scientific publications and the case file, produces a more persuasive assessment and valuation of the damage. The expert has also taken into account other explanations for the respective surpluses of Congolese production and Ugandan exports. As to valuation, the expert report applies a plausible discount to the international market price.

278. As previously noted (see paragraph 272 above), the expert did not include the value extracted by civilians from natural resources in Ituri in the amount of compensation estimated in his original report, based on his assumption that, during the period of occupation, civilians were voluntarily involved in the production, trade and export of those resources and that profits retained by them remained in their control (see paragraph 272 above). In the circumstances assumed by the expert, it can be concluded that an operator's continued retention of its own profits does not amount to an act of “looting, plundering and exploitation” in respect of which the Court found that Uganda had failed to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power under Article 43 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 (2005 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 253, para. 250) and thus, would not call for any reparation by Uganda. However, the 2005 Judgment also refers to instances in which UPDF members facilitated illegal trafficking in natural resources by commercial entities (ibid., para. 248). The evidence available to the Court does not permit an appreciation of the extent to which the scenario assumed by Mr. Nest prevailed in Ituri, as compared to situations in which other private persons deprived the operator of profits through acts of looting, plundering or exploitation of natural resources. In considering the compensation owed with respect to all acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources, the Court therefore places emphasis on the calculations made by Mr. Nest using the “proxy tax” methodology.

279. The Court notes that the terms of reference provided to the expert by the Court did not include damage to fauna and damage to flora through deforestation and that the expert therefore made no findings with respect to those forms of damage to natural resources (beyond commercial trade in timber).

280. The Court observes that the DRC refers, in support of its claim for damage related to natural resources, to the UNPE reports, the Porter Commission Report, the Mapping Report, reports by non-governmental organizations and reports prepared by domestic institutions. In its 2005 Judgment, the Court expressed its general view that the Porter Commission Report and the United Nations reports furnished sufficient and convincing evidence to determine whether Uganda engaged in acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of the DRC's natural resources (ibid., p. 201, para. 61, and p. 249, para. 237). The Court attributes probative value to the findings of these reports, particularly if they are corroborated by the Mapping Report and the expert report by Mr. Nest.

281. Taking these general considerations into account, the Court will draw its conclusions on the basis of the evidence that it finds reliable in order to determine the damage caused by Uganda to Congolese natural resources and the compensation to be awarded.

2. Minerals

3. Flora

D. Macroeconomic damage

367. Finally, the DRC claims US$5,714,000,775 for macroeconomic damage.

368. In the operative part of its 2005 Judgment, the Court found that “Uganda, by engaging in military activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo . . . violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention” and held “that the Republic of Uganda is under obligation to make reparation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the injury caused” (I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 280-282, para. 345, subparas. (1) and (5)). The Court did not, however, specifically mention macroeconomic damage.

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369. The DRC submits that the unlawful use of large-scale force by Uganda caused a considerable slowdown in the economic activity of the DRC, constituting a loss of revenue for which full compensation must be paid. The DRC invokes the principle that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed (Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47). The DRC also claims, referring to Articles 31 and 36 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, that compensation should cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits in so far as it is established. Therefore, in the DRC's view, general economic consequences are not excluded from the compensable damage.

370. The DRC submits that any past State practice or jurisprudence that rejected reparation for macroeconomic damage resulting from war or armed conflict was based on special provisions peculiar to each case in point and that all these cases were exceptions to the general rule of full reparation.

371. According to the DRC, Uganda caused compensable general economic injury, in addition to more specific harm. The DRC maintains that there is no risk of double recovery if compensation for macroeconomic damage is awarded together with compensation for loss suffered by individuals. In this regard, the DRC argues that, if a country suffers on both the macroeconomic and the microeconomic level, the former represents a loss of profits, whereas the latter represents damage to the existing assets of businesses or production units.

372. To substantiate its claim, the DRC commissioned two experts from the University of Kinshasa to estimate “the macroeconomic damage caused by the 1998-2003 war”. This 2016 study (hereinafter the “Kinshasa study”) is based on a model that was developed by two economists who specialize in modelling the impact of war on the economic performance of affected countries. The DRC maintains that there is nothing speculative about macroeconomic damage, since the effects of war on the macroeconomic balance of affected States, the progress of the economy and its performance in terms of growth, are measurable and have indeed been measured by the DRC using proven methods and reliable data. The DRC further submits that the data it provided show that although the Congolese economy was already declining in 1998, the downturn was precipitated by the war and the economy began to recover when the war ended, demonstrating that the war had caused specific and identifiable macroeconomic harm.

373. According to the Kinshasa study, the macroeconomic damage suffered by the DRC as a result of the 1998-2003 war amounts to US$12,697,779,493.27. Since, in the DRC's submission, the harm resulting from the war was not caused solely by Uganda's internationally wrongful conduct but was also the consequence of acts of other States, Uganda's share amounts to 45 per cent of the total. The sum claimed by the DRC under this head of damage is thus US$5,714,000,775.

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374. Uganda disputes the DRC's claim for macroeconomic damage on several grounds.

375. Uganda submits that the DRC's claim is not covered by the 2005 Judgment. In Uganda's view, the DRC must show an “exact injury” resulting from “specific actions” that constitute violations of international law for which the Court has established Uganda's responsibility, which the DRC has not done with respect to macroeconomic damage.

376. Uganda also maintains that macroeconomic damage resulting from armed conflict is not compensable under international law. Uganda argues that this is confirmed by the uniform rejection of such claims in State practice and in jurisprudence. Regarding State practice, Uganda refers to the Treaty of Versailles and the unilateral or conventional reparation schemes after the Second World War, none of which included an obligation to pay reparation for the macroeconomic impact of the war. With regard to jurisprudence, Uganda cites the EECC final awards on Ethiopia's damage and on Eritrea's damage, respectively, for the propositions that international law imposes no responsibility to compensate for the “generalized economic and social consequences of war”, and that past tribunals have not “found generalized conditions of war-related economic disruption and decline to constitute compensable elements of damage, even in the case of some types of injury bearing a relatively close connection to illegal conduct”.

377. Uganda further considers that macroeconomic damage is not subject to compensation under international law because it is inherently speculative. More specifically, Uganda claims that the causal nexus between its violation of the prohibition of the use of force and any possible macroeconomic loss is not sufficiently direct and is too remote. Uganda asserts that the DRC's claim itself illustrates the speculative nature of this head of damage, as “no claim for compensation can be justified by recourse to probabilities, variables, statistical methods and cryptic formulas”.

378. In addition, Uganda submits that the concept of lost profits does not encompass macroeconomic damage as claimed by the DRC. In this regard, Uganda argues that lost profits relate to income-producing assets. Uganda contends that the economy of a nation does not constitute an income-producing asset. According to Uganda, the DRC fails to identify any assets that were specifically designed to produce profits and were affected by Uganda's internationally wrongful acts.

379. Uganda also argues that the macroeconomic damage for which the DRC seeks compensation includes damage that is also claimed elsewhere in its written pleadings and that the DRC thus effectively seeks double recovery under the guise of macroeconomic damage.

380. Finally, Uganda asserts that, from an economic science perspective, the methodology by which the DRC substantiates its claim is flawed. Noting that the Kinshasa study mainly relies on a model developed by two economists, Uganda commissioned the same two experts, Mr. Paul Collier and Ms Anke Hoeffler of the University of Oxford, to prepare an assessment (hereinafter the “Collier and Hoeffler assessment”) in which they set out their critical views of the Kinshasa study. Apart from alleging several technical errors and raising issues with the data used in the Kinshasa study, the Collier and Hoeffler assessment points to an “overall flaw [that] is more fundamental” and consists in an implausible assumption of positive growth in gross domestic product in the DRC after 1998 and in disregarding the rise of global commodity prices from 2001 onwards.

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381. The Court does not need to decide, in the present proceedings, whether a claim for macroeconomic damage resulting from a violation of the prohibition of the use of force, or a claim for such damage more generally, is compensable under international law. It is enough for the Court to note that the DRC has not shown a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the internationally wrongful act of Uganda and any alleged macroeconomic damage. In any event, the DRC has not provided a basis for arriving at even a rough estimate of any possible macroeconomic damage.

382. The Court considers that it is not sufficient, as the DRC claims, to show “an uninterrupted chain of events linking the damage to Uganda's wrongful conduct”. Rather, the Court is required to determine “whether there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act . . . and the injury suffered by the Applicant” (see paragraph 93 above; Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 26, para. 32; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 332, para. 14; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 233-234, para. 462). Compensation can thus only be awarded for losses that are not too remote from the unlawful use of force (commentary to Article 31 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 93, para. 10). A violation of the prohibition of the use of force does not give rise to an obligation to make reparation for all that comes afterwards, and Uganda's conduct is not the only relevant cause of all that happened during the conflict (see EECC, Final Award, Ethiopia's Damages Claims, Decision of 17 August 2009, RIAA, Vol. XXVI, p. 719, para. 282).

383. Uganda's unlawful use of force may well have had a negative effect on the economy of the DRC. In these proceedings, however, the Court must determine whether any macroeconomic damage allegedly suffered by the DRC is supported by the evidence, and whether the DRC has established a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the internationally wrongful conduct of Uganda identified by the Court in its 2005 Judgment and this head of damage. The Kinshasa study on which the DRC relies does not provide any certainty regarding the existence or extent of the negative effect on the economy alleged by the DRC. The countervailing Collier and Hoeffler assessment casts serious doubts on the Kinshasa study, at least regarding the extent of any possible damage and the potential effects of any independent causal factors. The Court also notes that the methodology used in the Kinshasa study is based on an econometric model that is designed to show general trends or verify certain hypotheses that may suffice for abstract scientific purposes or policy recommendations. The Court is not convinced that the methodology used in the study is sufficiently reliable for an award of reparation in a judicial proceeding.

384. The Court concludes that the DRC has not demonstrated that a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus exists between the internationally wrongful acts of Uganda and any possible macroeconomic damage. The Court therefore cannot award compensation to the DRC for losses allegedly arising from the general disruption to the economy as a result of the conflict (see EECC, Final Award, Ethiopia's Damages Claims, Decision of 17 August 2009, RIAA, Vol. XXVI, p. 747, para. 395). The Court thus rejects the claim of the DRC for macroeconomic damage.

A. Costs

394. The DRC in its final submissions requests the Court to order that the costs it incurred in the present case be reimbursed by Uganda. It argues that there are special circumstances for doing so, referring in particular to the gravity of the violations of international law from which the DRC and its people suffered, as well as the catastrophic scale of the damage that resulted. The DRC submits that it has faced an enormous task in identifying and assessing that damage, which has placed an additional burden on already impoverished public finances, a burden that the DRC would not have had to bear if large areas of its territory had not been invaded and occupied by the Ugandan armed forces for a number of years. In the DRC's view, those circumstances fully justify making an exception, in the present case, to the general rule set forth in Article 64 of the Statute of the Court that each party bear its own costs.

395. Uganda, for its part, argues that granting the DRC's request for costs would run counter to the presumption set forth in Article 64 of the Court's Statute, and that it would be contrary to the practice of the Court and its predecessor, neither having ever ordered one party to pay the costs of the other. Uganda contends that only if the Court were faced with a serious abuse of process by a party might there be a possibility of departing from the principle; in its view, such circumstances are not met in the present case. Uganda submits that it was fully justified in resisting the DRC's claims and that there is therefore no basis for ordering it to pay the DRC's costs. In its final submissions, Uganda requests that the Court declare that each Party should bear its own costs.

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396. Article 64 of the Statute provides that “[u]nless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own costs”. Taking into account the circumstances of this case, including the fact that Uganda prevailed on one of its counter-claims against the DRC and subsequently waived its own claim for compensation, the Court sees no sufficient reason that would justify departing, in the present case, from the general rule set forth in Article 64 of the Statute. Accordingly, each Party shall bear its own costs.

B. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest

397. The DRC in its final submissions requests the Court to order Uganda to pay pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest. With respect to pre-judgment interest, the DRC observes that, according to Article 38, paragraph 1, of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, “[i]nterest on any principal sum due . . . shall be payable when necessary in order to ensure full reparation”. The DRC contends that, in light of the principle of full reparation and taking into account the passage of time, pre-judgment interest is appropriate in the present case. The DRC in its written pleadings requested the Court to fix the rate of the pre-judgment interest at 6 per cent. At the hearings, it proposed a rate of 4 per cent, payable from the filing of the Memorial on Reparation, due on heads of claim other than those for which the amount of compensation awarded by the Court, based on an overall assessment, already takes into account the passage of time.

398. The DRC also requests that post-judgment interest, at a rate of 6 per cent, accrue on the principal sum awarded by the Court, should Uganda fail to pay it “on the date of the judgment”.

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399. Uganda argues that ordering pre-judgment interest in the circumstances of the case would not be consistent with the practice of the Court or the rules applicable to inter-State compensation under international law. In this regard, it submits that pre-judgment interest would apply only in circumstances where the Court determines that a fixed sum was due to the applicant as of a specified date in the past, and to the extent that is necessary to ensure full reparation. Uganda argues, however, that no such circumstances exist in the present case. Rather, it asserts that the DRC generally seeks compensation based on a present-day valuation and that there is no basis for supplementing that valuation with compensatory interest.

400. Uganda considers that in the circumstances of the case, the DRC is only entitled to post-judgment interest. In this regard, it accepts that, should the Court order Uganda to pay compensation to the DRC, it could order that, if such compensation is not paid within a reasonable period of time, interest would accrue on the amount owed until the date of payment. However, Uganda argues that what constitutes a “reasonable period of time” for such payment must be assessed in light of the amount established by the Court. Given contemporary market conditions, it urges the Court to set such interest at an annual rate no higher than 3 per cent.

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401. With respect to the DRC's claim for pre-judgment interest, the Court observes that, in the practice of international courts and tribunals, while pre-judgment interest may be awarded if full reparation for injury caused by an internationally wrongful act so requires, interest is not an autonomous form of reparation, nor is it a necessary part of compensation in every case (see Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 58, para. 151). The Court notes that in determining the amount to be awarded for each head of damage, it has taken into account the passage of time (cf. ibid., p. 58, para. 152). In this regard, the Court observes that the DRC itself has stated in its final submissions that it is not requesting pre-judgment interest in respect of damage for which “the amount of compensation awarded by the Court, based on an overall assessment, already takes account of the passage of time”. The Court considers that there is thus no need to award pre-judgment interest in the circumstances of the case.

402. With regard to the DRC's claim for post-judgment interest, the Court recalls that it has granted such interest in past cases in which it has awarded compensation, having observed that “the award of post-judgment interest is consistent with the practice of other international courts and tribunals” (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 343, para. 56; see also Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2018 (I), p. 58, paras. 154-155). The Court expects timely payment and has no reason to assume that Uganda will not act accordingly. Nevertheless, consistent with its practice, the Court decides that, should payment be delayed, post-judgment interest shall be paid. It will accrue at an annual rate of 6 per cent on any overdue amount (see paragraph 406 below).

C. Request that the Court remain seised of the case

403. In its final submissions, the DRC also requests that the Court “declare that the present dispute will not be fully and finally resolved until Uganda has actually paid the reparations and compensation ordered by the Court” and that “[u]ntil that time, the Court will remain seised of the present case”.

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404. The Court observes that the DRC, by its request, is essentially asking the Court to supervise the implementation of its Judgment. In this regard, the Court notes that in none of its previous judgments on compensation has it considered it necessary to remain seised of the case until a final payment was received. The Court moreover considers that the award of post-judgment interest addresses the DRC's concerns regarding timely compliance by the Respondent with the payment obligations set out in the present Judgment. In light of the above, there is no reason for the Court to remain seised of the case and the request of the DRC must therefore be rejected.