Trans –Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia enters its second year of publication with an examination of heritage, history and historical processes. The contributions range from a critique of broad world-historical frameworks to detailed analysis of architectural references in court chronicles. Together, the articles share in attending to historical, regional, and comparative processes in, across, and beyond Southeast Asia.

Higher education in East Asia is at an important historical juncture where its flagship universities are locked in a race to internationalise. In this restructuring, international students become a critical element in university and national strategies, as a key resource to strengthen university research and to augment the skilled labour force of a country. This article examines the issue of student migration at three scales. First, an idea of the regional magnitude of student movements is determined by examining inbound and outbound movements of students moving out of their home countries to study abroad within Pacific Asia (East and Southeast Asia). Second, by using Singapore as a case study, the paper examines the role of state policy in the internationalisation of higher education. We see how state and university policies shape the new work of flagship universities. And third, by drilling down further and using a survey sample of National University of Singapore international students, the main body of the paper examines the process of decision making, the elements which attract students to Singapore, their adjustment process, and their plans after graduation. This paper argues that the internationalisation of education brings about a powerful set of influences to the host society particularly when there are policies facilitating foreign students and their insertion into the host economy and society. Far from being a small temporary minority locked away in ivory towers, foreign students become the focus of policy, a talent that is sourced, a pillar supporting the economy, the hope of new marriage formation and the arrest the fertility decline, and an essential ingredient in the resultant multicultural society.

Global trends which have seen the dramatic rise of the East-Southeast Asian economies suggests a turning of the wheel. Students of world history will recall the central place of China and India in the pre-modern world as producers and exporters of, variously, silks, ceramics and textiles, just as their populations and economies vastly dwarfed those of medieval Europe. The sprawling tropical zone of Southeast Asia, known historically as a prime source of spices and natural commodities, also boasted impressive civilisations. Still we are perplexed as to how a region boasting internationally known trade emporium dropped off the centre stage of world history. Reading back, did colonialism and imperialism turn the tide against indigenous agency? Or was stagnation an inevitable feature of life in pre-modern Southeast Asia? In seeking to answer these and other questions, this article both replays and critiques the many constructions of the broader East-Southeast Asia region, including its historiography, with special attention to recent trends in the framing of world-regional and global history. This is important, I argue, as localism, powerful state narratives, and the legacies of colonial conceptions and categories all contrive to ignore the importance of a holistic framing of this part of the globe.

This article argues that ‘would-be migrants’ – people who prepare for migrating overseas to the extent that their present lives are significantly changed – should become a central figure in migration studies. There are many more would-be migrants than actual migrants, and they also have deeper impacts on migration processes and local societies. Instead of treating the would-be migrant as a derivative of the category of ‘migrant’, this article establishes it as the primary figure, and argues that migration is a contingent outcome of being a ‘would-be’. In order to do so this article delves into the living conditions of would-be migrants in northeast China, with a focus on two aspects that concern them the most: the exorbitant intermediary fees and the high risks involved. The would-be migrants' experiences suggest that the prevalent pattern of unskilled outmigration since the 1990s should be understood as a result of developments inside of China, particularly a condition that I call the ‘displacement of the present’. The figure of would-be migrant is not only methodologically revealing for migration studies, but also urges us to rethink how we may engage with rapid social changes.

The maritime regions of Southeast Asia played an important but varying role in connecting South Asia and China prior to the sixteenth century. With regard to commercial exchanges, traders, ships, and polities in Southeast Asia facilitated and sometimes controlled the flow of goods. Additionally, merchant associations from South Asia and China established their bases in Southeast Asia to participate in trading activities in the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea regions. At least three distinct networks emerged as a result of these maritime interactions: 1) networks of exchanges among the polities skirting the Bay of Bengal; 2) networks that connected the areas around the South China Sea; and 3) networks of direct exchanges between South Asia and China. Buddhist ideas also circulated through these networks, but seem to have made limited inroads in the maritime regions of Southeast Asia prior to the fifth century AD. By this time, Buddhism had already spread widely in China, with significant number of Buddhist missionaries arriving in the region through the maritime routes. Rather than playing a staging role in the transmission of Buddhism to China, the doctrine may have penetrated maritime Southeast Asia due to the vibrant Buddhist interactions and a significant increase in commercial activity along the networks linking South Asia and China during the fourth and fifth centuries. The use of Buddhism to legitimise new regimes in China and the diplomatic exchanges between Southeast Asian polities and these courts may have also facilitated the spread of Buddhism in the region.

Islamic finance has been growing significantly across the globe. In Southeast Asia, interest in Islamic finance and its growth is significant in Malaysia. Compared with Malaysia, in Indonesia, however, the largest Muslim population country where an Islamic resurgence has been widely taking place, the growth of Islamic banks remains slower and on a smaller scale. Furthermore, recent research shows that Islamic piety does not systematically translate into the use of Islamic banks among middle-class Indonesians. Against these findings, this article highlights a relatively understudied Islamic finance institution, Islamic Savings and Credit Cooperatives, in Indonesia commonly known as Baitul Maal wat Tamwil (BMT). The BMT sector is separate from the banking sector and as such has received little scholarly attention as part of Islamic finance in Indonesia. The number of the BMTs in Indonesia has increased significantly since the 1990s and they are grass-roots Islamic financial institutions offering financial services to relatively small-scale traders in urban areas. Based on data from anthropological research in Central Java, this article argues that Islamic propagation is an important element among the BMT founders and workers. They perceive their economic activities as Islamic propagation by deeds (dakwah bil hal) to achieve social justice.

In August 2010, the Vietnamese government and people celebrated the 1000th anniversary of the establishment of their capital Thăng Long (present-day Hanoi). Historical research on Thang Long has progressed considerably over the past decade, especially since the ‘18 Hoàng Diệu’ archaeological site was found. As a specialist in the Ly-Tran Period, I offer this contribution to the study of the spatial composition of Thăng Long Capital under the Ly dynasty (AD 1010–1226), through a re-examination of written sources such as dynastic annals. In view of the various functions necessary for a capital, new questions need to be addressed based on the original texts of the sources and the theories of East Asian ancient capitals. For instance: 1) were the cam trung (‘inside the forbidden area’) and dai noi (‘great interior area’) the same or not? 2) thanh (‘wall’) and thanh noi (‘inside the wall’?) are often mentioned in the sources, but which wall of the capital was it? 3) In China, the outermost area of the capital was not always included in the thanh (cheng) area; did the system of ‘three concentric walls’ indeed exist in Đại Việt during the Ly-Tran Period? And, 4) what functions and meanings did the space within each wall (and the suburban area outside the outmost wall) have? Given the present condition of sources, it is difficult to answer these questions. In this article I offer some tentative remarks in an attempt to fix a steady base for future collaborative research between historians and archaeologists.

This article investigates whether and how local livelihood issues are linked to international development policy and practices in the Mekong River Basin under a two-level game approach. Based on field research and interviews with villagers, and national and international policy makers associated with two hydroelectric dam projects, four key livelihood issues that are central to local communities, but are not currently considered important in international development policy and practices, are described. Fundamental to these issues is the problem that existing frameworks of international institutions do not consider local communities and citizens as legitimate participants at the international level. It is argued that the linkages between local- and international-layer institutions are not established by considering only policy issues and interests of nation-states; the focus of existing frameworks of international institutions. A major challenge for international development planning in the Mekong River Basin is establishing direct linkages between local livelihood issues and international development institutions.

The three cities of Malacca, Penang and Singapore share a century-long history as the British Straits Settlements, with similar multicultural traditions and urban morphology of dense shophouse districts. In the post-colonial period, these have been the basis for the production of heritage for urban renewal, civic identity formation, and international tourism. Yet, each city has approached the production of its history as heritage in different ways. The differences have been specified in terms of whether heritage production has been led by the state, market or civil society, and criticised as ideology or ambivalently interpreted as formative of identity in the face of globalisation. As colonial port-cities integrating into or becoming a new nation-state, I argue that the production of heritage in the three cities is driven by the politics of post-colonial identity interacting with the political economy of urban redevelopment. I argue that the production of heritage is one facet in the production of space and an increasingly important one in globalising Asian urbanisms. We can specify the differences in production of heritage space in the three cities in terms of the orientation of imagination and the ends of production. I show that the three city-states have been interpreting its history for heritage production in either Asian or cosmopolitan imaginations and configuring its heritage production for either political identity formation or economic product development, or a mix of both. The differences, I demonstrate, are caused by the differing politics of post-colonial identity and economic development involving the three cities.

Scholars have recently argued that globalisation processes have significantly altered not just the productive but reproductive sphere. ‘Reproduction’ is formulated to include both biological and social reproduction, and which at the individual level requires ‘care’ throughout the life-cycle – that is, from cradle to grave – in sustaining the body in its corporeal and affective aspects. Concepts that have emerged in the literature in recent decades such as the ‘transnational family’, ‘global householding’ and ‘global care chain’ draw attention to the observation that the formation and sustenance of households is increasingly reliant on the international movement of people and transactions among household members residing in more than one national territory. Applying these notions to the context of the city-state of Singapore where the predicament around eldercare (resulting essentially from rapid fertility decline, shortages of Singapore women's reproductive labour and rigidities in the gender household division of labour) accompanies rapid globalisation, this paper examines strategies of care substitution which draw on the lowly paid labour of two groups of transnational subjects (mainly women) – transnational domestic workers working in the privatised sphere of the home, and transnational healthcare workers in institutionalised settings. The paper reflects upon the interdependencies between flows of transnational care migration and delves into the gender and class implications of these flows for an understanding of the links between transnational migration and social change.

This paper attempts an explanation for the persistence of Khmer cultural identifications on the Ca Mau Peninsula of Vietnam. This low-lying peninsula is a unique human environment, where Khmer villages, Buddhist temple festivals and livelihood activities are centred on a network of saline-infested rivers. The presence of Khmer communities along these waterways is noteworthy, for much scholarship suggests that the waterways of the multi-ethnic lower Mekong region tend to be dominated by non-Khmer ethnic groups. The vigorous Khmer presence on the peninsula is even more intriguing given that the peninsula is a migratory and trade oriented region, long under Vietnamese administration and subject to military and environmental upheavals that have challenged Khmer tenure.

The paper suggests that mastery of communal water harvesting allowed Khmers to survive the long saline water season and gave them a secure foothold in this region. Additionally, their collaborative water harvesting practices contributed to cohesion and a common identity among Khmers and helped strengthen the Theravada Buddhist wat as one of the key cultural institutions on the peninsula. However, the development of an extensive irrigation network by the Vietnamese state in the last thirty years has had the opposite effect. Canal developments facilitated intensive agriculture, immigration and the introduction of new cultural models into the peninsula, while creating economic and environmental insecurity for Khmers and undercutting the traditional grounds for collaboration. Such changes cast light on the links between ethnic identifications and the system of fresh water provision in the lower Mekong region.

In the early 1920s Southeast Asia, before communism compelled the creation of inter-colonial intelligence networks in the late period of the decade, a situation that can be called the ‘China problem’ emerged as an issue for the colonial powers in the region. This problem refers to the political activities by local Chinese populations in response to events that were taking place in China. The colonial powers, however, could not find a common solution to this issue, but instead dealt with it individually. An explanation to this lies in the fact that, unlike in Northeast Asia where the ‘Washington System’ shaped international politics in the 1920s, in Southeast Asia no such official framework had been established to deal with regional issues. This article sets out to demonstrate that under Britain's ‘informal empire’ in Southeast Asia, the colonial powers informally started to exchange information on domestic Chinese politics in their colonies as well as the political development in China. The ‘China problem’ was thus a catalyst that brought to the region ‘international’ politics and in particular the politics of immigration control.

In response to global attention to the young child, early childhood programs have become a national and provincial focus in Indonesia since 2000. The roll out of public programs for low income communities has made use of a longstanding mode of delivery: the volunteered, community-based labour of women. Although susceptible to analysis as a mode of governmentality, an older scholarship on the domestic community, its role in social reproduction, and its shaping by global accumulation offers significant insights as to why this method for delivering social welfare persists, even as it dovetails with more recent work on care and networks of global care labour. Based on ethnographic work in Yogyakarta, this examination of changes in international development regimes considers the contradictory effects for the empowerment of women as against children. Ultimately, the care labour required for early childhood programming, which has been taken to follow from the naturalised link between women's socially appropriate care work and childrearing, provokes instead questions about the awkward relationship between children and women. That is to say, recent developmental regimes seem to promote the empowerment of children as against women. By foregrounding social reproduction, this awkward relationship becomes a productive way to consider the limits of governmentality and to reconsider the domestic community as critical to understand globalisation, neoliberalisation, and the reorganisation of development and social welfare in the early twenty-first century.

The currently popular practice of propitiating, or ‘adopting’, child spirits in Thailand reveals an ambivalent attitude towards childhood. According to Buddhist scholars on childhood, Buddhist conceptions of children do not differentiate children in significant ways from adults in terms of their relative purity or innocence, as both children and adults possess countless lifetimes of karma; children are thus agentive beings, although not yet fully realised as adults. The child ghosts reflect the complex, competing conceptions of childhood, where they are both valuable resources to be deployed in the assistance of their families, and vulnerable beings in need of adult caretaking. Child ghosts are markers of both material and sentimental resources for their adoptive parents, or ‘guardians’. This article explores representations of child ghosts in popular media, and investigates child ghost propitiation practices through interviews with child ghost guardians. In addition, an overview is provided of the various categories of child ghosts, including kumanthong, kuman-thep, kuman-phrai, luk-krok, and rak-yom.