Autonomous zones and nationalist civil war

In India and Myanmar, the British employed a variety of terms – including backward areas, scheduled areas, excluded areas, partially excluded areas, and frontier areas – to refer to regions with a particular form of indirect rule that not only allowed communities to rule themselves but also isolated them from other communities. I refer to these as autonomous zones. The British created indirect forms of rule in all autonomous zones to allow communities to control their own affairs under the influence of colonial officials. All autonomous areas therefore recognized the presence of one community and gave them considerable control over regional legal-administrative institutions. The British also celebrated these institutions as “customary,” something that promoted beliefs that the colonial institutions had long-standing, precolonial origins. Externally, autonomous zones formally isolated communities from the rest of the colony as a means of “protection.” The official justification for the creation of autonomous zones was to protect “primitive” upland communities from their more “advanced” lowland neighbors. British officials – trained in colonial pluralism and social evolution – valued the cultures of the various “primitive” communities but feared that they would not survive if incorporated into larger colonial society. Of equal or greater importance, however, the British created autonomous zones to protect themselves: They wanted to isolate upland communities to prevent lowland anticolonialists from influencing them. To enforce both types of protectionism, the British isolated communities living in autonomous zones by creating separate colonial legal-administrative institutions for the autonomous zones, excluding autonomous zones from colonial legislatures, and forbidding all non-residents from travelling through the autonomous zones without formal colonial permission.

A review of nationalist civil wars in the autonomous zones of India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh highlights how this form of rule contributed to conflict after postcolonial nation-states repealed local autonomy. In particular, this form of colonialism created a formal system of self-rule in territories that were proclaimed the customary heartlands of communities, purposefully separating upland communities from the dominant lowland communities, and justifying this isolation as necessary for the protection of the community against “dangerous” others. As a result, postcolonial leaders of new nation-states sought to dismantle autonomous zones as part of the decolonization process, whereas the communities living in autonomous zones opposed forced integration into postcolonial nation-states because they had nationalist frames and expectations backed by mobilizational resources. In this section, I focus on the Nagas, but very similar dynamics led to nationalist war among the Chittagong Hill Kachin, Karenni, Mizo, Shan, and Wa communities (Adnan Reference Adnan2004; Brown Reference Brown1988: 69–70; Chakraborty Reference Chakraborty2014; Chandha Reference Chandha2005; Jaquet Reference Jaquet2018; Sadan Reference Sadan2013; Uddin Reference Uddin2010; Yawnghwe Reference Yawnghwe2010).

“Naga” is a recently created umbrella term referring to diverse peoples who speak dozens of languages in a mountainous and heavily forested region known as Nagaland. Until recently, Nagas had village-based polities and did not self-identify as a community, and Naga villages commonly fought one another. Prior to British rule, no plains state controlled Nagaland.

Although the British had little interest in Nagaland, the region separated Assam and Manipur, and the British wanted Nagaland as a corridor linking the two. Given stiff resistance, the marginal position of Nagaland in colonial India, and the absence of easily exploitable resources in the area, the British employed an indirect form of rule that left Nagas high levels of autonomy. Unlike most systems of indirect rule, the British did not recognize and rule through a prince or chief because councils controlled precolonial Naga polities. British officials therefore maintained these councils while formalizing and transforming them based on their understandings and reformulations of Naga tradition. Although previously separate, Naga villages and polities became more unified during the colonial period. Most notably, officials organized a pan-Naga council that included representatives from all local councils and used it to rule all Nagas.

British pluralism therefore maintained but readjusted local self-rule while institutionalizing a new level of Naga self-rule at the regional level. This regional government included administrations and councils that empowered Naga leaders to rule the Naga nation, and these institutions provided extremely valuable mobilizational resources: They were ready-made organizations with links to all local councils that could engage all people and implement policies throughout the territory. At the same time, communal self-rule played a vital role constructing powerful Naga communal frames. As noted, Nagas were not unified politically prior to British rule and had considerable cultural diversity, speaking over 30 languages. British rule recognized Nagas as a coherent community and helped to nationalize them by providing their own national council and treating Nagas as the national community of Nagaland. The institutionalization and celebration of Naga self-rule, in turn, created popular and powerful expectations for continued cultural and political autonomy.

In addition to institutionalizing Naga self-rule, the few British officials working in the area sought to limit outside influence as much as possible, and this also strengthened Naga nationalist frames and expectations. Some refer to these officials as “anthropologist” colonialists who were fascinated with Naga culture and sought to protect it (Das Reference Das, Kanato Chophy and Chaudhuri2022; Thomas Reference Thomas2016: 33). In so doing, they tried to limit the impact of the “plains” peoples living near Nagas, who the British believed were more “modern” and would overrun the Nagas if given the opportunity. This isolationism and the colonial justification for it heightened Naga mistrust of the “plains” Indians. Indeed, British officials in Nagaland constantly emphasized that the plains Indians posed a serious threat, and this recognition and fear of the other strengthened reactions to the forced incorporation of Nagas into the Indian nation-state.

Protestant missionaries were active in Nagaland, worked closely with the colonizers, and strengthened colonial pluralism. Nearly half of all Nagas converted to Christianity by independence; almost all Nagas are Christian today. Missionary influence further isolated the Nagas from the “plains” Indians and strengthened Naga nationalist frames and expectations for self-rule. By standardizing select languages, making them written languages, printing a variety of materials that present Nagas as a real community, providing vernacular education, and making religion an important marker of community, missionaries promoted a strong Naga consciousness and “pride in their culture and traditions” (Chandha Reference Chandha2005: 276; Thomas Reference Thomas2016). They also provided a strong organizational base for a more unified national community by creating the Council of Naga Baptist Churches and overseeing the founding of the Naga Club in 1918 (Baruah Reference Baruah2020: 106). The Naga Club developed into a nationalist organization and, among other things, actively lobbied the colonial government to retain Nagaland’s “excluded” status during the various constitutional reforms (Franke Reference Franke2009: 39; Thomas Reference Thomas2016: 78). And because the missionaries saw the religions of the plains communities as competition, they also viewed the plains communities as a danger and favored isolationism.

During the Indian independence transition, the Naga Club transformed into the Naga National Council (NNC), a political party that represented Nagas and lobbied the British to retain Naga autonomy (Chandha Reference Chandha2005: 280–2; Maxwell Reference Maxwell1973). As Suykens (Reference Suykens, Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly2015) notes, Nagas – who decades earlier were divided and lacked a collective identity – now viewed themselves as having a “natural” state and requiring national self-rule (142-3). The NNC therefore argued that Nagas were not part of India prior to or during British rule and therefore insisted that they have their own nation-state (Singh Reference Singh2013: 798–9). The Indian National Congress saw the Nagas as both too primitive to rule themselves and a danger to the new Indian nation-state, so they refused to even listen to Naga demands and unilaterally incorporated Nagaland into India as part of the Assamese regional state. In reaction, the NNC organized a nationalist movement and declared Nagaland independence. Although this declaration caused contention and antipathy, Naga leaders did not push their demands and grudgingly accepted their integration into postcolonial India. This was facilitated by the fact that the Indian and Assamese governments did little to disrupt Naga politics during the first years of independence. In time, however, both national and regional governments began to exert greater influence over Naga affairs, including efforts to assimilate Nagas into “Indian” culture, kicking Christian missionaries out of the region, and removing Nagas from positions of authority. In reaction, Naga nationalists held a plebiscite in 1950, and the overwhelming majority of Nagas voted for secession. The national and state governments sent police and soldiers into the region to counter nationalist protests, and, when faced with extreme violence and repression, Naga nationalists revolted in 1955, beginning the first of two nationalist civil wars.

The processes leading to the nationalist civil war in Nagaland clearly show how British colonial pluralism strengthened reactions to lost communal autonomy by promoting nationalist frames, expectations for self-rule, and mobilizational resources. As previously noted, colonial pluralism helped forge a Naga collective identity and nationalized it by institutionalizing Naga self-rule and justifying it as necessary to look out for the well-being of the Naga community. This nationalist frame and history of self-rule, in turn, created popular expectations for continued Naga self-rule. Finally, the case shows how colonial pluralism provided important mobilizational resources that allowed nationalists to act on their grievances. For one, British rule provided Nagas with their own administration and council, and both helped organize the nationalist movement and – after going underground – the civil war. Similarly, missionaries were instrumental in organizing the NNC, which became the main nationalist party. This party organized resistance against the Indian military and took over the regional administration after the British left (Suykens Reference Suykens, Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly2015: 143). The NNC was able to use these organizational resources to complete a variety of underground activities to sustain the war effort, including taxation, protection, and providing justice and services (Suykens Reference Suykens, Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly2015).

Princely states and nationalist civil war

Princely states were the most common form of indirect rule in British India. Although also receiving great autonomy and having separate administrations, princely states differed from the autonomous zones in important ways. For one, princely states were more centralized, with one paramount “customary” authority that was usually retained from the Mughal Empire. In addition, the populations of autonomous zones were more communalized in that indirect rule was supposed to protect communities and make possible communal self-rule. The princely states, on the other hand, usually had maharajahs or nawabs who ruled over diverse communities, thereby retaining the multi-communal and imperial character of the Mughal Empire that usually preceded them. The Tripura and Manipuri princely state – the only princely states located in Zomia – were exceptions to the non-communal character of princely states. Both retained either considerable or complete autonomy from the Mughal Empire, and the maharajas ruled in the names of their “tribal” communities. And just like in the former autonomous zones, postcolonial leaders fought nationalist civil wars against the Indian state to regain this autonomy after the postcolonial state removed it. In this section, I focus on the Mizoram nationalist civil war, although processes leading to the Tripura conflict were shaped by British colonial pluralism in similar ways (Debbarma Reference Debbarma, Singha and Amarjeet Singh2015; Gan-Chaudhuri Reference Gan-Chaudhuri and Gan-Chaudhuri1980; Kumar Reference Kumar2016; Saha Reference Saha2002).

In 1814, the Konbaung Dynasty of contemporary Myanmar conquered Manipur, thereby ending a long line of Manipuri kingdoms stretching back nearly a millennium. A decade later, the British captured the region and incorporated it into colonial India. Prior to foreign rule, ethnic Manipuris controlled the kingdoms. Manipuris speak their own language, are overwhelmingly Hindu, and presently make up more than half the region’s population. Most of the remainder of the population are from small communities speaking a variety of languages, many of whom self-identify as Naga. British rule maintained Manipuri autonomy from colonial India by retaining precolonial Manipuri authorities and institutions to rule the region under the watchful eye of colonial administrators. In combination with the region’s long and proud history of precolonial statehood, this form of rule strengthened Manipuri nationalist frames and expectations for continued self-rule.

At independence, the British did not force princely states to join either India or Pakistan, and the Maharaja of Manipur established an independent government in 1947 that included an elected legislature. Shortly after India sent troops to Hyderabad to force that princely state to join India, the Indian government effectively kidnapped the Maharaja of Manipur and pressured him to join India. In “agreeing” to the merger, the Maharaja did not consult with the Manipuri legislative assembly, and many therefore viewed the merger with India as both coerced and illegitimate. The forced incorporation of Manipur, in turn, is at the heart of the nationalist narrative in Manipur, with nationalists demanding that Manipur secede from India (Sanatomba Reference Sanatomba, Noni and Sanatomba2015: 206; Verghese Reference Verghese1996: 116).

After its merger with India, the Indian government placed Manipur under the direct control of New Delhi and barred locals from positions of authority (Brara Reference Brara and Bhattacharyya2022: 292). Over time, many Manipuris became aware of their powerlessness and resented what they saw as India’s illegitimate and forced integration of Manipur, and a nationalist movement quickly emerged and strengthened. The Indian state reacted by vigorously repressing the movement, which only strengthened grievances (Hanjabam Reference Hanjabam2008). Thus, in 1964, the United National Liberation Front was formed and began training members to fight for national self-rule (Sharma Reference Sharma2000; Tarapot Reference Tarapot2003: 177–9).

Similar to the Naga conflict, the root cause of the Manipuri nationalist civil war was the removal of Manipuri autonomy through the region’s forced incorporation into postcolonial India. At the same time, Manipuris reacted to lost autonomy because a long history of precolonial statehood and an indirect form of British rule focused on community and custom promoted both a powerful nationalist frame and expectations for self-rule. By the time the nationalist civil war began, however, postcolonial nation-state building reforms eliminated the political institutions that made possible indirect rule during the colonial period, and regional political institutions therefore offered less mobilizational resources than in Nagaland (Brara Reference Brara and Bhattacharyya2022: 292). Given the lingering remnants of past institutions, strong nationalist frames and expectations, geographic isolation, and rugged terrain, Manipuri nationalist were still able to organize a nationalist movement in the face of heavy state repression.

Colonial pluralism without nationalist civil warfare: The Karen conflict

Karens are concentrated along the Myanmar-Thai border, with most residing in Myanmar. Similar to the Nagas, Karens speak diverse languages and were not politically unified prior to British rule. In contrast to the Nagas, however, Karens lived primarily in the lowland regions near larger communities. As a lowland community living among other communities, the British did not give Karens autonomy through indirect rule in colonial Myanmar. Yet because Karens were more supportive of British rule than the more powerful lowland communities, the British recognized, accommodated, and empowered Karens in other ways. In so doing, British colonial pluralism strengthened Karen opposition to losing power to the largest lowland community – the Bamar, who make up more than two-thirds of the total population and took over the state after independence. Of all pluralist policies, special legislative and military representation were especially influential.

Similar to the Nagas, the ideal and material bases of a Karen community were absent prior to British rule, and a powerful Karen nationalist frame was constructed during the colonial period. Like the Nagas, Protestant missionaries played an important role creating a Karen communal frame (Gravers Reference Gravers1999; Jørgensen Reference Jørgensen and Marshall1997; Rajah Reference Rajah2002; Thawnghmung Reference Thawnghmung2012). As one prominent missionary remarked, “From a loose aggregation of clans we shall weld them into a nation yet” (Smeaton Reference Smeaton1920: 19), and Keyes (Reference Keyes1977) recognizes that missionaries were likely “the most important factor in the development of a Karen national movement” (56). Missionaries did so by standardizing three Karen languages, recording histories and running printing presses that printed material depicting Karens as a primordial community, running Karen schools, and organizing Karen associations (Lange Reference Lange2017).

Special communal legislative representation also contributed to this Karen communal frame and played a particularly important role nationalizing it. During the colonial period, officials estimated that Karens made up 10 percent of the total population, making them the second largest community after the Bamar. Given their relatively large size and location in directly ruled areas, Karens received reserved seats in the Burmese Legislative Council. Karen communal representation began informally with the appointment of one representative in 1916 and was formalized and expanded to include five seats in 1923 and twelve seats in 1935. Legislative representation organized Karens to look out for the well-being of all Karens and, in so doing, nationalized Karens. Tellingly, Dr. San C. Po, the first Karen representative on the Legislative Council, is recognized as the father of the Karen nation and wrote the “bible” on Karen nationalism after over a decade of fighting against Bamar politicians in pursuit of Karen interests in the Legislative Council, and Karen leaders point to the reservation of legislative seats as awakening Karens as a nation (Fink Reference Fink and Po San2001; Burma Reforms Committee 1921: 232, 238). Along these lines, Lewis (Reference Lewis1924: 96) provides an early analysis of Karen-Bamar relations and notes that Karens had continued to assimilate into Bamar culture after the onset of colonial rule but that the reservation of legislative seats played a decisive role halting this process.

In addition to creating a strong Karen nationalist frame, the reservation of legislative seats provided Karens with important mobilizational resources and increased Karen sensitivity to reductions in communal power. Considering the first, nationalist organizations are vital to the organization and success of nationalist movements, and communal legislative representation transformed a Karen association – the Karen National Association (KNA), which was founded with the support of Baptist missionaries – into a political party that actively pursued Karen interests. This organization formed the heart of the Karen nationalist movement and was the main organization coordinating nationalist efforts.

Communal legislative representation also made Karens sensitive to a Bamar nation-state by recognizing Karens as a distinct national community and empowering them to look out for the well-being of their community in the legislature. A review of the minutes of the Legislative Council proceedings highlights this communalization of politics by showing that Karen representatives usually refrained from general policy discussions but spoke up to pursue Karen interests. Karen representatives, for example, inquired about the representation of Karens in the Military Police (Burma Legislative Council 1932: 583), the Judicial Services (Burma Legislative Council 1936: 146, 262), the Legislative Council (Burma Reforms Committee 1921: 22, 78), the Imports Advisory Committee (Burma Legislative Council 1946: 277), and education and teacher training (Burma Legislative Council 1938: 3). They also demanded greater funding of Karen schools (Burma Legislative Council 1938: 5–7), the use of Karen languages in schools and the government (Burma Legislative Council 1929: 197), and the suppression of crimes against Karens (Burma Legislative Council 1929).

Given their communal frames and expectations for communal power, Karens were very sensitive to efforts to integrate them into a Bamar nation-state. Karen representatives therefore assertively demanded not only the maintenance of Karen privileges but the expansion of their power and autonomy. Most importantly, Karen politicians recognized the autonomous zones in northern Myanmar and lobbied for the creation of a Karen state that would make possible self-rule and isolation from the Bamar. This demand only intensified Bamar anger and resentment, especially since Bamar viewed Karens as colonial stooges and outnumbered Karens in many regions that Karens claimed as their homeland.

Along with missionaries and communal legislative representation, communal military units were another aspect of colonial pluralism that contributed to the Karen civil war. Throughout most of the colonial period, the British excluded Bamar from the colonial military because of their constant resistance to British rule. Along with Indians and two upland communities (Chin and Kachin), Karens were greatly overrepresented in security forces and had their own military units. Evidence suggests that communalized military units contributed to the Karen nationalist civil war in three main ways.

First, Bamar leaders tried to purge the military of Karens in their efforts to build a Bamar nation-state, and this strengthened Karen nationalist opposition to Bamar rule. Given their exclusion form the colonial military and their resentment of the colonial military after they were allowed to join it, many Bamar organized and joined militias, and the militias were a major force behind the rise of a more assertive, exclusive, and combative Bamar national chauvinism in the 1930s that clearly demarcated between “collaborators” and “nationalists” (Callahan Reference Callahan2003: 37). The Bamar nationalist militias, in turn, formed the bulk of the Burma Independence Army (BIA), which joined Japanese forces to expel the British from Myanmar during the Second World War. And after the War, the composition of the military proved a difficult and contentious issue. Although Bamar forces eventually switched sides to help the British defeat the Japanese, the British did not trust them, disbanded the BIA, and stacked the post-War military with minority troops who had supported the British throughout the war. After further negotiations, the British agreed to incorporate BIA units into the military, although they kept them separate from non-Bamar units (Callahan Reference Callahan2003: 95–6). At independence, there was therefore two distinct militaries, and Bamar nationalists greatly resented the powerful minority forces and sought to disband these forces to create an exclusively Bamar military.

The second way in which communal military units contributed to nationalist civil warfare was by promoting open military conflict between Bamar and Karen combatants. The British used minority military units to combat Bamar anticolonial forces, with Karens assisting the British militarily during the wars of colonial conquest, helping to contain the Saya San Rebellion of 1932, and fighting Bamar and their Japanese supporters during the Second World War. The resulting violence enflamed relations between Bamar and Karen communities and cemented Bamar views of Karens as dangerous collaborators who had no place in the great Bamar nation. As a result, Bamar forces commonly attacked Karen villages and killed civilians during these conflicts, and this promoted strong Karen opposition to incorporation into a postcolonial nation-state dominated by Bamar.

The third and most direct way through which the overrepresentation of Karens in the colonial military contributed to nationalist civil warfare was by providing Karens with valuable resources needed to wage and maintain a war against the postcolonial state. In addition to having their own military units, Karens were greatly overrepresented at the upper levels of the colonial military at independence, this despite efforts by Bamar nationalists to Bamarize the military. Given the communal split in the military at independence and efforts by Bamar officials to take control of the military, Karen soldiers were targets and suffered hostilities and threats, and conflict between Bamar and Karen soldiers erupted. As a result of this and the continued attacks on Karen civilians by Bamar units, Karen soldiers and military leaders deserted and formed the Karen National Defense Organisation as a military wing of the KNA. Weapons, soldiers, and skilled military leaders, in turn, allowed Karen nationalists – who were only a fraction of the total Karen population – to mount a bloody civil war months after independence.

An analysis of British Zomia therefore offers evidence that British colonial pluralism contributed to nationalist civil warfare in influential ways. While the construction of postcolonial nation-states controlled by lowland communities was the root cause of nationalist reactions among minority communities, the analysis shows that British colonial pluralism – which both institutionalized and celebrated communal self-rule – strengthened nationalist frames and expectations in ways making communities sensitive to reductions in communal power and autonomy. At the same time, pluralist policies provided minority communities with organizations, military units, and their own political institutions, all of which provided mobilizational resources to mount resistance to lost autonomy. Communalized indirect rule was the most influential pluralist policy in this regard, as it strengthened and constructed nationalist frames among upland communities, created strong expectations for continued self-rule, and provided the communities with local institutions to mobilize nationalist movements. The Karen case shows that British colonial pluralism also shaped frames, expectations, and mobilizational resources through other policies and that the presence of indirect rule in other parts of colonial Myanmar promoted demands for Karen self-rule. Both the Naga and Karen cases, in turn, highlight how missionaries were part of the colonial pluralist system and strengthened frames, expectations, and resources.

Vietnam: Limited colonial pluralism and limited nationalist conflict

Although experiencing a bloody anticolonial war that morphed into a war that was simultaneously civil and international, data from UCDP and EPR suggest that Vietnam has not experienced a nationalist civil war (Pettersson and Öberg Reference Pettersson and Öberg2020; Vogt et al. Reference Vogt, Bormann, Rüegger, Cederman, Hunziker and Girardin2015). Comparison with British Zomia provides evidence that a relatively non-pluralist form of colonial rule greatly influenced this pattern. That being said, the French implemented a much more pluralist form of rule among the Montagnard, and they organized the most powerful and violent nationalist movement in postcolonial Vietnam.

French colonialism in Vietnam overwhelmingly maintained the precolonial communal hierarchy while simply placing the French on top. Through a weak form of associationalism, the French worked through Kinh elites – including persistent efforts to retain the emperor as a national symbol – and usually did not recognize, accommodate, or empower non-Kinh communities. French colonial education, for example, was taught almost exclusively in French and Vietnamese, and schools were concentrated in regions with large Kinh populations. Relatedly, the French did not encourage the use of minority languages and helped spread the Vietnamese language. Finally, the French encouraged Kinh to migrate to regions inhabited primarily by minorities, thereby creating a greater Kinh presence throughout the territory. As a result of these policies, French colonialism focused on the Kinh and did not strengthen the nationalist frames, expectations, and mobilizational resources of other communities.

To analyze a negative case of nationalist civil warfare, it is helpful to compare it to a positive case, and this comparison is more insightful when the positive and negative cases are very similar in a variety of ways. Several factors make Myanmar an appropriate case for comparison with Vietnam. First, both Myanmar and Vietnam had large precolonial states, large communities living in lowland areas, and small communities residing in the mountainous and forested periphery. Even more, both cases experienced a period of Japanese rule during the Second World War that resulted in co-nationals fighting one another. The cases differ, however, in terms of the extent of colonial pluralism and postcolonial nationalist war.

Myanmar contrasts starkly with Vietnam in that the colonizers institutionalized clear and powerful communal divisions among the colonized and transformed communal hierarchies. British policies in colonial Myanmar recognized the division between diverse communities and formally institutionalized the power and autonomy of upland communities, going so far as to purposefully isolate upland communities from the Bamar. In contrast, the French paid less attention to minorities, rarely empowered them, and opened peripheral regions to Kinh in-migration to exploit their labor on newly created plantations. Moreover, the British encouraged the use of minority languages and rarely used Burmese to communicate with minority peoples, whereas French colonial officials used French or Vietnamese almost exclusively. An important symbolic difference, in turn, is that the British destroyed the Konbaung Dynasty in Myanmar and exiled the royal family, whereas the French made a concerted effort to maintain the Vietnamese Emperor as a symbol to help legitimize French rule. Finally, pluralist policies in Myanmar provided upland communities with military and organizational resources to fight for self-rule, but both were much rarer in French Vietnam.

All of these factors made the anticolonial movement in Myanmar an overwhelmingly Bamar affair, and many minorities opposed independence because they feared integration into a Bamar-dominated postcolonial nation-state that would limit the rights and power that they gained under British rule. Despite considerable efforts by the French to create a similar division to defeat the Kinh-led anticolonial movement, these much more punctuated efforts were far less successful because French colonialism did not strengthen nationalist frames and expectations among upland communities and because the Viet Minh – in contrast to Bamar anticolonialists – did not resent non-Kinh as colonial stooges but instead actively courted them for support (McElwee Reference McElwee and Duncan2004: 191). According to Nguyen Khac Vien (Reference Nguyen1968), “whereas the colonialists, the feudalists and the nationalist parties treated the minority peoples as ‘savages,’ the Communists were the first to believe in their revolutionary potential and to advocate joint action by all the nationalities with a view to national liberation and social emancipation” (11).

Comparison with Myanmar therefore highlights a non-pluralist form of colonial rule as deterring nationalist civil warfare in postcolonial Vietnam, as upland communities generally accepted postcolonial nation-state building efforts that recognized them but gave them a subordinate position within the nation-state. In this way, the lack of colonial pluralism limited their sensitivity to the Kinh nation-state. The French did, however, employ some pluralist policies in colonial Vietnam. Most notably, the French used a form of communalized indirect rule among the Montagnard, and the Montagnard organized a violent nationalist movement, albeit one that usually is not categorized as a nationalist civil war.

The Montagnard people make up approximately 1 percent of the Vietnamese population and are a unique example of an upland community in the French Empire with authorities who controlled their own “customary” tribunals and administrations, suggesting a form of indirect rule similar to that in the British Empire (Lange Reference Lange2009; Salemink Reference Salemink2003: 80–82). Even more, the French organized the Montagnard into a short-lived autonomous polity – Pays Montagnards Du Sud Indochinois – that formally separated the Montagnard region from colonial Annam as a means of gaining Montagnard support during the First Vietnam War (Safman Reference Safman, Ganesan and Yin Hlaing2007: 49; Salemink Reference Salemink, Antlöv and Tønnesson1995). Similar to upland communities in British Zomia, the Montagnard include diverse peoples speaking different languages, and colonial policies promoted the rise of a Montagnard communal frame (Hickey Reference Hickey1982; Salemink Reference Salemink, Antlöv and Tønnesson1995). As the term “Montagnard” suggests, they live in mountainous and densely forested regions in south-central Vietnam, a region that has relatively low population density and that was located at the periphery of the precolonial states. During the early colonial period, the French had little presence among the Montagnard. When French influence expanded, some officials – especially Léopold Sebatier – devised an indirect form of rule that codified “traditional” law and recognized and maintained Montagnard chiefs (Salemink Reference Salemink2003). Sebatier sought to protect the Montagnard by giving them greater autonomy and limiting the influence of other more “advanced” groups in the area, including French settlers (Salemink Reference Salemink2003: 81–2).

The French did not employ pluralist policies universally among the Montagnard, however, and competing forces caused the form of rule to change over time. Recognizing the disruptive effect of French settlers and Kinh migrants, Sebatier tried to prevent them from moving to the region in the 1920s. This opposed an important colonial directive to further integrate the central highlands into Indochina, so Sebatier’s superiors removed him from power in 1926 and created a direct form of rule. By the mid-1930s, growing Montagnard resistance to colonial interference and settlement led to a return of Sebatier’s model of customary law (Salemink Reference Salemink, Antlöv and Tønnesson1995: 270). And with the Vietnamese anticolonial war, the French created an independent Montagnard region to gain their support and create a buffer between Cochinchina and the communist-controlled north (Christie Reference Christie1996: 93–2; Salemink Reference Salemink, Antlöv and Tønnesson1995: 285–6). According to Salemink (Reference Salemink, Antlöv and Tønnesson1995: 264), this period of self-rule successfully popularized an idea of a Montagnard homeland, thereby creating expectations for Montagnard political and cultural autonomy.

After the defeat of the French in 1954 and the division of Vietnam into the North and South, the Montagnard peoples eventually found themselves at the epicenter of the second Vietnam War. The Viet Minh made considerable inroads into the central highlands and successfully recruited many Montagnard (Salemink Reference Salemink, Antlöv and Tønnesson1995). At the same time, thousands of Montagnard joined FURLO, an organization that sought greater autonomy for Montagnard, Cham, and Khmer Krom communities in South Vietnam but that was created and run by the Cambodian government to regain control of regions that it had lost to Vietnam prior to French rule (Dharma Reference Dharma2006; Salemink Reference Salemink, Antlöv and Tønnesson1995). Following an example set by the French during the First Vietnam War, the American military trained many Montagnard to fight the Viet Minh.

Relations between the Montagnard and South Vietnam were very contentious. After coming to power in 1954, the South Vietnamese government took control of the central highlands, formally ended indirect rule among the Montagnard, implemented assimilationist policies, and resettled refugees from North Vietnam (Dharma Reference Dharma2006; Hickey Reference Hickey1982: 5–12, 16). As with the Nagas, Montagnard leaders mobilized against this forced integration, and some demanded Montagnard self-rule and used violence in pursuit of it (Christie Reference Christie1996; Dharma Reference Dharma2006; Hickey Reference Hickey1982). This conflict, however, generally is not considered a nationalist civil war due to its limited scale and non-nationalist focus.

One important factor that limited the expansion of this conflict is that it was part of a larger civil and international war, with the Americans, Cambodians, and Viet Minh fracturing the movement by organizing their own Montagnard supporters (Christie Reference Christie1996; Dharma Reference Dharma2006: 69; Salemink Reference Salemink, Antlöv and Tønnesson1995). That being said, the actual scale of the conflict was likely greater than commonly recognized because the violence between Montagnard combatants and the South Vietnamese military was considered part of the Vietnam War, not a nationalist war for greater Montagnard autonomy. And although the Cambodian government organized FURLO to increase its own power and although FURLO was the main anti-state actor fighting the South Vietnamese government to increase the autonomy of minority communities, most FURLO combatants were Montagnard who fought against forced political integration that removed their autonomy and land, not for an enlarged Cambodian state (Christie Reference Christie1996; Hickey Reference Hickey1982: 117). In fact, many FURLO members had previously participated in and supported BAJARAKA, a Montagnard nationalist movement started in 1956 in reaction to the removal of Montagnard cultural and political autonomy by the South Vietnamese government (Dharma Reference Dharma2006; Hickey Reference Hickey1982). Thus, the case of the Montagnard parallels the nationalist civil wars in British Zomia in showing how pluralist colonial policies that formally provided this upland community with autonomy and self-rule contributed to nationalist violence when postcolonial governments repealed the pluralist policies and forcibly incorporated the upland community into a postcolonial nation-state.

Thailand: A case of no colonial pluralism

Unlike India, Myanmar, and Vietnam, Thailand was never a European overseas colony. And instead of recognizing, accommodating, and empowering minority communities, the Thai state made a particularly aggressive and concerted effort to remove the political and cultural autonomy of minority communities. With one exception, Thai nation-state building did not cause nationalist civil war, and this exception had characteristics that strengthened nationalist frames, expectations, and mobilizational resources in ways similar to British colonial pluralism.

Although varying over time, Thai nation-state building efforts were very aggressive and began as a reaction to the threat of British and French colonialism. Nation-state building was no easy task, as the Thai state ruled most regions indirectly and only a fraction of the population was ethnic Thai (Steckfuss Reference Streckfuss2012). Many communities that previously had cultural and political autonomy therefore found themselves forcibly integrated into the Thai nation-state.

Although concentrated in Myanmar, Karens are the largest recognized minority community in Northern Thailand, but Thai Karens – unlike their Myanmar brethren – have not fought nationalist civil wars. One important reason for this is that Thai Karens were never recognized, accommodated, or empowered by pluralist policies. As a result, they neither developed nationalist frames and expectations for self-rule nor gained powerful mobilizational resources. In this way, Thai Karens were not sensitive to being forcibly integrated into the Thai nation-state and had very limited capacity to mount resistance. Instead of opposing forced integration, Thai Karens grudgingly accepted it, and most now self-identify as both Thai and Karen (Buadaeng Reference Buadaeng, Peacock, Thorton and Inman2007). The case clearly highlights that grievances are not sufficient for nationalist movements, as intensive Thai nation-state building policies have greatly reduced the cultural and political autonomy of Thai Karens. Thai Karens have lost land rights, experience considerable discrimination, and are among the poorest in Thailand. Without nationalist frames, expectations, and mobilizational resources, however, Thai Karens have not mobilized nationalist movements like the Nagas, Manipuris, and Myanmar Karens.

Although a comparison of Thai and Myanmar Karens highlights the influence of colonial pluralism on nationalist civil war, nearly ten times as many Karens live in Myanmar, so demographic size might explain why the Thai Karens did not organize a nationalist movement. If the population argument is correct, the Isan, or Lao, should be particularly prone to nationalist movements, as they make up one-third of the total Thai population, whereas the Myanmar Karens make up approximately 8 percent of the Myanmar population. Paralleling the Thai Karens, however, the case shows how the absence of colonial pluralism limited nationalist reaction to lost cultural and political autonomy.

The Isan are concentrated in Khorat plateau, which borders both Laos and Cambodia. Historically, the Khorat plateau was part of the Khmer Empire, but Isan began moving into the region from present day Laos around 500 years ago and became the dominant linguistic community in the Khorat plateau. The Isan are from the Thai-linguistic family, but the Isan and Thai languages are different, with Isan being closer to Laotian than Thai.

After the arrival of the Isan, the Khorat plateau was on the periphery of different empires and included a number of small polities. With the growing strength of the Thai state in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the region transferred from Laotian to Thai hands. At first, the Thais ruled it through vassal states, thereby providing considerable autonomy to local polities in return for the acceptance of Thai authority. With Thai state-building in the late-19th century, however, the Thai government built a new administrative system in the region that reported directly to the central state. As elsewhere, these reforms were combined with nation-building efforts among the Isan, with expanded and obligatory education being the main focus. The schools were run by the government, used the Central Thai language exclusively, and taught curricula that were extremely nationalistic and focused on the history of the Thai nation. And although the Isan are Buddhist, their traditions differed from Thai Buddhism, and centralizing religious reforms placed Isan Buddhism under state control.

The Thai government was particularly concerned about nation-state building among the Isan due to the ever-present threat of colonialism. With French control of neighboring Laos and Cambodia, Thai leaders feared French intrusions into the Khorat Plateau. Even more, the French saw the Isan as Laotian and encouraged them to join French Laos. Around this time, a religiously motivated rebellion occurred in the Khorat Plateau, thereby heightening Thai fears of losing the region. In 1904, the Thai state therefore made a concerted effort to make the Isan Thai. The first concrete step they took toward this goal was to stop employing the term “Lao” and substituting the invented term “Isan,” which referred to the geographic location (Liu and Ricks Reference Liu and Ricks2022: 27). And although the Thai state had previously considered the Lao distinct from Thais, they now declared that new “scientific” findings showed that the Isan were pure Thais (Steckfuss Reference Streckfuss2012: 308). At the same time, they ramped up efforts to integrate the Khorat Plateau into Thailand by removing local authorities and building a large state apparatus.

Despite continued political and economic inequalities, condescending treatment from “real” Thais, and the state’s refusal to recognize the Isan as a community, lost autonomy has not promoted an Isan nationalist movement. Although “Isan” has emerged as an important regional identity, it is not communalized and politicized. As a result, Isan have not organized a political party protecting communal interests (Ricks Reference Ricks2019). Even more, surveys consistently show that Isan self-identify with and value the Thai nation more than Central Thais (Ricks Reference Ricks2020). The case therefore shows that lost autonomy did not push the Isan to rebel even if they were a main target of assimilationist policies, effectively erased as a community, and relatively poor and marginalized. Unlike the British colonies, however, the Thai model of political community that was created in the late 19th century was anything but pluralist, as it neither recognized, empowered, nor accommodated the Isan. Comparison with British Zomia, in turn, suggests that this difference helps explain the lack of an Isan nationalist movement.

Thailand has, however, experienced one nationalist civil war: the Malay-led Patani civil war. The main reasons why the Malays mobilized a nationalist movement, whereas the Isan did not, are cultural difference and historical autonomy, both of which promoted strong reactions against lost autonomy. Considering the first, Thai Malays are overwhelmingly Muslim, whereas the Isan are Buddhist. As a result, Thai Malays greatly resented Thai authorities making Buddhism the official state religion and limiting their religious autonomy (Barter Reference Barter2014; Chalermsripinyorat Reference Chalermsripinyorat2021). Although less influential, the Malays also had a well-established written language that was very different from Thai and used a different script, thereby increasing Malay opposition to making Thai the sole official language.

That being said, the Southern Insurgency has been active in only three of the four Southern provinces with a majority Muslim/Malay population: The conflict has occurred in Pattani, Yala, and Narthiwat but has been absent from Satun. Cultural difference alone, therefore, cannot explain patterns of nationalist civil warfare in the region. A second factor that promoted nationalist opposition to lost autonomy is a long history of statehood under the Sultanate of Patani, which ruled Pattani, Yala, and Narthiwat but not Satun (Christie Reference Christie1996). The Sultanate of Patani was founded in the 14th century. Although it became a tributary state of Thailand three and a half centuries later, it retained near total autonomy until the early 20th century. And similar to indirect rule in British Zomia, the removal of this autonomy created powerful grievances that motivated nationalist civil war (Brown Reference Brown1988; Melvin Reference Melvin2007; Safman Reference Safman, Ganesan and Yin Hlaing2007: 34). Although also having an overwhelmingly Malay population, Satun was never an autonomous polity, thereby weakening nationalist frames and expectations.